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Abstract 
 
Violence is often treated as an organisational compliment to illicit drug production and 
exchange in sub-Saharan Africa. The thesis challenges this view in light of the “chain 
work” undertaken by cannabis cultivators in Sierra Leone, and examines its complex 
web of labour, exchange, and extra-legal relations. Research reveals that an 
apprenticeship system during the early 1800s slavery abolition period continued to 
organise labour in Western Area’s small-scale agriculture. Meanwhile, the migration of 
cultivators from Jamaica during the economic crises and War on Drugs of the late-1980s 
coincided with the spread of Rastafari culture and a post-war Neo-Evangelist discourse 
that established apprenticeship as a legitimate means for learning how to cultivate 
under the guidance of those known as “shareholders”. These shareholders were 
gatekeepers in accessing land, exchange partners and extra-legal relations. They secured 
greater returns without organised violence. This is explained by examining the 
shortcomings of current conceptual approaches and turning to Pierre Bourdieu’s 
relational sociology. It employs a mixed methodology of objectivist and subjectivist 
modes of analysis. The analysis relates the qualitative experience of cultivators and 
dealers to the particular position they occupied within the economic field of cultivation 
and exchange and the juridical field of law enforcement. Despite being motivated by 
strong economic incentives, apprentices and journeymen were subject to the 
uncertainties of limited contracting arrangements and illegality, which exposed them to 
exploitation. However, by adopting particular ways of acting, reasoning and valuing that 
qualified their status as “youth men”, they continued to invest in and reproduce this 
institution. I examine how emic practices of “sababu”, “grade” and “haju” acted as covert 
principles that limited the possibility for newcomers to secure higher value exchange 
partners, greater returns and police inaction. The thesis concludes that apprenticeship 
was the site at which structural advantages favouring the established shareholders were 
reproduced.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.1. Introductory Vignette: “Going inside the game” 
 
While sitting on a bench outside Pablo Base in Hastings; a panbɔdi [tin hut] where young 
men congregate to smoke diamba [cannabis], drink pɔyo [palm wine], and discuss 
politics, relationships and sex, Turkish told me how he used to run illicit drugs from one 
of Lumley Street’s ghetto houses following a coup d’état led by Johnny Paul Koroma’s 
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) that removed elected-President Tejan 
Kabbah from power in May 1997. Turkish worked as a lookout for what he referred to 
as a cartel colloquially named “After Twelve”, operated by affiliates of the AFRC and 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) that had infiltrated Freetown and its environs prior 
to a brutal and devastating offensive. Taking his time to smoke one “sling” [cigarette of 
cannabis], Turkish outlined how during the early 1990s he moved from his place of 
birth in Hastings and attended secondary school in Eastern Freetown while living with 
his uncle. When his uncle passed away and with “finance not there” he found a job 
through his father – a Local Unit Commander in the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) – as a 
warehouse worker for the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNMIL). With the 
“sababu”1 of his father to support him, Turkish claimed he ran illicit drugs for After 
Twelve, including cannabis herb and cocaine, under the cover of the UNMIL distribution 
warehouse. At night he smuggled compressed cannabis herb to Guinea-Conakry in the 
engine parts of second hand cars, a practice colloquially referred to as “change oil”. He 
claimed that the “fast money” of this trade allowed him to relieve the financial burden 
indicative of what he described as “the load in his head”. 
 
Numerous scholars have argued that social practice for youth in sub-Saharan Africa 
plays out in a context of uncertainty and unpredictability, and have explored the various 
ways in which those at the margins have sought to regain some control (Jackson 1998; 
Simone 2004, 2006; Hoffman and Lubkemann 2005; Christiansen et al 2006; Vigh 2006, 
2009; Cooper and Pratten 2015). Uncertainty is encountered when youth participate in 
the illegal production and exchange of goods, given a lack of trust, asymmetries in 
available information, and the ever-present apprehension of being detected by law-
                                                        
1 A widely spoken Krio term that probably originates from Mandingo and the Arabic ‘sabab’ to 
mean good fortune from an influential person, usually within a system of patronage. 
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enforcement (Beckert and Wehninger 2013).2 The weakness of formal institutions such 
as the education system, factory and courts is argued to have resulted in fields of activity 
that no longer seem to make sense when using extant conceptual approaches that 
emphasise well-institutionalised norms and rules (Ralph 2008; Vigh 2009). The “load” 
in Turkish’s head was analogous to what critics of mainstream economics refer to as 
‘fundamental uncertainty’: probabilities could not be assigned to events that could not 
be knowable ex ante: ‘the future is yet to be created’ (Dequech 2008; see also Dequech 
2000: 44-50; Hanappi 2011: 795-6). When trying to plot a course and relieve the load in 
his head, Turkish claimed he did not know what the future held (Gerrard 1994; Beckert 
1996; Graeber 2012: 25-7; Lainé 2014).3 
 
Turkish leaned his head back against the corrugated zinc walls of Pablo Base and started 
to “meditate” [smoke diamba]. Unwilling to further risk his life while hemmed into a line 
of work that seemed to offer no further opportunities, he suggested in a low whisper 
that his dependency on those “big men” within the cartel meant his life was on the 
precipice of turning “bɔmboshɔro”:  
 
“A disturbance in life […] when all goodness has gone, when you are cast away […] 
bɔmboshɔro is not good for us, it is awful […] I pray I can overcome any situation in life. I 
want to overcome my debt.”4 
 
Turkish lamented his social stasis by referencing a common contrast between the socio-
economic mobility afforded to “playing the game” with the “stiffness”, fixity and stasis of 
“the system”. The system connoted waged labour, the school, government jobs and the 
diaspora; those whose economic, geographic and social mobility was assured by 
                                                        
2 Illegality represents the official position of the state and cannot be conflated with the actions of 
agents of the state, such as the police. Economic activities are therefore illegal if the good 
exchanged and mode of transaction are illegal (Beckert and Wehinger 2013). This distinguishes 
illegality from informality, which generally involves the illegal exchange of legal goods (Portes 
and Haller 2005: 425).  
3 The application of neoclassical economics to illegal drug economies has been widely critiqued 
(see Dwyre and Moore 2012; Sandberg 2012: 1134-6 for overviews). Discrepancies in the 
popular ‘risks and prices’ model (Reuter and Kleiman 1986) are usually explained with reference 
to ‘failures of judgement’ on the part of participants, rather than empirical weaknesses stemming 
from a narrow model of rational action (Caulkins and MacCoun 2003: 438, 456). Recent studies 
of cannabis markets have challenged neoclassical tendencies to separate the roles of buyer and 
seller (Caulkins and Pacula 2006; Coomber and Turnbull 2007) that are often undertaken 
simultaneously (Sandberg 2012: 1138-40). Such economic analyses have, however, been 
confined to cases of wholesale import and retail distribution in North America and Europe.  
4 Interlocutors claimed “bɔmboshɔro”, written here phonetically in Krio, referred to a “fracas”, 
meaning a break or rupture in life. It was perceived to be an emasculating status and associated 
with a loss of manhood.  
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bureaucratic processes and technologies - ID cards, passports and drivers licenses – that 
benefited only those sat behind silver-tinted windows in the air conditioned offices of 
Siaka Stevens Street (cf. Jackson 2008: 65). As Mats Utas (2014: 175, 2015) has argued, 
the system closely resembles the sociological concept of ‘structure’ and of youth trapped 
in a condition of urban marginality. Turkish and his peers continue to occupy a liminal 
position, characterised as ‘risks yet at risk’ (Vigh 2006a), as breakers yet makers 
(Honwana and de Boeck 2005) and vandals yet vanguards (Abbink and van Kessel 
2005). 
 
Unable to recount the painful experiences he and his peers had been subject to during 
the RUF’s advance, Turkish said that by the end of the war in 2001 he had moved back to 
his place of birth in Hastings. While congregating with other young men in search of 
employment in one of Back Street’s panbɔdi’s, Turkish explained how he met a 
“shareholder” called Harold from whom he rented a plot of land for one “scale” 
[kilogram] of cannabis a season in an area of bush known as “Obɔnoki”. By escaping 
Freetown and moving back to Hastings, Turkish reasoned he could now embark on 
“finding his own lane in life”. To do so required him to quite literally “go inside the game” 
in order to learn from Harold how to “sabi” [know, understand in phonetic Krio 
vernacular] cannabis cultivation and dealing.5 In doing so, these young cultivators 
invested in an ascetic commitment to the “strain” of hard work and the patience 
required to be recognised as a productive and “righteous somebody”.  
 
 
                                                        
5 “The game” appears to be analogous with a 'moral economy' (E.P. Thompson 1971, 1993; James 
Scott 1971; Austen 1993; Newell 2009: 180-1). Earlier work has used the moral economy 
concept to explain the legitimation of notions of justice and rights against the self-interests of 
unfettered markets and state over-centralisation, indicative of working class and student protest 
in Sierra Leone’s wharves and university campuses (Bolten 2009; Harris 2014: 33-46). Moral 
economies are formed according to conscious consent with shared norms perceived to be in an 
agent’s best interest. Despite James Scott’s (1976: 4) more complex approach to the psychology 
of moral economy claiming to ‘deal with the nature of exploitation’, moral economy lacks a fully 
worked out theory of domination and it is unclear how a moral rhetoric is, subjectively-speaking, 
rendered compatible with objectively exploitative labour relations. Scott recognises this 
shortcoming when suggesting that ‘such theories [of moral economy] rarely provide a conceptual 
link between an a priori notion of exploitation and the subjective feeling of the exploited […] Such 
an approach must start phenomenologically at the bottom’ (ibid: 159-60). Scott (1985: 307, 323-
4) discusses Bourdieu in later work claiming that ‘appropriation must take place through a 
socially recognized form of domination’, but reduces Bourdieu’s treatment of domination to 
‘mystification’, applicable only in ‘very rare and special circumstances’. Ironically, Scott argues 
that hegemony works ‘to define what is realistic and what is not realistic and to drive certain 
goals and aspirations’ (ibid: 326). This mirrors precisely Bourdieu’s concepts of illusio, 
misrecognition and symbolic violence as I discuss in Chapter Two and as deployed in the 
following analysis. 
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So you left the cartel? 
“Yes, I worked, worked, worked, but I didn’t see any other way [out] except that 
[cannabis cultivation]. That’s why I came back to my home land [place of birth], where I 
am from, so I could start to develop and make progress on my own.”6 
 
In the next secton I examine the ethnographic and theoretical literature on youth, 
particularly in West Africa, in order to situate youth as a specific kind of social 
construction in the context of apprenticeship in Sierra Leone. 
 
1.2. Youth and apprenticeship 
 
Research on youth in West Africa has been marked by a post-structuralist ambivalence 
that makes the concept of youth difficult to pin down (Honwana and de Boeck 2005: 3). 
As Deborah Durham (2000: 116) argues in a review of the anthropological literature, 
youth in everyday practice is a ‘social shifter’, one that represents ‘a very shifty category 
that seems to fit many people at the same time but no one consistently’. A more recent 
critique of the literature has concluded that there remains a ‘fuzziness of the idea of 
youth [that provides] no conceptual clarity of how their choices, situations and 
motivations can be understood’ (Van Djik et al 2011: 5; also see Philipps 2014). Yet, in 
the quote above, Turkish’s decision to move back to Hastings was guided by a specific 
telos, one that obligated him to “start to develop” and to “make progress on my own”. 
Rather than associated with government-mandated numerical age brackets7 or socio-
biological stages of development, I interpret “youth” as a socially constructed, 
generational category that invokes different emic meanings and status-claims 
embedded in particular relations of power. This conception of youth suggests a 
transition from childhood to adulthood that is neither fixed or stable, nor immanent or 
permanent (Durham 2004; Christiansen et al 2006). As Langevang (2008) remarks of 
youth ‘managing’ towards adulthood in Ghana: 
 
‘Adulthood is not an endpoint at which people arrive but rather encompasses composite 
positions that are achieved, a process of becoming that is continuous’. 
 
                                                        
6 Interview with Turkish, Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 17/09/2013. 
7 Sierra Leone’s National Youth Policy 2003 defines youth as aged between 15 and 35 years, 
which is indicative of how this socio-generational category is much wider than compared with 
the Global North. 
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I follow Christiansen et al (2006: 11) in their interpretation of youth in West Africa as 
being premised on two states, those of becoming adult and those of being youth. 
Becoming adult corresponds with culturally, historically, and socially specific processes 
that generate broad generational categories within a society. Being youth, however, is 
more specific to the individual and depends on how those considered to be “youth” 
position themselves and are positioned by this generational category.  
 
From the perspective of their elders, the passage from youth to adulthood in Sierra 
Leone ‘crucially’ depends on ‘ritual and social obligations’ to gain ‘economic 
independence’, which is perceived necessary for marriage, handling parental 
responsibilities and providing for the community (Peters 2011a; Boersch-Supan 2012: 
27, 31). For instance, parents, teachers and government officials would frequently 
caution “the youth” that “an idle mind is the devil’s workshop”. This early 1800s English 
proverb inherited the colonial maxim that education is a prerequisite for social mobility; 
such that “youth” are defined by their being productive and as using their labour and 
faculties to fulfil social obligations to communal and national development (Langevang 
2008; Manning 2009; Boersch-Supan 2012). As Bolten (2012: 499) argues, ‘Sierra 
Leonean sociality emphasized the importance of relationships to individual survival’, 
such that a young man’s “bigness” corresponds to ‘whether they nurture those who 
initially invested in them’ (also see Jackson 2011). Otherwise, a young person is 
relegated to a “bobo”; a Krio term for a “small boy” who is dependent, lacks direction 
and does not possess the labour and skills necessary to provide for his family or wider 
community. 
 
These social obligations stem from a history of struggle over patrimonial authority and 
the need to extract cheap labour, control access to resources and ensure social control. 
Under the British colonial policy of indirect rule in Sierra Leone’s interior during the late 
1800s to early 1900s, paramount chiefs were granted powers to elicit labour from their 
subjects: an arrangement ‘that was little distinguishable in some aspects from domestic 
slavery’ (Peters 2011b: 39). The result was an ‘ossification of patrimonial authority’ 
whereby a two-tiered society organised around a demographic cleavage divided the 
families of chiefs who had access to education, labour and land, from those whose labour 
was extracted by chiefs for the ostensible benefit of their chiefdoms (Fanthorpe 2001: 
379-384). The post-independence period, as Reno (1995) has argued, was also marked 
by the emergence of a ‘shadow state’ that controlled access to mining through a parallel 
network of political patronage. As a result of these twin developments, Sierra Leonean 
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politics and society has been based on what Peters (2011b: 42) describes as 
‘patrimonial principles’. These principles mean that ‘national resources’ are distributed 
through a system of ‘personal favours to followers who respond with loyalty to the 
leader rather than to the institution the leader represents’ (Richards 1996: 34).  
 
Those deemed to comprise “the youth” are usually still the patrons of elders. This 
division of labour is relatively uncontested and premised on the ‘well-established norm 
to provide (unpaid) labour in the name of community and development’ (Boersch-Supan 
2012: 46). Youths’ obligations to, and dependency on, their elders is indicative of what 
Boersch-Supan (2012: 27) calls a ‘generational contract’. The generational contract ties 
‘several generations vertically and horizontally to each other through material and non-
material exchanges taking place over the life course’. Such arrangements do, however, 
more often result in exploitation. Peters (2012b: 47) notes, for instance, that there are 
‘striking’ similarities between slavery and the way elders ‘manipulate the labour’ of 
young people today, such that the ‘expression of a cultural legacy [still] persists’ (also 
see Fanthorpe 2001). Consequently, young men in contemporary Sierra Leone have 
frequently bemoaned the “slave work” of agriculture in the rural provinces that, being 
organised by customary authorities, is deemed labour intensive, paternalistic and as 
requiring ‘too much work for far too little yield’ (Cartier and Bürge 2011: 1082-3).  
 
The growing political and social marginalisation of young people and resulting 
instability of this generational contract was, of course, made apparent with devastating 
effect during Sierra Leone’s civil conflict in the 1990s. Most researchers argue that those 
who comprised the insurgent Revolutionary United Front were largely young, rural men 
who were seeking to challenge, by violent means, the gerentocratic control paramount 
chiefs had over their ‘productive and reproductive’ rights (Peters 2011b: 34; Richards 
1996; Humphrey and Weinstein 2004; Richards 2005). Rural settlements in which the 
village was the ‘primary social matrix’ were characterised by the ‘extreme localization of 
criteria of identity and belonging’, including ancestral rights to land and chiefly family’s 
exclusive access to formal education. As rapid demographic change exacerbated the 
exclusivity of these patrimonial relations, those marginalised by this system had little 
recourse to other forms of moral community. Young persons could not undergo the 
same rites of passage or associate through the same social relations, rendering them 
neither ‘citizens’ nor ‘subjects’ (Fanthorpe 2001: 372, 375). 
 
 
 
12 
 
In the aftermath of this inter-generational conflict, Bolten (2012: 497) argues that 
donor-funded reconstruction programmes focused on the “sensitisation of youth”, 
which re-established the gerentocratic order albeit with a more accommodating 
character. While there is disagreement as to the legitimacy young people ascribe to the 
continuation of patrimonial authority in rural affairs (Fanthorpe 2005; Sawyer 2008), 
the generational contract is now largely characterised by ‘qualitative’ rather than 
‘quantitative’ challenges to authority in young peoples’ relations with their elders 
(Boersch-Supan 2012: 31). This has been demonstrated by a number of scholars in 
relation to the creation of youth associations and their use of human rights discourse to 
carve out a space in civil society to challenge the perceived uncivil customary practices 
of elders (Boersch-Supan 2012; Fanthorpe and Maconachie 2012; Tom 2014). 
Therefore, a young person’s pursuit of self-enterprise in Sierra Leone is negotiated 
through a potentially exploitative generational contract. Yet it is one that offers 
opportunities for capital accumulation. The contract remains necessary to gain the 
social status of adulthood which, as a process of becoming, is qualified by being able to 
marry, raise children and provide for elders (Bolten 2012: 498). 
 
Economic autonomy is, however, difficult to achieve in a context where socio-
generational categories are primarily determined by gerontocratic control over wealth, 
land, status and even women. This is especially the case when young people are afforded 
limited educational opportunities and are subject to widespread unemployment, 
resulting in a ceaseless search for “job facility”, usually in small-scale agriculture or the 
informal sector (Peters 2011a; Boersch-Supan 2012: 27). Like elsewhere in West Africa, 
the skills training provided by a traditional apprenticeship represents an ‘intermediate 
position’ towards self-employment (Nordman and Pasquier-Doumner 2014). 
Furthermore, the qualitative shift in the character of Sierra Leone’s patrimonialism has 
meant that: 
 
‘An important part of youth’s ‘maturing’ lies not only in learning by doing and gaining 
more formal responsibilities but, more importantly, by ‘being close’ to elders, ‘listening’, 
‘watching’ and ‘taking advice’ […] learning is seen by elders as a one-way process flowing 
from elders to youth.’ (Boersch-Supan 2012: 31-2) 
 
This thesis is concerned with how the institution of apprenticeship organised youth’s 
labour in cannabis farming. Similar to what Meagher (2010: 64-6) refers to as 
‘apprenticeship networks’, young men trained under the guidance of those they called 
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“shareholders” who provided a ‘gateway to entry’ to economic and social capital and the 
potential for obtaining self-sufficiency and social worth. As I examine in Chapter Four, 
Sierra Leone’s apprenticing system was utilised under British colonialism in the late-
1700s during Christian missionary efforts to challenge slavery by transforming 
recaptured slaves from unproductive and idle to productive wage labourers. After 
independence, apprenticeship continued to represent an important means for the 
under-educated to receive training and access employment in a range of informal 
enterprises, such as baking, blacksmithing, carpentry and tailoring (Chuta and Liedholm 
1976). I argue that, in relation to small-scale agriculture, a system of ‘apprentice 
provisioning’ represented an institutional adaptation to control labour in the service of 
capital accumulation.  
 
However, the informal apprenticeships involved in farming cannabis were not governed 
by contracting arrangements or independent referees, such as the state, paramount 
chiefs or parents. This meant an apprentice was subject to uncertainty, exploitation and 
the danger of perceiving their labour as “slave work”. I therefore also argue that, much 
like the qualitative shift in patrimonial relations described above; the social 
construction of “youth man” represented an institutional accommodation of young 
people’s agency to suit the needs of a hierarchically organised activity. This was 
necessary because the expectations of young men needed to be congruent with their 
expectation that, by undertaking cannabis farming, they too could achieve adulthood. 
 
Having left the cartel, Turkish was apprenticed to his shareholder Harold, a relationship 
he described as follows: 
 
“Harold is a big man, because he is a caretaker and he sponsors me for the farming […] 
financially you need support, so they call you […] you get it from Harold.”  
 
So you said he is your ‘shorty’? 
“A shorty is a person who likes you. Any instance, you know, he is your boss. Like you 
have your boss in college. So it is like a shorty […] He will help you, he will guard you. 
He guards you from the police.”  
 
[…] 
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“Those that have started a business are called shareholders. We are the small boys; we 
have our head who is the overseer. So we are the sm- small boys. So I believe we have to 
build like them, we have to assist them.”8 
 
I argue that youth represents what Durham (2000) refers to as a ‘social effect of power’. 
Youth assumed a differentiated status rooted in an organisational need.  
 
Furthermore, apprenticeship has been studied by scholars concerned with the linguistic 
and non-linguistic transmission of embodied knowledge, skills and techniques, in cases 
ranging from artisans to boxers (Coy 1989; Ingold 2000; Wacquant 2004a; Bloch 2012: 
19, 150-1; Dalidowicz 2015). Common across these studies is that, when undertaking 
apprenticeship: 
 
‘Skill is not a ‘thing’, nor is it a mental representation, to be acquired, fixed, and secured, 
but it is a transformation of our being in the world.’ (Dalidowicz 2015: 839-40, emphasis 
added) 
 
Many apprentices and journeymen working on Western Area’s cannabis farms were 
treated by their peers as “youth men”. This represented a strategic intermediate social 
category. By possessing agricultural skills and committing their able-bodies to labour in 
the service of the community, they were recognised in emic terms as “youth”. Many 
were also numerically older and had children to provide for, but remained dependent on 
their shareholders for access to the economic and social resources that would secure 
their autonomy and self-sufficiency. Given the informal nature of apprenticeship, it was, 
furthermore, unclear when and whether they too would become shareholders. Hence, 
being youth-yet-men indicated a transitory state towards becoming socially adult that 
was expected but not yet fulfilled. For instance, Vigh (2006b: 32) describes how the 
“blufo” in Bissau-Guinean society is a ‘betwixt and between category described by the 
discrepancy between chronological and social age […] being symbolically stuck in the 
position of youth without possibilities of gaining the authority and status of adulthood’. 
Youth man was also a between category, but one in which apprentices and journeymen 
professed not to be stuck and without possibilities. Instead, it was common to reason 
that cannabis farming was a sure means to “find your own lane in life”.  
                                                        
8Interview with Turkish, Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 17/09/2013. “Shorty” is a colloquial term 
derived from late 1980s East Coast hip-hop culture before growing in popularity during the 
1990s (prounced as “shawty”) in the songs of Public Enemy and Tribe Called Quest. The term 
originally meant a “thug” or “wannabe” new to gang life, but more broadly refers to someone who 
sells drugs. 
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This apparent contradiction of chances and expectations requires an examination of 
how being a “youth man” is experienced, and how their expectations of masculine 
authority informed on-going social practice. I therefore also understand youth as a state 
of being in the world, of positioning within positions, that is negotiated in different 
contexts and situations according to a broader process of becoming socially adult. As 
Christiansen et al (2006: 11) go on to explain, it is necessary to: 
 
‘Look at the ways youth are positioned in society and the ways they seek to position 
themselves in society to illuminate the ways the category of youth is socially constructed, 
as well as the ways young people construct counter-positions and definitions.’ 
 
I therefore develop a relational sociological approach that is sensitive to the positioning 
of youth within broader socio-generational categories, precisely because it treats the 
social and experiential as ‘inseparable’ (ibid). In doing so, it is possible to understand 
how, despite youths’ expectations of reaching adulthood being highly uncertain in the 
absence of apprentice contracting, their qualification as “youth men” accommodated 
struggles over the economic, social and symbolic capital required to claim masculine 
authority. In other words, the ethics constituting what I term the ‘apprentice habitus’ 
(Chapter Five) informed youths’ practice when undertaking cannabis farming for the 
shareholders. It was experienced as a sense of requiredness and validation for what was 
necessary to be recognised as a youth man. However, these ethics conflicted with a 
youth culture shaped by rural-to-urban migrants during the 1980s. The globalisation of 
Western fashion, media and music provided youth with an avenue to escape from 
economic hardship by fantasising about an elsewhere, thought reachable through the 
“fast money” attributed to informal employment and social connections disembedded 
from kinship in the city of Freetown.9  
 
                                                        
9 This tension is also reflected in, for instance, the lives of young men in Abidjan, Côte D’Ivoire for 
whom fantasy was ‘glorified through not productive but consumption-oriented identities’. This 
fantasy defied ‘production as a means to an end – a secure livelihood with the opportunity to 
[move from] the status of social junior to social senior – consumption becomes means and end 
for defining manhood at the periphery’ (Matlon 2015: 147, 152). The need to accommodate these 
expectations is further evidenced by Waage (2006: 61), who concludes with regard to 
Cameroonian youth negotiating access to the unpredictability of informal employment, that 
‘These young peoples’ main challenge for succeeding in their personal project is to find ways to 
act out new knowledge and new roles in ways that are acceptable within the framework of local 
ideals for respectable identities.’ 
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I therefore examine how youth’s expectations of social adulthood were accommodated, 
while a hierarchy of cannabis production and marketing networks retained the basic 
institutional character of apprenticeship. Apprenticeship enabled a tier of proprietors 
known as “shareholders” to dominate production and marketing. This was primarily 
because they claimed first rights to land ownership. However, they also obtained first-
mover advantages following the arrival of several cultivators from Kingston, Jamaica, in 
the mid-1980s that were displaced by the ruling Jamaican Labour Party’s crackdown on 
cannabis cultivation amid the US-led War on Drugs. Already connected to Freetown 
through a Rastafari diaspora that was shaping youth culture during the 1980s, the 
established shareholders in Hastings – what youth referred to as “Ganja HQ” – planted a 
new seed variety (cannabis sativa), utilised new cultivation techniques, and secured 
access to high value cross-border buyers (Chapter Four).  
 
 
Map One: Location of field sites in Sierra Leone.  
Source: Open Street Map and Contributors, 2016. 
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During fieldwork at these sites in 2013 (Map One), I identified several clusters of 
cannabis production colloquially referred to as: Loko Fakay, Obɔnoki, Sugar Loaf, 
Wanpala, and You Must Grumble.10  
  
Apprentices were not afforded contracting arrangements governing the obligations of 
their shareholders, such as in wages, skills training and settlement upon graduation. 
Given cannabis cultivation was officially suppressed by the state, these youth also had 
little recourse to other authorities within the community to mediate disputes. Their 
participation could not, therefore, be based solely on the veneer of a promise to be 
granted one or two lagati [bundles] of cannabis herb each season. I argue instead that 
apprenticeship reproduced what I term structural advantages favouring shareholders. 
This was because apprentices and journeymen engaged in a one-sided valuation of what 
was necessary to succeed, which was defined by a particular ethics of economic and 
social conduct regarding what was required to reach adulthood. Resisting translation 
into the conceptual framework of ‘Big Man networks’ (Utas 2012) a close analysis of 
relations between shareholders, journeymen and apprentices during field work 
indicated that apprenticeship operated according to more covert forms of power and 
violence (see Chapters Two and Four). In the absence of contracting arrangements, then, 
apprenticeship provided an empirical site at which to examine the reproduction of a 
hierarchically organised field of activity in a context that has otherwise been treated as 
more volatile and prone to criminal breakdown (e.g. see Newell 2006; Lindell and Utas 
2012). 
 
1.3. Conceptualising chain work 
 
With state over-centralisation and the cronyism of indirect rule under President Siaka 
Stevens’ and then Joseph Momoh’s one-party state posited as the underlying causes of 
rural grievances that precipitated Sierra Leone’s civil war (Peters and Richards 2008; 
Richards et al 2011), the expansion of illicit economies throughout the 1990s and 2000s 
was presented as being facilitated by the parasitic, rent-seeking activities of elites 
occupying a ‘shadow state’ (Reno 1995; Hibou 1999; Keen 2005: 107; Reno 2009: 68; 
see Meagher’s 2003: 58-9 critique). The weakening of official state structures is argued 
to have allowed extra-legal networks to exert downwards pressure on cross-border 
trading arrangements assumed to be increasingly involved in criminal activities 
(Duffield 1999; Chouvy and Laniel 2007: 139-40) and provided a context for the 
                                                        
10 Pseudonyms are used to conceal the specific locations of these farms. 
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emergence of violent modes of accumulation and exchange (Roitman 2005; Kunkeler 
and Peters 2011; Mirella 2014). It is common to assume that ‘there is a real possibility of 
Freetown turning into another Sao Paulo or Bogotá, with youth-cum-drug gangs 
becoming part of the urban landscape’ (Kunkeler and Peters 2011: 282).11  
 
These geopolitical representations have tended to conflate different kinds of informal 
and illicit activities and further differentiation of goods and practices therein, despite 
limited empirical analysis of the actors involved in facilitating the expanding production 
and trade of such economically and politically distinct goods. For instance, Value Chain 
Analysis (VCA) originating in the work of Porter (1980) is widely utilised in the study of 
drug markets in Europe and North America and small-scale agriculture in sub-Saharan 
Africa. However, rarely are the full range of activities and stages of value addition 
involved in cannabis supply chains in the Global South examined, while those studies 
that do focus largely on the organisation of production (see e.g. Bloomer 2009). There is 
also scant consideration for the institutional histories from which these supply chains 
have emerged and the social norms by and through which they are operating (Meagher 
2003: 62-4, 2009: 505-517; 2014). Consequently, the conceptual approaches deployed 
to examine illicit activities are primarily derived from North American, European and 
Latin America experience. In doing so, illicit economies in sub-Saharan Africa have been 
left ‘essentially’ without a history (Klantschnig et al 2014).  
 
Cannabis cultivation in Hastings and Waterloo does not fit into a neat conceptualisation 
of illicit drug economies that privileges organised violence, state criminalisation, or as a 
contributor to the onset and duration of violent conflict. Cultivators at each site would 
instead lock their index fingers together and claim they were undertaking “chain work”: 
 
“Myself now, I am the grower. We have the pedlars [dealers] and we have the main 
sellers and buyers – that is chain work. I am the grower, I have a middleman who I have 
linked with; the man who buys and sells by slings [cigarettes of cannabis], and he comes 
with the money for me – you see? So that is the chain work.”12 
 
Chain work was not confined to production and supply activities occurring at the firm-
level of apprenticeship. Neither was it reducible to direct sales undertaken by 
                                                        
11 As Turkish earned a living in Eastern Freetown’s ghettos, Robert Kaplan (1994) denied that 
such ‘loose mollecules’ as Turkish could participate in anything like an organised field of activity, 
let alone a coordinated ‘economy’. 
12 Interview with B.I.G., Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 16/09/2013. 
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shareholders to already well-known dealers close to farms in Hastings’ and Waterloo’s 
ghettos. Rather, chain work related to a complex series of exchange relationships and 
social practices involved in the supply chain. Cannabis herb was, for example, sold by 
farmers to intermediaries in bulk who then separated the product into smaller 
quantities called “kwants” [1/4 kilogram] or “slings” [one cigarette] for onward sale in 
Freetown. The emic term is also not interchangeable with the better known concept of 
value chains, eventhough a process of value addition did occur after cannabis was sold 
to cross-border buyers in Guinea and Liberia, and also when middlemen separated 
cannabis into smaller quantities for sale in the domestic market. 
 
Chain work was instead a byword for the social interactions that held together a 
complex network reaching beyond buyers in close proximity and that linked together 
producers, buyers in the domestic and cross-border markets, and consumers. Crucially, 
the term also connoted a moral distinction from activities organised in a similar way, 
but what participants considered as being illegitimate enterprises, such as cigarette 
smuggling, cocaine and heroin trafficking, and the fencing of stolen goods. As one 
cultivator remarked when explaining chain work, “we bind around this, but not around 
that”. In order to conceptualise chain work, in the next section I provide a critical 
reading of the research on criminal enterprise. I argue that shortcomings associated 
with this research motivate the use of a relational sociology. 
  
1.3.1. Contested models of organised crime 
 
Understandings of organised crime stem from different theoretical histories, largely of 
North American and European import, that have responded to the changing empirical 
realities of crime since the 1950s (Von Lampe 2006; Hall 2008; Kleemans 2014: 32). Of 
particular concern has been to analyse the internal, economic characteristics of criminal 
organisations in order to establish how co-operation is ensured among illegal actors in 
support of recurrent criminal activities (Haller 1990). In particular, North American 
scholars beginning with Dwight Smith (1994) have drawn on transaction cost 
economics to argue that, in an illegal context characterised by uncertainty and the 
potential for opportunistic self-interest, some level of organisation is necessary aside 
from market-based mechanisms (Von Lampe 2006: 82). 
 
To this end, organised crime has drawn from a number of disciplines in order to shift 
the analytical focus between the “who” and “what” of organised criminality, across 
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different levels of analysis from individual to collective. Von Lampe (2006: 84) suggests 
this represents a bifurcation of the literature between concerns with ‘structures of 
association’ and ‘structures of activities’; the latter taking its starting point as criminal 
enterprise rather than organised criminality. There seems to be some agreement, 
however, that analysis is left with an ‘ambiguous conflated concept, produced by a 
stratification of different meanings’ (Paoli 2002: 52; see also Smith 1991; Moselli 2005: 
10-11; Von Lampe 2006: 80). Organised crime continues to encompass a broad 
empirical foci, for it simultaneously seeks to characterise both the provision of criminal 
goods and services (as ‘organised crime’) and the forms of social organisation (as 
‘Organised Crime’) that coordinate these economic activities (Hagan 2006: 134; Paoli 
2002; Hall 2008: 369). Common to this literature, however, is a concern with the degree 
to which the “who” and “what” of criminality is actually organised, which depends 
foremost on whether criminality is being ‘driven by a structural logic of organization 
and unified purpose’ (Abraham and Schendel 2005: 4; also see Hall 2008: 374).  
 
Organised criminal enterprises involved in the distribution and marketing of illegal 
drugs are often shown to be short-lived and small, depending on who is involved in 
them and according to what specific criminal enterprises they are engaged in (Reuter 
1983; Van Duyne and Levi 2005). Natarajan (2006) concludes, for instance, that heroin 
distribution networks are organised by ‘small groups of loosely linked entrepreneurs 
rather than large, highly structured criminal syndicates’. Such observations result in 
what Paoli (2002) describes as the ‘paradox’ of organised crime, which requires an 
explanation for why particular organised crime groups grow and survive while others 
remain small and fleeting. This begets a more critical view on the minimal definition of 
organised crime, whereby the provision of illegal goods and services is separated from 
the study of ‘criminal organization[s], understood as a large-scale collectivity primarily 
engaged in illegal activities with a well-defined collective identity and subdivision of 
work among its members’ (Paoli 2002: 52). The degree to which criminality can be said 
to be organised therefore depends on: the maintenance of a formalised structure based 
on personal, ethnic, or kinship ties that utilises force or violence; their unified sense of 
collective identity; the degree to which this structure monopolises the production 
and/or distribution of illegal goods or services across legal and illegal divides, and their 
resilience and ability to expand over time (Papachristos and Zhao 2015: 2938; Ellis and 
Shaw 2015: 509).  
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Most empirical research in this vein originates in taking bureaucracy as the archetypal 
model of organised crime (Papachristos and Zhao 2015), as demonstrated by studies of 
Italian and Sicilian Mafias, such as the Cosa Nostra (Gambetta 1993; Varese 2001).13 
This conception of the Mafia has more recently been stretched to encompass ‘gangs, 
clans and insurgencies’ that are argued to provide alternative forms of governance in 
the context of weak states (Shortland and Varese 2016). These are understood to be 
private and hierarchically organised groups that behave relatively autonomously and 
work against the state. When communities are disorganised and states are unable or 
unwilling to enforce and protect property rights, Mafia groups respond by fulfilling a 
demand for private protection over a range of illegal and legal economic activities 
(Kleemans 2014: 36-8; Smith and Papachristos 2014). These groups of strongmen are 
bound by non-economic ties of obligation, loyalty and trust; enabling them to function as 
de facto rulers who commercialise the sale of protection, which is enforced primarily 
through the use and credible threat of inter-personal violence (Gambetta 1996; Paoli 
2002). The resulting protection economy works to undermine the capacity of the state 
to deliver public goods and services such as security, which, mirroring Charles Tilly’s 
(1985) theory of state formation, results in the Mafia group selling protection by means 
of extortion rather than legitimately through taxation in the legal sphere (Shortland and 
Varese 2016: 811-2). It is therefore the ‘fact of being protected [that] acts as a singular 
lubricant for economic transactions’ (Dewey 2012: 686; also see Leander 2004).  
 
However, as Smith and Papachristos (2014: 662) argue, in practice the members of 
organised crime groups must integrate with ‘noncriminal society’. They occupy a more 
ambiguous position in relation to the state than the strict functionalist opposition 
implied by bureaucratic Mafia models. For instance, having recognised the role local 
notions of legitimacy play alongside state legal codes in social encounters between law-
breakers and law-enforcers in the context of weak states; some scholars have drawn a 
distinction between juridical principles of state-mandated legality and local notions of 
licitness that inform everyday social interaction (van Schendel and Abraham 2005: 17). 
This analytical complexity is, however, often reduced to corruption, with criminal agents 
understood as motivated by a desire to subvert the appropriate roles of public office by 
breaking legal codes solely in pursuit of private gain. The notion that corruption 
threatens state authority is typically based on an ideal-typical model of the Weberian 
                                                        
13 Von Lampe (2007: 110) suggests this is primarily the legacy of Cressey’s (1969) research that 
concluded organised crime in the United States is synonymous with Mafias, particularly the Cosa 
Nostra, such that they operate as ‘both a business organization and a government’.  
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state, as a rational and neutral bureaucracy that serves the public interest (Gupta 2005: 
8). However, what counts as corruption is more situational and subject to the context-
specific sensitivities of what constitutes localised perceptions of the ‘public interest’ 
(Heidenheimer 1989: 7-10).  
 
The resulting difficulties in identifying a boundary between legal and illegal, and public 
and private interest, in the everyday activities undertaken by these groups has provided 
a window for critical scholarship addressing the theoretical utility of organised crime 
models (Hall 2008: 372). For instance, in the social anthropology literature criminal 
activity in the Global South is more readily understood as occurring in social contexts 
that are not governed the same way as those involving the legal system. This results in a 
degree of ‘ontological uncertainty’ when utilising models of organised crime owing to 
the plurality of different public authorities that criminal groups work with and exploit in 
these contexts (Dewey 2012: 683; also see Zaitch 2005; Hall 2008: 373; Clunan and 
Trinkunas 2010; Aguiar 2011; Auyero et al 2014: 104-5). 
 
This observation is not new. As Keith Hart (1973: 74-6) acknowledged in his study of 
self-employment in Accra, something is amiss when participants’ perceptions of illegal 
activity are made to conform with conceptual schemes embedded in moral and legal 
principles enacted by the state; such as the right to property, obligation to repay debts, 
and rectitude of public office (Robertson 2006: 9). State-mandated illegality is an 
important resource when multiple different kinds of public authority; such as “Big men”, 
town chiefs, the police, secret societies and youth associations, are staking particular 
claims and negotiating particular classifications of what is licit and permissible and what 
is illicit and impermissible (Heyman 2013: 304; for Sierra Leone see Baker 2008; 
Albrecht 2015). It is analytically prudent, therefore, not to treat ‘the state’ as a unitary 
actor, and instead to glean the actions and interpretations of law-enforcers during their 
social encounters with law-breakers. The state represents, as Raeymaekers et al (2008: 
8) argue, only one source of public authority among other ‘specific modes in which 
different social forces in society strive for political control and domination’.14 
 
This is well illustrated by the market for stolen vehicles in Buenos Aires. According to 
Dewey (2012), the local police force engaged in the sale of illegal protection to criminal 
                                                        
14 Eschewing a model of the Weberian state, the concept of ‘hybrid political orders’ is, for 
example, now widely discussed among policy makers for these reasons (see Boege et al 2009; 
OECD 2010).  
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enterprises, while also protecting the public from crime. The sale of protection was a 
‘largely non-violent relationship’ based on the ‘temporary non-application of the law as 
a commodity’ (ibid: 681-2). Hence, an a priori distinction between public and private 
interest precludes the ways in which law-breakers and law-enforcers are interlocked for 
long-established institutional reasons. More broadly, criminal groups have increasingly 
been argued to operate in an ‘extra-legal’ fashion that cuts across a clean-cut distinction 
between legal and illegal (Nordstrom 2010). As Galemba (2012: 9; also see Titeca and 
Flynn 2014) has argued in her examination of cross-border smuggling, attention to the 
overlaps between the legal and illegal might hold the ‘key to the functioning of many 
socioeconomic systems’. And yet the variability of law enforcement has only recently 
been acknowledged as a ‘pertinent sociological research topic’ within the organised 
crime literature (Beckert and Wehinger 2013: 7).  
 
Given that cannabis production and marketing in the Global South usually occurs in the 
context of weak states or spaces characterised by partial or ungovernance, it is readily 
assumed these activities are organised by small and closed groups that accumulate and 
protect returns. Despite a paucity of empirical evidence, the commercialisation of small-
scale cannabis farming is said to be achieved by ‘recourse to Mafia activities’, which 
facilitates collusive agreements based on the non-economic ties of loyalty, obligation 
and/or trust found in clan, kinship and ethnic bonds (OGD 1998: 10; Labrousse and 
Laniel 2006: 35, 343, 256-7, 259-61; also see Paoli 2002: 88). These organisations often 
resemble an internal patron-client structure, whereby commands are dictated from the 
top to the bottom of a hierarchy, based on a relationship of dependency in which the 
patron has exclusive access to valuable economic and social capital, and can offer the 
client continued protection (Papachristos and Smith 2013). These dependency 
relationships also ensure market information is protected from detection and disruption 
by law-enforcement, both externally through the ‘clientelisation’ of exchange 
relationships and internally by way of collusion and secrecy (Geertz 1978; Baker and 
Faulkner 1993; Kollock 1994; Smith and Papachristos 2014: 648). A ‘common culture’ 
binds recurrent exchange and contractual arrangements that are deemed necessary for 
adjudicating increasingly complex transactions (Dick 1996).  
 
Following this thread, retail-level drug ‘gangs’ are demonstrated to ‘embrace common 
goals, engage in common enterprise, [and] regulate the revenue generating activities of 
their members’ (see Benson and Decker 2010: 131; also Decker et al 2008). Given the 
barriers to growth presented by illegality, these groups are usually ‘dense’ and ‘small’ to 
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ensure internal member and external customer loyalty, thereby minimising or 
maximising risk in line with the presence of law-enforcement (Smith and Papachristos 
2014: 662; also see Reuter and Haaga 1989; Adler 1993; Hagedorn 1994; Eck and Gersh 
2000: 265; Desroches 2005; Paoli et al 2009). For instance, Bouchard (2008) 
demonstrates that cannabis cultivation in Quebec comprised groups of 3.7 farmers on 
average at each production site.15 The tendency for crime groups to monopolise illegal 
markets is therefore the Mafia’s ‘exception rather than rule’ (Von Lampe 2004: 84), such 
that limitations on group size are supported by the credible and strategic use of force to 
prevent interference by law-enforcement and limit the entry of challengers. This results 
in many small-scale producers competing to claim a patchwork of monopoly rents 
(Reuter 1983; Reuter and Kleiman 1986: 301-2; Ayres 1987; Gambetta 1988, 1993; 
Fiorentini and Peltzman 1997; Heyman and Smart 1999: 4; Zaluar 2000; Coomber and 
Maher 2006: 741; Antonopoulos 2008: 281)16 and stands in contrast to ‘overarching 
power structures’, such as Mafias, that monopolise violence over a range of individuals 
and groups that may conduct a variety of different illegal and legal enterprises 
(Shortland and Varese 2016: 812). The latter provides a non-violent means for 
managing the succession of strongmen and ensuring discipline among members.17  
 
Despite this organisational logic, recent reviews of the organised crime literature have 
conceded that ‘we know very little’ empirically about organised criminal groups outside 
the context of Europe and North America (Papachristos and Zhao 2015). Ellis and Shaw 
(2015: 509) are more dismissive, suggesting that in the context of sub-Saharan Africa it 
would be unwise to begin with definitions of ‘organised crime’ imported from studies of 
Europe and North America. Instead, the primary characteristic of organised criminality 
in Africa is the presence of markets for protection organised through ‘private 
arrangements’ in collusion with agents of the state such as police forces, customs 
                                                        
15 As Paoli (2002: 88) concludes, contrary to popular depcitions, that ‘Mafia consortia hardly ever 
operate as a single unit’, because different economic enterprises are left to single members. 
16 Empirical analysis in the context of Western Europe and North America broadly agrees that 
cannabis exchange markets, rather than firm-level organisations involved in cannabis 
production; usually do not share the violent characteristics of markets for other illicit goods 
(Curtis 1998: 1250; Curtis and Wendell 2000: 141-4; Reuter 2009: 376). 
17 Separately, violence may also be utilised externally under conditions of competition between 
organisations in order to ensure the protection of economic transactions, or in gaining territorial 
control over new areas in which to sell drugs. Although cannabis markets are generally not 
observed to experience ‘systemic violence’ in competition between competing producers and 
marketers (Reuter 2009), it continues to be the case that, for the internal organisation of small-
scale cannabis production and marketing: ‘violent enforcement and organizational hierarchy are 
[treated as] compliments’ (Rogers and Leeson 2012: 97; see also Beckert and Wehinger 2013: 
15-7).  
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officials and politicians. This protection economy cannot be reduced to the ‘criminal 
capture’ of state institutions or an alternative Mafia-like governance arrangement in 
which protection is offered in opposition to the state’s unwillingness or incapability to 
enforce property rights. Rather, organised criminality is characterised by the: 
 
‘Reformulation of politics and crime into networks that transcend the state/non-state 
boundary in ways that are hardly subsumed in standard concepts of organized crime.’ 
(ibid: 505, emphasis added) 
 
A number of shortcomings undermine the utility of organised crime for examining 
cannabis production and marketing in the context of Sierra Leone. First, the emphasis 
placed on internally homogenous social ties based on clan, ethnicity or kinship 
precludes an explanation for self-enforcing arrangements among heterogeneous groups 
(Leeson 2008: 162-3). This is especially the case in Sierra Leone where participants are 
diverse owing to colonial history, rapid rural-to-urban migration and displacement 
following civil conflict. By extension, violence is privileged as a blunt device that cuts 
across difference to ensure co-ordination, especially in contexts that are unfamiliar 
(Bunt et al 2014: 334). This also presents opportunities for particular cultural traits and 
identities to be essentialised as more or less amenable to overcoming the uncertainties 
presented by illegality; as suggested by a renewed focus on ethnic-bonding models of 
drug trafficking. Organised crime scholars have, therefore, begun to recognise the need 
for a closer examination of how trust and social capital facilitate cooperative criminality, 
rather than beginning with extant organisational structures (Von Lampe 2006: 88-9). 
Second, there is often a lack of clarity regarding the object of study, which obscures 
attention to how individuals are specialised in different tasks, such as the production of 
goods as opposed to their distribution and exchange (Shortland and Varese 2016: 811-
2). Meanwhile what constitutes the boundaries of an organised criminal group is not 
readily specified. This weakens the reliability of theoretical conclusions drawn from 
empirical case comparisons, especially when these are largely based on evidence from 
Europe and North America (Bouchard and Morselli 2014: 294). Finally, members of 
criminal organisations and agents of the state are often intertwined for functional 
reasons when undertaking criminal activity. This begets a more relational state-society 
framework that is attentive to context-specific modes of extra-legal regulation that take 
place outside of, but not necessarily in opposition to, weak states. 
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1.3.2. Towards a Relational Sociology: Criminal Networks and Institutions 
 
Formalised models of criminal organisation lack utility when analysing criminal 
enterprise in West Africa. In contrast to North American and European cases, studies 
demonstrate the involvement of non-permanent and flexible organisations, including 
‘adhocracies’ and ‘syndicates’, whose participants are often diverse, allocated resources 
according to task specialisations, engage closely with agents of the state, and use their 
flexibility as a resource to avoid detection and interference by law-enforcement (Shaw 
2003; Simone 2004: 417; Ellis 2009: 185-90; Klein 2009; Ellis and Shaw 2015; Paolo 
2016). Over the last two decades, the network concept has been methodologically and 
theoretically formalised into a widely adopted bottom-up, exploratory approach to 
studying organisational forms such as these, which are often based on ‘short-term 
relationships and shifting coalitions’ rather than comparable to formalised 
organisational structures synonymous with bureaucracy or patrimonialism (Bouchard 
and Morselli 2014: 296; see e.g. Morselli 2005, 2010, 2014; Von Lampe 2006: 82-3, 
2009; Bunt et al 2014; Carrington 2014; Kleemans 2014; Papachristos 2011, 2014; 
Smith and Papachristos 2016).  
 
Drawing on earlier conceptions of organised crime as rooted in inter-related and 
overlapping social relationships, a network approach examines the processes involved 
in organising criminality, be it in an illegal market or an overarching governance 
structure (Bouchard and Morselli 2014: 11). This differs in focus to the broader 
criminological literature, which considers non-recurrent exchange – burglary, car-
jacking and theft – and concludes that participants are confined to small groups that do 
not organise effectively (Benson and Decker 2010: 131). Instead, it is the 
‘embeddedness’ of criminal agents in pre-existing social relations, such as ethnicity, 
friendship and kin that shapes more durable organisational strategies. In essence, 
embeddedness purports that economic behaviour cannot be separated out from social 
and cultural context. Rather than beginning with organisational hierarchy then, 
networks exist on a spectrum from the more fleeting to durable, and from the more 
open and expansive to asymmetric and closed (Morselli 2005: 10-11). As Bunt et al 
(2014: 322) conclude, ‘social embeddedness means that existing relations and 
structures are not the only breeding ground for criminal activities, but also determine 
what form these activities can take’.  
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Embeddedness is, however, ‘quite a broad church’ (Kleemans 2014: 40) and one that 
has been applied ‘haphazardly’ in the African context (Meagher 2005: 220-2). For 
criminal organisation, the concept is largely imported from the New Economic Sociology 
popularised by Mark Granovetter (1983, 1985, also see Fligstein and Dauter 2007). 
Economic sociology scholars take a structural-functionalist approach to networks, 
agreeing they are crucial for explaining how cooperation and co-ordination are ensured 
in the conduct of criminal enterprise (Morselli 2005: 20, 34; Aspers 2011: 175-6; 
Papachristos 2011, 2014; Beckert and Wehinger 2013; Papachristos and Smith 2013; 
Smith and Papachristos 2016: 645-6).18 The concept is analogous to what Beckert 
(1996: 827-9) refers to as a ‘restrictive social device’, because it reduces the uncertainty 
stemming from product illegality and mutual distrust by regulating economic action 
through existing social relations. These are said to prevent opportunism and provide a 
shared framework for cooperative action. 
 
The prevailing view of embeddeness is demonstrated by Morselli’s (2005, 2014) 
commonly cited work on ‘criminal networks’. Here, embeddeness represents a 
constraint on freedom for action and choice, based on levels of dependency with others 
in the network that fluctuates between determinist and indeterminist effects of network 
structure on social action. Networks can, for instance, be agency-centred when 
entrepreneurial agents are able to exploit ‘structural holes’ by investing time and energy 
in developing new business contacts, rather than remaining ‘closed and cliquish’ (ibid: 
24). At the same time, agents can also be excluded from opportunities for brokering due 
to gatekeepers that control access to economic and social resources. The productive 
view of networks is associated with the formation of what Granovetter (1983, 1985) 
terms ‘weak ties’ that bridge difference and form new bonds, resulting in a more 
symmetric network structure. By contrast, ‘strong ties’ are asymmetric and produce 
closed social groups that are inwardly bound by relations of loyalty and obligation. 
Strong ties aid in the internal organisation of illicit activities by ensuring that ‘fraudulent 
actions will be penalised by exclusion of the violator from key social networks and 
future transactions’ (Portes 2010: 137). These ties are often chacaterised by 
‘homophily’, which has positive effects on peer influence; because ties are based on the 
familiarity and sameness of characteristics such as age, place of residence and criminal 
experience (Carrington 2014). The resulting closed and asymmetric networks are a 
                                                        
18 Beckert and Wehinger (2013) provide the first schematic approach to criminal enterprise in 
the sub-discipline of the sociology of markets. Here, the ‘economic coordination’ of illegal activity 
is the unifying theme and is discussed through the typology of value, competition and 
cooperation. 
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function of the imperative to facilitate trust through recurrent interaction inwards; 
utilise concealment to avoid detection; ensure intra-network monitoring of participants, 
and to pool scarce resources in the production of illicit goods. Weak ties, by contrast, 
enable the expansion of illicit transactions by facilitating the generation of trust 
outwards through on-going interactions with prospective exchange partners. This 
ability to bridge across networks is often said to be the product of agents exploiting 
structural holes and gaining access to useful information.  
 
Smith and Papachristos (2016: 645-7) conclude, however, that weak ties are rare in 
criminal enterprise. Instead, expansive criminal networks are ‘multiplex’, in terms of the 
content and role of social ties. Given criminal enterprise requires resource pooling, task 
specialisation, and access to information (especially from law-enforcement authorities), 
multiplexity signals how agents come to ‘stack’ different social relationships on top of 
each other as they exploit different roles when co-ordinating action. In this sense, 
‘multiplexity adds depth to social relationships by building on pre-existing ties […] 
provid[ing] a foundation for trust that can reduce risk and mobilize action’. Smith and 
Papachristos (2016: 662) conclude, therefore, that criminal networks are typically 
asymmetric, ‘dense, small, and highly multiplex’; characteristics that are increasingly 
marked by economic, social and power inequalities the longer they remain durable 
(Hess 1998: 82-3). These networks are also the building blocks for governance 
approaches that suggest networks ‘minimize the need for state regulation’ (Meagher 
2007: 221). Von Lampe (2006: 86-7) similarly concludes that, rather than clusters of 
weak ties, criminal enterprsise are organised through closed ‘chains’. Network 
asymmetry, closure and density are, in sum, treated as functional to the need for 
internal monitoring and sanction, particularly when evading detection by law-
enforcement.  
 
Despite providing better specification of the organisational elements required to 
maintain criminal enterprises, the criminal network approach has remained largely 
exploratory and descriptive (Carrington 2014), with few attempts to theorise agency, 
culture and power beyond a functional-structuralist interpretation that views networks 
in terms of what agents can purposively use social relations for in ‘self-directed’ action. 
This shortcoming is reflected in the recent notion of ‘relational positioning’ (Morselli 
2005: 37, 2014). Here, power is reduced to a ‘capacity to control resources’ in terms of 
nodal proximity to gatekeepers and the relations of dependency that are formed by 
consequence. By thinking in terms of function and structure, embeddedness abstracts 
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out a single aspect of social life (ethnicity, exchange, friendship, kin, sex and so forth), 
which is then analysed in terms of how structural characteristics are amenable to illicit 
coordination. Such weaknesses are echoed in a review of criminal networks by Smith 
and Papachristos (2014: 662), who conclude that ‘culture, agency, and context’ tend to 
be abstracted in network analyses of criminal enterprise, rather than problematised as 
core themes when explaining the relationship between criminal action and social 
structure (also see Meagher 2009). What result are stylised analyses whereby violence 
and trust are viewed, respectively, as functional equivalents to symmetric and 
asymmetric network structures. Furthermore, by treating culture in terms of its utility 
or tendency to facilitate certain kinds of action and network structure, the criminal 
network literature is often culturally essentialist and prone to stereotype. This is 
problematic when conceptualising the emic practice of “chain work”, given the presence 
of ‘too much embeddedness’, particularly in the context of West Africa, readily justifies a 
pathological analysis ‘associated with parochialism, fragmentation, and communal 
violence’ (Meagher 2005: 219, 221-2; also 2010: 22). 
 
Recent scholarship has argued, by contrast, that these shortcomings necessitate a fine-
grained analysis of the institutional content of networks (Meagher 2005: 224). An 
institutional approach is sensitive to the historical legacies of networks and how they 
have been reshaped into contemporary forms of non-state governance, particularly in 
contexts ‘characterised by state neglect and chaos’ (Meagher 2005: 226-230; Meagher 
2009; Meagher 2010: 25-6). As Krippner (2001: 777) has suggested, this approach was 
lost due to the displacement by the new economic sociology of earlier notions of 
embeddedness that underscored the importance of ‘studying institutions as concrete, 
multiply-determined objects that could contain various social processes 
simultaneously’. 
 
Much like networks, institutions are conceptually broad and account for a wide array of 
economic and social phenomena that cut across the formal, informal and illegal divides, 
albeit making it challenging to pin down precisely what ‘an’ institution is. The baseline 
definition for informal institutions is a subset of patterns of regularised conduct, or 
‘rules of the game’, which unlike formal institutions are ‘created, communicated, and 
enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels’ (Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 725). 
Informal institutions typically represent ‘patterns of behaviour deriving from pre-
existing forms of public authority’ that continue to be shaped by struggles over power 
and resources and that may compete for legitimacy with formalised state institutions 
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(Meagher 2007: 408-9). Such institutions include, for instance, the British colonial 
system of indirect rule used to extend commercial and political control into Sierra 
Leone’s protectorate during the 1800s, where paramount chiefs continue to exercise 
authority through post-war policies of governance decentralisation. Given the presence 
of multiple sources of authority in West Africa, a ‘legal pluralist’ approach has typically 
been utilised to study non-state modes of regulation and their attendant political 
implications.  
 
Legal pluralism is subject to confusing specification and disagreement over what 
constitutes the core concept of ‘law’ (Tamanaha 2000: 297; 2011: 2). Broadly-speaking, 
the literature recognises that, beyond the nation-state, more than one body of ‘law’ 
exists and that these are systematised through social norms and processes that, for 
example, are involved in the mediation of local disputes and acquisition and 
enforcement of land rights (Griffiths 1986; Santos 1987; Merry 1988). As Benda-
Beckmannn and Benda-Beckmannn (2006: 12) have argued, the concept of law is 
broadened beyond the state to become ‘the summary indication of those objectified 
cognitive and normative conceptions for which validity for a certain social formation is 
authoritatively asserted’. Here, a system of law outside the regulatory framework of the 
state is said to encompass a broad range of social processes that maintain order and 
motivate legitimate conduct, but that are ultimately reducible to the concepts of 
institution, norms and rules that, coupled with the threat of force, represent a kind of 
‘institutionalised norm enforcement’ (Tamanaha 2011: 3-5; 2000: 297; Benda-
Beckmannn and Benda-Beckmann 2006: 22, fn, 22). Legal pluralism also implies a sense 
of identification with and obligation to non-state authority, such that the institutional 
basis of law acts as an ‘enabling and constraining context for social interaction in all 
arenas’ (Benda-Beckmann and Benda-Beckmann 2006: 23). Apprenticeship could be 
characterised in these terms, given the institution lacks codified contracting 
arrangements and referees for managing relations between apprentices and their 
masters, despite the former recognising his obligations to the latter. 
 
However, as the Benda-Beckmannns in a review of the legal pluralism literature admit, 
very few studies consider how informal institutions are reproduced by examining the 
social processes involved in their reproduction, while little theoretical work has, in turn, 
been undertaken to achieve this empirical aim (ibid: 22, fn. 22; also see Emirbayer and 
Goodwin 1994: 1413). This is crucial when observing that ‘not all forms of social control 
are law’, particularly in cases where agents fail to obey rules and where a high degree of 
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uncertainty in the absence of contracting arrangements or enforceable property rights is 
hastily equated with pathological assessments. The latter typically emphasises the 
instrumentalisation of law by elite interests or emergence of violent social organisations 
prone to closure or criminal breakdown (Tamanaha 2000: 298; Martin 2011: 330-2). 
This results because institutional analyses have a tendency to concentrate on the “what” 
of social action and co-ordination in terms of patterns of social behaviour, rather than 
the “why” of how these regularities are intuited and reproduced by agents (Martin 2011; 
Tamanaha 2011: 5). This forecloses attention to how non-state forms of regulation are 
reproduced and altered through the on-going actions and interpretations of the 
individuals that constitute them. As Meagher (2009: 25) has similarly concluded: ‘it is 
not enough to ‘rediscover’ the role of the social; we must ‘problematize the social’ as a 
‘regulatory force’. 
 
Tamanaha (2000: 206) argues, however, that these ‘myriad’ phenomena do share the 
common characteristic of involving ‘rules’, such that informal institutions might be more 
accurately described as a ‘rule system’.19 Rules are either ‘regulative’ or ‘constitutive’ 
(Martin 2011: 295-6). Regulative rules determine how agents should act in a given 
social formation, while constitutive rules determine what agents are acting towards in 
terms of the stakes and goals that motivate their actions. Institutions typically focus on 
the former rather than the latter by relating rules to agents exogenously. Regulative 
rules are the observed products of patterns of regularised conduct. Institutions are, at 
root, ‘simply one particular subset of a more general, and non-problematic, process of 
intuiting patterns’ (Martin 2011: 303). Yet these patterns must be ‘inter-subjectively 
valid’ to agents, meaning they must be constitutive of their action, if they are to be 
willingly adhered to and reproduced in the absence of sanction and violence. Hence, the 
current literature often fails to relate rules to agents endogenously, which begets a focus 
on the point of view of the agents responsible for “doing” the action that is regularised 
and intuited as an inter-subjectively valid patterning of rules.  
 
I therefore follow Martin’s (2011: 303) approach to the explanation of social action and 
agree that a rule is better understood as ‘the alignment of particular action imperatives 
with position’. The positons, in this instance, are marked by social categories such as 
“youth man” and “shareholder” that, in turn, are rooted in unequal distributions of 
economic and social capital. The alignment of an agent’s on-going action and 
                                                        
19 For instance, Benda-Beckmann and Benda-Beckmann (2006: 18) describe a ‘legal system’ as 
foremost being a ‘body of legal rules and regulations conceived of as a totality’.  
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interpretation with these positions is secured according to phenomenologically valid 
experiences of, for instance, appropriateness and requiredness, the character of which 
stems from broader cultural values and social influences. Tamanaha (2000: 314, 
emphasis added) similarly argues that in order to ensure greater conceptual specificity 
in the legal pluralism literature, institutions can be understood as a bundle of inter-
related practices, where each practice represents ‘an activity that constrains aspects of 
both meaning and behaviour, linked together by a loosely shared body of (often 
internally heterogeneous) norms and activities’. This is particularly necessary given 
recent research on cannabis production and exchange has concluded that the 
connection between drugs and violence ‘varies depending on the type of drug and the 
nature of the surrounding culture’, and yet there exists a paucity of studies that engage 
with a phenomenological mode of enquiry to ascertain how the motivations and views 
of drug users and producers relate to and reproduce resulting organisational structures 
and strategies (Copes et al 2015: 32; see also Sandberg 2012).20 Furthermore, I suggest 
it is also analytically prudent to start with individuals, rather than with a pre-defined 
group or pre-existing network of social relations, in order to focus upon the 
transactional relationships between individual members in an activity that may or may 
not adhere to positions within a clearly demarcated and regulated organisational 
structure (Von Lampe 2006: 81, 87-8; also see Levit and Venkatesh 2000). 
 
A focus on the phenomenological alignment of action with position therefore provides 
an alternative entry point for examining how institutions, like apprenticeship, remain 
durable and stable despite the absence of contracting arrangements, certainty over how 
masters will settle, or what the likely returns after being apprenticed might be. By 
understanding that these inter-subjectively valid alignments function as restrictions on 
interaction, it is possible to grasp the emergence of ‘vertical social differentiation among 
persons’ (Martin 2011: 293). The alignment of expectations with chances from the point 
of view, for instance, of the apprentice in relation to his shareholder, is a core theme of 
Pierre Bourdieu’s relational sociology. Bourdieu suggests that this is because his 
underlying aim is to discover how it is possible for ‘behaviours [to] be regulated without 
being the product of rules’ (Lamaison and Bourdieu 1986: 114). What emerges in his 
early sociology is a notion of ‘strategy’ defined in opposition to the rules that constitute 
                                                        
20 The importance of relating a phenomenological mode of inquiry to an examination of social 
structure is not new. For instance, in his seminal study of crack dealers in East Harlem, Philippe 
Bourgois (1995: 3) argues that a mastery of street culture was necessary to navigate ‘a complex 
and conflictual web of beliefs, symbols, modes of interaction, values and ideologies that have 
emerged in the opposition to exclusion from mainstream society’. 
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institutions. A strategy is the product of a particular social game that represents a ‘set of 
regularities in action and interpretation’. According to the game metaphor, there is room 
for improvisation as agents face new circumstances, but that ‘cannot be achieved by 
mechanical obedience to explicit, codified rules’. This is because an agent can play 
according to the rules in agreement with their own interest but also treat the rules “as 
if” they were the case. Consequently: 
 
‘One can speak of a game in order to say that a group of people participate in a regulated 
activity, an activity which, without necessarily being the product of obedience to rules 
obeys certain regularities.’ (ibid: 112-3) 
 
Important when studying the social organisation of illicit production and exchange 
under conditions of uncertainty then, is the examination of an agent’s sense of 
requiredness and validation, particularly as these also relate to the broader socio-
generational categories of youth discussed earlier, which motivate and co-ordinate 
regularised action that is endogenous to an institution. By starting with the relation 
between an individual agent’s experience and their objective position within an 
institution, it is possible to avoid essentialist or pathological analyses that emphasise 
criminalisation, organised violence and exploitative patrimony (Shammas and Sandberg 
2016). I turn to outline this relational sociology in Chapter Two and how it aids an 
analysis of what I term structural advantages. I suggest this requires bridging objectivist 
and subjectivist modes of analysis. In doing so, a relational sociology provides a window 
on how the institution of apprenticeship is reproduced and rendered stable despite 
uncertainties owing to illegality and a lack of self-enforced contracting arrangements 
between apprentices and shareholders.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
1.4. Cultivating Hierarchy: Research Question, Outline and Main Argument 
 
The research question guiding this thesis motivates a sociological analysis focused on 
examining the particular forms of acting, reasoning and thinking that youth acquired 
and practiced as they undertook apprenticeships: 
 
How are structural advantages secured in cannabis production and marketing 
networks, without dominant players limiting contestability by resorting to 
organised violence? 
 
The degree of contestability in illegal markets is an important parameter in the 
question, because, from what I term an objectivist-structuralist viewpoint (see Chapter 
Two), it is the most significant factor determining how and according to what social 
mechanisms producers are organised (see Venkatesh and Levitt 2000; Leeson and 
Rogers 2012: 92). Contestability is determined by the particular entry and exit barriers 
that prospective participants in an illegal market may face on the supply-side. In illegal 
markets, these barriers usually result from the deliberate strategies of dominant players 
to stifle competition, but also include sunk costs, availability and access to appropriate 
skills and technology, and the strength of loyalties between existing buyers and sellers. 
Cannabis markets are assumed to comprise relatively autonomous small-scale 
agriculturalists engaged in near perfect competition because cannabis farming is 
considered to be a highly contestable activity. This is, however, a more specific 
characteristic of domestic cannabis markets in which there is oversupply, a 
susceptibility to ‘hit-and-run’ tactics, and resulting high price competition. On this view, 
cannabis seeds are easily accessible and can be grown in a variety of soils according to 
rudimentary skills that result in negligible differences in quality. These localised 
markets are also relatively illiquid; resulting in a higher proportion of credit-based 
transactions that undermine the accumulation of greater returns to a smaller pool of 
players. 
 
Although these conditions characterise cannabis farming in Sierra Leone’s rural 
provinces, in Western Area a small number of cannabis producers monopolised 
transactions with cross-border exchange partners, while claiming rights of first 
ownership to plots of land. These specific endowments provided a comparative 
advantage, because their greater accumulated returns over time were re-invested to 
enable the expansion of production and incentivised new entrants to join their 
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particular apprenticeship networks. Such developments were unusual in a context 
where agriculture typically suffered from low yields that undermined labour 
productivity, which in turn motivated the continuation of more coercive labour 
arrangements, such as customary authorities, to reduce the ratio of costs to yields and 
extract a profit (Cartier and Bürge 2011: 1083-4). The resulting market in Western Area 
was, however, not organised through overtly coercive labour relations, yet remained 
characterised by oligopolistic competition, in which only a small number of players 
accrued the greatest returns. Given that the use of violence can be costly towards 
achieving this end, Reuter and Kleiman (1986: 310) argue that cannabis is typically 
farmed in accordance with a ‘mercenary strategy’ during times of price depression in 
otherwise higher value legal cash crops. Entry barriers are assumed to be low, allowing 
cannabis production to be utilised as a fall back livelihood strategy. It is, for instance, 
common to argue in this context that criminal firms are not capable of growing in size, 
with only some mature markets capable of comprising multiple mini-monopolies 
(Bouchard et al 2009). 
  
These dominant firms are also understood to have succeeded by having behaved 
strategically. Strongmen lead in developing a hierarchical organisation that enables the 
use of credible threats of inter-personal violence against rivals who might otherwise, for 
example, capture cross-border exchange partners, invade more productive farms or 
engage in corruption by colluding with state-mandated enforcers of violence directed 
against competitors. However, the privileging of strategic behaviour misses how, in 
other contexts, prospective rivals are already the dependents of incumbent firms, rather 
than independent actors making relatively autonomous decisions with regards to entry 
strategy and pricing behaviour. In the case of Western Area, the founding farmers of the 
1980s and 1990s took on young men to work as apprentices, some of which 
transitioned to become de facto journeymen renting plots of land on the same farm as 
their former master. This resulted in the emergence of a number of firm-like social 
groupings, in which an upper tier referred to as “shareholders” presided over a lower 
tier of workers who were, initially, apprentices following their commands. Threats of 
violence or deliberate collusion were not overt features of this arrangement, contrary to 
the assumptions of two-tiered hierarchical models of criminal actors that were shown to 
be prevalent in the organised crime literature (Rogers and Leeson 2012: 90-91). 
 
Although Western Area comprised a small number of dominant farmers who ostensibly 
exercised control over the market, I take the threat of price competition posed by 
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potential rivals as being independent of an incumbent’s strategic decisions to raise entry 
and exit barriers. This also involves holding equal “innocent” barriers to entry based on 
the existing endowments of incumbents that do not comprise an explicit strategy for 
denying entry. At root, the theoretical motivation of the research question is to discard 
with rational choice models underpinning the economics of organised crime, in favour 
of a practice-based theory of action based on social learning. This is detailed in Chapter 
Three. 
 
Having framed the research question in this way, the analysis can proceed by focusing 
on how endogenous factors determine market structure. Endogenous factors relate to 
the institutional context of cannabis production and marketing, such as the social 
relations between bosses and apprentices, informal rules governing access to land, and 
the schemes of valuation enacted by participants. These factors are taken as being 
primarily responsible for reproducing an oligopolistic market structure in the absence of 
organised violence or collusion with a unitary and corrupt police force. For instance, the 
time required undertaking an apprenticeship can be translated as an incurred sunk cost 
that prevents the quick exit necessary for a hit-and-run or mercenary strategy to be 
successful. As such, the research question begins with the view that market incumbent’s 
fear of competition, and prospective responses to deal with this fear, are already largely 
discounted by rivals perceiving that they must participate in apprenticeships. 
 
It is, therefore, the motivation of the research question to understand how 
apprenticeship is taken to be an agreeable and meaningful course of action, and how it 
shapes the on-going practices of those participating in them. This avenue of enquiry is 
used to determine the structural effect apprenticeship has on cannabis production and 
marketing, and why a hierarchical structure continues to be reproduced. It is therefore 
in accordance with the structural effects on youth’s participation in apprenticeship, in 
terms of the particular forms of acting, reasoning, and valuing they acquire and 
reproduce through on-going practice, that I use the term structural advantage. Moving 
forward, the research question is tackled by identifying boss-apprentice relations as a 
case of what I refer to as the reproduction of structural advantage in the economic field of 
cannabis cultivation and exchange and the juridical field of law-enforcement. 
 
In Chapter Two: Cultivating Hierarchy: The Conceptual Approach I turn to discuss 
Pierre Bourdieu’s relational sociology. The concept of economic field is derived from 
Bourdieu’s late theoretical work on economic sociology, in which he privileges a 
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‘structural vision’ of economic activity and organisation against dominant economic 
models based on methodological individualism. In addition, I elaborate on what he 
refers to as ‘open concepts’ in order to reconceptualise violence as endogenous to the 
institution of apprenticeship, rather than violence being treated as an overt strategy. 
Furthermore, rather than being guided by an interactionist vision that embeds on-going 
action in inter-personal relations, Bourdieu’s structural vision suggests that “relations” 
are instead found between different positions within organised fields of activity. These 
fields are organised in terms of how encounters between shareholders, their 
apprentices and law-enforcers are foreshadowed, perceived and valued. Bourdieu’s 
open concepts, especially illusio, misrecognition and symbolic violence, are fleshed out 
to guide analysis during the empirical chapters and examine what I refer to as the 
reproduction of structural advantage. The shareholders secured a structural advantage 
as gatekeepers to economic capital in cash-money, land and labour. Structural 
advantages needed to be reproduced. By entering into apprenticeships that were 
recognised by youth as legitimate competence, I argue that shareholders were able to 
affirm a sleight of hand that these advantages were rooted in.  
 
In Chapter Three: Going inside the game, I outline how apprenticeship was identified 
as a site for the reproduction of structural advantages and the process by which I 
entered the field, paying attention to ethics, positionality, reflexivity and the politics of 
how illicit drug economies are represented when writing about them. Having sought to 
bridge sociological and anthropological methodologies, I detail a number of objectivist 
and subjectivist techniques of data collection used during field research in the peninsula 
towns of Hastings and Waterloo from December 2012 to December 2013. Rather than 
following the conceptual shortcomings of the objectivist-structuralist approach, and 
taking care to protect against a more naïve representation of social reality offered by the 
subjectivist-constructivist approach, I build on Bourdieu’s sociology to develop a 
methodological avenue I refer to as social aesthetics: the examination of qualitative 
experience tied to a particular point of view in the overlapping economic and juridical 
fields. By coordinating the particular forms of acting, reasoning and valuing of 
cultivators and dealers in structurally unequal positions, what I refer to as ‘practices’, 
social aesthetics provides a window onto the reproduction of structural advantage, 
without recourse to direct intervention by a higher authority.  
 
In Chapter Four: Chain Work, I examine the historical origins and contemporary 
characteristics of apprenticeship as a means of organising labour, in addition to chain 
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work as an inter-related complex arrangement of production and marketing networks. 
Sierra Leone’s apprenticing system was utilised under British colonialism during late-
1700s Evangelical Christian efforts to challenge slavery by transforming young 
recaptured slaves from unproductive and idle to productive wage labourers. After 
independence, apprenticeship continued to represent an important means for the 
under-educated to receive training and access employment in a range of informal 
enterprises. I argue that, in relation to small-scale agriculture, a system of ‘apprentice 
provisioning’ represented an institutional adaptation to control labour in the service of 
capital accumulation. Furthermore, having been displaced by the US-led War on Drugs 
in the 1970s and 1980s, I discuss how Jamaican cultivators migrated to Sierra Leone and 
introduced higher yielding seed varieties and new growing techniques that provided the 
more established shareholders in Hastings and Waterloo with a competitive advantage 
over newer cultivators. I argue that apprenticeship provided youth with strong 
economic incentives. However, the absence of contracting arrangements and referees 
meant apprentices were subject to uncertainty and exposed to attempts by shareholders 
to exploit them for cheap labour. Meanwhile, journeymen remained trapped in low-
margin domestic markets with limited opportunities for land ownership. 
 
The chapter then shifts to an objectivist mode of analysis to map out the topography of 
advantages in production and exchange relations enjoyed by these more established 
cultivators. By examining the characteristics of price competition between cultivators 
within and across several clusters of production, in addition to the production 
hierarchies through which labour was organised, I demonstrate that the shareholders 
benefited from structural advantages as gatekeepers in access to economic and social 
capital. The chapter concludes by introducing Bourdieu’s (2005) concept of economic 
field to explain how shareholders secured their more dominant position without 
recourse to organised violence, motivating a closer, subjectivist examination of 
apprenticeship through which structural advantages were being reproduced in the 
linking of economic field and apprentice habitus.  
 
In Chapter Five: The Game, I begin to link field and habitus to argue that youths’ 
subjective expectations to, as they put it, “find their own lane in life” were realigned by 
their respective shareholders to the more reasonable goals of owning land, building a 
house and providing for the household against a stylised Western modernity. The 
chapter draws on life histories to examine the emergence of a folk cosmology 
comprising Rastafari and Neo-Evangelist values that differentiated cannabis cultivation 
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as a righteous pursuit requiring hard labour. The readjustment of expectations rested on 
the shareholders’ ability to deceive and conceal their cynicism that the future was more 
uncertain. Apprentice cultivators misrecognised certain characteristics for what was 
required to succeed and claim masculine authority. Unlike the narrow concept of 
economic interest, I utilise what Bourdieu refers to as the ‘illusio’, and argue that 
cannabis cultivation had psychological as well as economic payoffs found in the 
intermediary social category of “youth man”. This commitment to righteous labour 
motivated what practices were possible. 
 
In Chapter Six: Apprenticeship, I focus on apprenticeship in the relations between 
shareholders, apprentices and journeymen as the site at which structural advantages in 
access to cultural, economic and social capital were reproduced. By organising labour in 
this way, apprenticeships facilitated collective “learning by doing”. Apprentice 
cultivators learned how to cultivate, how to establish new exchange partners, and how 
to value cannabis in ways that came to be taken as legitimate competence. The chapter 
examines the emic practices of “sababu” [obtaining the support of an influential person] 
and “grade” [evaluating the quality of cannabis herb] that resulted from these 
apprenticeships. Sababu represented the imperative in a context of scarcity to establish 
relationships with a person of influence who could provide new opportunities. Despite 
having functional importance for facilitating recurrent exchange, the chapter argues that 
apprentices and journeymen perceived and valued social relations in a one-sided way 
that ensured the shareholders retained more-or-less exclusive access to the highest 
value cross-border exchange partners. This was indexed by unequal positions within the 
economic field. When cultivators negotiated the quality of cannabis for sale their 
valuation related more to expectation based on social position. Sababu worked through 
a moral rhetoric by which apprentices and journeymen reasoned that hard work, 
honesty and an ascetic commitment to the “strain” of hard labour were the 
characteristics most likely to obtain new opportunities and become a successful 
cultivator. The chapter thereby concludes that apprenticeship and resulting 
commitment to “sabi the game” ensured these emic practices operated as principles that 
regulated the possibility of converting social into economic capital, thereby limiting 
chances of succeeding. 
 
The final part of the research question entails an examination of how cultivators and 
dealers established extra-legal relations with law enforcement such that the ‘official’ 
rule of law was enacted in relation to some participants in the cannabis economy but not 
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others. In Chapter Seven: Raiding, I focus on encounters between law-breakers and 
enforcers and argue that those occupying structurally disadvantaged positions within 
the economic field were subject to criminalised categories and targeted by the police 
who disrupted their activities. Turning to Bourdieu’s concept of the juridical field, as 
outlined in Chapter Three (2.5), law-enforcers drew on the seeming autonomy of the 
state and enforced the law selectively based on local distinctions regarding what 
counted as permissible and impermissible activity. Apprentices and journeymen 
reasoned that by being righteous labourers, and not idle or unproductive, that they 
would not be subject to this criminalising discourse.  
 
I argue that the dynamics of law enforcement began to change following the 
introduction of TOCU. The hardening of distinctions between law enforcers and 
breakers placed these extra-legal relations under stress and cultivators increasingly 
relied on more formalised arrangements of what they referred to as “haju”: giving a little 
something for something in return.21 This secured police protection but its efficacy 
depended on economic capital rather than personal character. As another covert 
principle of convertibility, this practice relied on the commoditisation of not-so-secret 
information. I explain how cannabis cultivation and dealing was synonymous with 
public secrecy: knowing the facts but not being able to articulate them as such. Rather 
than secrecy being related to the privacy of closed groups attempting to conceal their 
activities from law enforcement, public secrecy mattered for how certain knowledge 
was interpreted and how secrecy foreshadowed encounters between law enforcers and 
breakers in terms of what could and could not be said with efficacy. The chapter argues 
that public secrecy created scarcity in information concerning illegal activity that was 
widely known. The market for this information worked as an additional principle of 
convertibility that secured the structural advantages enjoyed by shareholders. 
 
In everyday encounters with shareholders and law-enforcers, the emic practices of 
sababu, grade and haju formed a triptych regulating opportunities to access economic 
capital that otherwise had been secured by a sleight of hand. By participating in 
apprenticeships that rendered particular ways of acting, reasoning and valuing as 
correct and legitimate, and that in doing so garnered social value as a righteous 
                                                        
21 “Haju” is a Krio term; probably a phonetic contraction of the English (1600s to 1800s) phrase 
“pay dues” or “pay your dues”, meaning an obligation (i.e. to owe somebody) to make payment 
that is fitting or rightful. The phrase was used, for instance, in the payment of “dues” for 
transporting cargo on merchant ships and the payment required of early 1800s apprentices to 
rent land on plantation estates in the Americas and West Indies. It can therefore be understood 
as the need “to do something that you do not enjoy in order to have something that you want”.  
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somebody, apprentices and journeymen clung to the expectation that they could claim 
masculine authority in a context of scarcity in opportunities for gaining a stable income. 
By recognising themselves to be working as righteous somebodies, these young men 
also misrecognised that they reproduced the structural advantages enjoyed by their 
respective shareholders. In turn, journeymen attempting to become shareholders 
privately held a more cynical view of their efforts and as such needed to “bluff bluff” 
[deceive, fool] relations with their new apprentices. This resulted in the regulation of 
the cannabis economy through symbolic violence rather than recourse to direct 
intervention against challengers and protection of transactions through the organised 
and credible threat of violence. 
 
The conclusion of this thesis, Chapter Eight: Reproducing Structural Advantage 
outlines empirical contributions and raises theoretical implications for the study of 
youths’ participation in illicit economies in sub-Saharan Africa. Namely, it discusses how 
Bourdieu’s open concepts, particularly illusio, misrecognition and symbolic violence, in 
addition to recent developments in field theory towards a social aesthetics, provide new 
tools for examining domination. I argue that the concept of structural advantage is 
useful for examining the durability and reproduction of institutions in contexts 
characterised by uncertainty. By using a mixed methodology and elaborating on 
Bourdieu’s conceptual tools, I argue it is possible to understand how social order can be 
established and maintained in contexts that have otherwise been characterised as more 
uncertain and volatile.  
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Chapter Two: Cultivating Hierarchy: The Conceptual Approach 
 
2.1. Introduction: Turning to Bourdieu’s open concepts 
 
Pierre Bourdieu’s scholarly work has ranged from anthropological studies of the 
Algerian Kabyle to the sociological study of class reproduction in French society. Tracing 
the development of Bourdieu’s conceptual toolbox there is a productive iteration 
between anthropology, a discipline that tends to emphasise conceptual eclecticism and a 
subjectivist approach drawing cases from the context of the Global South, in contrast to 
the conceptual parsimony of sociology that draws primarily from the Global North 
(Calhoun 2006; Burawoy and von Holdt 2012: 1-2). With this in mind, Bourdieu’s 
project is fundamentally concerned with bridging what he recognised as a false meta-
theoretical and methodological dichotomy in the social sciences between ‘objectivist-
structuralist’ and ‘subjectivist-constructivist’ approaches (Bourdieu 2003: 285, 2006: 
72-8; Bourdieu 1986: 14-5; see also Brubaker 1985: 746-7, 749-753).  
 
Objectivist-structuralist approaches, synonymous with ‘models’, ‘rules’ and ‘structures’ 
operate from a position outside an agent’s experience, exemplified by structuralism, in 
addition to the behaviourism and functionalism of networks and institutions in 
economic sociology. These conceptual approaches privilege the material conditions of 
social life as autonomous from and working on the agent in an overly determinist 
fashion. The approach typically relies on mechanistic models of causality comprising 
externally determined ‘self’-interests, which, in more sophisticated approaches, are held 
to be constrained by institutions and norms (Beckert 1996: 827-9; Bourdieu 2006: 73). 
Such approaches fail to establish how on-going action is rendered meaningful and why, 
even when courses of action appear to contradict a ‘rational’ means-ends relationship, 
agents come to invest in their activity and reproduce their otherwise disadvantaged 
position. The ‘reality’ of the model is, in short, located outside the head of the agent, 
providing ‘second-best’ explanations that ‘slip from the model of reality to the reality of 
the model’ (Bourdieu 2006: 30). 
 
Subjectivist-constructivist approaches, including phenomenology, privilege beliefs and 
conceptions from the point of view of experience in the world and argue that action is 
dependent on mind and agent, and adherence to a ‘creative free will [… that] reduce[s] 
the objective intentions and constituted significations of actions and works to conscious 
and deliberate intentions of their authors’ (ibid). Social reality is reduced to the 
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representations agents have of it and implies a certain view of social ‘reality’ is shared 
by agents (Bourdieu 1989: 14-5). Agents in the subjectivist view act reasonably rather 
than causally in the stricter sense of the objectivist-structuralist approaches. In doing so, 
this approach struggles to explain how any apparent breakdown in rationality comes to 
be reasonable to an agent during their on-going experience of that reality. Youth are 
afforded a higher degree of agency in ‘navigating’ their social environment and bridging 
social difference, despite their social world being represented as somewhat more 
uncertain and volatile given an absence of attention to social structures that are 
arguably less visible, more complex and highly differentiated (cf. Simone 2004; Johnson-
Hanks 2005; Vigh 2006, 2009). As Bourdieu (1990b: 42) remarks, ‘the world of action is 
[treated as] nothing more than [an] imaginary universe of interchanging possibles’. 
Bourdieu also claims that when privileging the individual and their interpretation of 
reality there lacks a conceptual approach for examining how extra-discursive, symbolic 
relations of power shape how agents act, reason and perceive in ways that are 
meaningful even if these practices are in the service of those who dominate them. It is 
often the case, therefore, that the subjectivist-constructivist approach ‘excludes[s] the 
question of the conditions of its own possibility’ (Bourdieu 2006: 3).  
 
To bridge this gap Bourdieu developed a relational sociological approach that he 
characterised as ‘constructivist structuralism or structuralist constructivism’ (1989: 
14). This project has sought to move beyond the impasse between objectivist-
structuralist and subjectivist-constructivist approaches, which he held to be 
‘dialectically linked’ (ibid: 15). Bourdieu's sociology entails a conceptual shift to the 
relations between the individual agent and the social structure in which they are 
positioned (Wacquant 1987: 74-5). This avoids remaining trapped in the ‘interactionist 
vision’ of ‘relations’ (Bourdieu 2005: 76; Emirbayer and Johnson 2008: 9-10) whereby 
the criminal network literature conceptualise ‘relational ties’ as inter-personal and 
formed ‘among interacting units’ (McIlwaine 1999: 305). As Martin (2009: 14) argues, 
there is no philosophically sound reason to lend conceptual primacy to social relations 
or ‘ties’ in the interactionist sense at the expense of the individual agent.  
 
A structuralist-constructivism has two theoretical pillars. First, social structures are 
taken to be objective from the point-of-view of the agent and lie in the distribution of 
different forms of capital within a field of organised activity. Second, social structures 
are inter-subjective in the lived experience of agents, indicative of symbolic systems that 
advance particular modes of classification, appreciation and valuation that agents rely 
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upon to make sense of what is happening in everyday life. These two pillars refer to 
Bourdieu’s concern with the ‘intrinsically double nature of social life’ (Brubaker 1985: 
750). The linking of each pillar is motivated by the need to understand how social 
structure is internalised in the mind of the agent with the recognition that action is 
‘shaped as much by unconscious, habitual, taken-for-granted dispositions as by 
conscious intentions and world views’ (Jackson 1998: 9). Through this process of 
internalisation, referred to as the ‘habitus’, agents reproduce particular forms of action, 
appreciation and judgement, which in turn produce regularities that the researcher-as-
observer objectively identifies as a regularised and patterned field of activity. Bourdieu 
also argues against a tendency to abstract market exchange and ‘embed’ it in on-going 
social relations. Instead, the concept of economy equates more closely to an ‘economy of 
practices’ (Bourdieu 1990b: 123, 124-8; Lebaron 2004: 552). The methodological 
avenue of this alternative conceptual approach requires examining what agents do, as 
well as what they say, in order to grasp why, not just how, the practices agents invest in 
through their on-going activity come to be reproduced. Agents do not blindly follow 
rules or norms, nor do they automatically engage in the kind of rational calculation 
advanced by economic formalists. Action is instead based on a practical sense of how to 
operate within a field of activity such that fields are relatively autonomous with each 
entailing its own set of practices or “common-sense” way of going about things.  
 
By drawing on this relational sociology I piece together a conceptual approach that 
examines the establishment of hierarchy through what I refer to as the reproduction of 
structural advantage.22 The subjectivist approach, synonymous with ethnography, is to 
be rooted in fields of activity that, having been structured and re-structured according 
to unequal distributions of capital, provide some agents with an advantage over others. 
Structural advantages relate to objective inequalities in access to economic capital (land, 
labour and high value exchange partners) and as a social construction in terms, for 
example, of distinctions between “youth”, “youth man” and “shareholder”. The 
experience of participating in apprenticeship corresponds with a social aesthetics: 
qualitative experience from the point of view of an individual who assumes a particular 
position-taking within an organised field of activity (Martin 2011: 314-5). Given that 
youths’ subjective expectations were, from the point of view of the researcher, usually 
incongruent with the objective chances they had of succeeding in the cannabis economy, 
                                                        
22 The importance played by the notion of ‘hierarchy’ in Bourdieu’s sociology is most obvious in 
his discussion of economic organisation outside the legal framework of the state (Bourdieu 1977: 
183-197, see Modes of Domination). 
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social aesthetics provides an approach for examining how action corresponded with the 
position apprentice cultivators assumed at the bottom of their respective production 
hierarchies. In doing so, the chapter provides a conceptual approach for examining how 
structural advantages enjoyed by shareholders were reproduced through the on-going 
action of the dominated, without their direction intervention. Relational sociology 
provides a conceptual toolbox to examine the reproduction of structural advantage in 
both economic and social terms, while paying attention to more covert, extra-discursive 
processes that are attuned to how the unequal chances of participants came to be 
congruent with their more optimistic expectations. This chapter now turns to discuss 
‘open concepts’. 
 
2.2. Open concepts 
 
The conceptual approach for examining the reproduction of structural advantage makes 
use of a mode of theoretical enquiry that Bourdieu terms ‘open concepts’. Open concepts 
provide a perspective from which the researcher views and interprets social reality. It 
provides a set of conceptual lenses that are used to interpret an agent’s experience of 
reality in relation to their objective social position, and reflexively, to be aware of the 
researcher’s own position in making this interpretation and in representing the reality 
of agents (Abend 2008). This enables a relational analysis attuned to covert forms of 
domination and violence from the perspective of the agent, without falling into a false 
dichotomy between objectivist and subjectivist approaches (Bourdieu & Wacquant 
1992: 96-7). Open concepts are used to examine the reproduction of structural 
advantages from the position of those who are disadvantaged (Leander 2008: 15). 
Leander (2008) argues these represent ‘thinking tools’ to be taken into the field and 
operationalised in order to attune the researcher to domination and violence, helping to 
grapple with how agents conform to hierarchy and thereby reproduce it, albeit not in 
terms of their explicit acquiescence. Being ‘armed’ with these thinking tools requires 
challenging the perceptions of researcher and researched by moving reflexively 
between an agent’s representation of reality, their position within a field, and the 
researcher’s representation of this relation (Wacquant 2014b: 119). 
 
This iterative process is complex and time-consuming for as Bourdieu argues, 
domination works most effectively when research subjects are somewhat disinterested 
or articulate common place understandings of their situation. Thinking tools provide a 
conceptual starting point from which to interrogate why those ‘losing’ from the point of 
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view of an objective model continue none-the-less to pursue a particular course of 
action and engage in practices they perceive to be meaningful. Consequently, I treat the 
concepts of field, habitus, practices and symbolic violence as inseparable and operating 
within the same theoretical system: ‘put[ting it] to work empirically in systematic 
fashion’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996: 96).23 Open concepts guide empirical analysis 
and necessitate the reconstruction of Bourdieu’s sociology (Abend 2008: 182). Although 
Bourdieu’s studies of the Algerian peasantry represent an exception that I draw on in 
what follows, critique of these concepts is necessary because they have often been 
interpreted in relation to Bourdieu’s engagement with well-established and striated 
fields – such as French class society – that has restricted attention to the more plural 
relationships between concepts in his wider tool box. 
 
2.3. Fields, Games, and Capital 
 
Much like youths’ claim that they were “going inside the game” to undertake 
apprenticeships, Bourdieu has argued that fields are analogous to games (Bourdieu 
1990: 64; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996: 98-100). Fields comprise a social space of 
structured and objective positions assumed by concrete agents who share a common 
stake – or ‘common commitment’ (Wacquant 1987: 72) – to participate and play the 
game according to an uneven distribution of economic, social and cultural capital. Fields 
of organised activity are relatively autonomous from each other and the positions 
marked out within them are the products of particular social and historical processes 
that endow each field with a particular logic. There are as many fields as there are 
reasons for agents to participate in them. Fields are structured according to the 
relations between the different positions that agents occupy. They are not composites of 
interpersonal relations of interaction and cooperation between agents (Bourdieu 1986: 
16; Emirbayer and Johnson 2008: 6). This important distinction between the position of 
concrete individuals, and the positions to-be-taken and reproduced, requires thinking 
not in empiricist terms of observable social interactions, but instead in terms of how 
agents come to ‘take’, claim and reason from a particular position, and play the game in 
such a way that reproduces inequalities within the field.  
 
                                                        
23 Reflecting on Bourdieu’s early studies of the Kabyle in Algeria, Wacquant (2014b: 123-4) 
suggests, however, that habitus can be deployed independently in empirical analysis, especially 
where their lacks a well-organised field of activity. 
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Each position-taking corresponds with the unevenly distributed resources that agents 
have accumulated; what Bourdieu refers to as ‘species of capital’. Capital is deployed in 
an on-going struggle over the principles that construct and reproduce the field, usually 
in favour of the dominant (Bourdieu 1998a: 3). Fields are not simply shorthand for 
‘social context’ (Wacquant 2014b: 125). Neither does the field concept substitute for a 
network of inter-dependencies and the visible interactions and conflicts between them. 
Rather, the field offers the image of a social space comprising positions to-be-taken, each 
marked by the unequal accumulation and resulting distribution of capital, which is 
perceived and valued in ways corresponding to unequal ‘objective’ positions. When 
competing with each other, agents seek to accumulate and use capital in defence of their 
position and during attempts to challenge the position of others. 
 
Three types of capital: economic, cultural and social, are perceived and valued according 
to the distribution of a fourth distinct kind, symbolic capital, which regulates the 
recognition of each species of capital as socially valuable and convertible into different 
forms (Brubaker 1985: 755). The convertibility, or ‘fungibility’, of different types of 
capital is generative of strategies used by the dominant to accumulate and utilise that 
capital. In doing so, this reproduces their position within the field. Symbolic capital 
accounts for how these different forms of capital are liable to be misrecognised and 
objectified in line with the dominant that ‘try to conserve a particular distribution and 
form of capital, while the dominated attempt to subvert this order’ (Emirbayer and 
Johnson 2008: 11). The appreciation and perception of capital corresponds to an agent’s 
position-taking, which may also be used as a resource to challenge the dominant.  
 
Economic capital represents accumulated human labour and access to it (money, credit, 
land, institutionalised property rights etc.) provides dominant players with a ‘structural 
advantage’ (Bourdieu 1986). Economic capital is convertible into other forms of capital, 
and vice versa, according to particular principles of convertibility that are specific to the 
culture and history of the field, such that capital is objectified and socially recognised as 
useful and valuable in particular ways. When structural advantages in access to 
economic capital are secured by the dominant, the dominated are less likely to challenge 
the organisation of the field and the on-going accumulation of and convertibility 
between capitals according to which these positions are being reproduced. 
 
Cultural capital relates to socially recognised and/or institutionalised expertise and 
skill. It is convertible into economic capital according to particular principles of 
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convertibility. Bourdieu claims that cultural capital exists in three states: embodied, 
objectified and institutionalised. Embodied capital refers to an agent’s mastery of how to 
act and interact in ways recognised as being socially valuable, and is closely related to 
the concepts of habitus and practices (Sandberg 2008: 156). The objectified state is 
cultural capital congealed in objects, such as cannabis product, the value of which is 
adjudicated according to an agent’s position within the field in relation to others. Finally, 
the institutionalised state – synonymous with “the system” – underpins the embodied 
and objectified states, indicating rules and technologies used to reproduce the utility of 
some forms of cultural capital over others, such as the utility of certain academic 
disciplines within the education system or predominance of a particular kind of 
economic theory within the financial sector. In his later work, cultural capital is treated 
as a sub-type of informational capital but also as a substitute in response to criticism of 
his allegedly narrow focus on high culture (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996: 19). 
 
Bourdieu (1986) provides a specific definition and interpretation of what the wider 
sociological literature refers to as social capital: the ‘possession of a more or less 
durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance 
and recognition’. Who you know matters and depends on the recognition of certain 
social relationships as more ‘useful’ than others. These relations are socially constructed 
and require a high degree of sociability, time and effort, in addition to investments of 
cultural and economic capital, to establish new relationships and ensure they remain 
durable. While more dominant agents are liable to perceive and use social capital 
instrumentally, self-interest is not taken-for-granted as an analytical starting point. 
Social capital provides access to resources possessed by others. The nature of the social 
relationship determines the value of the resources being accessed (Portes 1998: 4). By 
accumulating social capital agents gain access to, for instance, new markets and lending 
arrangements (economic capital), to advice and expertise (embodied cultural capital) 
that, because of repeated interaction and various modes of officialisation can be 
institutionalised. Social capital therefore secures and re-secures the position of 
dominant players according to their past accumulation of social capital and the schemes 
of recognition on the part of the dominated that have emerged to correspond with the 
dominant’s vision of how relationships should be broached and adjudicated. Social 
capital is, therefore, inherently exclusionary, opposed to phenomenological approaches 
that emphasise inter-subjective agreement and the productive capacity of social 
relationships to enhance social mobility and establish connections across difference. 
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The distribution of capital within a field corresponds to the unequal positions of agents 
within it, that, in turn, determine who has the potential to continually reproduce their 
more dominant position, and importantly, to (re)produce the position of those less 
dominant. The potential to succeed in a field depends on the volume and composition of 
capital that agents are endowed with, in addition to how capital is adjudicated according 
to an agent’s position within it. The ‘accumulated labour’ of the dominant in trying to 
conserve a particular distribution and interpretation of capital limits the possibilities 
open to the dominated to subvert the organisation of the field (Emirbayer and Johnson 
2008: 11).  
 
Capital is something you not only possess but also do. It is accumulated in both its 
objectified, material form and in an ‘embodied’ or incorporated form that relates to how 
agents perceive and value the different kinds of capital they are trying to accumulate. 
Rather than interpreting capital as a resource that is ‘held’ or ‘possessed’, its utility lies 
in how other agents come to recognise its status, value and worth, which limits the 
accumulation of and convertibility into other kinds of capital necessary to challenge the 
dominant. While all kinds of capital are liable to be accumulated self-interestedly, 
Bourdieu is not formalist. Rather, particular fields are reproduced according to 
particular interests depending on the history of contestation and struggle that has 
resulted in the formation of that field. Empirical work is therefore necessary to examine 
how capital is objectively distributed and how the adjudication and valuation of these 
different species of capital corresponds with their degree of convertibility into other 
forms. Vice versa, an unequal distribution of capital can work to limit subversion of the 
social constructions and principles of differentiation that structure the field. To grasp 
the reproduction of structural advantage requires both objectivist and subjectivist 
modes of analysis that are attentive to the particular history and cultural logic of a field, 
and how this logic has come to regulate participation in it. 
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2.4. The juridical field and the post-colonial state 
 
Bourdieu has produced a theoretical account of the state (see Bourdieu 1998a: 35-63; 
Bourdieu 2014), but it is not utilised in full here, instead I draw selectively on the open 
concepts of juridical field and capital. This is because Bourdieu’s analysis was primarily 
concerned with the French state and a tight relationship between class structure and 
habitus. The state is defined as: 
 
‘An X (to be determined) which successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use 
of physical and symbolic violence over a definite territory and over the totality of the 
corresponding population (Bourdieu 1998a: 40)’. 
 
Relying on Bourdieu’s extension of Weber’s conceptualisation of the bureaucratic state 
is unsuitable in the context of the Sierra Leonean post-colonial state given primacy is 
attributed to a legitimate monopoly over physical and symbolic violence.24 Bureaucratic 
power results in a monopoly over the accumulation of ‘informational capital’ by, for 
example, utilising surveys, taxation and cartography (Bourdieu 1994: 7-8). This 
monopoly is, however, incomplete in the context of Sierra Leone, which is characterised 
by the ‘hybrid governance’ of a range of non-state actors such as customary authorities, 
secret societies and youth organisations that have largely been understood in relation to 
the concepts of legal pluralism and informal institutions (see Chapter One, 1.3.2). These 
non- and extra-state organisations provide security (Meagher 2012; Albrecht 2015: 
613-4) and often benefit from the hybrid legitimacy of ‘public’ rather than solely state 
authority without recourse to the use of sanctions (Logan 2013; also see Lund 2006, 
2007), both in cooperation with and in opposition to the state with important political 
and economic implications. As argued previously, these approaches focus on regulative 
rather than constitutive rules, such that it is unclear how rule systems are reproduced 
from the point of view of agents, especially in contexts characterised by uncertainty. It 
is, furthermore, necessary to conduct a micro-sociology attuned to the relative 
autonomy of agents of the state, such as the police, during their encounters with law-
breakers without conflating these agents with the state itself. To examine the 
reproduction of structural advantages I consider the relationship between the economic 
field of cannabis cultivation and exchange and the state by starting with Bourdieu’s 
(2006: 183-197) discussion of ‘modes of domination’. This concept emerged from 
Bourdieu’s field studies concerning the reproduction of social order where the state, 
                                                        
24 I address symbolic violence in section 2.8.2. 
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including the educational system and judiciary, have been weak or absent. In this sense, 
the field of cannabis cultivation and exchange is relatively autonomous but overlaps 
with the juridical field of law enforcement.  
 
Recent micro-sociological studies of law-enforcement in West Africa have examined 
how the police enforce the ‘official’ law in some situations but not others by 
purposefully negotiating the boundary between ‘state’ and ‘society’ during their 
encounters with law breakers (Beek 2012: 554).25 Eschewing a distinction between 
legal formalism, whereby the law is held as autonomous from the social world, and legal 
instrumentalism, whereby the law remains in the service of dominant groups, Bourdieu 
(1987) introduces the concept of juridical field. In practice, the juridical field is 
somewhat autonomous from society and functions according to ‘specific power relations 
which give it its structure and which order the competitive struggles’ within it, in 
addition to an ‘internal logic’ that foreshadows and structures encounters between law-
enforcers and breakers when participating in that field. As American legal realists and 
legal pluralist scholars have similarly argued, the law is closely tied to and produced by 
other fields and practices, albeit operating in a seemingly autonomous and impersonal 
fashion. Bourdieu argues that participants in the juridical field, such as the police, 
benefit from its performative logic (ibid: 838). By harnessing ‘juridical capital’ law 
enforcers use their officialdom to impress a particular vision of order onto fields that the 
juridical field of law enforcement overlaps (Bourdieu 1989: 22). The law’s ‘deceptive 
appearance of autonomy’ (Bourdieu 1987: 808) results from its impersonality and 
neutrality by which: 
 
‘Substantive – as opposed to procedural – decisions publicly formulated by authorized agents 
acting on behalf of the collectivity, are magical acts which succeed because they have the power to 
make themselves universally recognized. They thus succeed in creating a situation in which no 
one can refuse or ignore the point of view, the vision, which they impose.’ (ibid: 838) 
 
Juridical capital represents a tool used by agents of the state to intervene in and regulate 
other fields by criminalising and delegitimising particular social categories and practices 
                                                        
25 This point of departure does not necessitate the blurring of a conceptual distinction between 
informal and illegal modes of regulation (e.g. see Meagher 2010). Rather, I begin with ‘boundary 
work’ as one of few approaches addressing policing in West Africa that considers the experience 
of law enforcement during encounters between law breakers and enforcers. As I argue in Chapter 
Seven, institutional changes to law enforcement in Sierra Leone hardened the distinction 
between law enforcers and breakers. This suggested the ability to ‘blur’ distinctions between 
legal and illegal was a privileged resource for those cultivators and dealers, such as the original 
‘shareholders’ of the mid-1980s, who were more dominant.  
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(ibid: 839). Given juridical capital is unequally accumulated, an objectivist analysis of the 
resulting juridical field – by, for example, using the tools of network analysis (Chapter 
Seven, 7.5) – informs a subjectivist analysis of how law-enforcers and breakers deemed 
who was criminal and who was not during their encounters. In doing so it is possible to 
link the juridical field to the economic field and examine the rationales that determine 
the degree of blurring between law enforcers and law breakers, in addition to the 
practices through which access to juridical capital was regulated. The concepts of 
juridical field and capital are therefore necessary in order to further examine the 
reproduction of structural advantage. 
 
2.5. Symbolic Capital 
 
Symbolic capital is a central concept in Bourdieu’s toolbox. It determines the degree to 
which different species of capital endow agents with the power to improve their 
position in the on-going struggle over principles of social construction that have 
produced and work to reproduce the field. This concept relates the objective positions 
taken by agents with the degree to which they recognise particular forms of capital as 
useful and valuable, and that correspond with a particular ‘vision’ regarding how capital 
is to be accumulated, utilised and converted into other kinds. More concretely, symbolic 
capital is, for example, analogous to a sense of esteem, identity status and worth 
towards achieving a better life. In Bourdieu’s sociology symbols do not filter reality or 
act as a ‘screen’ blocking its true nature. Rather, symbolic action works to actively 
construct social reality as agents internalise their unequal structural position and 
reproduce it through on-going practices (Bourdieu 2000: 172; Leander 2008: 14). 
Symbolic capital renders some avenues of action and forms of interpretation possible 
without reference to explicit rules or norms of conduct in the first instance. Agents come 
to know and recognise the specific logic of a field ‘through the categories of perception 
that it imposes’ (Bourdieu 1989: 21), which are reproduced through the practices of 
dominated agents that are often taken-for-granted and treated as somewhat matter-of-
fact and banal (Bourdieu 1986: 18). As Bourdieu (1998: 85) explains, symbolic capital is 
‘a principle of differentiation that permits them [i.e. the dominated] to recognize all 
these differences and to give them value’. The resulting symbolic order is most stable 
when it is ‘objectively in agreement with the objective structures of the social world’ 
(ibid: 55). 
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Challenges against the dominant levied in the accumulation, convertibility and use of 
cultural, economic and social capital play out according to a struggle over the ‘monopoly 
of the power to consecrate’ that reproduces shared beliefs in the value of certain goods 
and relationships but not others. Linking the aforementioned types of capital with 
symbolic capital then, it can be argued that the authority of the dominant is indicative of 
a ‘credit-based value, which only exists in the relationship with the field of production as 
a whole […] ‘authority’ is nothing other than ‘credit’ with a set of agents who constitute 
‘connections’ whose value is disproportionate to the credit they themselves command’ 
(Bourdieu and Nice 1980: 264-5). Symbolic capital regulates the convertibility of other 
species of capital, particularly economic capital, into different forms, and is generative of 
how particular positions are reproduced within a field, which corresponds to the 
strategies employed by the dominant to retain their position (Wacquant 1987: 69). 
Bourdieu concludes, however, that in the final analysis fields are 'engendered by the 
objective structures, that is [...] by the economic basis of the social formation in question' 
(Bourdieu 2006: 83, emphasis added). Symbolic capital accounts for the one-sided 
perceptions of agents who, when making reference to rules, customary codes, ethical 
norms or moral frames as guiding their actions ‘conceals, even from their own eyes, the 
true nature of their own practical mastery’ and the ‘objective truth’ of how the field they 
are ‘implicated’ in was produced and is being reproduced by virtue of their on-going 
investments of energy, labour and time (Bourdieu 2000: 19). Symbolic capital is 
therefore understood during the empirical analysis as a covert, somewhat extra-
discursive principle that regulates the accumulation, convertibility and use of cultural, 
economic, juridical and social capital in favour of the dominant shareholders. The 
concept of symbolic capital is examined in more ethnographic terms as a principle 
responsible for reproducing structural advantages through the on-going practices of 
apprentices and journeymen. 
 
2.6. Competent Practices 
 
Practices break with a false dichotomy between objectivist-structuralist approaches that 
privilege rules and norms and subjectivist-constructivist approaches that privilege 
inter-subjectivity. Practices result from patterns of recurrent activity, interpretation and 
reasoning, a ‘process of doing something’ that is meaningful, embodied and experienced 
as competent by the agents implicated in these practices (Bourdieu 2000 [1977]: 16-22; 
Schatzki 2001; Adler and Pouliot 2011: 6). Practices are distinct from behaviour and 
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action. The concept is not analogous to behaviour with meaning or ‘practice’ in the 
singular. Instead, practices correspond to a third level of action characterised by:  
 
‘Patterned actions that are embedded in particular organized contexts [such as 
apprenticeship] and, as such, are articulated into specific types of action and are socially 
developed through learning and training.’ (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 5)  
 
Practices take on a particular form that conceptually-speaking represents a ‘block’ of 
‘bodily activities, forms of mental activities, ‘things’ and their use, a background 
knowledge in the form of understanding, know-how, states of emotion and motivational 
knowledge’ (Reckwitz 2002: 249). Rather than beginning with norms or rules of the 
game, practices represent ‘those non-linguistic conditions for an activity that are 
learned’ and are generative of patterned sets of action that we come to recognise as 
objective social structures at the level of the field (Turner 2001: 120). The simpler the 
learning process required to produce like practices, as organised through the institution 
of apprenticeship, then the longer the ‘chain of links’ that can be extended between 
agents to reiterate the same kinds of tacit knowledge (ibid: 124). This chain of links 
expands and incorporates more participants in an organised and structured way. By 
learning how to grow cannabis, and being recognised as productive and skilled 
cultivators, I argue in Chapter Six that youth were recognised to have gained an 
‘embodied competence’ (Bourdieu 2006: 81) such that those outside of the field treated 
their practices as socially meaningful and valuable (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 4). The 
practices – particular ways of acting, reasoning and thinking – acquired through 
apprenticeship related to the “correct” or “right” way to go about things. The stability of 
a field therefore depends on whether practices continue to be recognised as legitimate 
by dominant and dominated players and thereby reproduced (Bourdieu 2000: 184). A 
methodological approach to practices requires an examination of the various routinised 
ways in which cultivators and dealers perceived, reasoned, valued and acted (Reckwitz 
2002: 250). In doing so, Chapter Three discusses the methodological avenue of social 
aesthetics by which practices are examined both from the point of view of the agent and 
their experience of them (subjectivist mode of analysis), and according to how these 
practices materialise into the objective social structures – i.e. the economic and juridical 
fields – observed by the researcher (objectivist mode of analysis).  
 
But how are practices shared between a wider collective of agents engaged in the same 
activity? Recent critique has tended to reduce practices to habit and claimed that the 
 
 
55 
 
learning of practices alone is not a sufficient causal mechanism for establishing how 
practices are ‘shared’ and ‘iterated’ (Turner 2001). Two weaknesses arise from this 
critique. First, practices indicate practical activity with an audience, such that practices 
are directed towards and garner recognition as legitimate – i.e. as ‘correct’ – by others 
participating in the same field. The conjunction of social practices would therefore be an 
oxymoron. Consequently, practices can be deemed as right or wrong by the dominant in 
accordance with the particular vision of order established within a field. For practices to 
be legitimate is indicative of agreement regarding what particular patterns of acting, 
reasoning and thinking are perceived to be required of a field and are validated by 
others in that field. Unlike action, practices are meaningful both in the mind of the agent 
and for those in the wider field who give recognition to practices, hence the pluralisation 
of this concept.  
 
Practices must also be congruent with an agent’s background knowledge as indicated by 
the emphasis placed on learning and the social qualification of what I refer to as 
‘competence’. Bourdieu (1990) refers to this requisite knowledge as the ‘skill’ or 
practical knowledge embodied by the agent. Hence, capital is a resource and something 
to be used in line with an agent’s competence. However, as indicated by the generative 
concept of symbolic capital, capital (economic, cultural and social) can only be 
accumulated, converted and utilised if practices are ‘legitimate’ and align with a 
dominant conception of how the field is to be reproduced. The pluralisation of practices 
is indicative of meaningful action that is socially recognised as the legitimate way to act 
and interpret in relation to others, which is congruent with the competencies acquired 
by the agent – in this case through apprenticeship. Hence, in what follows, I refer to the 
‘legitimate competence’ of practices to signal both of these dimensions. 
 
Second, in my reading, practices entail a closeness of fit between the bodily means and 
mental ends of action (Reckwitz 2002: 251-2). Patterns of action are organised in a field 
in the sense that they are worth ‘striving for’ towards a reasonably held expectation that 
is invested in and taken as meaningful but not necessarily as normative (Martin 2011: 
248-54). The ends must appear reasonably achievable from the point-of-view of the 
agent, which in turn acts as a motivator for an inter-linked set of practical actions that 
form a block directed towards the achievable end goal or aspiration. Laurent Thévenot 
(2001) has developed this argument further to claim that practices are geared towards a 
shared ‘conception of the good that governs human activity’ and establishes modes of 
coordination between agents. Practices are therefore not simply actions with meaning 
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because they are continually reiterated and organised according to the closeness of fit 
between means (the agent’s competence), which are attuned to reasonably achievable 
ends that differ according to an agent’s social position within a field. Ways of thinking, 
interpreting and acting are therefore closely related to individually unique expectations, 
which being more-or-less congruent with the objective chances of succeeding in a field, 
form a coherent block of practices that are inter-subjectively valid to agents despite 
occupying structurally different positions. Practices do not correspond to neat schemes 
of rationality. Instead, they are more vague in the social reality of the agent, needing 
only to appear “worth it” to the agent who reiterates those practices accordingly.  
 
2.6.1. Practices and the wider tool box 
 
To summarise in relation to Bourdieu’s wider toolbox, practices are the product of: i) 
how a field is structured and the symbolic relations of power that generate it, and ii) the 
habitus, or set of dispositions, an agent brings into the field. Practices cannot, therefore, 
be entirely reduced to an agent’s history and the dispositions they carry with them (i.e. 
subjectivism). Neither can practices be reduced to observations of recurrent activity at 
the level of the field (i.e. objectivism). This avenue returns to the false dichotomy 
between subjectivist-constructivism and objectivist-structuralism. Instead, practices 
shift the methodological focus towards explicating what people do in addition to the 
discourses and representations present in what they say. This is the case because 
Bourdieu (2006: 79) places emphasis on the notion that: 
 
‘Subjects do not, strictly speaking, know what they are doing that what they do has 
more meaning than they know.’ 
 
How an agent represents their particular view of reality through interview and in 
everyday discussions matters more in terms of where they ‘speak from’ in terms of their 
(dis)advantageous objective position within a field, which allows those in structurally 
advantageous positions to ‘produce the material realities they purport to represent’ 
(Leander 2008: 14). Practices result in the ‘objective regularities’ experienced by agents 
that lend to the durability of unequal social positions the researcher observes as the 
materialised field. Youth participating in the field of cannabis cultivation and exchange 
interpret these practices and the ‘objective’ positions from which they are practiced as 
common knowledge. This process of ‘incorporating’ objective structures into the 
cognitive and bodily practices of the agent is what Bourdieu refers to as ‘embodied’ 
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knowledge or a ‘practical sense’ that is elucidated in relation to the concept of habitus. 
The efficacy of practices is indicated by the verb form, ‘position-taking’, which 
references the active construction of a field from a particular point of view attuned to an 
agent’s habitus (Bourdieu 2000: 183). 
 
Building on habitus, which is addressed below, practices entail a degree of 
disinterestedness and “matter-of-factness” in agents’ interpretations of what they are 
doing. Practices are not, however, entirely pre-reflexive and inaccessible to conscious 
articulation and elaboration (Chapter Three, 3.5). Rather, practices are congruent with 
some reasonable aim-in-view and an agent’s sense of place in the social field. A common 
sense or 'practical know-how', what Bourdieu (2006: 19) has simultaneously referred to 
as ‘legitimate competence’ and ‘learned ignorance’ (Bourdieu 2000: 184), is shared by 
agents from similar position-takings within a field even if practices maybe somewhat 
more diverse at first glance. Analogous to what Bourdieu refers to as a ‘feel for the 
game’; practices provide agents with a sense of direction and meaning that is not wholly 
reducible to consciously-planned and purposive action. Practices provide agents with an 
immanent sense of their place in an organised field of activity and a shared sense of the 
direction that field is taking in terms of their prospective future position within it (i.e. 
their expectations). Crucially, these prospective positions are circumscribed by a ‘sense 
of limits’ such that current practices are reasonably anchored in a future that appears 
achievable rather than flexible or multivalent (ibid: 185; Reckwitz 2002: 245-6). 
 
2.7. Habitus: Motivating Participation and Coordinating Practices 
 
An agent’s propensity to assume a position within a field and reproduce the practices 
that objectify it is motivated by the acquisition of durable dispositions, which, from a 
phenomenological point of view shape how an agent thinks, feels and conducts social 
life. Methodologically-speaking, habitus does not provide an explanation for action in 
isolation but is instead an ‘invitation to investigate the social constitution of the agent’ in 
terms of the courses of action that are taken to be reasonable, achievable and investable 
in (Wacquant 2014a: 6). The dispositions that shape social reality are structured 
according to an agent’s habitus. Habitus is a concept that signals to the researcher how 
dispositions come to be acquired. In circumstances where social positions are 
congruent, it explains how these dispositions are shared between agents subject to 
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similar economic, political and social conditions throughout history.26 Habitus requires 
departing from the empirical individual as defined by roles or scripts; indicative of the 
conceptual shorthand of ‘actor’ associated with the ahistorical rationality of 
‘embeddedness’ as critiqued in Chapter One (also see Hanappi 2011: 788). Instead, 
habitus begins with the epistemic individual, an agent with a history that has acquired 
particular dispositions that guide and motivate their current practices. Habitus suggests 
that participation in the cannabis economy is motivated by dispositions shaped by prior 
social and economic experience that coordinates on-going practices and in doing so 
organise the ‘ways in which the world appears to members of society and the ways in 
which each could imagine himself and improvise action’ (Calhoun 2006: 1405). 
 
Rather than reproducing the field in circular fashion, the concept of habitus is indicative 
of a ‘tendency, not a compulsory order’ such that an agent’s reasonable expectations 
closely fit the objective potentialities observed by the researcher in the wider field 
(Lainé 2014). While the probability function of a group of like-individuals aggregated 
actions reveals some objective potentialities at the level of the field; this same 
probability function breaks down when applied to the individual at the level of the 
habitus. The coordination of practices within the field is facilitated by the adaptive 
capacity of habitus to maintain expectations in line with the more limited positions of a 
given field that reproduce and maintain it (Hanappi 2011: 761-3).  
 
The term ‘acquisition’ indicates habitus is the culmination of transposable and learned 
dispositions (Wacquant 2014b: 126, 129). More generic dispositions are first acquired, 
often imperceptibly and gradually through shared experiences of deprivation, familial 
relations and schooling that are sources of what Bourdieu in his studies of education 
terms primary dispositions and what Wacquant (2014a) appropriating Bourdieu’s 
distinction refers to as the ‘primary habitus’. Primary habitus represents a certain 
‘baseline social personality’. It acts as both a limit and a motivational resource that can 
be attuned to more imminent social relations, institutions and economic circumstances 
an agent is confronted with. The secondary habitus derives from the primary habitus 
but is shaped by more immediate and specific situations, groups and institutions. As 
                                                        
26 Wacquant (2011, 2014a) refers to habitus as a ‘signal concept’ to be used as a guide during 
empirical research, and furthermore distinguishes between habitus as a ‘topic’, identifying 
something to be investigated empirically (i.e. what makes a competent boxer), and as a ‘tool’, a 
particular method of inquiry during empirical research (i.e. how a boxer acquires certain 
dispositions and bodily knowledge). 
 
 
59 
 
such it may entail multiple different dispositions depending on the field at play 
(Wacquant 2014a: 7). 
 
In this vein, Wacquant focuses on pedagogical forms of labour and training or 
‘apprenticeships’ – most notable in his auto-ethnographic study of the pugilist in Body 
and Soul (2004) – as the site at which certain skills and bodily competencies are learned 
through a combination of observation and interaction with others engaged in the same 
activity. These learning processes are geared towards gaining a practical mastery such 
that ‘desires are aroused and channelled towards their proper objects in repeated 
interaction with other participants’. The greater the distance between the primary 
habitus and its subsequent iterations in particular groups and activities (i.e. secondary 
habitus), the less likely an agent is to be meaningfully anchored in a field. Therefore, ‘the 
more difficult the traineeship, and the greater the gaps and frictions between the 
successive layers of schemata, the less integrated the resulting dispositional formation 
is likely to be.’ (Wacquant 2014a: 8).  
 
2.7.1 Habitus: cognitive, conative and affective 
 
Habitus is opposed to rational calculation, which specifies an ‘actor’ with no history that 
fulfills goals posited by an external model. According to this view of rationality, there is 
limited appreciation of the agent’s particular social or economic experience (Hanappi 
2011: 791). By contrast, habitus points to how on-going action is attuned to reasonable 
rather than rational expectations. The reasonableness of action is supported by both 
bodily and cognitive factors, although recent critique suggests Bourdieu fails to clearly 
distinguish between these two characteristics (Martin 2011: 255).  
 
To respond to this critique and flesh out the theoretical specification of habitus, 
Wacquant (2014a: 8-9) has identified three analytic components: cognitive, conative 
and affective. The cognitive component of habitus endows agents with perceptual 
categories through which they assign meaning and distinguish the value of activities, 
people and things. From the point of view of the agent these social categories and 
distinctions relate to what Bourdieu refers to as ‘principles of vision and division’. 
Cognitive dispositions represent relatively durable ways of valuing and perceiving, but 
these are more malleable when confronted with the emergence of a secondary habitus. 
The cognitive component of habitus is analogous to principles of 'hierarchicization', 
'division' and 'vision' that guide judgement and action in different fields (Wacquant 
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1987: 79). These principles mobilise dispositions regarding what is good and bad, 
vulgar or beautiful, valuable or surplus to requirements. The resulting expectations 
exhibit a close fit between secondary habitus and positions taken within a field 
(Bourdieu 2010) – hence the term position-taking in Bourdieu’s work. These 
dispositions work to shape the social 'distances, that are predictive of encounters, 
affinities, sympathisers or even desires' (Bourdieu 1998a: 10). They produce the 
practical segmentation of those at the top from those at the bottom: an 'organizing 
principle for action' (Bourdieu 2006: 18).  
 
Conative habitus is carnal. It relates to the bodily competencies and skills acquired 
through the secondary habitus, facilitating practices that reproduce particular positions 
based on the recognition that certain competencies and skills are valuable. Taken 
together, the cognitive and carnal components of habitus signal how agents are able to 
interpret and act in the social world, whereas the affective component of habitus signals 
why agents, in the first instance, desire to invest their energy and time in a given course 
of action in terms of what they are continually motivated and inspired to do. The 
affective dimension of habitus corresponds to a sense of what should be valued in the 
'objective future' that is designated by a 'shared modal understanding [and] evaluation 
of certain expectations and aspirations as reasonable and of others as unreasonable 
(Brubaker 1985: 759). The affective component of habitus thereby facilitates a certain 
'love [for] the inevitable' (Bourdieu 2006: 77). 
 
Taking cognitive, conative and affective components together allows, as Bourdieu 
(2006: 20) argues, for habitus to depart from rational or norm-guided action. The 
habitus corresponds with the agent’s learned feel for cannabis cultivation and exchange, 
and a 'practical evaluation of the likelihood of the success of a given action in a given 
situation [that] brings into play a whole body of wisdom, sayings, commonplaces, ethical 
precepts'. Habitus mobilises dispositions and embodied knowledge that are brought 
into the moment of interaction between agents in a field. These dispositions are 
reinforced by the objective structures of the field (e.g. apprenticeship). The secondary 
habitus, in turn, shapes participation in the field and a reasonable understanding of the 
agent’s position in relation to others. Habitus acts as the motor of action in Bourdieu's 
sociology because it defines the 'generative principle of distinct and distinctive 
practices’ rather than reducing agents to subjects of free will or causally-determined 
automatons (Bourdieu 1998a: 8). It instigates a 'practical logic, that of vagueness, of the 
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more-or-less, which defines one's ordinary relation to the world' (Bourdieu 2006: 78) 
and shapes what agents reason, do, and say in different contexts and situations.  
 
2.7.2. Habitus as a dispositional theory of action 
 
The underlying theoretical thrust of habitus is that, even in our most conscious 
thoughts, we struggle not to take some aspects of reality for granted. Habitus is attentive 
to taken-for-granted and common sense experiences that endow practices with certain 
conditions of possibility and render particular courses of action and types of activity as 
reasonable rather than rational (Bourdieu 1998a: 33-4; Collet 2009: 424). Or, in other 
words, habitus coordinates a ‘practical evaluation of the likelihood of the success of a 
given action in a given situation’ (Bourdieu 2006: 77). Wacquant (2014b) summarises 
this theoretical statement as Bourdieu’s ‘dispositional theory of action’ rather than as a 
fully worked out explanation for action. It is important, however, to bear in mind that 
Bourdieu does not deny the possibility of conscious reflection and that agents do form 
prior intentions to act. Rather, habitus signals how agents act as if they were rational 
(Hanappi 2014: 166; Lainé 2014: 78).  
 
Positions within a field are actively constructed by agents (the field comprises position-
takings) in relation to the interaction between their primary and secondary habitus, 
such that there is an affinity between an agent’s subjective capacity to reason, think and 
act (i.e. dispositions & habitus), in addition to their objective chances relating to the 
distribution of cultural, economic and social capital. Wacquant (2014a: 5) summarises 
the relationship between subjective capacity and objective possibility as the 
‘conjunction between disposition and position’. This is theoretical shorthand for the 
internalisation of particular dispositions and forms of bodily knowledge, which, by way 
of recurrent practices and principles of vision and division produce the ‘objective’ field 
of organised activity observed by the researcher. The closer the congruence between an 
agent’s objective position and their habitus – e.g. between the objective distribution of 
capital and their position-taking – the more likely a field is to form, the more taken-for-
granted its positions and motives become, and the more durable that social order is 
likely to be. Habitus, in sum, guides and motivates relatively stable patterns of reasoning 
and acting (i.e. practices) that result in the topography of the field. This iterative 
relationship between habitus and field is what Bourdieu commonly refers to as a 
'structuring structure'. Wacquant (1987: 75), in appropriating Bourdieu’s theory, refers 
to this as a 'structured dispositions'. 
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2.7.3. Hysteresis 
 
Fields often emerge outside of well-entrenched class structures. Subjective expectations 
do, however, tend to fit poorly the objective chances circumscribed by such fields: such 
is the case when corporate managers use the phrase “managing expectations”. To 
examine empirical cases defined by a mismatch of field and habitus, Bourdieu has 
employed the concept of ‘hysteresis’ (Wacquant 2004b: 391-2 for an overview). 
Hysteresis is a time lag between when habitus is constituted and when it is activated to 
motivate and coordinate stable patterns of behaviour, reasoning, thinking and valuing 
that materialise into the positions of a more-or-less stable field that is recognised as the 
objective reality. Hysteresis is not simply a mismatch between an agent’s habitus and 
their recognition of the stakes and positions of others within a field such that somebody 
‘feels out of place’ (Wacquant 2014b: 126). Rather, this additional concept accounts for 
situations in which habitus is not internally coherent, integrated or tending towards 
congruence with the structure of a given field (Wacquant 2012a: 5-6). Bourdieu (2000: 
161) is at pains to emphasise that:  
 
‘Habitus change constantly as a function of new experiences. Dispositions are subject to 
a sort of permanent revision, but one that is never radical, given that it operates on the 
basis of premises instituted in the previous state.’ 
 
Hysteresis therefore also accommodates fields that are yet-to-come. The concept 
reminds us that a field must first be produced before it is reproduced. For example, 
Wacquant (2014b) argues that contrary to locating habitus in the individual, it is a 
multi-scalar concept that can be applied to different aggregations of social activity, 
including individuals, groups (e.g. class, gender, demography) and institutions (e.g. 
academia, art) depending on the empirical context and the research question at hand.27  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
27 It is worth noting that in Bourdieu’s canonical texts, such as Outline of a Theory of Practice and 
Pascalian Meditations, ‘habitus’ is used in both the singular and plural sense, which has often led 
to confusion. 
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2.7.4. Habitus and the wider toolbox 
 
Habitus represents a useful conceptual point of departure in cases of illicit economies 
that lack a well demarcated field. It is also crucial at the theoretical level to relate 
habitus to other concepts in Bourdieu’s wider toolbox. First, habitus shifts primacy to 
the individual and takes their on-going practices as the unit of analysis. Agents actively 
construct relations between positions within the field (as these positions are perceived 
and adjudicated) rather than beginning with pre-existing inter-personal relations – or 
network ‘ties’ – that then take primacy over the individual and shape interaction into 
asymmetric and symmetric structures (Martin 2011: 13-14, fn. 18). Second, habitus acts 
as a bridge between the false dichotomy of objective and subjective approaches. It 
allows for an examination of how apprenticeship was reproduced through their on-
going participation. 
 
Furthermore, habitus is a window onto the inconsistencies, weaknesses and successes 
of Bourdieu’s attempt to develop a constructivist structuralism. Habitus is made to do a 
great deal of theoretical work in these regards (Brubaker 1985: 760) and has 
accordingly been critiqued by sociologists concerned with conceptual parsimony and a 
neo-positivist methodological bias that relegates habitus to a ‘black box’ (Martin 2011: 
255-6; Burawoy 2012: 204). However, it is more appropriately understood as an open 
or signal concept designed to guide empirical analysis and be reconstructed by it in 
iterative fashion. Habitus draws attention to the dispositions, bodily competencies and 
practical knowledges that are acquired and shared by agents that motivate participation 
and coordinate practices. Rather than a purely ‘theoretical operator’ (Wacquant 2014b: 
119) habitus requires further specification during empirical research. In the empirical 
chapters, I work to link the economic field with the primary habitus of the established 
shareholders and the secondary habitus of apprentice cultivators. The concept of 
habitus is necessary to examine how the subjective expectations of youth were brought 
into alignment with their more limited chances and how this alignment in turn dealt 
with the uncertainty arising from illegality and lack of enforceable contracting 
arrangements with shareholders. While an ethnographic analysis demonstrates that the 
dispositions of youth entering apprenticeships were often idiosyncratic and multivalent, 
expressing a range of different ambitions, their resulting practices tended towards 
conformity and the patterning of action at the level of the field (Collet 2009: 420).28 
                                                        
28 From a methodological point of view, Collet (2009: 419-20) suggests habitus ‘is an invitation to 
understand what influences the view that agents have of their own actions without reducing 
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Methodologically-speaking, then, habitus highlights the productivity of researcher-as-
observer (of the field), researcher-as-participant (in practices) and researcher-as-
interpreter (of the habitus) who, armed with open concepts must ‘swim in the stream of 
action and filter out its composition, rather than scope it from the bank’ (Wacquant 
2012b: 123).  
 
2.8. Reproducing structural advantage: linking field and habitus 
 
Having established that habitus: i) motivates and shapes participation in a field, and ii) 
coordinates practices within a field; the chapter now turns to elaborate a theoretical link 
between field and habitus to guide an analysis of how the hierarchical organisation of 
Sierra Leone’s cannabis economy is reproduced through the on-going practices of 
participants. I therefore use the terms reproducing structural advantage and cultivating 
hierarchy in verb form. In what follows I critique the utility of structural violence 
towards an explanation for how agents incorporate a habitus that actively reproduces 
the hierarchical organisation of economic and juridical fields. I argue that agents 
misrecognise their subjection to structural violence associated with the state 
bureaucracy, political corruption and economic inequality – what youth in Hastings and 
Waterloo referred to as “the system” – as shared with shareholders who they perceived 
to “play the game against the system”. I proceed by turning to the concepts of illusio, 
misrecognition and symbolic violence to provide a conceptual approach for examining 
how domination was actively reproduced. In doing so I advance a theoretical 
explanation for why rationality from the point of view of the researcher appears to 
breakdown despite the continued investment of youth in their on-going activity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
them to a model [and] agents rely on their previous experience and their current and previous 
social positions as a tool to respond to a crisis’. 
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2.8.1 Structural violence of “the system” 
 
I now turn to establish a conceptual approach for examining how violence is 
experienced as compatible with reasonable expectations to achieve a better and 
dignified life, without recourse to violence as overt and working visibly on the agent. 
Both legal and illegal markets are argued to be organised through the credible threat of 
violence, such as that which upholds state sanctioned laws, or the inter-personal 
violence of a gang leader’s baseball bat or a Mafia boss’s fists. It is open to empirical 
debate whether ‘systemic violence’ during exchange and the enforcement of contracts 
plays a significant role in regulating the economies of illicit drug production in the Global 
North as well as the Global South (Goldstein 1985; Brownstein and Goldstein 1990). An 
empiricist or behaviouralist approach to violence entails what Lukes (2005: 109) in a 
comprehensive critique of power terms the ‘exercise fallacy’ or ‘power-to’. Violence in 
this view is used to allow one party to alter the interests of another and ensure they 
align with their own. 
 
Three shortcomings arise. First, the role of violence in altering another’s interests 
constitutes a conscious act; they know their best interest but knowingly acquiesce 
against it due to the threat of violence. Second, violence is physical, inter-personal and 
exercised from the top down. By taking these conceptions of violence together a 
behavioural and empiricist methodology treats violence as overt and the resulting 
structure of power relations as something to be ‘accessed’ and discovered during 
research that works towards those at the top where authority is expected to be 
exercised over those at the bottom. This conception of violence was shown to be 
prevalent in the organised crime and economic sociology literatures and conforms to an 
‘interactionist vision’ (Bourdieu 1986: 16). The analytical focus is on visible outcomes of 
overt violence that are fully contained within the moment of interaction between agents, 
taken as both inter-personal and as resulting from demonstrating credible threats to 
deploy violence (Lukes 2005: 16-9). 
 
An analytical blind spot emerges when power is treated as the outcome of overt rather 
than covert forms of violence (Bourgois 2009: 24).29 The researcher is afforded an 
                                                        
29 Bourgois (2009) suggests symbolic violence sits in-between structural and ‘normalised’ 
violence. Normalised violence refers to the ‘commonsensical’ discourses that come to ‘render 
systematic patterns of brutality invisible’ and entails a process of objectification through which 
agent’s invest in particular identities and roles to make sense of the world, but which are 
ostensibly a product of conditions of structural violence (ibid: 20). Symbolic violence for 
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ability to ‘reach out and touch’ the objective relations of violence, even while this 
method of enquiry foregoes an explanation for why agents often do not comprehend ‘the 
[objective] structures that are realized in them’ (Bourdieu 1986 16; Fourcade 2007: 
1022; cf. Venkatesh and Levitt 2000). The subjectivist-constructivist approach, 
meanwhile, privileges inter-subjective agreement rather than considering how such 
agreement conforms to a one-sided conception of social relations that is perceived to be 
matter-of-fact and even inevitable (Wacquant 1987). 
 
Structural violence begins to account for more covert and implicit forms of violence. 
Violence has an indirect effect whereas inter-personal violence has both a physical and 
psychological direct effect. Structural violence originates from the institutionalisation of 
economic inequality and social injustice in the lives of those less dominant. It works to 
restrict agency while rendering the source of these constraints ambiguous, vague 
and/or incomprehensible (Galtung 1969, 1985; Farmer 1996; Bourgois 2009: 17). For 
Farmer (2004), structural violence is material and the product of an unequal 
distribution of resources throughout history. It is the dominant that, even if 
unintentionally, continually work to reproduce structural violence by maintaining 
inequalities in access to opportunities, such as in education, the labour market, 
healthcare and economic production.  
 
Structural violence is analogous to Lukes’ second dimension of power given the concept 
focuses on the ‘rules of the game’ that govern social life and set economic agendas. It is a 
game in which the interests of agents consciously enter but according to an agenda that 
is shaped in such a way that the resulting decisions favour the dominant. Youth 
recognise that particular issues are organised out of the agenda. Yet they are not in a 
position to organise them back in given this agenda is by-and-large inaccessible to them. 
Power, in this sense, is taken as ‘power over’ someone dependent on somebody else, or 
some other group, who dominate in two ways. First, in relation to power as generically 
about establishing control over a decision-making process, and second, in relation to 
power as the credible threat of sanctions that prevent the contravention of a dominant 
authority. Structural violence does, however, fall short of examining how youth 
continued to participate as apprentices in the cannabis economy towards expectations 
aligned with their reasonable rather than rational interests. Furthermore, “the system” 
                                                                                                                                                              
Bourgois refers to how agents ‘blame themselves’ for their position such that their domination 
becomes somewhat naturalised. As I argue in what follows, normalised violence overlaps 
significantly with symbolic violence, and Bourgois arguably presents a somewhat reductive 
reading of Bourdieu’s symbolic violence.  
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was a widely articulated emic concept that was explicitly recognised as a shared source 
of structural violence and that apprentices and journeymen perceived their 
shareholders were equally subject to, despite remaining hemmed into structurally 
disadvantage positions characterised by an objectively high degree of uncertainty 
regarding future opportunity and success. Youth openly resented the system and held it 
responsible for limiting their life chances. 
 
Following Lukes (2005: 21), the power-to and power-over dimensions of violence have 
tended to overlap. It is analytically prudent to sub-categorise overt violence as 
theoretically analogous to coercion. More broadly, power operates to secure alignment 
with dominant interests in different ways: when the dominant actively or otherwise 
threaten to deprive a more dependent agent (coercion); when agents act without 
consciously altering the interests of others (influence); when a command is understood 
to be legitimate (authority); and finally, when an agent adopts a course of action but 
cannot determine the source of the interest that motivated it (manipulation). It is to the 
roles of influence, authority and manipulation, in terms of how youth were unaware that 
their interests had been altered (influence) but continued to pursue these altered 
interests as ‘correct’ (authority & manipulation) that need to be addressed if the 
continual reproduction of structural advantages through youths’ on-going participation 
as apprentices is to be explained fully. To move beyond structural violence I turn to 
consider what participants in the cannabis economy referred to as “the game”, and 
examine how by playing this game apprentices and journeymen were subject to 
symbolic violence. 
 
2.8.2 Symbolic violence in “the game” 
 
Recent criminological research has highlighted the significance of ‘symbolic boundaries’ 
around the use of violence that are aligned with the ‘acculturated meanings’ of offenders 
(Copes et al 2015: 33). Illicit drug markets often operate in very different cultural 
contexts that legitimise and permit varying degrees of violence (Sandberg 2012). The 
key shortcoming of structural violence was that it could not account for how violence 
can be ‘productive, transformative, authoritative and [yet] compatible with dignity’ 
(Lukes 2005: 109, emphasis added; cf. Bourgois 1995). A conceptual problem arises 
when trying to explain on-going participation in structurally disadvantageous activities 
that are viewed by agents to be legitimate in the sense of being believable and investable 
in. Bourdieu refers to this as a ‘committed stake’ in the field. “Playing the game” 
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represented a meaningful alternative to the structural violence of “the system”. I 
proceed by adopting a relational approach to violence that is not reducible to inter-
personal relations and ‘interdependencies’ between agents (Emirbayer and Goodwin 
1994; Emirbayer 1997; Lukes 2005: 112). A relational approach utilises conceptual 
tools that examine how youth come ‘to accept their role in the existing order of things 
[i.e. the game], either because they can see no alternative to it [i.e. the system], or 
because they see it as natural and unchangeable’ (Lukes 2005: 28).  
 
To do this I turn to Bourdieu’s open concepts of illusio, misrecognition and symbolic 
violence that are found in his analysis of ‘modes of domination’ in non- and extra-state 
regulated fields (Wacquant 1987: 66). Bourdieu argues that the on-going practices of 
those in structurally disadvantaged positions are motivated by specific socially 
constructed interests (illusio) and entail a degree of misrecognition in terms of 
miscomprehending that a particular one-sided course of action is the best means of 
achieving certain expectations posited by an agent’s illusio. Bourdieu (1998a: 72-84) 
argues that the illusio entails immediate, economic incentives that encourage 
participation in particular fields in addition to the reproduction of practices affording 
particular psychological payoffs. These psychological payoffs result from the perception 
of inclusion and opportunity within “the game” of cannabis cultivation and exchange in 
contrast to exclusion from “the system”, and recognition by others within the same field 
that the practices they undertake (forms of action, reasoning, and valuing) are respected 
and socially valuable. The illusio is double-edged because it motivates on-going 
participation in structurally disadvantaged activities, albeit based on recognition of the 
economic and socio-psychological rewards that are expected to result. Illusio signposts 
the ‘fact of being caught up in and by the game, of believing the game is “worth the 
candle” or, more simply, that playing the game is worth the effort’ (Bourdieu 1998a: 76-
7). By playing the game against the system apprentices and journeymen exhibit a: 
 
‘Confused awareness of the profound complicity between the adversaries [i.e. their 
shareholders] interested in the same field: they disagree with one another but at least 
they agree about the object of disagreement.’ (ibid: 78) 
 
Illusio therefore entails a degree of misrecognition in the on-going practices of youth 
that is analogous to ‘illusory ideas of what is natural [and] induce[s] or encourage[s] 
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failures of rationality’ (Lukes 2005: 115).30 Bourdieu’s claim is that psychological 
payoffs construe participation in highly unequal fields as economically disinterested 
from the point of view of the agent who is motivated by reasonable interests, rather than 
participation being explained away as a breakdown in rationality. Arriving at this 
understanding of misrecognition requires two theoretical manoeuvres. 
 
First, it is necessary to break with a phenomenological approach to lived experience said 
to reveal the ‘true’ nature of domination, such that a more objective account of violence 
in this view would require the researcher to shift from outsider to insider. Second, 
misrecognition entails a break with the supposedly more objective truth of the 
researcher-as-insider who examines how social structures have been incorporated 
through the lived experience of agents, and how in doing so, the agent actively 
reproduces their domination (Bourdieu 1998: 40; Bourdieu 2000: 202-5; Burawoy 
2012: 187-8). This double break provides the conceptual starting points for examining 
how youth invested so much time and effort while apprenticed despite the uncertainties 
of opportunity and success in the absence of enforceable contracting arrangements. 
Misrecognition suggests that youth often did not recognise apprenticeship as being 
responsible for reproducing their structural disadvantage because participation 
afforded them reasonable economic and psychological payoffs that were not otherwise 
available. Consequently, youth rarely challenged the structures of domination 
responsible for keeping them hemmed in.31 
                                                        
30 The original French term for misrecognition in Bourdieu’s texts, ‘méconnaisance’, is not directly 
translatable into English. It can, however, be understood as a ‘confused awareness’ (Bourdieu 
1998a: 78) or ‘mis-conception’, or more directly as ‘mis-knowledge’. Recognition translates to 
‘réconnaisance’, meaning to ‘know again’, such that recognition signposts the alignment of 
practices (action, reasoning, and valuing) to those that support the dominant, and as such 
misrecognition is a failure to perceive this realignment. Practices are cognised according to 
particular dispositions that have meaning only in relation to particular fields of activity and their 
specific culture and history.  
31 Burawoy (2012: 192-3) argues it is important to distinguish between ‘mystification’ or 
‘ideology’ generated in the gap between an agent’s experience and the social relations that they 
have entered into, opposed to misrecognition, which accounts for how the dispositions of agents 
are shaped by a deep-seated habitus that is congruent with unequal social relationships. 
Burawoy concludes that domination can result from both and is conditional on neither 
simultaneously (ibid: 198-9). Rather than abandoning habitus as Burawoy argues (ibid: 200), I 
emphasise that the concept provides an analytically useful starting point for how secondary 
dispositions are attuned to unequal social relations that agents are implicated in, but also deeper-
seated primary dispositions, established in the bodily dispositions of the unconscious, which 
result from a particular personal history and process of socialisation. Burawoy ostensibly 
reduces habitus to primary dispositions and misses the secondary habitus as a potential 
empirical site for grasping the reproduction of domination. Manual labour on the factory floor 
was, for Burawoy, construed as a game shared by workers and motivated for ‘good psychological 
reasons’ that resulted in the naturalisation of domination. Treating work as a game with 
objective stakes helped to deal with mundane, routinised tasks, while exit from this game 
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Symbolic violence is the outcome of misrecognition in the lives of youth such that the 
objective structures of an unequal field gain a degree of stability. The concept 
necessitates a conceptual shift from the macro level of centralised ‘power over’ or 
‘power to’, to focus instead on the individual and their subjective dispositions and the 
concrete mechanisms through which these are brought into congruence (Bourdieu 
1998a: 40).32 Violence operates according to relations of symbolic power between 
dominant and dominated, a ‘tacit complicity’ that legitimises one-sided interpretations 
and valuations of the world (Bourdieu 1989: 20). From this, I take symbolic power to 
mean: 
 
‘The capacity to impose and inculcate means of understanding and structuring the 
world, or symbolic systems, that contribute to the reproduction of the social order by 
representing economic and political power in disguised forms that endow them with 
legitimacy and/or taken-for-grantedness.’ (Wacquant 1987: 66)  
 
Methodologically, symbolic violence is approached from the position of the dominated 
habitus, both primary and secondary, which are responsible for reproducing their 
domination. Such an approach does not solely require a topographic view to identify 
those who ‘possess’ power and observations of how those ‘wielding’ this power make 
others acquiesce to their own interest. By linking field (objectivist analysis) with habitus 
(subjectivist analysis) it is possible to examine how shareholder-apprentice relations 
were ‘recognized as suitable, legitimate, approved […but] that, if presented another way, 
would be unacceptable’ (Bourdieu 1990: 85). The reproduction of structural advantages 
results from both the objective mal-distribution of economic, social, juridical and 
cultural capital within an organised field of activity, and in terms of how these species of 
capital were misrecognised as ‘socially accepted or socially concealed uses of other 
                                                                                                                                                              
entailed a degree of ostracisation. At the same time, it was a game that could not be taken 
seriously if its conditions of existence were intellectualised, questioned and objectified by those 
participating in it. It is this ‘subjective truth’ that makes work bearable for agents who are 
unlikely to wilfully reflect on their disadvantageous social position in view of the psychological 
violence this otherwise entails. While mystification provides a ‘rational, cognitive basis for 
consent’ – what Burawoy associates with the Gramscian view of hegemony – it lacks tools for 
grasping the second theoretical break. First, in terms of how the conditions and sources of 
domination are re-concealed and dissimulated (ibid: 194-5). Second, for how fields already 
subjected to the structural violence of more exclusionary fields (i.e. the game in the system) 
produces domination in relation to that field but internal to its own relations. 
32 During the methodology (Chapter Three) I identify apprenticeship as the mechanism through 
which symbolic violence is reproduced. 
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types of capital’ (Wacquant 1987: 69). As Bourdieu (1998: 40) concludes, symbolic 
violence: 
 
‘Incarnates itself simultaneously in objectivity, in the form of specific organizational 
structures and mechanisms, and in subjectivity, in the form of mental structures and 
categories of perception and thought.’  
 
Symbolic violence is central to Bourdieu’s conceptual toolbox. It accounts for how any 
objective distribution of capital (the field) exerts a ‘structural effect’ according to how 
different species of capital are perceived and valued, and in terms of how particular 
practices are accepted as competent and permissible. The concept is therefore closely 
related to symbolic capital because it is generative of covert principles that govern the 
accumulation, convertibility and use of various kinds of capital (cultural, economic and 
social) into other forms. It also accounts for ways of interpreting and perceiving how to 
most effectively accumulate, convert and utilise this capital. More concretely, symbolic 
violence is the product of, for example, misrecognising hard work, honesty and sacrifice 
as the means by which to play the game against the system. Symbolic violence results in 
a 'self-fulfilling prophecy' that reproduces structural advantages through on-going 
activity perceived to be compatible with dignity and worth striving for (Wacquant 1987: 
69, 74; Bourdieu 1998a: 40-1). This is examined in relational terms: of relations 
between position-takings in the field according to which one-sided practices were 
adjudicated, and finally the relations between this economic field and the juridical field 
of law enforcement.  
 
When beginning with symbolic violence I am not suggesting that youth lack a capacity to 
act (i.e. agency) or that their actions are restricted by particular social rules. Instead, by 
using the phrases ‘reproducing structural advantages’ and ‘cultivating hierarchy’ I am 
emphasising how youth actively engage in captivating and meaningful activities that 
reproduce their domination by symbolically denying their dependency on those more 
dominant. (Mis)recognition is at once conscious and explicit (and unconscious and 
implicit) but requires specification in terms of the concrete mechanisms and relations 
through which it is reproduced.  
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2.9. Conclusion: Conceptual tools for examining the reproduction of structural 
advantage 
 
The conceptual approach outlined in this chapter was motivated by bridging objectivist-
structuralist (institutions, networks and structures) and subjectivist-constructivist 
(phenomenology) approaches. This followed from the identification of a number of 
conceptual shortcomings in the economic sociology, network theory and organised 
crime literatures (Chapter One). When dealing with the uncertainties of product 
illegality, lack of enforceable property rights, and threat of interference by law-
enforcement, direct intervention by a higher authority using overt violence was 
privileged as the principle means for ensuring the organisation and survival of criminal 
enterprise. Rather than reaching out and trying to ‘touch’ these power relations in a 
behaviourist or empiricist sense, I turned to what Bourdieu refers to as open concepts. 
These conceptual tools were deployed during field research in order to attune the 
analysis to more covert and less empirically graspable forms of violence. Having taken 
“the system” and “the game” as heuristic devices with which to organise this line of 
critique, I discussed a number of shortcomings that resulted in a conceptual shift to 
structural violence: when historically instituted rules of the game are weighted in favour 
of the dominant but which the dominated cannot readily establish the source of. While 
this represented one avenue for examining youths’ motivation to undertake 
apprenticeships, it did not fully explain continued participation in contravention of their 
‘best’ interest. This was because they explicitly recognised that the system was the 
source of structural violence, which in turn motivated their desire to “play the game 
against the system”. 
 
It was therefore necessary to consider how participation in cannabis production and 
marketing networks reproduced what I termed structural advantages as shareholders 
regulated their apprentices’ and journeymen’s access to economic and social capital. To 
do this, I outlined Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic violence. The concept linked an 
objectivist examination of the unequal accumulation of economic, social and cultural 
capital, with a subjectivist analysis focused on symbolic capital that was generative of 
the one-sided interpretations of how these species of capital were accumulated, 
converted and utilised. The historical accumulation of symbolic capital by the 
shareholders ensures other kinds of capital and ways of accumulating them are 
recognised as legitimate competence by the dominated. Practices were treated as plural 
in the sense of having an audience within a field that corroborated their viability. 
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The concept of habitus is opposed to purely rational action and instead emphasises that 
action is reasonable and entails particular cognitive (reasoning, thinking), carnal 
(bodily) and affective (emotions, feeling) schemes of appreciation, perception and 
valuation that guide action, but do not overly determine action as such. Habitus is 
related to particular dispositions formed in relation to particular histories and more 
imminent institutions and social structures, such as boss-apprentice relations, through 
which social reality is interpreted and acted in relation to. I therefore concluded that 
habitus represented a dispositional theory of action that was useful in terms of 
understanding what motivates participation in a given field and how the practices 
responsible for reproducing that field come to be coordinated. I divided the concept of 
habitus into primary and secondary dimensions, which relate to the habitus of the 
shareholders and the habitus of apprentices and journeymen respectively. The concept 
of habitus was necessary to examine how the subjective expectations of agents in terms 
of their aspirations and hopes were made congruent with the objective chances they had 
of getting by in an organised field of activity; especially in terms of recognising hard 
work, sacrifice and honesty as the means by which to succeed. I referred to 
incongruences between habitus and field as hysteresis. It was therefore deemed 
necessary to engage in both objectivist and subjectivist modes of analysis to link field 
and habitus and examine how structural advantages are reproduced. 
  
The reproduction of structural advantage could only be fully examined in relation to 
Bourdieu’s concepts of illusio, misrecognition and symbolic violence. These conceptual 
tools suggested those in structurally disadvantageous positions misrecognise their 
‘objective’ reality as somewhat matter-of-fact, banal and even inevitable, and are useful 
for examining how practices conform to the organisation of the economic and juridical 
fields. In the next chapter I locate apprenticeship as the empirical site at which to 
examine the reproduction of structural advantage and operationalise a methodological 
avenue for utilising the open concepts discussed in this chapter during field research. 
More specifically, I discuss how to examine the extra-discursive dimensions of symbolic 
violence during field research, especially in relation to issues of positionality, reflexivity 
and ethics that arose as I went “inside the game”. 
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Chapter Three: Going inside the game 
 
3.1. Introduction: Research question and methodological avenues 
 
The methodological rationale of this thesis is motivated by the discussion in Chapters 
One and Two that bridged a long-standing division between objectivist-constructivist 
and subjectivist-constructivist approaches that has underpinned research on illicit drug 
economies. More specifically, the turn to Bourdieu’s open concepts resulted from having 
engaged with a number of other conceptual approaches, such as economic sociology, 
network theory, and an iterative engagement with social anthropology, which raised the 
issue of disciplinary silos but also the opportunity to develop an alternative 
methodological avenue. To do this, the research process begins with an objectivist 
research question that is answered by incorporating the subjectivity of cannabis 
farmers: 
 
How are structural advantages secured in cannabis production and marketing 
networks, without dominant players limiting contestability by resorting to 
organised violence? 
 
The research question is prompted by an initial analysis of the economic field of 
cannabis cultivation in Chapter Four. There I examine the characteristics and structure 
of the cannabis economy (production and exchange) and determine that the 
shareholders from the 1980s and 1990s “controlled” larger farms, employed more 
apprentices, monopolised relationships with higher value exchange partners, and 
therefore obtained greater returns than newer farmers. The concept of structural 
advantage points to these objective relations of power particularly in terms of control 
over access to land and labour. Yet by following Bourdieu, I also examine an inter-
related subjective dimension of (dis)advantage. In doing so, a subjectivist mode of 
analysis is incorporated into the research question and requires the linking during field 
research of three concepts: field, habitus and practices. I do so, first by examining how 
youth conformed to apprenticeship rather than setting up farms independently and 
directly challenging the shareholders. And second, by examining how youths’ on-going 
practices – acting, reasoning and valuing – were shaped through their on-going 
participation in apprenticeship. Consequently, the subjectivist analysis is concerned 
with: i) ascertaining the motivations that secure the participation of newcomers through 
apprenticeship; and with: ii) identifying the emic practices that secured indirect 
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competition in the economic and juridical fields. In doing so the research question is 
prompted by the observation that the shareholders did not retain their dominant 
position by taking recourse to direct intervention through organised violence. Instead I 
aim to explain the reproduction of structural advantage in the economic and juridical 
fields by virtue of youths’ on-going participation in boss-apprentice relations. 
 
The research question is tackled via three methodological steps that are related to 
Bourdieu’s open concepts: 
 
1. Identification of an appropriate field site(s) at which cases of structural advantage 
can be examined in objectivist terms. To examine the economic field. 
 
2. Utilisation of a subjectivist approach that examines the historical and social 
conditions responsible for securing participation. To examine the primary and 
secondary habitus. 
 
3. Identification of the concrete mechanisms responsible for linking field (via 
objectivist analysis) and habitus (via subjectivist analysis) in such a way that 
reproduces the disadvantaged positions of youth through their on-going 
participation in the economic and juridical fields. By examining the reproduction of 
particular practices. 
 
To link the concepts of field, habitus and practices, and examine the reproduction of 
structural advantage, I deploy Bourdieu’s (2003) preferred methodological approach of 
‘participant objectivation’ (also see Wacquant 2004b: 395-9). The aim is to turn 
‘objectivist tools’ such as network analysis and statistics onto the ‘private person’ in 
order to situate their interests, motivations and the particular representation they have 
of their social reality within a wider field of organised activity. It is the case that our 
research subjects ‘do not stand before their action […] in the posture of an observer’; for 
they are invested in practices and are unlikely to work as professional philosophers that 
consciously stand outside of experience and continually intellectualise it (ibid: 288). 
Asking “why” somebody undertakes cannabis farming is, therefore, to assume that the 
whole truth of the practice is in their head and that the researcher only needs to extract 
this ‘truth’. Caution is especially reserved where participants in illicit activities are 
subject to domination and the varying degrees of misrecognition this entails.  
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As I argued in the previous chapter, relational sociology claims that agents practice as 
irreversible what the researcher seeks to reconstruct as reversible. In other words, 
there is a degree to which practices cannot be consciously articulated by those who are 
‘implicated’ in them. The researcher must therefore exercise a degree of detachment 
(see Candea et al 2015 for an overview) rather than solely pursuing objectivity by way 
of increasing immersion into the world of the agent through participant observation, for 
‘how can one be both subject and object’ simultaneously (ibid: 281)? The ramifications 
of collapsing a distinction between object and subject were especially apparent late on 
into field work. During the introductory vignette in Chapter One, I discussed with 
Turkish, a cannabis cultivator in Hastings, the hardship he experienced while 
participating as a runner in one of Lumley Street’s cartels: 
 
“I do not want bɔmboshɔro, a disturbance in life […] when all goodness has gone, when 
you are cast away […] bɔmboshɔro is not good for us, it is awful […] I pray I can 
overcome any situation in life. I want to overcome my debt. That is why they [the 
shareholders] call me Turkish. It is why they gave me this name.”33 
 
“Bɔmboshɔro” is a Krio colloquialism synonymous with “fracas”: a break or a rupture. 
While it is of course possible to empathise with loss or hardship, it would arguably be 
naïve to claim that I was ‘immersed’ in Turkish’s sense of emotion and urgency so as to 
claim that I could fully comprehend (and rationalise) his social reality and the whole 
trace of his past that shaped his perception of being on the brink of bɔmboshɔro. This is 
not to argue that the researcher should not be aware of the discourses through which 
youth articulate their lives, as Utas (2002: 49-51) carefully unpacks in his discussion of 
‘victimcy modes’ of representation during research with Liberian youth who 
participated in conflict. This is precisely what the reflexive dimension of Bourdieu’s 
methodology calls for and which I discuss in 3.5. Rather, it is to dispense with a view of 
objectivity that calls for ever greater intimacy with our research subjects. The notion 
that researchers are 'with' their research subjects is a ‘stereotype’, which as Venkatesh 
(2002: 108) somewhat hypocritically argues, ‘has to be driven finally into its grave’. 
 
Participant observation would furthermore presuppose the learning processes by which 
youth have come to understand the world and therefore presuppose identification of the 
concrete relations through, and the histories according to which, certain dispositions 
and practices have come to be invested with meaning. This does not mean embarking on 
                                                        
33 Field notes, with Turkish in Hastings, 30/08/2013. 
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two independent research avenues, by separating out emic from etic, even if this is 
necessary for structural purposes when writing. Rather, the linking of objectivist and 
subjectivist analysis considers the inter-relation between emic and etic that is necessary 
for examining the ‘social conditions of possibility’ that give rise to certain experiences 
and practices. In doing so, these provide a critical vantage onto a ‘necessarily fictitious 
immersion in a foreign milieu’ (Bourdieu 2003: 282).   
 
To achieve this aim, the methodology begins with an objectivist analysis that maps out 
cannabis production and marketing networks. First, I examine the characteristics of 
competition and struggles that played out according to unequal positions occupied by 
cultivators and dealers within their respective production hierarchies. Data was 
collected using a survey of cultivators that snowballed throughout field research from 
December 2012 to December 2013. This survey was conducted after purposively 
identifying those categorised as shareholders, journeymen and apprentices, in terms of 
their level of autonomy in decision-making and access to economic and social resources, 
which were grouped into several production hierarchies around shareholders that had 
claimed first rights to land ownership (Chapter Four). Snowball sampling is often used 
for accessing ‘hard-to-reach’ or ‘hidden’ populations such as drug users, in contexts such 
as cannabis production and marketing where a more representative probability sample 
is challenging to implement due to the lack of a reliable sampling framework. In this 
instance, my informants were also aware of the study’s purpose and actively searched 
for farmers at each site of production, albeit only in cases where I was present with 
them to verify their claims. 
 
Selection bias can arise from attempts by gatekeepers to conceal the identities of close 
associates or when the researcher follows initial social networks and potentially misses 
less connected and more socially distant farmers. Cannabis farmers were, however, 
often difficult to locate, especially through referral when beginning with farmers of 
lower social status. Therefore, initial cultivators usually idenfitied sites of production 
which were then mapped out. These physical sites of production were then visited and 
each cultivator validated by cross-checking claims to land-ownership with other 
cultivators and members of the community. The initial six months were dedicated to 
this labour intensive strategy so as to identify the entire population of cannabis farms 
and accompanying farmers within the limits of Western Area. Given the unit of analysis 
was individuals; the methodology did not use Participatory Rural Appraisal to conduct 
small-scale surveys (Chambers 1983). As Malleson et al (2008: 2) argue in an evaluation 
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of small-scale livelihood surveys in West Africa, the PRA takes rural households as the 
unit of analysis and, while cost- and time-effective, is limited in understanding ‘broader 
socio-economic, political and historical processes’ that impact agriculturalists. 
Therefore, in line with recent African small-scale agricultural studies (Munyua and 
Stilwell 2009), a mixed qualitative and quantitative methodology involving participant 
observation, one-on-one interviews and surveys is undertaken periodically throughout 
field research to triangulate the validity of data collected from farmers (Creswell 2003).  
 
In terms of the qualitative research, this also involved a purposive snowball sample that 
began with an apprentice in Hastings and a shareholder in Waterloo. This worked to 
reduce the degree of gatekeeper bias and triangulated differences in interpretation, 
motivations and values from less to more dominant positions. This is in line with the 
methodological approach of social aesthetics outlined in the next section (3.1.1). Given 
each cluster of farmers was relatively small; I was able to conduct a baseline survey of 
the total population of apprentices, journeymen and shareholders at each site between 
December 2012 and December 2013. Data were gathered on seasonal variation in 
advertised and transaction prices, the volume of inputs (fertiliser, chicken dung and fish 
skin) used to grow cannabis, the types of exchange relationships used to sell cannabis 
(open market and closed, cross-border exchange partners), the duration of 
apprenticeships, and the total time spent cultivating cannabis.34 Data collected during 
this time period was generalisable to the illegal context of what Maconachie et al (2012) 
refers to as urban and peri-urban agriculture (UPA) in Western Area. Maconachie et al 
conclude that 62% of legal UPA farmers were under the age of 35, and benefited from 
Western Area’s unique system of informal land regulation, and marketing and 
production networks. These factors are distinct from the rural provinces and allowed 
young men in Western Area to improve their access to economic capital and social 
standing. For this reason, the sampling strategy selected only cannabis farming sites in 
Western Area, given their unique context and greater commercial viability. By cross-
checking between first-person interviews, informal discussions and observations of 
everyday activity, I validated and mapped out the production hierarchies that linked 
apprentices to their respective shareholders and the extra-legal relations cultivators 
utilised with law-enforcers to access information regarding raids against their farms 
(see Chapter Seven).  
 
                                                        
34 See Appendix One for tabulated data from the survey. Also see Appendices for English and Krio 
translations of the initial topic guide, including survey questions. 
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To map and analyse these economic and extra-legal topographies I drew on objectivist 
techniques such as: network mapping using software tool Gephi,35 regression analysis 
using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), and kernel density analysis 
using the R statistical software package. Kernel density calculates a smoothed-out 
histogram amenable to identifying nuances in the price distributions for agricultural 
goods, enabling the identification of seasonal variations that I control for using 
regression analysis to estimate price variations owing to factors including product 
quality, social capital in access to open and closed market exchange partners, and the 
degree of incumbency within apprenticeship. These tools were complimentary in 
analysing price competition and formation, in addition to the topology of relations that 
comprised production hierarchies and extra-legal relations with law-enforcers. I discuss 
these methods and their theoretical implications in more detail as they are drawn on 
throughout the empirical chapters. This is despite such tools ‘usually [being] excluded 
from the arsenal of anthropological weapons’ (Bourdieu 2003: 284). I refer to the 
topographies produced by these methods as the economic field of cannabis cultivation 
and exchange (Chapter Four) and the juridical field of law enforcement (Chapter Seven). 
The latter also entailed observations of how law enforcement interacted with youth and 
the extra-legal encounters and relations that protected dominant players despite 
‘official’ suppression of cannabis cultivation and dealing by the state. In doing so, I argue 
that the economic and juridical fields were inter-related to ensure the reproduction of 
structural advantage. 
 
Meagher (2009) has argued that the use of networks as a theoretical approach to 
examine non-state regulation encounters a number of analytical drawbacks. A focus on 
topological structure privileges the patterning of ties over their content. Agency-centred 
approaches assume a flat ontology that results in the solving of collective action 
problems on the basis of mutual interests. The analytical focus of each is the ‘form’ of the 
network and therefore its structure in a more limited topographical sense, rather than 
efforts focusing on unpacking the content of ties in terms of the mechanisms of agency, 
culture and power responsible for the regulation of networks. This aim, as Meagher 
suggests, is important if studies of non-state regulation are to move beyond the 
economic to consider their political implications.  
 
                                                        
35 I have used the Gephi software package both for analysis of network centrality and 
betweenness, and the weighting of nodes, in addition to presenting the resulting network 
diagrams. These are discussed in more detail as utilised during the empirical chapters.  
 
 
80 
 
In my reading, preference for the institutional conception of networks outlined in 
Chapter One (1.3.2) converges with an interactionist vision. I acknowledge that this 
approach is decidedly important for it adds much needed empirical specificity, 
especially given that recent studies of illicit networks (e.g. Nordstrom 2004) are often 
based on ‘a highly speculative departure from available evidence’ and have a tendency, 
as previously argued, to treat illicit networks as ‘highly centralized rather than 
fragmented’ (ibid: 17). Rather, the issue here lies with conceptual approaches that 
privilege inter-personal relations, and ‘mechanisms’ in the sense of empirically 
observable face-to-face interaction, as the site at which agency, culture and power play 
out. This conceptualisation of illicit organisation is at odds with the concept of field I 
outlined in Chapter Two. I argued that ‘relations’ lie between positions taken by 
cultivators and dealers within a field and the associated dispositions that are brought 
into the moment of interaction between agents that guides their action and 
interpretation. Furthermore, the norms and rules that comprise institutions tend to lie 
outside the head of the agent, congruent with what Beckert (1996: 827-9) refers to as 
restrictive social devices that are held to be responsible for regulating social action.  
 
For example, youth regularly commented that they needed to obtain “sababu”: a person 
of influence who could provide access to new opportunities. This could be understood 
as the emic counterpart of social capital. While this had functional importance for 
facilitating recurrent exchange, the objectivist vantage misses how sababu was 
perceived and valued in different ways, in terms of respect and trustworthiness, and 
depended more on the status youth brought into an encounter with a potential sababu 
than was it negotiated in the immediacy of the encounter (Chapter Six, 6.3). Given that 
sociologists have begun to highlight the ways in which learned dispositions foreshadow 
interaction (Torche and Valenzuela 2011) and considering that there is arguably no 
philosophically sound reason to privilege relations over individuals (Martin 2011), the 
interactionist vision precludes a fuller explanation of illicit practices. Pushed further, 
where continual interaction results in establishing the norms posited by an institutional 
approach, or when such norms are more difficult to pin down, we rely on a conception 
of power that takes recourse to direct intervention in illicit economies or alternatively 
one that advances ‘mutual’ interests through a shared moral rhetoric.  
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3.1.1. ‘Social aesthetics’ and analytical tasks 
 
I follow recent developments in field theory that argue for linking the objective position 
of the agent and their subjective reality to provide a fuller explanation of social 
phenomena. This approach to social scientific explanation is referred to as ‘social 
aesthetics’ (Martin 2011: 236-244; Fligstein and McAdam 2012): the experience of an 
individual is qualitative because it is oriented from a particular objective point of view 
within an organised field of economic and social activity. The objective positions within 
a field can be examined using tools such as statistics and network analysis, while 
qualitative tools such as interviews and participant observation are also required to 
examine the interpretations and perceptions of agents. By tying these two modes of 
analysis together it is possible to grasp the qualitative experience of the agent in terms 
of ‘what [they] actually feel in the environment, a push to do or be something’ (Martin 
2011: 244). This mode of explanation draws on Bourdieu’s theoretical argument that 
dispositions are shaped by particular cultural, economic and social conditions (resulting 
in the primary habitus) set against more immediate ‘objective’ power relations 
(resulting in the secondary habitus). Habitus therefore shapes action and interpretation, 
but is tied to a particular position within a field as it has emerged historically. Social 
explanation is therefore not complete without an understanding of the conditions that 
give rise to action and the particular positions within a field from which and towards 
which action is oriented. I referred to this theoretical position in Chapter Three as a 
Dispositional Theory of Action (see 2.7.2). This alternative approach to social scientific 
explanation requires a methodological rationale that accounts for: the cultural, 
economic and social conditions that give rise to particular dispositions motivating 
particular kinds of action; how these motivations confront the objective relations that 
structure a particular field (i.e. boss-apprentice relations), such that particular actions, 
expectations and interpretations are tied to an agent’s historical position within the field 
they are participating in. 
 
Social aesthetics enables a close approximation of how the expectations of the agent (as 
identified by a subjectivist analysis) relate to their chances of succeeding in the field (as 
identified by an objectivist analysis). It provides a methodological avenue to examine 
non-state regulation without privileging institutions as directly intervening to restrict 
action or the interactionist vision that privileges inter-personal mechanisms of trust and 
violence. In doing so it has been important to recognise that while a top-down view of 
the field suggests certain regularities and tendencies, e.g. of price competition or 
 
 
82 
 
patterns of network ties, these regularities tend to breakdown when confronted with 
the more idiosyncratic interests and motivations of the agent. While a probability 
function can be drawn over the field, it cannot be drawn over the individual (Lainé 
2014). As such, habitus is emphatically not about claiming that all agents “conform” to 
particular schemes of action and interpretation or that they articulate the same interests 
and representations of social reality in line with some dominant conception. Rather, it is 
to acknowledge that practices are invested with different kinds of meaning even though 
the researcher-as-observer recognises that practices take on a regular pattern that 
structures durable positions within the field – what Bourdieu refers to as the patterning 
of social action. With this in mind, the research process maps out the economic and 
juridical fields using network and statistical techniques, while Bourdieu’s open concepts 
remain attentive to the dispositions and practices of agents during their encounters by 
means other than interaction and/or the shaping of interaction through certain 
institutional norms and rules, or the credible threat of organised violence. 
 
A further methodological issue when examining structural advantage is that much of our 
lived experienced is grounded in structures and processes that often cannot be 
consciously accessed. This is a particular shortcoming for the subjectivist approach that 
reduces analysis to the representation agents have of their particular reality. To link the 
economic and juridical fields with the habitus of youth participating in them, it is 
necessary to identify more concretely the mechanisms responsible for reproducing 
structural advantage. To do this, and having established the methodological avenues 
that need to be undertaken, the research question can be broken down into five 
analytical tasks: 
 
1. Undertaking a historical analysis to determine how the economic and juridical 
fields of cannabis cultivation and law enforcement have come to be structured. 
 
2. Establishing the positions of dominant and disadvantaged players within this field 
and the objective characteristics of competition and struggle that are indicative of 
these position-takings. 
 
3. Establishing the social conditions that have given rise to particular dispositions 
motivating participation in the cannabis economy. 
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4. Identifying the concrete relations and mechanisms through which youth 
misrecognise structural advantages as an ‘objective’ social reality, and come to be 
invested in the economic and juridical fields that they work to reproduce. 
 
5. Examining how the juridical field of law enforcement interacts with the economic 
field in 'failing' to enforce the official rules that would otherwise challenge 
positions of dominance. 
 
The accomplishment of these tasks requires identification of the mechanisms and 
processes – the cases – through which structural advantages are reproduced. In the next 
section I elaborate on the role played by theory (i.e. open concepts) during a subjectivist 
enquiry that seeks to identify and examine these modes of domination.  
 
3.2. The role of theory in identifying and examining cases of structural advantage 
 
This section examines how theory can be related to evidence so as to ‘operationalise’ 
Bourdieu’s open concepts (Leander 2008). Rather than identifying and examining cases 
of structural advantage according to a hypothetico-deductive model of research enquiry 
that tests hypotheses based on extant theoretical propositions (Flyvbjerg 2001; Gerring 
2004), the research process begins with a set of open concepts that were motivated by 
the identification of short-comings arising from the objectivist-structuralist and 
subjectivist-constructivist approaches. Open concepts provide theoretical sensitivity 
without being straight-jacketed by a theoretical ‘framework’. This does not, however, 
necessitate a more open-ended exploratory approach that treats cases as found objects 
that later come to be of theoretical interest. All ethnographic enquiries are at bottom 
theoretical because the researcher selects and deselects certain aspects of empirical 
reality and ascribes certain actions, claims and representations as “evidence” of a 
particular case over others. Rather than simply reportage, theoretically-informed 
ethnographic research is also driven by an ethical impulse because it entails a degree of 
transparency when identifying conceptual biases brought into the field, withstanding 
the ‘epistemological fairy tale’ of inductive Grounded Theory (Wacquant 2002: 1481).36 
Given its central aim of discovering theory through bottom-up emic concepts and 
practices (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Glaser 1978), Grounded Theory arguably struggles 
                                                        
36 Wacquant (2004: 1481, fn. 19) is unapologetic in his accusation that this ‘I-began-to-get-ideas-
from-the-things-I-was-seeing-and-hearing-on-the-street approach to field-based inquiry [… 
does] not discover the hidden mechanisms that produce’ the practices observed by the 
researcher. Wacquant cautions (again unapologetically) that a grounded theory approach is 
always open to ideological bias during analysis and representation.  
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to locate the mechanisms responsible for reproducing domination that are often covert 
and non-obvious, and as such evade the search for ‘theoretical clues’ from a given ethnos 
(Tavory and Timmermans 2009). Following this line of critique, I take theory and 
evidence as mutually constitutive in the construction of evidence when examining the 
reproduction of structural advantage.37 
  
To this end, Bourdieu and especially Wacquant (2004a), are explicit in their argument 
that primary habitus is shaped by an agent’s early social environment, such as 
experiences of education, family and religious practice, which is subsequently re-
adjusted (producing a secondary habitus) in confrontation with immediate relations of 
power and social institutions. The identification of cases demonstrative of the 
reproduction of structural advantage is therefore theoretically informed rather than 
theory-generating or purely inductive (Wacquant 2002). The research process involved 
continuous and time-consuming iteration between gathering evidence in the field and 
theoretical reflection that, in turn, shaped what was to be considered ‘evidence’ towards 
answering the research question and further elaborating upon how the resulting 
conceptual approach was to be specified. 
 
To accommodate this productive iteration between theory-at-the-desk and evidence 
gathered in the field, field research from December 2012 to December 2013 was divided 
into two halves. The first half identified the research issue and question, and invested 
patience and trust in building relationships with a small number of interlocutors that 
provided incremental access to other cannabis cultivators and dealers in Hastings, 
Waterloo and Freetown. During desk research in June 2013 it was possible to step-back 
and examine the initial material, reframe the research question, and establish the 
                                                        
37 Burawoy’s (1991, 1998) Extended Case Method was considered as an alternative 
methodological avenue for examining cases of structural advantage in the field. ECM integrates a 
phenomenological approach within a broader political economy framework in order to ‘extract 
the general from the unique’ and develop the macro-foundations of a micro-sociology on the 
basis of pre-existing theory. ECM works out from a case to reconstruct theory. Manoeuvring away 
from a positivist model of social science, ECM applies of a ‘reflexive model of science’ to 
participant-observation. This has affinities with Bourdieu’s method of participant-objectivation 
by trying not to separate subject and object (folk and academic theory) in the pursuit of 
objectivity in terms of four goals: reactivity, reliability, replicability and representativeness. In 
doing so ECM ‘extends’ from individual to larger structures that shape their practices and 
dispositions. However, with a view of the relation between ‘the game’ and ‘the system’, I did not 
pursue this methodological avenue beause ECM’s focus on theoretical extension goes too far, 
pointing outwards to ‘macro structures’ synonymous with structural violence, rather than 
keeping the methodological focus on the more discrete forms of domination that have emerged in 
opposition to them. Burawoy (2012) has since engaged with Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic 
violence (Burawoy 2012), suggesting a logic of enquiry through ECM that is in line with that 
elaborated here. 
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conceptual tools required to guide a more intensive period of field research and 
empirical analysis from July to December 2013. This later period of research focused on 
boss-apprentice relations (i.e. apprenticeships) and encounters with law enforcement as 
specific cases of how structural advantage was being reproduced. Having closely read 
Bourdieu, the resulting conceptual approach outlined in Chapter Two motivated the use 
of mixed qualitative and quantitative methods despite having originally embarked on a 
purely ‘ethnographic’ or qualitative approach. During this first phase of field research I 
identified apprenticeship as the case indicative of how structural advantages were being 
reproduced. 
 
3.2.1. Locating the Case: apprenticeship 
 
After negotiating access to cannabis farms in order to survey their financials and map 
out the organisation of production, I noticed that cultivators had arranged their farming 
plots into several clusters that were each referred to by a colloquial nickname: Loko 
Fakay, Obɔnoki, Sugar Loaf, Wanpala and You Must Grumble, among others located in the 
outlying towns of Macdonald and Four Mile. While cultivation was prevalent throughout 
Sierra Leone’s provinces, cultivators claimed that these clusters of farming collectively 
comprised “Ganja HQ”. Indeed, they closely allied the findings of archival research as the 
historically most well-established sites of cultivation for commercial export (see 
Akyeampong 2005). 
 
Although chain work is indicative of a flat form of organisation synonymous with social 
bridging usually facilitated by ‘weak ties’ (Granovetter 1985), youth described how they 
were ‘drawn’ into such work by already established cultivators and dealers referred to 
as ‘shareholders’. One youths’ explanation was indicative of this: 
 
“In the bush we have leaders. When you first meet them they control you.”38 
 
Unemployed youth who congregated in panbɔdis [tin huts] awaiting income-generating 
opportunities were drawn into these arrangements selectively, with their prospective 
shareholders claiming they had to ensure they had the “intention” and “the mind to do 
it”. After gaining access to farms and interviewing both newer and more established 
cultivators it was apparent that these labour relations were hierarchically organised. 
                                                        
38 Interview with Musa Koroma, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 20/11/2013. 
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Apprenticeship was a reasonable means by which to obtain economic capital (cash-
money, credit and land) and so young men trained under shareholders who claimed to 
“control” them. What I term boss-apprentice relations allowed shareholders to explicitly 
instruct youth how to cultivate cannabis, how to monetarily value the product of their 
labour, and acted as gatekeepers when new comers tried to establish relationships with 
higher value exchange partners. Consequently, the boss-apprentice relation functioned 
as a gatekeeping mechanism that regulated youths’ access to economic and social 
capital. 
 
I subsequently turned to examine whether direct intervention by the shareholders, in 
the form of organised violence and/or corruption through a unitary police force, was 
responsible for raising barriers to entry as claimed by the objectivist-structuralist 
approach. Contrary to the organised crime and network literatures that privileged 
asymmetric and centralised organisational structures, apprentices and their respective 
shareholders claimed that they could not “take the advantage” amid disputes or when 
preventing challenges by rival cultivators. By refraining from the use of inter-personal 
violence, refrains from taking the advantage assumed an equal playing field from which 
an advantage could be gained, despite the topography of cultivation revealing more 
hierarchical tendencies. These initial findings indicated that more covert forms of power 
were at play and required a conceptual shift that resulted in the turn towards 
Bourdieu’s relational sociology during desk research in June 2013. Following Bourdieu’s 
focus on the peasantry and long standing interest in ‘Modes of Domination’, as discussed 
in the later chapters of Outline of a Theory of Practice, I focused on apprenticeship as the 
site at which youth came to adopt particular practices – patterns of acting, reasoning 
and thinking – that, in turn, reproduced their disadvantaged position without their 
shareholders’ need for direct intervention.  
 
A period of desk research in June 2013 also revealed that apprenticeship had been 
identified elsewhere as the most promising empirical site at which to serve clarity on 
Bourdieu’s less well-specified open concepts, such as embodiment, habitus and 
practices (Bloch 2012: 192-3); and has been central to the later defence and elaboration 
of Bourdieu’s conceptual and methodological approach (see Wacquant 2004b, 2011). 
Furthermore, both Bourdieu (2000: 136) and Wacquant (2014b: 129) have argued that 
the concept of misrecognition is open-ended and requires empirical illustration in order 
to add theoretical specificity. I therefore took apprenticeship as the site at which 
structural advantage is reproduced in the on-going participation of youth in the cannabis 
 
 
87 
 
economy. Apprenticeship was the central ‘case’ for examining how misrecognition was 
secured and re-secured through the on-going activity of apprentices. Consequently, field 
research between July and December 2013 focused explicitly on examining 
apprenticeship. 
 
3.3. The field as an arbitrary location 
 
Having identified apprenticeship as a case for examining the reproduction of structural 
advantage, it was necessary to locate and map out the field site in which these relations 
were situated. I understood the historically most well-established sites of cannabis 
cultivation and exchange in Hastings and Waterloo as an ‘arbitrary location’ (Candea 
2007). The advent of multi-sited ethnography first advocated by Marcus (1995) has 
deconstructed the field site to the point where it is the research subjects who define the 
boundaries and limits of the field, a process that the researcher follows as the 
researched constructs the object of inquiry (Gupta and Ferguson 1997). However, this 
doing away of the ‘bounded field’ (ibid: 38) is at odds with Bourdieu’s concept of field as 
constituting relatively autonomous but organised economic and social activities that 
engender certain limits on action and interpretation for their participants. The multi-
sited field is also at odds with what Wacquant (2004b: 389) refers to as the ‘living 
laboratories’ of Bourdieu’s field research. Each site of research, from Béarn to Algeria, 
represented an arena in which to reconstruct theory that spoke to broader practices and 
tendencies across difference. Rather than a much earlier precursor to what is now 
recognised as multi-sited field work, these were bounded sites used specifically for re-
examining his open concepts (ibid: 396).  
 
When explaining the tasks involved in undertaking chain work, cultivators bound their 
index fingers together and placed emphasis on the fact that cultivation “de na di grawnd” 
[it is in the ground here]. The cultivation of cannabis comprised situated hierarchies of 
labour relations and social encounters through which its product was exchanged. The 
case was chain work and its site was Hastings and Waterloo. The field was therefore not 
so much unbounded, multi-sited and awaiting discovery, but rather, the bounding of the 
field stemmed from an analytical decision that it was necessary to establish the 
positions and relations of participants within a given organised field of activity – and 
indeed to deal with the time constraints required of a ‘deeper’ subjectivist enquiry into 
youths’ domination. Given the importance of illusio, misrecognition and symbolic 
violence to the conceptual approach, I was cautious not to rely solely on my research 
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subjects to construct the object of enquiry without first considering the objective 
position they occupied from my more detached position of researcher-as-observer, in 
relation to the particular representation of social reality that they were providing from 
my position of researcher-as-participant. A more ‘open-ended’ field enquiry, as Candea 
(2004: 172-3) claims, would be to invoke an ‘imaginary freedom’.39 Rather than 
directing efforts at ‘following’ objects, relations and agents, then, I instead paid heed to 
the boundedness of reasoning and thinking – as well as of geographic mobility – that 
were often imperceptible to apprentice cultivators and therefore absent from the 
representation they had of their social reality, which afforded them the perception of 
more “movement” within it.40  
 
To expend effort on leaving the bounds of the field site in favour of mapping all social 
ties within a wider network would have been to depart from a bottom-up view of 
hierarchy in favour of an illusion of ideographic closure. Instead, it was necessary to 
begin with those I had identified within a field of organised activity (chain work), and to 
examine how their qualitative experience and partial knowledge was tied to this 
particular position (the game), to grasp the reproduction of structural advantage. The 
field site is thereby treated as an arbitrary location: 
 
‘The actually existing instance [of an empirical case], whose messiness, contingency, 
and lack of an overarching coherence or meaning serve as a ‘control’ for a broader 
abstract object of study [that allows the researcher to] reflect on and rethink conceptual 
entities [i.e. open concepts], to challenge their coherence and their totalizing aspirations 
[...] The decision to bound off a site for the study of ‘something else’, with all the blind-
spots and limitations which this implies, is a productive form of methodological 
asceticism.’ (Candea 2006: 180) 
 
Having argued that the bounding of the field site was an analytical decision necessary to 
examine the reproduction of structural advantage through Bourdieu’s open concepts, in 
what follows I outline issues that emerged with a subjectivist analysis during my time in 
the field. In doing so I elaborate on my entry into the field – what youth claimed to be a 
                                                        
39 During the first stage of research it was often the anxieties of 'not knowing enough' that lent 
itself to breadth, rather than focusing on a productive iteration between concept and evidence 
towards knowing what to know.  
40 As I examine in Chapter Six (6.4), it was precisely youths’ false perception that their open-
ended movement was a source of agency, which suggested that a multi-sited ethnography could 
provide evidence of social exclusion and economic disadvantage.   
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matter of “going inside the game” – and confront issues of positionality, reflexivity and 
ethics. 
 
3.4. Entering the field 
 
Entry into any field is entangled with its own unique idiosyncrasies that rarely conform 
to established academic norms involved in preparing oneself to be a ‘professional 
stranger’ (Agar 1996). As a field work novice my own entry was shaped by the legacy of 
a plethora of research contacts that were being used to study various conflict and ‘post’-
conflict topics relating to Sierra Leone’s civil conflict from 1991 to 2002. In certain 
respects this was a hindrance. Many of my interlocutors and especially their younger 
followers had, as they put it, been “sensitised” to the “exploitation” of being unpaid 
research subjects and utilised reasonably well-defined networks stretching into the 
provinces to ensure academic researchers got what they needed. Initial encounters with 
youth in attaya [green tea] bases and panbɔdis [tin huts], during which I practiced Krio – 
and grappled with its contextual interpretations, colloquialisms and metaphors – were 
framed by the obligation of needing “protection” from ostensibly dangerous outsiders.  
 
After at least two months spent “hanging out” a picture emerged of an eclectic youth 
culture that shifted between Rastafari dictates of “livity” [living positively], Neo-
Evangelist virtues of righteous labour, and ascetic Islamic commitments to moral 
virtuosity. This complex and highly differentiated value system often confronted a 
stylised Western modernity that promised there was more to be gained outside the 
corrugated zinc walls of the panbɔdi. Unlike media portrayals to the contrary, these 
youth were rarely ex-combatants and many had instead been displaced by the civil 
conflict during the late 1990s (Peters 2010). These youth retold oblique and 
euphemism-laden stories of the RUF’s advance into the outlying peninsula towns of 
Hastings and Waterloo. Uncommon, then, was a ‘victimcy mode’ of dialogue through 
which youth presented themselves as powerless individuals during their re-telling of 
the past (Utas 2003: 49-51). Rather, I encountered multiple ways in which youth 
established a veneer of agency by aspiring to a number of different identities and roles 
related to the benefits they perceived could be sought from what they continually 
referred to as my “project”.  
 
Most frequent was what I termed in my field diary “Mr NGO”. Youth bases were 
presented as proto-youth organisations with names such as “Youth, Empowerment, and 
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Development”. Youth often assumed I was an NGO worker and deployed a vernacular of 
NGO-speak and references to loose affiliations with “links” [contacts] in the NGO sector 
in the expectation of arranging a host of “programmes” to “sensitise the youth”. Such 
discourses took an immeasurable amount of patience to pierce beneath, even if they 
were indicative of a reality that had been shaped by the saturation of international 
donors and aid organisations in their daily lives. When first learning Krio at Fourah Bay 
College, my tutor claimed that there were many different kinds of youth: “those that 
swing briefcases, the raray [rootless] boys, those in the bush”, and so forth. Analogous to 
the “drɛg” [hustle] of a previous generation defined by geographic movement, youth 
greeted each other with the phrase “Aw di tɔnin” [How is it turning?]. ‘To turn’ was to 
make a profit. Yet the phrase also referred to an ability to literally turn into different 
roles, be it a mechanic, youth coordinator or cannabis cultivator.41 Youth earned 
incomes through a variety of licit activities including the ‘buy and sell’ of second hand 
clothes bundles in Eastern Freetown, as apprentices responsible for poda poda [minivan 
taxi] fares and, for those with more economic capital (and a generator), a range of street 
vending activities from barber shops to mobile phone charging stations.  
 
Movement around Eastern Freetown required dealing with territorial divisions claimed 
by kliks [gangs] including the Red Flag Movement (‘RFM’), Black Leo and Cens Coast Hood 
(‘CCC’). Sporting red, black and blue bandanas respectively a number of youth claimed 
that in early 2012 Black Leo and the CCC had joined “in combination” against the RFM. 
The RFM was taken as a conduit for President Ernest Bai Koroma’s ruling APC party and, 
growing rapidly in numbers, had betrayed itself to “the system”. Petty theft and fuel 
siphoning were organised through these kliks, albeit less visibly with such activities 
usually conducted at night. Theft was both physically and socially dangerous for those 
caught were often quickly held culpable by local residents and punished with mob 
violence before being taken to the local police station. Such cases bypassed the informal 
dispute resolution of a “shorty”’ [big man] in the panbɔdi. It was not, youth claimed, 
possible to “bɔf” [drop] the case. The itemised rules written onto the walls of youth 
bases in Freetown – “do not fight”, “do not spit” – corresponded with youths’ refrain to 
“no advantage am” [do not advantage him/her]. The veneer of an equal playing field 
                                                        
41 Hoffman (2007a) employs Deleuze and Guatarri’s concept of production in general and 
without distinction by which social relations and modes of labour are totally subsumed under 
capital (‘without distinction’) and there exists no ‘outside’ to surplus labour value in production: 
‘social life itself is a space for the generation of exchange value and the production of profits’ 
(ibid: 404). In this view, youth constitute a floating population that, by congregating in the 
panbɔdi – what Hoffman refers to as the ‘barracks’ – constitute sites of readily deployable labour 
for any task or any role. 
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established commonly practiced refrains from the use of inter-personal violence or theft 
that would otherwise have allowed youth to gain an advantage over those who were 
also trying to make money. These refrains worked to protect my research subjects’ 
personal security. As such, those more closed activities were distinguished from 
cannabis cultivation.  
 
The aim of this period was to befriend more accessible low-level dealers referred to as 
“pedlars”. With time I thought it would be possible to pinpoint from the fragmented 
jottings I was gathering in my field diary the locations and names of gatekeepers who 
would grant access to the historically most well-established sites of cultivation in 
Hastings and Waterloo that I had gleaned from previous archival research conducted by 
Akyeampong (2005). Venturing into less familiar [fiba] territory outside of Eastern 
Freetown, strategies of social closure for financial gain re-appeared and the anxieties of 
appearing to make no progress with my field research necessitated a change in strategy.  
 
These barriers to entering the field of cannabis cultivation came into even sharper relief 
when, emboldened but naïve, I attempted to “hike” into the dense bush surrounding 
Hastings and Waterloo. Not alert to the layers of surveillance and suspicion that 
surrounded this illicit activity, I was on all of three attempts followed and stopped by a 
Forest Guard representing the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. This first encounter 
with an agent of the state was indicative of the multivalent discourses and practices that, 
in a different manner for youth seeking employment, worked to deny entry into an 
economy that at street-level was neither particularly ‘taboo’ nor exactly secret. For the 
Forest Guard speaking with the capitalised authority of the Sierra Leonean state, the 
bush was a wild and dangerous place (Hoffman 2005: 301-3, 2007b) and I needed his 
“sababu” [an influential friend] as protection from those said to wield cutlasses at the 
sight of “strangers”. Deciding to abandon the somewhat anachronistic and heroic idea of 
“going it alone” in the field, I momentarily assumed the position of what my then-to-be 
research assistant nicknamed Lamine42 referred to as the “academic hustler”. While it 
would be unwise to treat the designation of ex-combatant as a social category somehow 
detached from its past (Jackson 2004), one such ex-combatant, a former member of the 
Royal Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF), proved that his past was instrumental in 
securing both initial contacts and providing much needed information as to the 
landscape of cannabis cultivation that I had initially gleaned from dealers in Freetown.43  
                                                        
42 A pseudonym is used to protect the identity of my research assistant.  
43 I would like to thank Dr Krijn Peters for his kind efforts in arranging this.  
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Rather than working from dealer-on-the-street to cultivation akin to a supply chain 
analysis, several discussions with Lamine – and his encouragement that I tackle the 
research head-on – gave me the confidence to again try and enter the field directly at the 
sites of cultivation in Hastings and Waterloo, before working outwards through its 
networks of labour relations, distribution and exchange. Lamine had spent time training 
during the early 2000s at a military barracks in Hastings. He explained to me in detail 
the routes taken in-and-out of the bush by cultivators when transporting their diamba 
[cannabis herb] to Freetown and beyond to Guinea. As an RSLAF private in the late 
1990s, Lamine participated in an offensive against the RUF after they had pushed into 
Hastings and Waterloo with brutal and devastating effect. The high-tension electricity 
pylons he and his squad mates had followed through the bush cut across several well-
stablished areas of cannabis cultivation, colloquially referred to as Loko Fakay, Next 
World and Makeni. With this knowledge also came legitimacy because RSLAF personnel 
were viewed by residents of Hastings and Waterloo as veritable heroes that ensured 
they were treated as “good” sababu. The flash of a military identification card was 
enough to reconfigure power relations and create a beachhead from which trusting 
relations could be piecemeal negotiated. As Hoffman and Tarawalley Jr (2014: 292) 
claim in their insightful take on the role of collaborators while undertaking research on 
violent conflict in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the research assistant’s authority ‘is rooted 
in the way these figures straddle multiple social spheres’. While Lamine was not as 
central to the play of narratives and interpretations as Tarawalley Jr was to Hoffman, 
being recognised and respected as former military personnel proved crucial for 
establishing contact with two cultivators whom Lamine and I believed were trustworthy 
enough to “get” the project.  
 
Since the early 1990s Musa had cultivated cannabis in his birthplace of Kambia District 
before joining the RSLAF later that decade. Having trained as a communications 
engineer he returned to Waterloo in the early 2000s and claimed first rights to land 
ownership that allowed him to clear a section of bush now named Loko Fakay after an 
old Krio village. Now in his early 40s, Musa claimed belonging to the social category of a 
“youth man” that was qualified by his being in “control” of two youth on his farm, Ayo 
Pack and Lamine, who were trying to understand the game while watering the crop and 
acting as lookouts to deter “idle thieves”. Musa lived in a house with his mother and his 
two young children were raised by his wife in a separate, much larger compound built 
and owned by an extended relative now living in the United States. Cannabis cultivation 
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provided Musa’s main personal income. He had, however, attempted to branch out and 
invest the capital he had earned into numerous other activities. The most ambitious 
attempt was in late 2013 when Musa purchased a minivan for Le4 million and converted 
it into a poda poda [minivan taxi]. Having hired one youth as a driver and another to 
collect fares, Musa bemoaned that they had “faked him” by failing to return the full 
balance on the poda poda’s second outing. Re-selling the poda poda, Musa reinvested the 
capital in the subsequent cultivating season.  
 
Lamine also helped me gain access to an area of Hastings known as “Back Street” that 
dealers in Freetown claimed to represent the hub for bulk buying cannabis herb. A 
collection of panbɔdis surrounded a large building known as “Islex Entertainment”. The 
walls of Islex were painted with murals dedicated to Reggae artists such as Peter Tosh, 
Bob Marley, Bunny Wailer and Burning Spear, in addition to newer icons such as LAJ 
and Kao Denero, each associated with “kliks” [gangs] in Eastern Freetown known as the 
Red Flag Movement and Black Leo respectively. Next to Islex resided a cluster of houses, 
resident to what youth in Back Street referred to as the “shareholders of the business”. I 
met my second primary interlocutor, nicknamed Turkish – amongst a host of other 
names – while spending time “binding” [hanging out] with young men as they drank 
pɔyo [palm], smoked diamba and discussed politics, religion and sex. Exclusively male 
spaces with occasional visits from girlfriends just outside its walls, the young men in 
Back Street vied for my sababu but ultimately conceded by giving me the nickname 
“Balogun Tɛnda”.  
 
Tɛnda is a phonetic rendering in a Krio accent of the English word thunder, like a “bolt of 
lightning out of nowhere”, as well as the nickname of a former Sierra Leonean 
goalkeeper who could save penalties like lightning. Balogun originates as a military 
institution in Yorubaland during the nineteenth century, where it referred to war 
commanders appointed by each Yoruba state (Jimoh and Oloruntola 2016). War 
commanders reported to the civil authority and were primarily responsible for leading 
able-bodied men within the community into offensive and defensive battles against rival 
states. The Balogun became powerful in economic and political matters, and so the 
colloquial use of the term in Krio is synonymous with someone in a position of authority. 
Sababu was prized and this nickname was indicative of the concessions and cynicism 
that pervaded youths’ hopes and refrains as they attempted to establish relationships 
with those perceived to assume a position of influence (the system) from which new 
opportunities might be granted to them. Turkish lived in a half-constructed panbɔdi with 
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his wife and three-year old son on a hillside clearing between Back Street and the 
winding copper-orange tracks that led to the plot of land he rented from his shareholder 
amid a cluster of farms colloquially known as Obɔnoki. While his wife sold household 
goods in Freetown’s Sani Abacha Street, Turkish’s main source of income was earned 
from cannabis cultivation.  
 
As outlined in the introductory vignette (Chapter One, 1.1), Turkish’s friendship, despite 
his lower position in the cannabis hierarchy, proved crucial for examining the limits and 
social distances within a field that Musa and my research assistant Lamine had more 
freedom to navigate. Getting to know Musa and Turkish was not just a matter of 
friendship, opportunity or access, but also an analytical decision. They represented 
different positions within the economic field of cannabis cultivation and juridical field of 
law enforcement from which I could flesh out a social aesthetics. Entry into the field of 
cannabis cultivation and dealing entailed a greater degree of reflexivity when 
encountering practices that were less visible but provided a window onto youths’ 
misrecognition of their social reality as somewhat more matter-of-fact, banal and even 
inevitable. 
 
3.5. “Going inside the game”: ethics and reflexivity 
 
‘The most difficult thing, paradoxically, is never to forget that they are all people like 
me, at least as much as they do not stand before their practice.’ (Bourdieu 2003: 288)  
 
Befriending Musa and Turkish proved crucial for being able to meet with other 
cultivators and accessing cannabis farms in the bush where I conducted a survey of 
cannabis cultivators and a series of one-on-one recorded interviews from Loko Fakay to 
other clusters of cultivation such as Sugar Loaf (see Appendix Seven). This process was, 
however, fraught with suspicion and the need to manage rumour, what cultivators 
cautioned as resulting in “blazing the lane”: preventing access to new opportunities for 
exchange. On my first visit into the bush with Musa and other cultivators from Loko 
Fakay in March 2013, a helicopter with radar used for conducting geological surveys 
attached to its underside flew over us. A BBC World Service feature aired shortly after 
on Musa’s portable FM radio concerning the lack of protection afforded police 
informants in the US drugs trade.44 Apprehensive, and feeling this turn of events 
conspiring against me, the cultivators claimed I was a CIA agent who had been sent to 
                                                        
44 See: ‘Snitches in the USA’, BBC World Service, http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p01611vz 
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“spy” on them. Unfortunate as this incident was, Musa worked tirelessly to prove that far 
from a “kɔngosa”45 I was merely a (British) student “writing a book” on cannabis 
farming. My rite of passage subsequently became about the veracity of this book. It was 
expected to provide the ‘true’ representation of life as a cannabis cultivator and the hope 
that, rather than an issue of law enforcement, cannabis cultivation would be taken as a 
matter of deficient agricultural policy. 
 
As my time surveying cultivators with Musa progressed, I faced further issues trying to 
grasp how cannabis farming was organised. While details of prices, crop rotations and 
output were fairly accessible, cultivators discussed the organisation of chain work – and 
therefore of their respective production hierarchies – in indirect and vague terms often 
laden with euphemism and mixed metaphors; what Ben Penglase (2009: 57-8) has 
referred to as ‘semantic ambiguity’. What I later refer to as public secrecy (Chapter 
Seven) did not, however, require someone with an insider’s view of secret societies that 
have long functioned to organise social life in Sierra Leone (cf. Hoffman 2012a: 292; also 
see Ferme 2011; Albrecht and King 2015). Although Lamine had experienced initiation, 
and was not shy to explain it or for that matter let me undertake it, I came to understand 
public secrecy, of knowing the facts but not being able to articulate them as such, as a 
more general social practice encountered in a variety of mundane contexts (Bellman 
1981: 1; Boltanski 2012). My lines of questioning could therefore not be framed in 
ethical terms as a matter of personal privacy.46 Secrecy was not analogous with privacy 
in the sense of concealing the content of information, but instead with how information 
was being presented and the effects this had in terms of foregrounding discussions and 
encounters throughout field research. I therefore took the analytical decision to observe 
                                                        
45 A Krio noun and pronoun gossip and somebody who gossips, in this context used to mean a 
police informant. 
46 There are six key principles that govern the Economic and Social Research Council’s (ESRC) 
Research Ethics Framework (REF). Of concern here is the third principle that, ‘The confidentiality 
of information supplied by research participants and the anonymity of respondents must be 
respected.’ While I have protected anonymity by obscuring nicknames and the locations of illegal 
activity, information was not treated by my interlocutors as ‘confidential’, but instead as a 
commodity that secured their position in the cannabis economy and, ultimately, that prevented 
them from having to resort to more dangerous criminal activity that would have seriously 
impinged on their personal security. I therefore treat confidentiality in the REF as unrelated to 
matters of personal privacy in order to respect the research participants’ representations of their 
activities. See: 
https://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/archaeology/documents/ESRCETHICS%20revised%20201
0.pdf, pg. 3. 
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how secrecy was practiced from the bottom (Turkish) and the top (Musa) during 
encounters cultivators had with their respective shareholders and law enforcement.47  
 
Given cultivators already possessed numerous tried-and-tested means by which to 
obscure their activities and identities, public secrecy was less an ethical issue of 
confidentiality and privacy. Such not-so-secret information represented a commodity 
that shielded youth from law enforcement and worked to protect knowledge of 
cultivation practices and high value dealers that was otherwise easy to share. The 
secrecy entailed when “going inside the game” instead raised ethical issues concerning 
the politics of representation when writing about illicit lives (Bourgois and Schonberg 
2009: 12-15). The issue was how to write in such a way that conveyed the specific 
cultural logic of these practices without succumbing to a mode of representation that 
could be appropriated by discourses of criminal breakdown or organised violence. I 
wanted to articulate this as a case, not of an “illegal drug economy” per se, but as an 
organised activity that for my interlocutors was meaningful and reasonably invested in, 
with participation being closely-related to arguably more mundane concerns of 
employment, masculinity and extra-state social order. Cognisant of the cultural 
essentialisms that pervaded the studies reviewed in Chapter One, I wanted to examine 
cannabis cultivation and dealing as a case of extra-state economic and social 
organisation free from moral prejudices found in the wider literature.  
 
To this end I took time to read Bourgois and Schonberg’s A Righteous Dopefiend and 
tackled what they refer to as ‘cultural relativism’.48 This was important because I was 
writing about forms of social life considered to be “righteous” that were also subject to 
powerful discourses that treated an otherwise productive activity as a threat to national 
security (see Chapter Seven). In line with the theoretical sensitives of Bourdieu’s open 
concepts, cultural relativism is a mode of critical analysis and writing that: 
 
                                                        
47 I agree here with Utas (2003: 79) that cultivators who had contact with the police (i.e. those 
that had secured haju) were more open in their accounts for they perceived to run a lower risk of 
being caught. What I add is that the degree of openness in youths’ accounts aligned with a more 
favourable position in a tacit hierarchy. 
48 I have also drawn from Bourdieu’s The Weight of the World (1998), a collection of upfront 
interview transcripts from those in precarious and marginal life circumstances across France and 
North America. To approach symbolic violence using a narrative mode of ethnography the 
contributors also provide a social and economic preface to their subject’s retelling that aimed 
towards a ‘practical and theoretical grasp of the social conditions’ of which their research 
subjects were ‘the product’ (ibid: 613).  
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‘Strategically suspends moral judgement in order to understand and appreciate the 
diverse logic of social and cultural practices that, at first sight, often provoke righteous 
responses and prevent analytical self-reflection.’ (ibid: 7)  
 
Consequently, my aim was to tease out the ‘pragmatic rationality’ of the encounters and 
practices I observed during field research (ibid: 9).  
 
A more immediate concern was the presence of law enforcement. My apprehension was 
that, having been treated as the sababu of particular cultivators I might alter the rules of 
the game and attract undue attention, disgruntlement and even resentment. During 
encounters with Sierra Leone Police (SLP) officers they were often affronted and 
disgruntled by my failure to contact them in the first instance, and perceived my failure 
to be granted their “permission” as incompetent. In both Hastings and Waterloo, I 
therefore regularly visited the town chiefs to make them aware of my presence and 
gradually broached the subject matter of my research. In both cases I was eventually 
greeted openly. I attended a tour of the National Police Training Centre in Hastings to 
observe the Operational Support Division (OSD) conduct live fire drills. The town chief 
of Hastings organised for me to meet ‘all’ the cannabis cultivators in the area, which 
provided me with a window onto the more formalised arrangements of “haju” [giving a 
little something] that secured police inaction.49 These authority figures were more 
concerned with the violent forms of criminality that might result if youth were pushed 
out of cannabis cultivation and as such invested in my book as a challenge to its 
representation by the Sierra Leonean government as a threat to national security.  
 
Following the logic of public secrecy I was also concerned with the politics of what it 
meant to reveal evidence of complicity and hierarchy in the cannabis economy to both 
outside audiences and to my interlocutors. Often I played a dual role as the participant 
observer by conforming to a view from the bottom (Turkish) that often did not converge 
with that of their respective shareholders (Musa) who were privately cynical in 
recognising their complicity. Semi-structured interviews were recorded at times and 
places away from the oversight of shareholders to engage apprentice cultivators and 
other youth in lines of questioning that challenged their pre-conceived views.50 
                                                        
49 I was, however, cognisant of research studies regarding ex-combatants that caution against 
approaching access through gatekeepers who often present a one-sided view of how such 
networks are organised (e.g. see Hoffman 2011).  
50 See Appendix 7 for examples of interview transcripts and Appendix 8 for examples of field 
diary transcripts. 
 
 
98 
 
Interviews were, however, often treated with a degree of suspicion and proved more 
useful for obtaining objective data regarding prices, the cultivation process, relations 
with other cultivators, in addition to confirming or drawing out inconsistencies with 
observations and details of informal discussions recorded in field notes. 51  The 
mechanisms responsible for misrecognition were, however, rarely articulated by youth 
during interview. Instead, they moved between outward signifiers congruent with the 
immediacy of their on-going activity. Such dialogue rarely involved introspection in the 
sense of ‘revealing’ underlying motivations and fears. During informal discussions 
recorded using scratch notes and written up later during the day, I was able to more 
flexibly move the conversation away from a line of reasoning that confirmed their 
representation of reality, and instead tried to pinpoint exactly why they continued to 
work under apprenticeships. While this approach proved more insightful, when 
speaking with my interlocutors I encountered mixed metaphors, euphemisms and 
ambiguity. 
 
How is it possible, then, to empirically grasp misrecognition through interviews that are, 
generally-speaking, inter-subjective not extra-discursive encounters? Psychoanalytic 
geographers have adopted a variety of approaches to tackle similar methodological 
issues (see Kingsbury 2009 for an overview). While attempting to examine the 
nationalistic motivations of football fans amid their emotional outbursts when watching 
the 2006 World Cup, Proudfoot (2010) argues that he encountered the ‘paradox of 
enjoyment [jouissance]’. When broaching the ‘why’ question ‘speech itself evaporates 
and we are left to interpret ellipses’ – it is the methodological task, therefore, to ‘make 
the ellipses speak’ (ibid: 511). Following Proudfoot I began to reflect on the 
methodological tools of ‘speaking’ and ‘looking awry’ that Slavoj Žižek (1992) has used 
in his analysis of nationalism and consumption practices. These modes of enquiry do not 
call for more intimacy and fuller immersion into the lives of research subjects. Rather, as 
Proudfoot argues, it requires a degree of detachment: 
 
‘I maintained an unproductive distance from the interviewee, acting solely as an 
observer rather than a participant [because] subjects are loathe to make conscious the 
unconscious […] To speak awry is to direct the research by situating the object in the 
periphery of one’s questions.’ (ibid: 514-5)  
 
                                                        
51 Quotes from interviews and field notes are acknowledged using footnotes containing a 
pseudonym as used by cultivators and dealers, role (e.g. cultivator, dealer), location, and date of 
occurrence. A list of interviewees is available in Appendix One (real names are omitted).  
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This required me to strategically withhold empathy because it was precisely a more 
empathetic line of dialogue that would have allowed my interlocutors to circulate 
between self-affirming signifiers that concealed the modes of domination that I posited 
they were subject to. During specific moments I would feign eye contact, speak in 
monotone or generally appear to be uninterested. I would interject the flow of dialogue 
with blunt and obvious questions: “what is the game?”, “why do you farm here?”, “who is 
your shareholder?”, “how did he become your sababu?” and so forth. Such lines of 
questioning were met with confrontation and exasperation – “Balogun, I’ve already told 
you. It is the way it is!” – but these responses provided a view of the limits around 
acting, reasoning and thinking when youth treated their social reality as matter-of-fact, 
always with close comparison to the objectivist analysis of the economic and juridical 
fields I was undertaking as a simultaneous observer. 
  
I have taken care during transcription to present the views of my interlocutors in an 
accessible format when translating from Krio to English, by retaining the original voice 
and by including pauses where conversations hanged. To allow the reader to relate 
these moments to the objectivist analysis, I have provided snapshots of dialogue 
indicative of more widely shared practices, using certain interlocutors (e.g. Turkish) as 
devices through which to convey a more coherent narrative. Certain emic concepts 
indicative of practices responsible for reproducing structural advantage (e.g. sabi, 
sababu, haju) are left in the original Krio vernacular but unpacked and explained in the 
third person. ‘These changes’ were necessary in order to ‘respect the integrity of human 
character and to retain the full contextual meaning’ of those participating in the 
cannabis economy (Bourgois and Schonberg 2009: 13).  
 
This approach did, for example, help examine how public secrecy was borne out in the 
act of concealing an ‘objective’ social reality to oneself through a subjective manoeuvre. 
Attention to absences during interviews and repetition of certain outward signifiers, 
what Bourdieu refers to as ‘recognition’ or ‘re-cognition’, highlighted certain extra-
economic payoffs that made life bearable for cultivators and dealers who claimed to 
have sought meaningful lives “inside the game”. This mode of dialogue and presentation 
was indicative of a rhetorical refrain youth frequently used when dealing with times of 
hardship: 
 
“Aw fɔ du” [What can I do?]  
“Yu mɔs bia am” [You must bear it]. 
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It is rarely possible to talk directly about domination in order to ‘reveal’ it. To disrupt 
embedded forms of judgement and perception by forcing the ethical imperative of 
confidentiality onto my research subjects and continually explaining the importance of 
why confidentiality “protected” them52 would in my opinion have been to: 
 
‘Spotlight the role of shame, that self-defeating emotion that arises when the dominated 
come to perceive themselves through the eyes of the dominant, that is, [when they] are 
made to experience their own ways of thinking, feeling, and behaving as degraded and 
degrading.’ (Wacquant 2004b: 393). 
 
By moving between a subjectivist and objectivist mode of enquiry I have aimed to 
situate the action and interpretation of my interlocutors within their specific position-
taking. This was a subjectivity that treated confidentiality as a practice of dissimulating 
hierarchy (and its psychological payoffs) rather than as a matter of personal privacy.  
 
My exit from the field was somewhat undramatic. Given that social media provided 
ample opportunity for continuous contact with my research subjects after leaving the 
field, the idea of closure or exit appeared as something of an anthropological 
anachronism. Exit was defined more by my leaving “the game” and working to represent 
the reality of the cultivators and dealers participating in it in a way that, as discussed, 
was cognisant of the politics of representation that could inadvertently return to impact 
their lives if appropriated by a discourse that was treating cannabis cultivation and 
exchange as a threat to national security. My exit will be complete after providing my 
interlocutors with what they referred to as a “reference point”. By explicating the 
qualitative experience of youths’ voices from a particular point of view within a 
hierarchy, in my “book” I hope to provide an objective account of how structural 
advantages were reproduced in Sierra Leone’s cannabis economy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
52 This in any case often only serves to protect academic institutions from litigation (Bourgois 
and Schonberg 2009). 
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3.6. Conclusion: ‘revealing’ the cultivation of hierarchy 
 
This chapter outlined the methodological rationale of the research and the process 
through which the research question will be answered. The thesis is concerned with 
how shareholders of the 1980s and 1990s retained their dominant position within the 
cannabis economy through the reproduction of structural advantages in access to 
economic capital and encounters with law enforcement. The boss-apprentice relations 
entered into by youth under their respective shareholders were identified as the 
empirical sites at which to study the reproduction of structural advantage through their 
on-going participation and activity. Rather than adopting a multi-sited study akin to a 
supply chain analysis I identified the chain work undertaken by cultivators as playing 
out in bounded sites – “we bind around this and not around that” – and as such I used 
these sites to operationalise Bourdieu’s open concepts during field research. By 
adopting the approach of participant objectivation I have argued it is necessary to utilise 
both objectivist (Chapter Four) and subjectivist (Chapter Five, Six and Seven) modes of 
enquiry and analysis. This enables a study of the economic and social conditions that 
have given rise to youths’ particular dispositions and practices (subjectivist) as these 
are tied to a specific position within the economic and juridical fields (objectivist) – 
indicative of an approach to social scientific explanation I referred to as social aesthetics. 
I argued that by bridging a division between objectivist-structuralist and subjectivist-
constructivist approaches to the study of illicit economies prevalent that is prevalent in 
the literature, it was possible to arrive at a more objective answer to the research 
question.  
 
The foregoing analysis draws on 55 interviews and 58 surveys of cannabis cultivator’s 
across five clusters of production – Loko Fakay, Obɔnoki, Sugar Loaf, Wanpala and You 
Must Grumble – in Hastings and Waterloo. Network diagrams comprising relations 
recorded between 158 bosses, apprentices and law enforcers are also utilised. My entry 
into the field took consideration of positionality, reflexivity and ethics. In terms of ethics, 
I conformed to standard principles of consent, personal and research subject safety, but 
reinterpreted ethical guidelines relating to confidentiality to preserve the pragmatic 
rationality of meanings and practices experienced by my interlocutors, and to respect 
their lives with dignity. I claimed this was particularly necessitated by what I referred to 
as the logic of public secrecy (Chapter Seven). Having identified these issues the chapter 
discussed the politics of representation involved when conveying and writing about the 
experiences and practices of illicit agents that were being re-presented through a 
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discourse that presented them as a threat to national security. In closing this discussion 
of methodology I turn to the empirical analysis. The next chapter examines the historical 
political economy of cannabis cultivation in Hastings and Waterloo to situate an 
objectivist analysis of the organisation and regulation of what established cultivators 
referred to as chain work. 
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Chapter Four: Chain Work 
 
4.1. Introduction  
 
This chapter begins by examining the use of apprenticeship during the British abolition 
of slavery movement in the late 1700s. The colony of Freetown was organised through 
an English evangelist parish system in which apprenticeship supported the missionaries 
“civilising mission”. This was seen as necessary to improve cash-crop production and 
undermine slave trading and labour, culminating in the 1833 Slavery Abolition Act that 
enforced apprenticeship elsewhere in the British Empire. I demonstrate that Sierra 
Leone’s system of apprenticeship predates those commonly attributed to the West 
Indies sugar plantations that emerged from the 1833 Act. Rather than resembling 
British master-slave contracts, the Evangelists worked closely with abolitionists in 
Sierra Leone. The principles of amelioration, agriculture skills training, and religious 
instruction were practiced as conducive to transforming recaptive slaves into 
industrious workers. What resulted was an institution of ‘apprentice provisioning’ that 
has continued to organise the labour and capital involved in small-scale agricultural 
production in Western Area.  
 
The chapter then examines how this basic institutional character of apprenticeship 
emerged again during economic structural adjustment in the 1970s and 1980s. State 
power centralised under Presidents Siaka Stevens and then Joseph Momoh, in response 
to the implementation of liberal economic policies designed to address structural 
imbalances and reduce informal and illegal cross-border trade (Reno 1996: 10). Sierra 
Leone was subject to falling agricultural output and export prices, diminished diamond 
extraction, and the closure of iron ore and rutile mines that drove down incomes and 
increased unemployment. Small-scale cannabis production grew as a compensation 
crop in Hastings and Waterloo, which represented the first sites of commercialised 
cannabis production during the 1940s. I demonstrate how cannabis cultivation in 
Jamaica also rapidly expanded during the 1980s based on marketing networks known as 
“higglers” that were closely inter-related with apprenticeships on the West Indies 
plantations. Jamaican cultivators fled to Western Area during the US-led “War on Drugs” 
and transferred new seed varieties, cultivation techniques, and contacts with overseas 
buyers to Sierra Leone’s cannabis farmers. These farms continued to be organised 
according to the system of apprentice provisioning and resulted in the clustering of 
farms around several dominant Sierra Leonean cultivators referred to as “shareholders”. 
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This was despite a campaign by the All People’s Congress (APC) government to 
implement new legal arrangements designed to control ‘disobedient’ and illicit subjects 
perceived to be responsible for smuggling in Freetown’s wharves, alluvial diamond 
mines and cash crops (Keen 2005: 32-5; D’Angelo 2015a: 6, 2016). 
 
The chapter draws on field research undertaken between December 2012 and 
December 2013 in Hastings and Waterloo.53 I use this material to examine the structure 
of production, marketing networks, and relations between shareholders, apprentices, 
and journeymen. New cultivators were apprenticed by the shareholders. As one 
apprentice noted: “you must go under someone to learn it, until you are perfect”.54 Chain 
work mimicked apprentice provisioning and resulted in a two-tiered market. 
Journeymen who had completed their training were confined to an illiquid domestic 
market that operated largely on credit, while renting small plots on the shareholder’s 
farm. Shareholders, by contrast, drew on the cheap labour of apprentices and regulated 
access to higher-value cross-border traders. I argue that this structural advantage was 
based on a “sleight of hand”, such that the concept of “boss” is useful when examining 
the relations between shareholders and workers. 
 
Finally, the chapter draws on Pierre Bourdieu’s economic field. This enables an analysis 
of how the shareholders benefitted from structural advantages, without directly 
intervening in the market through organised violence. Structural advantages 
corresponded to inequalities in access to land, labour and exchange partners that, 
having been secured according to non-economic competition, limited possibilities 
available to access these more exclusive markets without first having to work as a 
shareholder’s apprentice. The chapter concludes by arguing that the stability of the 
apprenticeship institution in the absence of written contracts and a central authority 
requires turning to a subjectivist-constructivist mode of analysis that takes the 
subjectivities of youth seriously. This is necessary in order to understand how the 
structural advantages enjoyed by dominant cultivators were reproduced through 
youth’s on-going participation in cannabis farming. 
 
 
                                                        
53 Evidence is drawn from a combination of 55 interviews with cultivators and dealers, a network 
analysis of labour relations in production (n = 154), in addition to financial accounts and price 
data collected during a survey of cultivators (n = 58) during both the dry (December to April) and 
rainy seasons (May to November). 
54 Interview with Cannabis Cultivator, Alie Kamara, Waterloo, 11/11/2013.  
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4.2. Abolition, Evangelism and Apprentice Provisioning 
 
Apprenticeship was utilised in Sierra Leone under British colonialism and continued to 
structure the labour and marketing networks involved in the small-scale production of 
cannabis along the post-independence peninsula. A nearly sixty-year old colonial policy 
legitimised the practice of apprenticing recaptured slaves from the late 1700s, until at 
least 1865, after being officially abolished in April 1848. Evangelical Protestants 
implemented an apprenticeship system to train liberated slaves that were resettling in 
Freetown, a settlement originally established by Granville Sharp in 1787. During this 
period, Freetown and the villages of Hastings, Sussex, Waterloo and York, comprised a 
growing mix of black Africans from London, Jamaican Maroon’s from the British colony 
of Nova Scotia, Black Loyalists who fought during the American Revolution, as well as 
Nigerian Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa liberated from Spanish and Portugese slavers.  
 
Freetown was originally administered by the Sierra Leone Company (SLC), established 
in 1791 by members of the evangelical Clapham Sect such as William Wilberfoce, 
Lieutenant John Clarkson, and later administered by Zachary Macaulay and William 
Dawes (Tomkins 2010: 92-100; Thomas 2011). Wilberforce and Clarkson led the 
abolition of slavery movement in Britain and the SLC embarked on a threefold task to 
abolish the slave trade, “civilise” recaptives through Christianity, and spread the gospel 
(Tomkins 2010: 92-100). Although evangelicals believed in the natural equality of moral 
character, this claimed universalism was lost in practice. Instead, racial, class and 
gender hierarchies were fixed through a ‘rule of difference’ similar to that experienced 
in colonial India. It was, therefore, expected that former slaves could only achieve 
redemption by becoming Christian subjects. Apprenticeship was the ideal institution 
through which they might become ‘grateful, obedient, industrious, and domesticated’ 
(Hall 2008: 778). To this end, Sierra Leone emerged as a test case for the abolitionists’ 
belief that slavery could be ended by establishing the virtues of ‘Civilisation, Commerce, 
and Christianity’ in Britain’s colonies (Everill 2013: 81).55 In this sense, apprenticeship 
provided the assets and skills necessary to develop “legitimate commerce”, which was 
thought necessary to undermine the cotton and sugar trade worked by slave labour on 
plantations in the West Indies and the Americas (Law et al 2011). However, as Tomkins 
(2010) and Everill (2013) argue, apprenticeship ultimately represented a compromise 
                                                        
55 Sue Thomas (2011) suggests that the origins of ‘the system of redemption and apprenticeship 
in Sierra Leone to Granville Sharp’s “A short Sketch of temporary Regulations (until better shall 
be proposed) for the intended Settlement on the Coast of Africa.”’  
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with powerful commercial and political interests in Britain who protested that full 
liberation would disrupt trade and result in growing political opposition financed by 
wealthy absentee plantation owners.  
 
The Slave Trade Act 1807 had officially abolished slavery in the British Empire, resulting 
in the Royal Navy’s West Africa squadron being deployed to patrol the Bight of Benin 
and Bight of Biafra, and along the West African coast to Freetown. By this time, the SLC 
had proven unprofitable and Sierra Leone came under the authority of the British 
Crown. The Clapham Sect retained its influence through successive governors and by 
establishing the Africa Institution in 1807. Admitting the SLC’s civilising mission in 
support of plantation production had been a failure, Wilberforce and his associates 
mandated the Africa Institution to focus on raising the living standards of new settlers. 
Clapham Sect member Zacharu Macaulay was, for instance, a firm believer in the 
transformative potential of education through apprenticeship, which tied freedom 
together with the virtues of independence and obedience (Hall 2008: 780). Macaulay 
was appointed as the Africa Institution’s secretary, having governed Sierra Leone under 
the SLC from 1974 to 1979. However, in an 1808 memoir on apprenticeship submitted 
to the African Institute, Macaulay cautioned that the proposed apprenticeship system 
would replicate the failings of slave labour and resulting protests experienced on the 
West Indies sugar plantations. He concluded that “the Slave Trade has proved a source 
of evil, that evil will be perpetuated by the proposed [apprenticeship] system [in Sierra 
Leone]” (Thomas 2011). 
 
Regardless of Macaulay’s protestations, the 1807 Act legally authorised the use of 
apprenticeship for captured slaves upon resettlement. According to the act, slaves 
became crown property and bounties were paid to their captors by Vice-Admiralty 
Courts in Freetown. If older than six years of age, apprenticeships were stipulated to last 
for a period of no more than fourteen years. Masters were obliged to provide food and 
clothing, but need not provide wages. Alternatively, recaptives were conscripted into the 
army or navy (Tomkins 2010: 24; Ryan 2016: 401). Gibril (2013: 5-6) demonstrates that 
men and children would be ‘apprenticed’ for twenty dollars to British colonists and 
settled Nova Scotian farmers in the peninsula’s villages.56 Alternatively, apprentices 
                                                        
56 F. Harrison Rankin, a former employee of the Liberated Africa Department, notes in White 
Man’s Grave that prospective masters “of any colour, may enter the King’s Yard, select a boy or 
girl, and thereupon tie a string or piece of tape round the neck as a mark of appropriation. He 
then pays ten shillings; and the passive child becomes his property, under the name of 
apprentice, for three years. So little discrimination is exercised with respect to the purchaser, 
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were utilised by the colonial administration as labour in the construction of public 
buildings, such as churches, provision stores and schools. In practice, most apprentices 
worked as agriculture labour on small-scale farms or as domestic servants (Ryan 2016: 
412). By the late 1820s, most apprentices in Sierra Leone were children under the age of 
fourteen working as domestic servants. Apprenticeship was therefore understood as 
akin to ‘involuntary child domestic labour’ (ibid: 402).  
 
An alarming increase in abuse cases heard by the Vice-Admiralty Courts meant that the 
abolitionists began to view apprenticeship as a system of exploitation. Indenture 
documents signed between government and master were often poorly enforced or not 
issued, such that masters could accumulate multiple apprentices in one household. 
Evangelical’s protested that apprentices were being sold to settlers and used to 
accumulate wealth, rather than fulfilling their contractual obligations to provide 
education (Ryan 2016: 408). Or, at minimum, receive training in crafts such as 
needlework (Thomas 2011). A growing trade also emerged between settlers and the 
government that used apprentices as free labour in rudimentary public works (Everill 
2013: 85). Ryan (2016: 410) notes that some masters did meet their obligation to teach 
apprentices valuable trade skills. Consequently, indenture documents were introduced 
that officially bound apprentices to craftsmen or the government, resulting in a 
reduction in the duration of apprenticeship from three to seven years before 
termination. Apprentices were freed once indenture contracts had expired and also 
provided by the colonial administration with a small parcel of land on which to begin 
cultivation. Former apprentices then often purchased apprentices of their own, who 
were usually male, and undertook farming in the villages of Hastings, Waterloo and 
Kissy (ibid: 411).  
 
Despite these nuances, the colonial authority’s inability to prevent the abuse was 
eventually brought to the attention of the British government under Sierra Leone’s 
Governor Thomas Perronet Thompson in 1808. Perronet, who was a close associate of 
Wilberforce, likened the African Institution’s apprenticeship scheme to the continuation 
of slavery. These sentiments were echoed by Thompson’s successor, Governor William 
Fersguson, who asserted that apprenticeship represented: 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
that domestic servants are in the habit of buying them, and of employing them in the heavier 
drudgery of house-work.” 
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“A moral millstone round the necks of its people. By placing easily within their reach 
the means of obtaining gratuitous labour, idleness is engendered [ … ] as, at length, to 
become an inveterate habit” (Ryan 2016: 406).  
 
The colony’s reliance on apprenticeship had the effect of undermining the Puritan work 
ethic; that the ‘millstone’ carried by apprentices implied a ‘dragging effect, a sinking 
effect, a prevention of ‘progress’’ (ibid: 415). Thompson, for his part, was relinquished as 
governor in 1810 under pressure from Wilberforce, who, as Tomkins (2010) concludes, 
continued to perceive that apprenticeship was a necessary evil to ease the transition 
towards the complete abolition of slavery.  
 
In response, apprenticeship in Sierra Leone was reshaped by the Christian Missionary 
Society (CMS) from 1810. The CMS played an important role in establishing Krio culture 
and identity, which largely mimicked Western-style churches, education and 
professional trades. The society’s aims aligned with those of the Clapham Sect, having 
been founded in 1799 by Evangelical Protestants who had broken away from the 
Anglican Church. The CMS was supported by new Evangelical groups, such as the 
Eclectic Society, as a vehicle for spreading the Gospel overseas and establishing a 
network of parishes that could begin to reform the slave trade through principles of 
amelioration. Apprenticeship was viewed as a means of ameliorating the slave trade’s 
ills and achieving the evangelical’s aim of transforming recaptives into “useful” 
members of society.  
 
Under the governship of Thompson’s successor Charles McCarthy, from 1814 
apprenticeships were implemented through a system of local parishes administered and 
financed by the African Institution. The institution enforced new regulations, albeit 
restricted to the territorial jurisdiction of the colony, which stipulated that recaptives 
were to be apprenticed for no more than seven years or until they were twenty-one 
(Everill 2013: 20). The CMS used apprentices to construct numerous parishes in 
Freetown and outlying villages. Each parish comprised a small community that was 
appointed a ‘Superintendent’ who managed the feeding, education and employment of 
nearly 13,000 recaptives (ibid: 85). The Anglican Priest Reverand Edward Bickersworth 
observed in 1816, for instance, that craft guilds had been established in each parish. 
Children also received some preparatory education and were then apprenticed as 
tradesmen and mechanics (Seddall 1874). Letters of correspondence also suggested that 
apprentices were trained by a growing number of craft associations and guilds, 
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including as builders, blacksmiths, and carpenters (Dixon-Fyle and Gibril 2006: 205, 
274; Tomkins 2010: 218). Bickersworth concludes, for instance, that apprenticeship was 
“very important to mark the indications of providential learning” and represented the 
only successful means by which settlers may become “useful members of society”. 
 
McCarthy’s parish system proved important for strengthening the Clapham Sect’s calls 
to outlaw slavery and introduce apprenticeship across the British Empire. The group’s 
continued advocacy culminated in parliament finalising the Slavery Abolition Act in 
1833, which specified a template for instituting apprenticeship in all of Britain’s colonies 
(Tyson et al 2005: 207). Until this point, the parish system was not directly financed by 
the British government and neither was apprenticeship legally enforceable elsewhere in 
the empire. (Holt 1992: 72) Despite this, from 1814 to 1824, McCarthy’s administration 
supported the plan in order to placate growing opposition in parliament for abandoning 
the colony, which was perceived to be a drain on government resources and unable to 
produce significant exports for the empire, such as coffee, cotton, palm oil and sugar.57 
In turn, parliament recognised apprenticeship as a ‘half-way covenant’ towards 
abolition; one that limited disruption to commercial trade and thereby reduced the 
potential for political opposition from wealthy plantation owners (Holt 1992: 56). 
 
Apprenticeship as specified by the 1833 Act was, therefore, devised to suit the interests 
of sugar planters in the West Indies, particularly Jamaica. The legislation sought to exact 
a complex system of social controls and labour discipline. It was thought that a ‘well 
regulated system’ could mould apprentices into industrious wage labourers, thereby 
striking a balance between labour and capital that, after freedom was granted, would 
maximise productivity and protect the sugar market for absentee plantation owners 
(Morgan 2012: 461). The institution was to be maintained by a complex system of 
accounting rooted in British industrialist ideas regarding how to inculcate regular 
working habits and a sense of ‘disciplined time’ (Tyson et al 2005: 205). The specific 
regulations regarding ‘work behaviour, task-rate, and punishment levels’ were left to be 
determined by legislatures in each colony (ibid: 207). This meant that in the West Indies, 
                                                        
57 Apprenticeship systems were also attractive during this period as anti-slavery colonisation 
among the Temne and Mende in Sierra Leone’s hinterland, and also in Liberia, was proving 
ineffectual, and held during parliamentary debates as responsible for the Royal Navy’s struggle to 
suppress slave traders further along the West African coast in the Bight of Benin and Bight of 
Biafra. These failures of the anti-slavery movement were viewed by opposition factions as 
disruptive to commercial relations, especially when the international legality of anti-slaving 
activities was already being challenged by colonial interests in the Americas and the West Indies. 
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unlike in Sierra Leone, masters struggled to overcome a reliance on intimidation and 
force (Holt 1992: 131). 
 
Apprenticeships were stipulated to last six years for field slaves (‘praedial apprentices’) 
and four years for house slaves and artisans (‘non-praedial apprentices’) before freedom 
was granted. During the period of apprenticeship, a master was to provide food and 
clothing, allowing the apprentice to work in his service unpaid for three quarters of the 
week over 40 ½ hours. The remaining quarter would be used for waged labour in order 
to accumulate enough savings to be self-sufficient after securing freedom. Apprentices 
could also use these savings to buy their freedom early according to fair valuation by an 
appraisement tribunal comprised of respected planters and colonial administrators. 
Unlike the system of accounting, appraisal was highly subjective. As Holt (1992: 133-4) 
suggests, appraisals were based on the ‘demeanour’ of the apprentice such that: 
 
‘Value was determined by a labourer’s age, strength, skills, and general worth. Strong, 
accomplished, reliable apprentices, the people most likely to seek appraisement, were 
valued much more highly than their idle and unproductive counterparts, and the inflated 
valuations which planters placed on them bore no relation to the wages offered for the 
extra work they performed’.  
 
In practice, few apprentices possessed the capital necessary to attempt valuation. Nor, 
as was especially the case in Jamaica, did planters regard their apprentices as possessing 
a good demeanour. This is largely because, as per the 1833 Act, master-apprentice 
relations were rooted in Britain’s master-slave contracts, and the Jamaican Assembly’s 
interpretation of more specific legal provisions – such as punishment – that were 
aligned with the interests of plantation owners who relied heavily on force and 
intimidation (Tyson et al 2005). Indenture documents underpinning apprenticeship 
were signed between government and master without reference to the apprentice, such 
that indentures were endowed with legal force “as if” the apprentice had voluntarily 
entered into the contract. In exchange, the master was obliged to treat his apprentice 
‘with humanity’ and refrain from excessive punishment (Ryan 2016: 402-3). While 
abuse still existed in Sierra Leone, it was generally regarded that the parish system 
inherited from the early 1820s onwards was more amenable to ‘dispose’ slaves 
humanely than it was in the West Indies (Africa Institution 1807: 22-3). Unlike the 1831 
and 1832 revolts in Jamaica, the transition to freedom in Sierra Leone was a relatively 
‘uncontested’ one (Ryan 2016: 401). 
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Under both systems, apprentices were not legally permitted to own land titles. Instead, 
masters were obliged to grant a small area of land on the plantation’s estate with which 
an apprentice could cultivate their own provisions. Given apprentices utilised their free 
labour for a quarter of the week, any surplus could be sold to planters or other 
apprentices (Morgan 2012: 461). Following Jamaica’s later adoption of the 1833 Act, 
Morgan (2012: 470-472) suggests the cultivation and sale of provisions began to expand 
by 1939. Furthermore, apprentices could also do extra work for hire on other 
plantations using their free labour, resulting in a patchwork of low margin trading 
relations across the plantations (Holt 1992: 135). The CMS argued that the transition of 
apprentice provisioning to wage labour in Sierra Leone was a necessary ‘panacea for 
what was considered a negative trend in the social values of the colony-born youth in 
Sierra Leone […] pairing the Bible and the plough tied the goal of the civilising mission 
to appreciate the peculiar cultural contexts of emerging non-Western churches’ 
(Olabimtan 2011: 207).58 
 
In Jamaica, provisioning was reinterpreted through specific colonial ordinances that 
created a two-tiered market protecting the returns of planters and their absentee 
owners. Planters in the West Indies linked rents with access to provisions. Each 
apprentice was assigned a fixed plot of land on the plantation to cultivate, according to a 
fee set by the master that was ‘proportionate to its value’. Cultivation outside the 
plantation was strictly prohibited and an apprentice could not sell produce on behalf of 
a master. The affordance of free labour time, access to land, and a surplus of crop, 
resulted in the creation of an autonomous low-margin marketing system that was 
‘functionally, historically, [and] psychologically’ wedded to small-scale agriculture 
(Mintz 1955: 98). Morgan (2012) concludes that by the late 1840s, provisioning had 
resulted in the emergence of a ‘proto-peasantry’ that undermined the commercial 
viability of the colonial sugar plantations.  
 
Apprenticeship was officially abolished by decree on 1 August 1848, two years earlier 
than legally stipulated. Parliamentary debates took heed of Governor Johnson’s caution 
that apprenticeship was a moral millstone around the empire’s work ethic and outlawed 
                                                        
58 The Evangelical missionary aim of advancing the civilising mission by undertaking agriculture 
development through apprenticeship was likely formalised by Reverend Ulrich Graf, the resident 
CMS Missionary in Hastings in 1845. For instance, Olabimtan (2011) demonstrates that Graf 
established model cotton farms in Hastings during the early 1850s that were adopted more 
widely by CMS missionaries, for instance, in the Yoruba mission at Abeokuta in southwestern 
Nigeria. 
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the practice. In Sierra Leone, most apprentices continued with the now well-established 
parish system, where they were afforded wages, greater access to land ownership, and 
were subject to religious instruction through schooling (Ryan 2016: 416). The 
continuation of provisioning under apprenticeship was crucial in creating a pattern of 
internal cultivation and marketing for which, at least by the 1950s in both Sierra Leone 
and Jamaica alike ‘seems to have fundamentally remained unchanged’ (Mintz 1955: 95). 
 
Archival records examined by Akyeampong (2005) demonstrate that the cultivation of 
cannabis indica for personal use, likely undertaken through provisioning overseen by 
settled planters, also began in the early 1800s, following introduction by Congolese 
slaves who later settled in Freetown (also see Duvall 2016: 12-3).59 By the 1940s, 
cannabis production began to grow on a commercial scale in Freetown and the 
peninsula towns of Hastings, Waterloo and York. The continuation of similar market 
conditions under apprentice provisioning resulted in a small minority of middlemen 
securing exclusive commercial relationships with overseas buyers through an educated 
Krio diaspora that dominated the civil service and had access to merchants using 
shipping routes into North America and Europe (Akyeampong 2005). As I demonstrate 
in what follows, the contemporary organisation of cannabis production and marketing 
in the service of inter-regional and domestic trading networks provided a guilded 
source of revenue during agricultural depression. Yet it retained the same institutional 
character as the parish system of apprentice provisioning. 
 
4.3 Economic depression and the growth of cannabis production in Western Area 
 
Cannabis farming expanded across Sierra Leone’s provinces and accelerated during the 
1970s and 1980s in the context of a collapse in commodity prices that depressed 
agricultural, mineral and cash crop exports, and left the one-party state under Siaka 
Stevens’ ruling APC with little room for rapprochement (Reno 1996: 10; Harris 2013: 
63-80). Inequalities in access to land also increased significantly during the 1980s, 
resulting in a greater number of small-holders producing diminished output and 
receiving declining real incomes. According to Weeks’ (1990: 10-11) estimates in 1971, 
35.2% of land owners possessed more than five acres of land, in contrast to 25.3% by 
1985, precipitating greater inequality in access to land and the widening of a gap 
                                                        
59 Sierra Leone’s colonial governor noted, for instance, that the colony’s first psychiatric hospital, 
Kissy Lunatic Asylum, was established in 1817 to deal with trauma experienced by returnee 
slaves and psychosis was attributed to the use of cannabis. 
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between average farm incomes with 70% of farming households falling below the 1984-
5 average. The wealthiest 3% enjoyed nominal incomes 18 times greater than the 
average for the poorest 20% of land owners. Non-agricultural incomes also declined 
rapidly with deflated wages falling from Le116 per day in 1969-70 to Le32 by 1985-6.  
 
Meanwhile, less than one third of agricultural output entered the legal monetised 
economy. As part of an International Monetary Fund (IMF) strategy to render exports 
more competitive, albeit largely to ensure the government earned enough foreign 
exchange to repay its creditors, Stevens devalued the Leone and enacted long-lasting 
structural changes that have left Sierra Leone’s agriculturalists exposed to global price 
volatility (Weeks 1990; Sheriff and Massaquoi 2012: 402).60 For the legal agricultural 
economy, an influx of lending from international financial institutions allowed the APC 
to purchase subsidised rice and sell it back on the local market at an inflated price. A 
subsequent IMF policy ‘corrective’ privatised agricultural marketing boards at a time 
when prices for locally produced food stuffs were falling relative to the returns 
obtainable on export, pushing much of Sierra Leone’s agricultural activity outside of 
formal channels of exchange and into the untaxed economy.  
 
For Hastings and Waterloo’s cannabis farmers, the 1980s to early 1990s represented a 
period of growth, contributed to by the introduction of new cultivating techniques and 
seed varieties from Jamaica that provided comparative advantages over regional peers. 
Farmers reported that small-scale cannabis farming was increasingly common in Sierra 
Leone’s provinces, especially in the context of increasing demand in Freetown amid 
growing urbanisation, cross-border markets in Guinea and Liberia; and to a lesser 
degree, bulk supply through international markets as recreational use increased in 
Europe (Leggett and Plietschmann 206: 189; Chouvy and Laniel 207: 139; UNODC 2011: 
31). On the supply-side, misallocations of labour resulting from rural-to-urban 
migration were spurred by diminishing output, declining real incomes, and inequalities 
in access to land (Weeks 1990: 10-11). This shift resulted in an abundance of 
experienced agriculturalists migrating to Western Area that were willing to undertake 
                                                        
60 Initially, the World Bank in 1981 recommended that the government take control of the price 
mechanism through state regulation of marketing boards and implementation of a progressive 
tax regime to facilitate ‘equitable growth’ (World Bank 1984; Weeks 1990, 1998). By 1987 this 
recommendation was reversed, and the World Bank advocated for reducing the Sierra Leone 
Rice Corporation’s ‘interference’ in the market for agricultural goods. Weeks (1990: 7) argues in 
a study of agricultural deficiencies in Sierra Leone for the International Labour Organisation that 
the World Bank had exploited ‘common sense’ during the 1970s in order to improve foreign 
exchange earnings and the government’s  ability to pay back its lenders. 
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small-scale farming. Furthermore, government subsidised imports of agricultural 
foodstuffs began redistributing income away from sellers to buyers, and thereby 
diminished incentives for farmers to re-engage in the local production of legal 
agricultural goods. Meanwhile, rapid urbanisation ensured Freetown’s informal 
economy was increasingly saturated, offering more precarious work and lower wages.61 
Separately, the growth in cross-border trade for cannabis herb exploited disparities 
between low domestic producer prices for licit agricultural goods (Conteh et al 2012: 
468). The greater returns available for exporting cannabis encouraged smuggling of the 
crop into neighbouring Guinea-Conakry and Liberia, creating an exclusive cross-border 
market that was being monopolised by a monopoly of land-owning cultivators with the 
right contacts.62 By 2012, for instance, there existed three official border crossings and 
53 unofficial border crossings into Guinea, compared with eight official border crossings 
and six unofficial border crossings into Liberia.63  
 
These early cannabis farmers claimed that, since the conclusion of civil conflict, Guinea 
emerged as the leading cross-border consumer market due to increasing demand; a 
favourable unofficial exchange rate between 2001 and 2004 that encouraged Guinean 
cultivators to import Sierra Leonean cannabis, and the exploitation of higher domestic 
prices on the parallel exchange market. Historical price data collected during a survey of 
cannabis farmers in 2013 indicated that the average nominal price per kilogram of 
cannabis increased by Le130,000 (USD31.7) from 1999 before stabilising at Le170,000 
(USD42.6) by 2012.64 While a smaller pool of farmers benefited from the higher-value 
cross-border market, the plateau in price reflects the growth of production in the rural 
provinces. This resulted in supply beginning to meet demand in the domestic market 
where a burgeoning number of youth in Western Area were lower value-higher 
frequency consumers. Consequently, stabilisation of the price in Western Area closely 
aligned to inflationary changes for a wider basket of domestically produced legal 
agricultural goods. Price stabilisation likely occurred due to the government’s decision 
to tighten monetary policy in 2011, encouraging a year-on-year reduction in inflation. 
With the cost of living more bearable and stable inflation rendering producer prices for 
                                                        
61 Non-agricultural real income fell from Le116 per day in 1967/70 to Le32 by 1985/6 (Weeks 
1990). 
62 Interview with UNODC officials, Freetown, 06/12/2013. 
63 Data provided by United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response Geographical 
Information Systems Services,  http://www.unmeer-im-liberia.website/unmeer-gims-web-map-
app.  
64 Price data is collected from surveys with 58 cultivators during 2013 that began cultivation at 
or before 1999. These data were cross-checked with price data supplied by Sierra Leone’s 
Transnational Organised Crime Unit (TOCU) and Bøås and Hatløy (2005). 
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agricultural goods less volatile, the need for apprentice farmers began to decline, 
encouraging a return to cultivating cash crops, such as coffee, cocoa and oil palm. 
Demand in Hastings and Waterloo’s principal export market for cannabis, Guinea, had, 
however, also momentarily fallen under President Alpha Condé. Inflation had increased 
significantly in Guinea since 2006, peaking at the highest level in West Africa by 2008. 
Consequently, the Guinean Franc weakened against the Leone and recovered by only 
half in 2008. Condé responded by implementing a ban on all agricultural exports in 
December 2007. This encouraged the uptake of domestic cannabis production in Guinea, 
particularly as 30% of the rural population that relied on cash crops as their main 
source of income (IRIN 2008c; WFP 2008). 
 
Falling real incomes and a decline in agricultural exports thereby increased demand for 
local production of cannabis in Guinea and Liberia, reducing the demand for imports 
from Sierra Leone and increasing competition among farmers who were able to grow 
more potent varieties, such as sativa.65 Export markets in Ghana, Liberia and Nigeria 
also grew more competitive as domestic and regional demand began to increase. 
According to Liberia’s Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), for example, Bong and Nimba 
counties, which are close to consumer markets in the capital Monrovia, had experienced 
an increase in small-scale cannabis production (VOA News 2012). Meanwhile, surplus 
supply remained low in Ghana and Nigeria as domestic demand continued to increase 
throughout the 2000s. The UN’s World Drug Report (2014) estimated, for example, that 
by 2013 Ghana had achieved the world’s highest per capita rate of cannabis 
consumption and that Nigeria was the largest producer of cannabis in sub-Saharan 
Africa with the second highest per capita consumption. 
 
Despite stabilisation of the regional cannabis export market, cultivation in Hastings and 
Waterloo was disrupted by civil conflict in the late 1990s, a period during which my 
interlocutors claimed that “everything turned to dust”.66 Cultivation in Sierra Leone 
trailed expansion driven by greater inter-regional demand elsewhere in West Africa. 
Nigeria and Ghana represented the first and second largest producers of cannabis herb 
respectively by the mid-1990s (Bernstein 1999: 15). Cultivation in Ghana grew with 
price declines in export-oriented cash crops, such as cocoa, which encouraged 
                                                        
65 Cannabis cultivation may also have reduced after the implementation of a trade embargo by 
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) following instalment of the AFRC in 1996, which 
further reduced import values, from USD181 million in 1990 to USD79 million in 1999, thereby 
alleviating some of the downward pressure on domestic rice prices (Sheriff and Massaquoi 2012: 
408). 
66 Interview with Musa Barrie, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 04/05/2013.  
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substitution away from lower margin legal crops to comparatively higher value illegal 
cannabis herb (ibid; Aykeampong 2005: 435). A Paris-based Global Drugs Observatory 
report (1995) cited by the UNDCP (1999: 24) notes that during the early 1990s cannabis 
cultivators in Côte D’Ivoire were capable of earning three hundred times more than 
their cocoa farming counterparts, and fifty times more than groundnut farmers in 
Senegal. Commenting on these findings Laniel (2006) notes that: 
 
‘Western Côte D’Ivoire started producing cannabis after the fall in coffee and cocoa 
prices in 1988/1989; [and] two-thirds [of cultivators] attribute their decision to grow 
cannabis to the economic and land crisis.’ 
 
This expansion in West Africa’s commercial production-for-export is confirmed by 
Ghana’s Narcotics Control Board, which estimated that 50% of cannabis herb produced 
in Ghana during the 1980s was destined for export markets (Akyeampong 2005: 435), 
while cross-border seizures across West Africa’s main cannabis producers peaked in the 
mid-1990s (UNDCP 1999: 29).67  
 
In the context of growing inter-regional demand, national law enforcement agencies in 
West Africa, unlike international donors and financial institutions, reported that the 
cross-border trading networks involved in the unofficial trade of legal and illegal goods 
were geographically more localised than those assumed to be involved in “trafficking” 
networks. This was because cannabis cultivation had already diffused throughout the 
region by the late 1990s, with sites of production concentrated close to areas of high 
demand, such that cultivators needed only to conduct intra-regional trade with close 
neighbours (UNDCP 1999: 33; Legget and Pietschmann 2006: 203). Cannabis cultivation 
and exchange during the 1970s and early 1980s was therefore increasingly 
decentralised in West Africa, particularly in response to the deleterious effects of 
uneven economic structural adjustment, albeit conflated by policy makers with the 
growth of informal cross-border trading networks that were initially presented as a 
                                                        
67 Cross-border seizures in Senegal grew by 201,962 kilograms from 1994 to 1996, and by 
238,785 kilograms in Ghana (UNDCP 1999: 29). Weak law enforcement does suggest, however, 
that demand for cannabis is unlikely to be highly elastic, while differences in yield efficiencies of 
producing regions somewhat limit the validity of such comparisons. Disclaimers relating to these 
methodological shortcomings are buried within several annual UNODC reports (e.g. see UNODC 
2011: 175, 2014: 24, fn. 53). There isagreement, however, that seizure statistics demonstrate a 
reasonable fit with trends in domestic and regional demand, and as such are a useful starting 
point from which to make inferences on trends in illicit drug economies (e.g. see Legget and 
Pietschmann 2006: 194).   
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popular livelihood strategy opposed to the financial mismanagement of the state (see 
Meagher 2003).  
 
According to the OGD there was an associated ‘increase in the number of short 
[exchange] networks’ between regional neighbours trading illicit goods during this 
period (1998: 10). This logic was not, however, extended to countries that had 
experienced a decade-long violent conflict. In these contexts, the ODG is demonstrative 
of wider policy discourse given its claim that illicit drug production was organised 
through a ‘Mafia model’ in countries such as Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and the so-called Rainbow Mafias in South Africa (ibid; also 
see Labrousse and Laniel 2006: 35, 243, 256-7, 259-61). For countries affected by 
violent conflict, cannabis cultivation was synonymous with organised violence or 
treated as a survival response to the combined effects of painful structural adjustment 
and civil conflict. 
 
For rural communities in Sierra Leone’s provinces, most notably Kambia District,68 
cannabis cultivation was, however, increasingly undertaken by numerous small-scale 
producers during the late 1990s. Unlike the Mafia model, cultivators mimicked the 
apprentice provision system by renting plots of less than one hectare from land-owners, 
and selling produce in the domestic market while a minority had access to middlemen 
able to facilitate cross-border trade into neighbouring Guinea and Liberia (also see Keen 
2005: 105, fn. 28). Much like its origins as a compensation crop in other West African 
producer countries (Bernstein 1996; Laniel 2006), these small-scale producers 
suggested that by the post-war recovery of the early 2000s, cannabis sativa was being 
intercropped with traditional foodstuffs such as cassava and rice in response to 
stagnating production (Sheriff and Massaquoi 2012: 410-11). Production costs had also 
diminished because agricultural inputs like fertilisers were subsidised by the 
government or obtained at lower-than-market prices from non-governmental 
organisations. The increasing availability of opportunities for agricultural skills training 
undertaken during the immediate post-war period also reduced labour costs and 
provided a further economic incentive for agriculturalists and the unemployed alike to 
cultivate cannabis. 
 
                                                        
68 A civil society representative and former cannabis cultivator claimed that Kambia District, and 
specifically the town of Madina, represented the fastest growing site of cannabis cultivation given 
its proximity to neighbouring Guinea (Freetown, 09/12/2013). 
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There is limited empirical evidence, at least outside its use as a compensation crop or 
used as a stimulant by factions of the anti-government Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF), that cannabis production expanded to meet the needs of an emerging war 
economy (Keen 1998; Duffield 1999; Reno 2000: 55; Humphreys and Weinstein 2003; 
Gberie 2005; Chouvy and Laniel 2007: 139-40; Reno 2009; Silberfein 2010). Neither 
was demand created during the pre- and post-war periods to meet the revenue needs of 
an extra-legal ‘shadow state’ (Reno 2009). Cross-border trade out of Sierra Leone during 
the late 1990s was instead confined to more parochial trafficking networks coordinated 
by the Nigerian-led Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Groups 
(ECOMOG) that had deployed an intervention force to quell the RUF’s offensives against 
Freetown.  
 
Chain work, by contrast, comprised a separate, two-tiered system of marketing 
networks, whereby those of greatest value were almost exclusively accessible to the 
shareholders in Hastings and Waterloo where larger-scale cannabis farming resumed 
following an end to the civil conflicting the early 2000s. This partitioning of the market 
occurred in response to changes in supply-side factors: increasing rural-to-urban 
migration of young unemployed youth, and improved yields and agronomy following 
introduction of the cannabis sativa variety by immigrant Jamaican cultivators in the 
mid-to-late 1980s. 
  
4.4. The shared institutional history of Jamaica’s ‘ganja complex’  
 
Cannabis farming and marketing in Hastings and Waterloo emerged from a system of 
apprentice provisioning. Jamaican apprentices in the West Indies’ plantations shared 
this provisioning system during the transition from slave labour to apprenticing. 
Following the official end of apprenticeship in Britain’s colonies by 1838, provisioning 
resulted in former apprentices selling their produce to a network of “higglers” engaged 
in low-margin transactions that were organised through West African marketing 
institutions inherited during the slave trade. Higglers acted as middlemen responsible 
for smuggling agricultural exports during a period of structural adjustment in the 1970s 
and 1980s; particularly ‘underground’ goods such as cannabis (Mintz 1955). This 
resulted in some higglers providing access to high-value exporters, while others served 
the increased competition and low-margins of the domestic market. Chain work denoted 
these networks for cannabis farmers and dealers in Western Area; both having emerged 
from apprentice provisioning. Mintz (1955: 99) concludes his study of Jamaican higgler 
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networks by suggesting, for instance, that ‘the interdependence between higglers and 
small-scale agriculture has never been broken and may be even stronger today than it 
was a century ago’. 
 
These small-scale production and marketing networks expanded during the mid-1980s 
at the height of US President Ronald Reagan’s War on Drugs. At this point, a number of 
cultivators emigrated from Jamaica and settled in Hastings, Waterloo and Freetown. 
Established cultivators suggested three figures: Carrie B, Burning Spear and Tafaray, 
arrived in Hastings in 1985 and introduced new cultivation techniques and the cannabis 
sativa variety. Waterloo’s oldest cultivator who had owned a farm for at least 25 years 
suggested, for instance, that: 
 
“He [Carrie B] was the first man that came, [and] they brought this [cannabis sativa] 
straight to the county […] Ganja was grown in Salone but they brought a different kind 
of production, because we used to grow it the local way.”69 
 
Another cultivator who had grown cannabis since the late 1980s outlined a similar 
history. He bemoaned the way in which collectivised farms under Siaka Stevens’ ruling 
APC party benefitted only the political elite. With a photo of the Jamaican cultivators in 
his hand, he suggested Carrie B and Tafaray arrived in Waterloo after being “exiled” 
from Jamaica in the early 1980s. Carrie B resided in Ibo Town, Waterloo with two local 
APC politicians, Mr Iskandrie and Mohamed Jabi from 1985 to 1995 while Tafaray was 
resident in Fulah Town, Waterloo. These APC politicians had, cultivators claimed, close 
familial relations with Rastafari members of the then-ruling Jamaican Labour Party 
(JLP).70  
 
These original shareholders reasoned their work was conducted according to non-
exploitative labour relations, which amounted to “binding around this and not around 
that”.71 Chain work subverted the chains that had tied down slave labour on the 
plantations of the West Indies by utilising an apprentice provisioning system of farming 
that was considered more autonomous and presented the opportunity of being able to 
gain long-term security in land ownership. In the contemporary context, cannabis 
farming was regularly contrasted with the “slave work” of legal agriculture in the 
                                                        
69 David Kamanda, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 12/11/2013. 
70 Interview with Musa Barrie, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 02/10/2013. 
71 Interview with B.I.G, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 16/09/2013.  
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provinces, which was deemed to be labour intensive and paternalistic, and required ‘too 
much work for far too little yields’ (Cartier and Bürge 2011: 1082-3).  
 
Cannabis farming was also shaped by the political struggles of the Jamaicans. Since the 
1950s, cannabis cultivation and consumption was closely intertwined with Rastafari 
ideology and cultural practices that were prominent among urban youth throughout 
Jamaica and West Africa (Savishinsky 1994: 27-28). For Freetown’s youthful populace, 
the Rastafari movement gained adherents because it represented an ‘ideological 
corrective’ for those who were: 
 
‘Trying to come to terms with urban living in a multi-ethnic, post-colonial African 
society, adherence to Rastafari provide[d] an alternative source of meaning and identity 
to a life frequently punctuated by hopelessness, alienation and despair in what [was] 
often perceived [to be] a hostile, corrupt and hypocritical Eurocentric environment.’ 
(Savishinsky 1994: 19) 
 
Following the activism of Marcus Garvey in the 1940s, Rastafari in Jamaica had grown 
increasingly anti-government and anti-free market. The movement was profoundly 
shaped by the history of the slave trade in the West Indies and adherents were 
motivated by a desire for returning to East Africa, referred to figuratively as “Zion” 
(Meeks 2002: 166; Shilliam 2012: 341).72 According to this discourse, “Babylonians” 
personified corrupt government authorities under the tutelage of colonial masters who 
prevented the Rastafari accumulating the capital necessary to return home.73 This 
discourse was shared by farmers in Hastings, for whom Babylonians were law enforcers 
that failed to “play the game” and were perceived responsible for obstructing their 
pursuit of economic autonomy.74 As one apprentice explained: 
 
                                                        
72 During the early 1940s Garvey’s spiritual successor Leonard Howell established the Ethiopian 
Salvation Society (ESS) to practice these ideals and promote a “true communalistic lifestyle”, a 
movement that reached its apogee with the establishment of Pinnacle, a self-sufficient commune 
in the county of Middlesex, comprising 700 men, women and children. Price (2012: 63-4) 
suggests the Jamaican government’s raiding of the commune in 1937 is largely responsible for 
the diffusion of Rastfari ideology and practices into the capital Kingston. 
73 This longing for return was somewhat satisfied in 1961 when the Jamaican government 
sponsored a Rastafari-led diplomatic mission to sub-Saharan Africa. The visit to Sierra Leone 
included meetings with President Tejan Kabbah and the Njala Agricultural Centre regarding ways 
of improving crop yields and rectifying labour shortages (see Minority Report of Mission to 
Africa, 1961).  
74 By contrast, Jamaican cannabis farmers were often regarded as having the same moral outlook 
as Robin Hood (Priest 1987; Shaw 2001). 
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“It is a case of doing things differently […] the Faray treat all men the same, they think 
fast, are honest. They will own land and a house […] When you are a Faray it means that 
you have the common understanding, it is someone you can trust. But the Babylonian is 
different, they are like the police. They think slowly [safu safu], all they want is [to own] 
a car, a plane; they are selfish, they will steal from you”.75 
 
To own land, make independent decisions, and accumulate capital autonomously, had 
held a special value for the Jamaican peasantry (Mintz 1955: 101). Zion and its 
personification Tafaray denoted strength and permanence in Rastafari vernacular and 
are reserved for those deemed honest, humble and hardworking “sufferers”. Zion was 
also shorthand for the hills along Sierra Leone’s peninsula where cannabis herb is 
cultivated. Babylon and Zion thereby figured as opposite poles in an imagined 
geography that contrasted enmity and hope. Prominent Rastafari leaders in Kingston 
during the 1960s and 1970s, such as Raz Jayze, referred to Babylon as “the system” that 
obstructed a return to the diversity and equality of Zion (Price 2009: 67-70; also see 
Rifka 2010: 32).76 Unlike the restricted access to land that characterises youth 
undertaking agriculture in the provinces, where customary law is preferred to an 
impersonal common law framework (Unruh and Turray 2006; Cartier and Bürge 2011: 
1082), undertaking cannabis farming for the shareholders appeared to satisfy 
expectations of economic autonomy and security for youth migrating to Western Area.  
 
The legal status of cannabis was also an important terrain of political and economic 
struggle for the Rastafari.77 Jamaica emerged as the US government’s “pet project” for 
demonstrating the superiority of capitalist market-led development over socialist 
democracy (Headley 1987; Harrison 2001: 121). Following election victories in 1972 
and 1976, the ruling People’s National Party (PNP) responded to demand and 
                                                        
75 Interview with Gbrilla Manseray, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 30/10/2013.  
76 Numerous organisations such as Reverend Claudius Henry’s “Back-to-Africa” and the Brothers 
Solidarity of United Ethiopia, in addition to academics campaigning for civil rights such as pan-
African historian William du Bois, began to petition the Jamaican government throughout the 
1950s culminating in the, albeit ultimately unsuccessful, submission of an Immigration and 
Repatriation Plan to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in 1954. The longing for return 
was partly satisfied in 1961 when the Jamaican government sponsored a Rastafari-led diplomatic 
mission to Africa, which included meetings with Sierra Leonean President Tejan Kabbah and 
meetings with Njala Agricultural Centre and Training College regarding limited food output and 
labour shortages (see Minority Report of Mission to Africa, 1961).  
77 Cannabis has been legally prohibited in Jamaica since 1913. Although revised legislation (the 
Dangerous Drugs Act) passed in the 1960s was more punitive and removed the discretion of 
magistrates. Mandatory minimum sentences for cultivation, sale and possession were three years 
of hard labour. At least 3,000 mandatory sentences were issued between 1964 and 1972, before 
the legislation was abandoned amid bottlenecks within the courts and overcrowding of the 
prison system motivated the passing of less punitive legilsation (Chevannes 2001: 33-4). 
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commodity-linked price volatility by significantly increasing state equity shares in 
flagship industries and strengthening bilateral ties with Cuba, which the Reagan 
administration – weary of Soviet promotion of client states in its periphery – sought, in 
turn, to destabilise and undermine. The PLP also continued the Jamaican Labour Party’s 
(JLP) democratic socialist policy of reorganising agriculture by investing in cooperative 
sugar production. These arrangements offered small-scale farmers the prospect of 
becoming owner-operators on larger-scale sugar cane properties. Government 
expenditure was also invested in the teaching of new cultivation techniques using 
‘demonstration plots’, rollout of fertilisation schemes, and introduction of higher quality 
and yielding crops (Crichlow 1997: 83-83). However, following the opposition JLP’s 
victory in 1980, a coalition of bauxite miners, and a middle class sympathetic to the 
political elite’s support for free market ideals; meant the War on Drugs began in the 
context of painful structural adjustment and resulting depression in agriculture 
production (Harrison 2001: 118-121).  
 
Consequently, much like in Sierra Leone, the 1980s witnessed a significant rise in the 
number of young and landless tenants for whom cannabis farming represented a 
suitable alternative (Crichlow 1997: 86). Contrary to the War on Drugs aim of reducing 
supply, cannabis emerged as the ‘principal commodity in [Jamaica’s] informal sector in 
the lean years of the 1970s and 1980s’ (Chavannes 2001: 33). Prime Minister Edward 
Seaga reamrked, for example, that cannabis cultivation represented: 
 
“The only healthy segment of the Jamaican economy. The 1.1 billion dollar business has 
been the economic lifeline of Jamaica for years, especially after traditional segments of 
the economy [had] failed.” (Cited in Harrison 2001: 123) 
 
In Jamaica, cannabis was increasingly grown in crop sharing arrangements alongside 
other agricultural goods, while its distribution was facilitated by networks of ‘higglers’ 
[dealers] that connected rural cultivators with urban consumers (Hamid 2002: xxxix; 
also see Johnson-Hill 1996: 16-17). This marketing network resembled the 
contemporary use of middlemen undertaking chain work in Western Area’s domestic 
and cross-border cannabis markets, which has largely resulted due to the circulation of 
slaves to the West Indies from West Africa (Mintz 1955). Hamid (2002: xv) notes that 
the interdependence between cannabis production and marketing comprised a ‘ganja 
complex’ that was already ‘endemic’ among the rural working classes in Jamaica since at 
least the 1950s. The system of apprentice provisioning established on West Indies 
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plantations following the 1833 Abolition Act, whereby masters provided apprentices 
with free labour time and a small plot of land their plantation to grow provisions, was 
mimicked in the late 1900s, such that the ‘cultivation of marijuana was always 
undertaken by the single individual’ (ibid: xxxix). The rapid growth of cannabis 
production during this period of economic downturn ensured Jamaica remained the test 
case for Ronald Reagan’s War on Drugs. This culminated in the 1988 United Nations 
Drug Conventions (UNDC) and the 1990 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Each treaty significantly expanded punitive law 
enforcement measures to target the activities and proceeds of cannabis farming and 
marketing. 
 
Although not party to the 1988 UNDC until December 1995 (INCSR 1996), the US State 
Department had already established a bilateral arrangement with the Government of 
Jamaica in 1984 and implemented that implemented a ‘Marijuana Eradication Program’. 
Opposition PNP and ruling JLP members actively opposed the programme during the 
1980s. The US had, however, introduced terms into the bilateral agreement – which 
were also later inserted into the 1988 UNDC – that ensured failure to comply resulted in 
the withdrawal of US votes towards obtaining credit from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). The potential loss of IMF credit and US economic assistance, at a time when 
external borrowing had produced a USD 3.5 million debt (one of the largest per capita 
debts worldwide), ensured the ruling JLP were locked into cooperating despite growing 
dissent from poorer rural classes (Long 1986; Priest 1987; Jones 2002).  
 
The US State Department recorded a significant spike in arrests from 2,272 in 1985 to 
3,341 in 1986, indicative of an equally significant increase in the scale of crop yields 
from 950 Mt in 1985 to 1,755 Mt in 1986, which subsequently declined to 460 Mt in 
1987 as the eradication programme began to take full effect (INCSR 1996). The 
deteriorating economic situation – unemployment had reached 35% by 1980 – also 
motivated the migration of influential higglers who controlled the export of cannabis 
and forwarding of proceeds to the then opposition JLP and ruling PNP.  
 
The Jamaican cultivators that found exile in Sierra Leone taught new cultivation 
techniques and introduced the cannabis sativa variety, which became known for it’s 
uniquely “clear high”.78 Two farmers nicknamed “Ɔsilibu” and “American” emerged as 
                                                        
78 The Jamaican diaspora also likely initiated a transition from self-sufficient production to 
commercialised export in Ethiopia during the early 1990s. One Jamaican cultivator suggested, 
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the dominant shareholders in Hastings, having established close relations with the 
Jamaicans in 1985. A farmer who had worked as an apprentice under these 
shareholders explained the resulting hierarchy as follows: 
 
“Ɔsilibu is our Chair [i.e. our boss]. They are all chairmen inside the business. They are 
the ones that have set up camp here [i.e. own land]. Any year they send thousands of 
kilos [of cannabis]. When the December harvest comes, you will sign up with 300 kilos 
[…] this ganja is going to Jamaica. It is going to Jamaica because they respect it, the 
ground here is so rich […] American is a shareholder alongside Ɔsilibu. They started the 
business here, inside Hastings, after coming with Mr Iskandri and Carrie B. They got a 
hold of the skunk seed, which they planted in Hastings and then in Waterloo. They are 
all friends together”.79 
 
As I explain in the next section, these shareholders controlled labour and access to 
higher-value markets by continuing the practice of apprentice provisioning first 
established under McCarthy’s parish system. By allowing fully-trained apprentices to 
rent a small plot of land on their farms with which to grow relatively autonomously, 
prospective competitors were confined to the greater competition and lower margins of 
domestic market networks that resembled those navigated by “higglers” in Jamaica’s 
cannabis economy. Furthermore, the Jamaicans passed on agricultural skills acquired 
during the 1980s collectivized farming schemes and introduced cannabis sativa seeds. 
This provided the shareholders with a comparative advantage in marketing, because 
cross-border buyers perceived that the Sierra Leonean climate and soil produced a more 
unique “taste”.  
 
Mirroring the contrast made by the Jamaican’s between Babylonians and Tafaray, 
cannabis farmers in Hastings’ who had been apprenticed by the Jamaicans also occupied 
a decidedly political terrain. As one of the shareholders nicknamed American explained: 
 
“You know, you know, most of the business belonged to Waterloo, through a man called 
Carrie B who lived in Ibo Town and his associate Mohammed Jabi who came and went 
with the diamba to the UK. He was blessed; not by me, but by God. Tell me, how many 
people has he brought work here? [...] Eventually they were pushed out of Hastings by 
                                                                                                                                                              
‘We taught them how to farm it and helped them with their problems’. Linkages between 
Jamaican and Ethiopian cultivators appear to have grown closer still following a decision by the 
Mengistu government to reduce land allocations promised to Jamaican settlers amid a 
resumption of eradication programmes in 1996 that destroyed 320 hectares of cannabis crop 
and arrested 21 farmers, all Jamaican (UNDCP 1998: 22-3). 
79 Interview with Turkish, Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 17/09/2013. 
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[Kabbah’s] SLPP [in 1996]. Everything was brushed and they stole all of his ganja […] He 
married a woman from Waterloo and moved back to Jamaica. We still had the links with 
London who used to send money back, but after the war ended they started to eat it, 
even the headman here uses the money now to pay off the NPA [National Power 
Authority] and have electricity at his house. American abruptly stands up and in 
animated fashion explains to me that. You know that we used to sing at school: ‘better 
days are coming’? He suddenly slumps down seated again, head between his knees. … But 
it’s getting worse. This is a hard, hard village, everyone is running every which way to 
try and find work. Freetown has the ways and means to get work, but Hastings relies on 
ganja. If ganja stops, the village will not stand. I ask what the consequences might be. 
Theft, too much theft, too much poverty can make you turn into a criminal; your head 
turns to a coconut. American gestures to a large mango tree in his back yard and begins 
to speak in a low whisper. You know what I am trying to say Balogun [the researcher]? 
He gestures to the mangoes at the top of the tree, moving his hands as if passing them 
along between people lined up in a chain to the bottom. He carefully and quietly reaches 
up to grab one, before placing it slowly back down on the ground. You see? There are 
plenty of tricks. Too much poverty will make you have no friends. When the lion is 
hungry in the jungle – you understand? There is money in this country, but we don’t see 
any benefit. They [the government] are weak; they chop everything […] Only one thing 
will stop the system changing. Fear”.80 
 
One apprentice farmer claimed that “when you hear that name, ‘American’, it is a 
powerful somebody”. He was correct, as the nickname implied; American was Ɔsilibu’s 
right-hand man. These shareholders reasoned in the same way as the Jamaicans that 
cannabis farming was productive and generated employment, and consequently was 
opposed to “the system” of nepotism and political elitism that had sought to destroy or 
capture the trade in the 1990s. By picking fruits in the shade of a tree, American was 
conveying a moral rhetoric shared by apprentices who were committed to the more 
equitable and righteous labour of cannabis farming. This was despite Western Area now 
hosting a small tier of shareholders who controlled the largest farms with the greatest 
returns.  
 
At the same time, the transition from the locally cultivated cannabis indica – known as 
Country Tay, Lobito and Sensimilla81 – to the farming of cannabis sativa enabled this 
                                                        
80 Interview with American, Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 07/11/2013.  
81 Sensimilla derives from Spanish to mean, literally, ‘without seeds’. Hamid (2002: x) argues 
sativa first arrived in Jamaica with indentured Chinese and Indian labourers that replaced 
emancipated African slaves the early 1800s. There is little evidence indicating cannabis sativa 
was present in Sierra Leone before the onset of World War Two, despite the possibility of 
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exclusive tier of cannabis producers in Western Area, particularly in the peninsula 
towns of Hastings, Waterloo, Four Mile, Macdonald and Tombo, to gain a further 
comparative advantage over aspiring farmers. For instance, cannabis indica has featured 
as the common strain grown throughout West Africa, requiring a period of two months 
before flowering (Bernstein 1999; Hamid 2002). Although cannabis sativa can take up to 
2 ½ months to bloom, it grows more quickly than indica during the vegetative stage 
prior to flowering. Both strains therefore have an average growing time from 
germination to harvest of four-to-five months. Sativa was, however, perceived to 
produce a “clearer high” than indica, and its association with Jamaican cultivators gave it 
a marketing advantage over regionally more common varieties. With a total growing 
time of four-to-five months, cannabis sativa also had a comparative advantage over 
other cash crops, such as palm fruit, which takes five-to-six months from pollination to 
maturity and can only be obtained from pre-existing palm trees not located in privately-
owned land.82 The unique “high” and comparatively higher value yields of sativa 
ensured cannabis farming became a ‘formidable market’, even in the face of regional 
competition and growing domestic supply (Leggett and Pietschmann 2006: 191). As 
Waterloo’s longest established cultivator asserted: “things had established then, unlike 
before”.83 
 
4.5. Economic incentives to participate in the cannabis economy 
 
Cannabis farming in Hastings and Waterloo provided young, rural-to-urban migrants 
who lacked capital with a reasonable opportunity to obtain a relatively secure income 
and to access land. Strong economic incentives permitted large numbers of unemployed 
youth to undertake cannabis cultivation from the early 2000s onwards. By 2013, for 
example, cannabis farming represented cultivator’s dominant source of income, while at 
least 67% claimed they had previously undertaken a range of other income generating 
activities, including alluvial diamond and gold mining, carpentry, vehicle repair and 
street vending. The remaining 13% of cannabis farmers were previously engaged in self-
                                                                                                                                                              
interaction with Arab trading groups originating from what is now Somalia and Kenya in East 
Africa (du Toit 1976). Colonial botanical studies suggest cannabis indica was cultivated in Sierra 
Leone from around the mid- to late-nineteenth century, originating from seeds brought to 
Freetown by recaptured Congolese slaves (Clarke 1851). Some established cultivators suggested 
lobito was first imported from Nigeria following refugee displacements during the Biafran war in 
the late 1960s. 
82 A similar trend is noted in Liberia. For instance, Liberia’s Deputy Justice Minister suggested in 
2008 during acceleration in the growth of small-scale cannabis firms in Bong and Numba 
counties that it took seven years for rubber and three years for palm oil to produce a return 
comparable to cannabis grown within three to four months (IRIN 2008a). 
83 Interview with B.I.G, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 16/09/13. 
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sufficient agriculture. The average net profit across all cultivators in Hastings and 
Waterloo during 2013 was Le2.64 million (USD 644), or Le9,962 per day based on 265 
working days. In comparison, more precarious waged labour is estimated to provide an 
average daily minimum wage of Le14,286 during 2013 (WFP 2014). All cannabis 
farmers in Hastings and Waterloo reported that cannabis farming provided their main 
source of personal income, and all but three cultivators had switched from inter-
cropping arrangements, typical of the 1980s and 1990s, to mono-cropping. Household 
incomes have, however, remained diverse in other contexts, and the data collected here 
indicates that the growth of cannabis cultivation in Western Area is driven by rural to 
urban migration, labour reallocation, and inequalities in land access and ownership, 
rather than simply commodity substitution (also see Bloomer 2009; Laudati 2014: 168).  
 
Cannabis sativa does, however, have an adaptable and resistant agronomy when grown 
in the peninsula hills (Duvall 2016: 13-14). Cultivation begins with the germination of 
sativa seeds, which are placed inside used water packets containing holes for water 
drainage, and then placed onto a growing table and covered with a tarpaulin to increase 
humidity and darkness. After one week, seedlings begin to form, referred to in Krio as 
“nɔsri”, meaning a nursery garden. Over a period of four weeks, soil moisture is closely 
monitored. The shoots are then placed into a dug-out hole with direct access to sunlight 
and watered using plastic jerry cans until the plant begins to vegetate. Usually within 
two-to-three months the sativa plant doubles in size and begins to bloom. Cultivators 
then identify the plant’s sex. Male buds comprising caniples84 are removed to prevent 
cross-pollination with female plants. Other cultivators choose to “groom” the cross-
pollinated plants after harvest to remove excess seeds. Both cleaning processes are used 
to remove unwanted seeds from the cannabis herb, which is a contributing factor in a 
buyer’s determining the potency of the cannabis and skill of the respective farmer. 
Cultivators refer to these cleaned buds as “sɛnsimilla” or “sɛnsi” for short; a term 
originating from the Spanish sin semilla, meaning “without seeds”.  
 
The plants then grow larger over a period of up to two months. NPK fertisliser, chicken 
dung and fish peel are mixed into each hole, according to varying quantities, 
combinations and timings; depending on the available capital and farmer’s preference. 
This process varies between farmers, but usually mimics that learned or modified from 
the technique of a former shareholder. Having prevented cross-pollination, the female 
buds begin producing trichomes containing a high ratio of canabinodiol to 
                                                        
84 Caniples are ball-shaped flowers that cluster together on a bud. 
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tetrahydrocanniboil, typical of sativa’s cannabinoid composition. Canabinodiol was a 
sticky subtance that farmers typically cleaned off and roled between the fingers to 
produce a dark brown ball of sought after cannabis resin.85  
 
Average yields for cannabis sativa in Hastings and Waterloo, which typically requires 
three to four months from planting to harvest, closely approximated yields estimated by 
the UNODC (2009: 93) for a well-tended, outdoor farm with no irrigation based in the 
United States. Based on an average farm size of 60.75m², cultivators produced a 
combined 26.2 kilograms annually. This finding contradicts the assumption that 
cannabis farming in sub-Saharan Africa is characterised by rudimentary techniques and 
the prevalence of cannabis indica, which otherwise results in the lowest yield 
efficiencies for cannabis production globally (UNODC 2010: 191-3; also see Duvall 2016: 
12-14).86 The introduction of cannabis sativa during the late 1980s afforded a clearer 
“high” than those of regional peers, and maintained a similar growing time as indica 
such that annual yields were comparable to Western Area’s most common agricultural 
cash crops. This was particularly important, as explained below, due to constraints 
around land access and farm size. Table One demonstrates that, for farms of equivalent 
size, cannabis produces greater yields of higher value than rice and palm oil in Western 
Area. For instance, over the course of a year, one square metre of a farm producing 
cannabis could obtain an average return of Le57,284 in the dry season and Le69,977 in 
the rainy season. Given cannabis produces a greater yield per metre, cannabis farms 
have the potential to obtain a nine times greater return than could be obtained from 
palm oil over the course of a year.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
85 Bosses typically allowed their apprentices to keep the resin for personal consumption or 
allowed them to sell it to known buyers. This also represented a useful was to placate 
apprentice’s impatience before receiving wages at the end of a season, and retained the 
connotation that profit was derived from the “strain” of hard labour. 
86 Regional variation in plot densities and yields weaken the validity of these estimates, despite 
attempts being made to control for plant size (e.g. see UNODC 2010: 183, 272). 
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Table One: Average yields and returns for cannabis herb compared with legal agricultural goods 
in Western Area. 
Crop, year Annual yield (kg) 
per square metre 
Advertised price (Le 
per kilogram) 
Annual return per 
square metre 
Upland rice, 2011 0.10 2,563 244 
Inland valley swamp 
rice, 2011 
0.21 2,563 528 
Oil palm, 2011 0.68 9,076 6,126 
Cannabis sativa (dry 
season), 2012 
0.43 132,910 57,284 
Cannabis sativa 
(rainy season), 2012 
0.43 162,360 69,977 
Source: MAFFS (2011); Fieldwork survey data (Appendix One) 
 
Other agricultural activities undertaken in Western Area, such as palm oil tapping, do, 
however, require fewer labour hours and are more amenable to livelihood 
diversification strategies. However, Western Area is resident to larger-scale commercial 
plantations on privately-owned land, resulting in a more saturated market that 
forecloses opportunities to access land.  
 
The majority of agriculture undertaken in Sierra Leone’s provinces is hindered by 
restricted access to land which is governed according to customary law enforced by 
patrimonial authorities (see Chauveau and Richards 2008). Arguably these institutions, 
first established under colonial indirect rule, were necessary for coercing labour when 
land was too abundant and labour too scarce to ensure the sustained productivity 
necessary for cash-crop export during the late-1800s (Austin 2009: 34-35). As Austin 
(2009) concludes, it was in the transition of coercive labour arrangements from slavery, 
to pawning under chiefs or apprenticing under colonists, that the commercial viability of 
slavery was eventually undermined. Improvements have arguably been made regarding 
the accountability and equality of these patrimonial institutions following the civil 
conflict, such that community relations are not marked by the grievances responsible 
for generating conflict during the late 1980s (Sawyer 2008; Fanthorpe and Maconachie 
2010). However, locals without inherited land rights, commonly referred to as 
“strangers”, still struggled to secure long-term access to land, which hindered 
agricultural productivity (Cartier and Bürge 2011: 1082). Recent evidence shows that 
agricultural productivity is difficult to sustain without cultivators perceiving that they 
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have longer-term security over land ownership (Unruh 2005: 102-108; Peters and 
Richards 2011: 379, 390, 393).  
 
Furthermore, agriculture in Sierra Leone suffers from acute labour shortages due to 
small yields resulting in an unfavourable ratio of costs to earnings in production. Labour 
accounts for an estimated 80% of production costs (Bolten 2009: 83). Rice farming, for 
instance, is burdened by high labour intensity, lack of specialised equipment, and 
limited land and labour security that prevents generating the yields necessary to sustain 
an extended work force (ibid). As Cartier and Bürge (2011: 1083) remark: ‘Put simply, 
agriculture in Sierra Leone requires too much work for far too little yields [therefore] 
precluding the involvement of a more extended network of people paid in kind and 
through reciprocity of labour’. 
  
Cannabis farming, by contrast, ‘does not require intensive management for high-potency 
products’ and is capable of being grown in ‘marginal sites’ (Duvall 2016: 14). Production 
also benefits from Western Area’s unique system of land tenure. Unlike in the provinces, 
land tenure is based on the freehold system of English common law comprising state-
owned land and individuated rights to privately-owned land (Renner-Thomas 2010). 
Cannabis farms were typically established on state-owned land during the 1980s and 
immediate post-conflict period of the early 2000s. During the early 2000s, for example, 
the Ministry of Lands issued temporary permits to internally displaced people in order 
to stimulate small-scale agriculture amid chronic food shortages. It was typical for 
cannabis farmers to claim that their plots resided on “government land” accessible to 
anyone. Given ownership rights have continued to be poorly enforced and regulated, an 
informal system of rights to first-ownership emerged that technically amounted to 
illegal squatting. This was particularly the case for Western Area’s population, many of 
which were displaced by civil conflict. For instance, a cultivator who farmed cannabis in 
an area of bush known as Loko Fakay suggested that: “it is free land, government land; 
everyman can go and work there”.87 As Bloomer (2009: 50) similarly observes in a study 
of cannabis production in Lesotho, access to land was ‘regulated but often non-codified’. 
 
Due to the resulting legal misunderstandings around land tenure and lack of clarity 
otherwise served by the enforcement of written contracts, the founding cannabis 
farmers justified their ownership claims on the basis of hereditary rights from ancestors 
or extended family members. Although these claims were difficult to independently 
                                                        
87 Interview with Musa Bangura, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 06/08/2014.  
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verify, it was in the continued absence of state-mandated officials that shareholders 
could exploit their close relationships with town chiefs in order to legitimise them. 
Claims to hereditary rights supported by town chiefs represented a sleight of hand 
necessary to dismiss challengers. For instance, to be granted access to land, which 
otherwise amounted to illegal squatting, apprentices still insisted that shareholders 
needed to, “draw you”, “bell you” or “give you the green light”, such that the authority to 
grant access to land was conferred on those who had established an original presence 
there (also see Machonachie et al 2012). Whether recognised as such or not, this 
continued exploitation of rights to first-ownership was attractive to shareholders and 
apprentices alike, because, unlike in the provinces, access to land was not primarily 
based on birth or kinship rights. Under the customary authority of chiefdoms in Sierra 
Leone’s provinces, access to land was regulated by high bride prices and tied labour 
arrangements (Richards et al 2011). 
 
Having established rights to first ownership, cannabis sativa was well-suited to 
maximising returns on these small, informally rented plots.88 In an evaluation of Sierra 
Leone’s land reform process, Unruh and Turray (2006: 5) note, for example, that in the 
context of a ‘fairly fluid economic and social environment’ where money or assets like a 
‘vehicle, shop, or even a job’ could be ‘finished’ at any moment, land in Western Area 
represented a more secure asset that ‘keeps on giving […] a significant aspect of a risk 
averse approach’ to making a living. This was especially the case for apprentice farmers, 
as apprenticeship presented an opportunity to accumulate capital and gain land 
ownership through the guidance of their respective shareholders. As I examine in 
relation to the notion of “winning the race” in Chapter Five, for example, proceeds from 
cannabis farming were reinvested to secure land titles and build a house. The pressure 
to claim home ownership was primarily driven by high rents, particularly as the 
demands of urbanisation in Freetown motivated newcomers in Hastings and Waterloo 
to exploit legal ambiguities in privately-owned land and secure more affordable housing. 
Such opportunities were generally unavailable when producing legal cash crops such as 
palm oil and palm wine, that, at least in Western Area, were not organised through 
apprenticeship; occupied less secure plots of land in the absence of a shareholder; 
required greater labour hours and inputs, and were exposed to hit-and-run strategies 
that generated greater price competition at local markets and undermined savings 
strategies. 
 
                                                        
88 Cannabis farms occupied an area of 60.75m² on average. 
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Farmers also reasoned that the more recent shift to mono-cropping cannabis was 
motivated by the lower and less predictable returns available when producing legal 
agricultural food stuffs, such as rice and cassava. For instance, the average price 
advertised to buyers for cannabis during the period of field research in 2013 varied 
from Le132,910 (USD32.4) per kilogram in the dry season to Le162,360 (USD39.6) per 
kilogram in the rainy season. These returns were 28.5 and 34.8 times greater, 
respectively, than the average national retail price, Le4667 per kilogram, for the same 
quantity of locally produced rice in 2013. Furthermore, cannabis farmers reported that 
reliable seasonal fluctuations in the price of cannabis enabled arbitrage and savings 
strategies. Farmers did this be reserving some cannabis to be sold at a higher price amid 
a foreseeable reduction in supply, especially from the provinces, during the rainy 
season.89 For instance, the distribution of average price across farms in Figure One 
demonstrates a significant seasonal difference. The overlap between the seasonal 
distributions suggests that, in the majority of cases, this seasonal change did not only 
affect the domestic market. Even when excluding outliers for the two largest producing 
farms in Hastings, in total 1,134 kilograms were sold during the dry season compared 
with only 277 kilograms during the rainy season. Consequently, at the higher-end, 
farmers well-connected with cross-border markets in Guinea and Liberia gained an 
additional advantage by adjusting farming cycles or saving harvested cannabis in order 
to gain the greatest returns during periods when supply was interrupted by the rainy 
seasons in neighbouring Guinea and Liberia. 
 
                                                        
89 Kernel density estimation is analogous to a smoothed out histogram and is typically used to 
examine price distribution among finite populations from which inferences regarding the 
structure of competition would like to be made.  
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By contrast, the exposure of legal agricultural goods to global market conditions and 
‘uncertainty about future inflation’ (Kovanen 2007; also see Glennester and Suri 2014: 
5) resulted in more volatile price variations that prohibited farmers from engaging in 
these kinds of strategic sales strategies. Government officials have, for example, 
responded to this volatility by attempting to install price control systems for agricultural 
goods, albeit with limited success: 
 
‘Officially Sierra Leone has no price control system. Consumers are generally at the 
mercy of retailers, who peg prices at their whims and caprices.’ (Africa Review 2011) 
 
Cultivators could therefore take advantage of more reliable seasonal fluctuations in 
supply and demand for cannabis sativa, which allowed them to proactively plan for the 
future rather than engaging in more short-term, reactive tactics. 
 
The resulting increase in the uptake of small-scale cannabis farming is demonstrated by 
data from the Sierra Leone’s Transnational Organised Crime Unit (TOCU). Seizures of 
cannabis herb increased by 2,821 kilograms in 2012, two years after the United Nations-
funded unit began operations in 2010. Furthermore, following implementation of more 
punitive drug control measures established under the National Drugs Control Act 
2008,90 guards at Pademba Road Prison in Freetown reported that the court and prison 
                                                        
90 The 2008 Act repealed the British colonial Dangerous Drugs Ordinance 1926 and compliments 
provisions under the Pharmacy and Drugs Act 2001. The 2008 Act serves minimum sentencing of 
Figure One: Distribution of prices for cannabis sold during the dry and 
rainy seasons in Hastings and Waterloo in 2013.  
Source: Fieldwork survey data (Appendix 1). 
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system had become increasingly overstretched. In response, magistrates de facto 
decriminalised cannabis cultivation, sale and possession by reverting to more lenient 
provisions contained within the Pharmacy and Drugs Act 2001. Furthermore, the 
majority of arrests for cannabis possession were often dealt with at local police stations, 
such that TOCU’s figures represent the majority of commercially produced cannabis 
destined for cross-border markets in neighbouring Guinea and Liberia.  
 
Growing domestic and regional supply since the late 2000s began to divide cannabis 
farmers into two camps. Those with the middlemen necessary to access cross-border 
markets began to produce in larger volumes and obtained greater returns that were 
reinvested into the hiring of apprentices, physical capital (such as fertiliser); payments 
in-kind to capture new buyers and bribes to the police. Meanwhile, those without these 
contacts faced greater competition in Western Area’s domestic market and remained 
hemmed-in to small-scale farming. Furthermore, the transmission of cannabis sativa 
from the Jamaican’s in the 1980s provided the shareholders with a marketing 
advantage, due to the clearer high yet comparable yields and harvesting time when 
compared with the more common indica variety. The unequal distribution of economic 
capital that resulted underpins the contemporary organisation of Western Area’s 
cannabis markets and labour relations. 
 
4.6. The economic organisation of chain work 
 
Farmers predominantly sold cannabis in bulk quantities to pre-established middlemen 
in Freetown, Hastings and Waterloo. Although most accounts suggest cannabis herb 
undergoes little processing before market (UNODC 2010: 190), cultivators “groomed” 
their cannabis during harvest to remove stems and seeds, which was then examined 
between the palms by buyers. This indicated that processing was an important step of 
value addition prior to selling to known buyers. These middlemen, referred to as 
“pushers”, were regarded by farmers as the crucial “links” of chain work because their 
value was derived from maintaining close personal relationships in contrast to fleeting, 
anonymous sales that characterised the open market. These dealers varied in their 
ability to access different markets. The majority would separate the product into smaller 
                                                                                                                                                              
five years for possession and sale of ‘hard drugs’ (which includes cannabis sativa), and life 
imprisonment for ‘importing, exporting, transhipping or transmitting’ illicit drugs.  
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quantities for onwards sale in the domestic market by word of mouth.91 As one dealer 
explained: “I am not a supermarket […] you meet up, sell it, and go”.92 Cannabis sativa 
remained the dominant variety of choice for buyers and relatively few farmers engaged 
in what was referred to as “mixed” cultivation by growing the indica variety as well.93 
These middlemen were also usually affiliated with a youth base. Here, “slings” 
[cigarettes] of cannabis were sold directly to, predominantly, young men.  
 
Alternatively, these same middlemen provided youth, at least those who were not 
already undertaking apprenticeships, with larger quantities of cannabis herb referred to 
as a “kwant”, which was roughly equal to a quarter kilogram. These were sold on credit. 
It was typical, for example, that a middleman request a kwant be sold for Le40,000 to 
Le50,0000 in return for commission on a sliding scale that began at half the value of the 
sale price. Given supply from the provinces had increased throughout the 2000s and 
periods of oversupply were now especially experienced during the dry season; credit-
based transactions reduced the risks for middlemen of selling to high frequency-low 
value buyers who could only afford to purchase cigarettes of cannabis. Although 
production in the rural provinces was not well integrated with markets in Western Area, 
middlemen occasionally sought to increase their margins by exploiting small time 
seller’s lack of knowledge regarding how to assess the quality of the herb by, for 
instance, passing it off as having been grown in Hastings or Waterloo. This occurred 
largely because oversupply resulted in a lack of demand and created an illiquid market. 
As such, dealers selling on credit often resorted to conducting what they referred to as 
“auctioning” and “fast money”. These sales tactics involved separating the kwants – also 
referred to as “pɛku” – into the smaller quantity of a cigarette in an attempt to sell as fast 
as possible, while still retaining some commission. These credit relations therefore 
increasingly tied new dealers to their respective middlemen and ensured they were 
dependent on their goodwill to delay or cancel debts when they failed to sell. Separate to 
this, those undertaking apprenticeships were also given opportunities to sell kwants on 
behalf of their bosses. These particular arrangements were, however, based more on 
                                                        
91 Barter transactions are immediate, non-recurrent and involve the transaction of goods in low 
volume. Market exchange was synonymous with the chain work undertaken by cannabis 
cultivators for it resulted in recurrence and the integration of exchange networks within 
Hastings, Waterloo, the capital Freetown and in cross-border regions of Guinea and Liberia (see 
Humphrey 1985: 51-2, 66-8). 
92 Interview with Cannabis Cultivator, Musa Bangura, Waterloo, 06/08/2013. 
93 The dominance of cannabis sativa indicated the base level for potency, measured according to 
Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) content, was the same for all cannabis produced. THC content 
typically closely correlates with increasing quantity and quality of fertiliser, and the time (usually 
after two months) between harvesting and consumption after which Trichomes degrades and 
reduces the crops potency when consumed. 
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testing an apprentice’s trust, with the cannabis sold for a fixed fee to a buyer already 
known to the shareholder.  
 
When supply was interrupted during the rainy season, middlemen benefitted from the 
conditions of a seller’s market. This was characterised by a shortage of goods available 
for sale, such that a seller could afford to sell at a higher price. Furthermore, when 
farmers and middlemen had engaged in more frequent transactions with a known buyer 
over time, they were able to negotiate higher prices. Buyers gained confidence in being 
recurrently provided with cannabis of high quality in potentially larger quantities, 
thereby strengthening the seller’s bargaining position as the buyer continued the 
relationship. By contrast, those selling outside of these exclusive networks at the ghettos 
and beach parties of the open market were subject to more-or-less fixed prices based on 
the quantities of kwant (Le30,000 to Le40,000) and sling (Le500 to Le1,000). This 
pegging of prices to an ordinal scale was likely necessary to ensure during transactions.  
 
For instance, the emic terms “locked game” and “open game” were indicative of how 
different modes of transaction were being established to deal with the uncertainties of 
what economists refer to as ‘information asymmetry’. A land-owning cultivator 
explained that in a locked game a buyer anticipated the unspoken agreement on a fixed 
price from which the seller should not deviate. Whereas in an open game, such as that 
synonymous with known middlemen – the “links” – price was ostensibly up for 
negotiation: “when you have friends that know about the game, then you can meet 
open[ly]”.94 Accordingly, most cannabis farmers (59%) without connections to well-
placed middlemen or shareholders faced the disadvantages of information asymmetry 
and constraints on price negotiation, because they were only able to sell cannabis on 
open markets in Freetown, Hastings and Waterloo. 
 
However, a smaller proportion (41%) sold to well-placed middlemen or were already 
those shareholders selling directly based on their respective long-standing relationships 
with cross-border buyers in Guinea and Liberia, and wealthier members of Freetown’s 
middle class. Within this more exclusive market, cannabis was only sold in multiples of 
‘skels’ [scales], each being roughly equivalent to one kilogram, given the expectation it 
would most likely be trafficked and then separated into smaller quantities for onwards 
sale elsewhere. Consequently, dominant cultivators that had accumulated sufficient 
economic capital and had access to higher-value buyers in Guinea and Liberia during the 
                                                        
94 Interview with Alie Kamara, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo,11/11/2013.  
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1980s and 1990s were able to increase production volumes and returns due to their 
continued relationships with middlemen who served these same cross-border buyers. 
Those cannabis farmers not able to access these more exclusive markets were able to 
participate in a more contestable market, but as a result of greater competition, were 
left to adopt sales strategies in the open market that resulted in comparably lower, if 
only more immediate returns. 
 
The role of shareholders as gatekeepers to exclusive markets, their pre-existing 
accumulation of economic capital, and claims of first ownership to land since the 1990s 
resulted in the geographical clustering of farms along Western Area’s peninsula hills 
into five distinct sites. Each cluster comprised a hierarchy of production, which included 
apprentices, journeymen and shareholders, as discussed later (see section 4.6.1). Some 
clusters were more competitive than others. For instance, one cluster of farms 
colloquially referred to as “You Must Grumble” produced the largest quantities of 
cannabis each season; largely due to the shareholder’s first-mover advantage in 
reinvesting accumulated capital and the labour secured from apprentices and 
journeymen during the 1980s and 1990s. You Must Grumble hosted between 10 to 15 
apprentices and up to five journeymen at any one time. However, due to Ɔsilibu’s on-
going relationships with middlemen involved in cross-border trafficking, farmers at this 
cluster could collectively benefit from the discrimination of higher prices and expansion 
in production resulting from larger orders. One of Ɔsilibu’s apprentices noted, for 
example, that at least two large orders to Liberia were requested each year; such that all 
apprentices and journeymen would pool the cannabis they produced on behalf of the 
shareholder, in exchange for a cut of the profits. Consequently, the You Must Grumble 
cluster of farms was able to gain greater returns than others, indicative of oligopolistic 
price competition whereby the shareholder operated as a price-setter in the more 
exclusive market (see Arlacchi 1998: 205). Table Two demonstrates the continuation of 
oligopolistic competition by comparing the annual net profit margin in 2013 for each of 
the five clusters of farms. 
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Table Two: Annual net profit and margins for cannabis farming clusters in Hastings and 
Waterloo.95 
Farm Annual net profit (Le) Annual net profit margin (%) 
Loko Fakay 1,334,000 22 
Obɔnoki 1,284,444 31 
Sugar Loaf 1,869,000 33 
Wanpala 2,761,750 56 
You Must Grumble 5,284,167 61 
Source: Fieldwork data (Appendix 1) 
 
Net profit margin adjusts for the costs of inputs, such as labour and physical capital (e.g. 
fertiliser), which contribute to an organisation’s size and gross profit margin. You Must 
Grumble represented the largest and most competitive cluster, with a 5% greater profit 
margin than its nearest rival. Another farming area, referred to as Sugar Loaf, increased 
expenditure on fertiliser, chicken dung, and fish skin by Le600,000 more than You Must 
Grumble.96 The average annual expenditure on these inputs across farming clusters was 
Le1,698,938 (USD415.5). The shareholder of Sugar Loaf reasoned his strategy would 
help him compete with rivals, as his farms currently obtained a below average 
transaction price in the dry season of Le101,667 per kilogram and Le150,000 per 
kilogram in the rainy reason. This strategy did not, however, translate into greater 
returns, instead obtaining a 27% lower net profit margin than You Must Grumble. Price 
competition was skewed in favour of a small tier of shareholders, which suggested 
economic exchange was not being played out within an equal playing field. 
 
These inequalities confirmed that there existed strategic barriers to entry as well as 
natural barriers, such as labour and physical capital, that determined the cannabis 
market’s degree of contestability. For instance, Tremblay et al (2009) conclude a 
statistical examination of the size and influence of criminal organisations by suggesting 
there are contributing factors; namely social capital and the nature of transactional 
relationships between leaders and followers, which determine the influence of an 
organisation in illegal markets other than the organisation’s size, propensity to organise 
and use violence, and the likelihood of detection by law enforcement including the use of 
                                                        
95 Net profit margin was calculated as total annual revenue less costs of inputs (fertiliser, fish 
skin and chicken dung), costs of informal land rent (where applicable) and payment of ‘haju’ 
[bribes] to law enforcers.  
96 Cultivators in Sugar Loaf each spent on average a total of Le4,717,500 (USD 1,150) on inputs, 
whereas cultivator in You Must Grumble and Loko Fakay spent Le4,119,167 (USD 1,004) and 
Le1,066,250 (USD 260) despite the latter obtaining greater returns.  
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corrupt strategies (see Reuter and Kleiman 1986: 301-2). As I go on to argue, other 
factors also contributed to the success of some clusters over others. These included the 
inherited institutional context, perceived status of leaders, and at the individual level, 
the practices learned, enacted and reproduced by participants in each production 
hierarchy. These factors are important for explaining how shareholders mediated access 
to more exclusive markets and how apprenticeship remained stable despite not being 
beholden to written contractors or being enforced by independent adjudicators. 
 
4.6.1 Apprenticeship system of cannabis production 
 
The shareholders mimicked the apprentice provisioning system of small-scale 
agricultural production that emerged under McCarthy’s parish system. This form of 
labour organisation had followed slavery and pawning modes of production prevalent in 
the provinces that, as Austin (2009) has argued, proved to be crucial in stimulating cash-
crop production for export across West Africa. Absent of coercion, legal force or written 
contracts, the youth who participated in these informal apprenticeships conveyed them 
as being congruent with their expectation to establish small-scale farms of their own. 
One apprentice farmer explained, for instance, that he was first apprenticed while 
searching for employment after migrating to Western Area in the mid-1980s: 
 
“Those that first started inside the business, they are the shareholders. We are the small 
boys, and we have our 'head' that we call the 'overseers'. We are the small boys and we 
must live by them and help them. [...] My boss back then had over fifteen small boys 
working for him. So I have done the same thing, start to develop [in order] to rule the 
business. So I am doing the business now with my own bobo [small boy] because I have 
already worked under them.”97 
 
In order to know longer be deemed a “small boy” or “bobo” a twenty-three year old 
cultivator who had just begun to grow cannabis with four other workers “under” a 
shareholder in Loko Fakay, suggested that “to be somebody you need training from the 
big ones”.98 The apprenticeship system was crucial in maintaining the shareholders’ 
dominance, primarily because it restricted the opportunities newcomers had to utilise 
what Granovetter (1985) refers to as the strength of weak ties in accessing higher value 
cross-border exchange partners through the “links” of their chain work. 
 
                                                        
97 Interview with Turkish, Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 17/09/2013. 
98 Interview with Lahay Corrie, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 18/11/2013. 
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For youth who congregated inside panbɔdi [tin hut] youth bases, apprenticing was 
highly selective. It required permission from the shareholders who adjudicated whether 
they could be “drawn” in and granted their close guidance. For instance, a 27 year old 
farmer who had cultivated cannabis for two years “under” a boss having previously 
worked as a carpenter and a masoner after arriving in Waterloo in 2007 suggested: “He 
[his shareholder] knows the good ones and the bad ones, so he put me inside the game 
[…] he told me to come inside”.99 Prospective apprentices reasoned that this was 
necessary, as only some possessed the acumen necessary to learn how to cultivate, 
including what inputs were required, how to value the quality and taste of cannabis, and 
how to establish relationships with buyers. This was confirmed by the shareholder of a 
farm nicknamed Sugar Loaf: 
 
“I am the leader. I am the force for work. When I work they see the example, and I tell 
them that by seeing this example it is their turn to take up the work. So when they go 
and work I am watching them. Any one mistake, I will correct it and tell them it is not 
the way to work – I direct it”.100 
 
A former apprentice turned journeyman who had recently begun to rent his own plot of 
land in You Must Grumble confirmed this: 
 
“In the bush we have leaders. When you first meet them they control you. If they see you 
want to work then you can brush [i.e. clear] the bush in that place […] no one will humbug 
[i.e. interfere] with you there.”101 
 
This journeyman had arrived in Waterloo searching for work as a carpenter in 2002 
following Sierra Leone’s civil conflict. He subsequently worked with 10 other young men 
for Ɔsilibu who, he suggested, had “taught me how to grow it” for at least three years. 
After his apprenticeship, he began to informally rent a small plot of land from Ɔsilibu in 
You Must Grumble. Another cultivator who arrived in Fula Town, Waterloo in 2005 aged 
eighteen claimed he too was taught how to grow cannabis under the eye of Ɔsilibu 
between 2006 and 2010, and now “grows for himself” in Loko Fakay where he rents a 
plot of land from another established cultivator.102 The most competitive cultivators, 
such as Ɔsilibu and American, were therefore more central to this history of 
                                                        
99 Interview with Gbrilla Manseray, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 30/10/2013.  
100 Interview with Musa Koroma, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 20/11/2013.  
101 Interview with Musa Koroma, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 20/11/2013. 
102 Interview with Lamine Barrie, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 20/09/2013. 
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shareholder-apprentice relations. Another youth who had previously cultivated in You 
Must Grumble explained the current organisation of production as follows: 
 
“Ɔsilibu was our ‘chair’ we called him ‘chairman’. The shareholders are all chairmen inside 
the business. You have seen? They are the men that first cleared the ground here and 
made a camp. They will take thousands of kilos when they go abroad [oba yanda]. Like 
this December, they have signed up 300 kilo […] it is going to Jamaica, because they 
respect it, because the ground is so rich […] American is also a shareholder, alongside 
Ɔsilibu. Well now they started the business, inside that town [Hastings] when they met 
with Mr Iskandrie who knew Carrie B. They got hold of the skunk seed and planted it in 
Hastings, and then they went with it to Waterloo […] They are all friends together inside  
the business […] They [the shareholders] may want to sell a thousand kilos of diamba 
[cannabis sativa], so they ask American to give five hundred kilos [from Obɔnoki farm]. 
Then Izato [another shareholder] will say he has five hundred kilos, or maybe two 
hundred kilos, so you know then that they will blend it […] wherever Ɔsilibu goes they are 
getting fine money. Say he gets one hundred tent [10 million Leones] he will pull [take] 
20 tent and give the shareholders 80 tent between them”.103 
 
The dominance of shareholders stemmed from the first-mover advantages they secured 
in access to higher-value trading partners, first rights to land ownership, and their 
central position within an emerging network of shareholder-apprentice relations. In 
turn, apprenticeships were perceived to offer the prospect of securing land ownership, 
sustaining an income, and being respected as a skilled agriculturalist.  
 
There was, however, no shared convention governing the duration of apprenticeship or 
how it was to be settled, especially given the illegality of cannabis farming prevented the 
formalisation of written codes and contracts.104 This is often also the case for ‘traditional 
apprenticeships’ that provide vocational training in the Sahel and Francophone West 
Africa’s informal economy, which as Walther (2008: 42, 45) concludes, are usually self-
regulating and based on a ‘moral commitment’. Furthermore, unlike apprenticeships 
elsewhere in West Africa, shareholders did not enter into either a verbal or written 
agreement with an apprentice’s parents or guardians (Boehm 1995). Neither did they 
request a training fee, as has been ‘unique’ to apprenticeships in informal manufacturing 
                                                        
103 Interview with Turkish, Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 17/09/2013.  
104 Legal contracts regulating the obligations, duration, and settlement of apprenticeships in  
West African informal enterprises, such as in Senegal and Nigeria, are also rare, with a ‘moral 
contract’ agreed between master and apprentice or with the apprentice’s family being more 
common (Walther 2000: 39, 42; Meagher 2011: 65-66). 
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clusters across West Africa (Velenchick 1995: 458). Neither was an apprentice selected 
on the basis of ethnic affiliation (Middleton et al 1993). Apprentices in Western Area 
were, however, of comparable age, between 16 and 18, and had completed some form of 
secondary education. 105 This is common under formalised apprenticeship training 
schemes, such as in Ghana (Monk et al 2008: 32). Usually apprentices began working for 
a shareholder after losing financial support for schooling from family members. In no 
cases was there a structured route of training or a standardized pedagogy for work. 
Neither, or course, did there exist a standardised qualification as proof of training. 
Instead, each shareholder taught their own particular method of cultivation. 
Furthermore, apprentices relied on the status of their shareholder and word-of-mouth 
to qualify their expertise.106 
 
According to one-on-one interviews, each apprentice spent 3.2 years on average 
working for a shareholder. This is in line with the duration of product- and sector-
specific apprenticeships involved in informal production across West Africa, which 
typically last between three-to-four years depending on the craft or occupation being 
undertaken, and the discretion of the master or madam (Bas 1989; Boehm 1997; 
Fluitman 1992; Hanson 2005: 168; Frazer 2006: 259; Monks et al 2008: 32; Walther 
2008; Anoyke and Afrane 2014: 136). The majority of apprentices returned to school or 
took up work in the informal economy, and benefitted from no appreciable increase in 
earnings derived from skills training; in contrast to apprentices in the Ghanaian and 
Nigerian informal sectors (Mabawonku 1979; Frazer 2006; Monk et al 2008). Others 
have, however, suggested that exploitation arises from the overstated learning potential 
of apprenticeship (Ninsin 1991) and the reduced earnings accruing to apprentices with 
lower education levels when compared to other forms of training (Monks et al 2008: 30-
31). Frazer (2006) suggests, furthermore, that for apprentice mechanics in Ghana, 
productivity was increased under a master but not when participating in other clusters 
of informal production. In Western Area, the shareholders engaged in exploitation by 
extracting cheap labour from apprentices and foreclosing their opportunities to become 
journeymen.  
 
This exploitation also stemmed from the insecurity of land tenure. As Machonachie et al 
(2012) note in a study of peri-urban and urban agriculture in Freetown: ‘cultivators 
                                                        
105 This is in line with the Child Rights Act 2007, which stipulates the minimum age before 
entering apprenticeship is fifteen in both the formal and informal sectors. 
106 Walther (2000: 43) reports similar observations for apprentices working in Senegal’s 
informal automative trade. 
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claimed that they were vulnerable to being exploited, particularly as land tenure 
arrangements were informal and not guided by well-defined laws or policies’. Hence, 
“Big Men” were increasingly sought in order to access land for rent. These unstable 
contracting arrangements are noted as being especially motivated by high working 
capital costs (Velenchik 1995), which problematically for masters, result in reduced 
productivity, depressed firm-level profits, and a higher non-completion rate (Berry 
1985: 142; Fluitman 1992; Donkor 2011: 32-34).  
 
Figure Two: Morphology of apprentice-shareholder networks involved in Hastings 
and Waterloo cannabis farming since 1985. 
 
To demonstrate this, Figure Two is a network diagram describing the duration of 
relations between shareholders and their apprentices. Each arrow points to a 
shareholder under which an apprentice, both former and current, was trained. The 
thickness of each arrow indicates the duration of the apprenticeship, while the size of 
each node corresponds to the total annual turnover of each farmer. Ɔsilibu, who first 
established You Must Grumble in the late 1980s, trained four apprentices who have 
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since become shareholders (American, Mohammed, Michael, and BIG). These original 
apprenticeships lasted three years on average, whereas Ɔsilibu now trains at least 12 
apprentices, albeit for only one year, often without being granted land to rent and the 
status of a journeyman. By contrast, the other less competitive shareholders typically 
trained fewer apprentices for longer, with a higher proportion being offered land on the 
farm to rent as a journeyman. 
 
This resulted in an overall smaller proportion of journeymen, on average aged 31, who 
had typically continued working for between six-to-eight years, after being granted a 
plot of land on a shareholder’s farm to rent. Only one journeyman went on to establish a 
farm independent of his shareholder. As is the case in other apprenticeships (see Monks 
et al 2008), this was due to prohibitively high capital requirements, but also because of 
delays in being granted a plot to cultivate in the peninsula’s bush or not being afforded a 
shareholder’s commitment to preventing police interference, as examined in Chapter 
Seven. 
 
Apprenticeships were not regulated by written contracts or adjudicated by a higher 
authority. They were based instead on ‘informal conventions’ (Meagher 2011: 67). As 
noted by apprentices elsewhere in West Africa, this lack of formalisation opens 
opportunities for hierarchy and exploitation (Hanson 2005: 168), such as by 
terminating an apprenticeship before training is completed (Meagher 2011: 65). And 
yet, in spite of this uncertainty, the expectations of apprentices remained stable. 
Apprentices remained committed to their labour despite the uncertainties of not 
knowing when their skills would be recognised as having been mastered, whether they 
would achieve land ownership, or whether they would be afforded independent 
decision-making in marketing networks. Just as McCarthy’s parish system stressed the 
virtues of ameliorating slave labour, the shareholders were not overtly coercive. 
Neither, as argued, did apprenticeship delay challenges by prospective rivals, for small-
scale cash crop agriculture in West Africa generally does not benefit from economies of 
scale (Austin 2009: 33). Furthermore, apprenticeship was, in any case, reasonably 
motivated because youth had limited economic capital and therefore required 
shareholders to access the land, fertilisers, agricultural skills, and buyers necessary to 
increase returns and lower costs. 
 
As argued, exploitation did arise from shareholders maintaining a high turnover of 
apprentices. And who, in turn, were left with little more than token payments in kind, 
 
 
145 
 
usually a “scale” [kilogram] of cannabis herb or 150,000 Leones (USD27), at the end of a 
five-to-six month season.107 As I explain later, exploitation arguably also arose from the 
obligation of journeymen to pool production with shareholders, who determined the 
resulting distribution of profits, in exchange for permission to continue renting plots of 
land that were otherwise of unstable legal status. Although, unlike apprentices, 
journeymen were considered more knowledgeable cultivators, this arrangement with 
the shareholders mimicked the apprentice provisioning system of the early 1800s. 
Journeymen sold primarily through low-margin marketing networks, synonymous with 
Jamaica’s higglers, and were unable to access higher-value cross-border exchange 
partners without being signaled by their respective shareholder. Such exploitation 
remained compatible with youth’s expectations for economy autonomy, and in doing so, 
facilitated the reproduction of a production hierarchy in each shareholder’s cluster of 
farms. Consequently, apprenticeship was responsible for reproducing structural 
advantages owing to pre-existing inequalities in claims to land ownership, and social 
capital and status, that institutionally-speaking were otherwise unstable 
 
The inter-dependence between apprenticeship and small-scale agriculture resulted in 
the clustering of cannabis farms in Hastings and Waterloo on land ostensibly owned by a 
shareholder, whereby each apprentice was allocated a plot on which he undertook all 
tasks under the watchful eye of his boss. Or, alternatively, the farm was organised into 
one large plot on which apprentices periodically rotated to undertake specialised tasks, 
such as planting, watering and guarding the crop from thieves. Apprentices were paid 
after completing a season, usually with one kilogram of cannabis herb compressed into a 
cement bag or the equivalent sum in cash, usually Le150,000. 
 
Shareholders also utilised journeymen who were judged to be fully trained, and who 
apprentices recognised to have mastered the necessary skills to grow cannabis of a high 
quality. Journeymen did not have the autonomy found in establishing their own 
cannabis farms. Instead, each paid a small rental fee in cash or cannabis herb to their 
respective shareholder and was required to supply cannabis for large bulk orders, 
usually to cross-border buyers in Guinea and Liberia. These contributions were 
exchanged for a fee determined by the shareholder. Unlike journeymen’s role as the 
employees of master craftsmen in medieval craft guilds, they were in the majority of 
                                                        
107 Meagher (2011: 65) notes that, due to economic pressures on Igbo masters, similar attempts 
were made to maximise the use of cheap apprentice labour in Nigerian informal production 
clusters. Monks et al (2008: 32) notes, however, that it is common for apprentices in Ghana to be 
paid either no wages or lower-than-market rates during their training. 
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cases permitted to sell surplus cannabis to youth bases in Hastings, Waterloo and 
Freetown, and in doing so established recurring exchange relations. However, they were 
denied direct access to the more exclusive higher value markets, which continued to be 
controlled by the shareholders. Separately, it was uncommon for a journeyman to work 
as a caretaker for several shareholders at a time. This usually occurred when former 
journeymen who had invested their capital in pursuing other livelihoods, such as 
purchasing a motorcycle taxi, periodically returned to cannabis farming due to financial 
difficulties or the theft of their assets. For apprentices, all capital and returns were 
controlled by the shareholder much like in a simple tree structure for which ‘any node 
has only one subordinate’ (Martin 2009: 177, fn. 34). Unlike journeymen, then, 
apprentices were not competitors in the domestic market, as all investments and 
returns accrued to the shareholder. 
 
Aware that my position within these fields of activity might alter my view of the power 
relations between different cultivators, I worked reflexively by moving between a more 
detached, ‘objective’ view of the field as elicited through surveys and network analysis 
and a more ethnographic examination of those from particular positions in the 
economic field of cultivation. As discussed in Chapter Three, a degree of detachment was 
necessary as part of a purposive sampling strategy that involved coordinating points of 
view from those at the bottom and top of these production hierarchies, in accordance 
with their situated lines of action, interpretation and reasoning. 
 
For instance, one cultivator, who was 28 years old, became a journeymen having 
“learned the work” from his shareholder in Waterloo from 2008 until 2011. His 
shareholder, who had grown cannabis since the late 1990s, provided him with a small 
plot within a cluster of farms known as “Wanpala”, a Krio term for wide, open area. After 
his boss passed away in 2012, the apprentice farmer gained an opportunity to “link” 
with a land owning associate of his boss in neighbouring Loko Fakay. Here, he rented a 
small plot of land comprising 150 cannabis sativa plants and gained the autonomy to 
produce and sell his own cannabis, for a small rental fee of one kilogram of cannabis 
each season.108 
 
When the apprenticeship system is translated into the conceptual framework of Big Man 
networks (Utas 2012), the ‘small-scale and semi-sovereign organizations’ that 
characterised each production hierarchy are held to coordinate the market. This is 
                                                        
108 Interview with Abdul-Rahman Sesay, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 20/09/2013.  
 
 
147 
 
argued to occur not on the basis of coercive ‘control’, but instead through mutual 
interests, usually the imperative to survive advanced within a shared moral framework. 
Although reference is made to structural power and power as something that can be 
‘invested’ and ‘possessed’, how power actually plays out for those assumed to have 
mutual interests is not readily specified according to this conceptual 
approach. Furthermore, by following the network concept as used in organised crime 
studies, the coordination of illicit economic activity is usually explained according to the 
dualism of organised violence or inter-personal trust (Meagher 2009; Danielsson 2014). 
 
In the institutional context of apprenticeship, then, a ‘boss’ is an arguably more useful 
concept for examining shareholders relations with apprentices and journeymen. In what 
follows, boss is used interchangeably with the emic term “shareholder” because it posits 
a useful baseline of what is necessary for a shareholder to command an apprentice. That 
is, aside from acting as a gatekeeper in access to land, higher-value exchange partners, 
and in possessing the authority to adjudicate an apprentice’s level of skill. This 
clarification is necessary because relations were not based on overt coercion or 
violence. In contrast to the master-slave origins of apprenticeship in the West Indies 
that necessitated intimidation and force on the plantation, cultivators emphasised the 
need to “no advantage am” [do not take advantage] by refraining from physical force in 
their business dealings or against apprentices. Rather, it was necessary to “sensitise” a 
dependent to their wrongdoing through reasoned discussion. In the minimal definition, 
then, bosses are actors that exercise power as if they were a patron, without legitimate 
authority (in Weber’s sense), but with recourse to various kinds of sanction, which 
included the termination of an apprenticeship without payment.  
 
Big men differ because they rely on redistribution by gift-giving to retain their followers. 
Both conceptual figures do, however, rely on a slight of hand when maintaining access to 
resources, be these economic or symbolic. Big Men, for instance, must convince 
followers that gifts are the product of their own wealth, rather than obtained from Big 
Men elsewhere or by other illegitimate means. That is, if the shared moral framework 
with followers is to remain stable. Meanwhile, in the case of the shareholders, claims to 
land ownership must be defendable in the absence of legal authority or, for example, 
that they convey expert authority to adjudicate the mastery of agricultural skills. Given 
there is always the potential for these sleights of hand to be challenged, the term boss is 
preferred here because it accommodates recourse to sanctioning dependents in order to 
affirm an unstable claim and specifies control over access to capital. For shareholders, 
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this typically involved refusing to pay wages, delaying an apprentice’s recognition as a 
journeyman, or forcing the apprentice to leave prematurely. This conception of boss-
apprentice relations is in line with Martin (2009: 219), who argues that ‘the ‘boss’ is an 
upstart who creates the inequality of relationships in a ‘self-oriented’ manner that, 
unlike a Big Man, assures they cannot have multiple followers in different networks at 
the same time’. Boss-apprentice relations therefore provide a conceptually accurate 
foundation for a qualitative examination of the hierarchies of cannabis production 
outlined above. This is mainly because they are more stable and less conditional (on 
redistribution) than those that characterise the Big Man networks of urban-based 
informal economies that are motivated more by consumption (see Utas 2012). Hence, 
using ‘boss’ acknowledges that shareholders in Hastings and Waterloo exercised power 
as if they were patrons; albeit based on social constructions of recognition and respect 
that, being unstable, required recourse to more material forms of sanction that asserted 
their control over access to economic and symbolic capital.  
 
For instance, one perceptive apprentice commented that the uncertainty of final 
payment represented a form of social sanction: “because I am under a boss I don’t know 
what he is going to pay me […] I think one million Leones for one season”.109 Likewise, 
the anxieties encountered when confronted with an increasing proliferation of rival self-
declared shareholders were ironically summed by one shareholder who, in response to 
my forthcoming interview with a supposed associate, questioned rhetorically: “Who is 
this chairman? There are so many chairmen these days!”110 These dynamics indicated 
that greater nuance exists in the conceptual overlap between patronage structures and 
what Utas (2012) refers to as ‘Big Man networks’. This is especially given that 
shareholder’s claims had to be accepted as legitimate by those whose secondary claims 
(the journeymen) depended on them for their continued veracity (Guyer 2007: 190; 
Martin 2009: 220-4).   
 
Following Bourdieu (2005: 76), the analysis now builds on institutional and network 
approaches by departing from the strictly interactionist vision. This is because the 
interactionist vision brackets power relations within the momentary encounters 
between partners to an exchange who observe each other and react to attempts to alter 
each other’s interest by means of establishing inter-personal trust or levying credible 
threats of sanction. Instead, a Bourdieuean approach utilises a ‘structural vision’. A 
                                                        
109 Interview with ‘George I Will’, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 02/08/2013.  
110 Interview with Musa Koroma, Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 20/11/2013. 
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structural vision accounts for how uneven distributions of economic, social, cultural and 
symbolic capital have structural effects on interacting participants. Capitals are 
unequally accumulated by agents and work to foreshadow the interactions between 
them. The structural vision examines how the positions of each agent within a field of 
organised activity, each being endowed with varying levels and types of capital, are 
rendered congruent with their expectations in social action and interpretation. This 
alignment of objective position with subjective expectation occurs outside of but 
informs social interaction; the congruence being rooted in an agent’s habitus. This 
approach to relational sociology, as the relations between objective positions and 
subjective expectations, provides an approach to understanding how apprentices, in the 
absence of enforced contracts, gain a degree of stability from the on-going reproduction 
of their practices. This requires beginning with the individual rather than the institution; 
with apprentice rather than apprenticeship. By shifting to Bourdieu’s concept of 
economic field, it is possible to demonstrate how what the interactionist vision takes to 
be the creation of market structures necessary to limit market efficiencies such as 
asymmetric information (see Beckert and Wehinger 2013: 15-7) are more precisely 
practices through which a particular hierarchy is reproduced that is compatible with 
what participant’s reason to be in their ‘best’ interest. The chapter now turns to the 
economic field as the beginning of an analysis regarding how the dominant position of 
shareholder’s was reproduced through the system of apprenticeship. 
 
4.7. Structural advantages in the economic field 
 
At the conceptual level, the economic field is highly unequal with dominant players 
securing structural advantages according to the:  
 
‘Volume and structure of the capital the agent possesses in its different species [such 
that] the worse placed they are within this distribution, the more [the economic field] 
restricts the space of possibles open to them and their ability to challenge incumbents’ 
(Bourdieu 2005: 75-6).  
 
The economic field is relational in the sense that the action of one cultivator depends on 
the relative position occupied by another and the relations of force between them. 
Market dynamics do not result solely from recurrent acts of exchange: ‘you have to add 
the impact of the structure of the field’ (Swedberg 2011: 74). Relations within the 
economic field of cannabis cultivation are divided into two axes: i) the relations within 
 
 
150 
 
each farming cluster between shareholders, journeymen and apprentices (the primary 
field) and ii) the relations between journeymen and shareholders within competing 
clusters (the secondary field) that excludes apprentices who are directly subordinate to 
a shareholder and do not compete. 
 
Struggles across the second axis play out according to non-price competition based on 
structural advantages in unequal access to non-economic capital. This includes the 
social capital accruing to relationships with cannabis dealers and middlemen; cultural 
capital in understanding how to cultivate and economically value cannabis; and juridical 
capital in access to protection from law-enforcement. The economic field is socially 
constructed and competition in the accumulation of these different species of capital 
entails indirect conflict, which is not ‘oriented solely by conscious, explicit reference to 
direct competitors’ (Bourdieu 2005: 82). Instead, as I examine in Chapter Six, certain 
ways of acting, reasoning, valuing and strategising formed structured sets of ‘practices’ 
that were tied to more and less dominant players. What cultivators recognised as 
rational behaviour was instead the product of ‘specific social and economic conditions’ 
and the relations with their shareholder when undertaking apprenticeship (ibid: 84).  
 
The concepts of economic field and habitus are closely inter-related and enable an 
examination of the degree of congruence between the position occupied across the field 
and the expectations an agent perceives as being congruent with this position. 
Apprenticeships, what Bourdieu (2005: 87) refers to as a form of ‘collective control’, 
motivate reasonable rather than rational expectations. The concept of economic field 
therefore relates the analysis of production and marketing networks here, with the 
more ethnographic analysis in Chapters Five, Six, and Seven. There I examine how the 
dispositions and practices of farmers are shaped by their particular history (primary 
habitus) and on-going relations with shareholders (secondary habitus), such that 
economic behaviour is the, ‘product of previous experiences of similar situations’ (ibid: 
84). As one young apprentice explained: 
 
“They sensitised me [i.e. taught me] about all of the business, like how to differentiate 
the male and female buds […] If your boss cheats you, then you cannot complain too 
much, because you probably haven’t done the hard work […] you must have the 
intention to do it”.111 
 
                                                        
111 Immanuel Lamey, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 02/08/2013.  
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It is important to recognise that, according to the economic field, what is practiced and 
recognised as rational strategy need not be rational from the ‘objective’ point of view of 
the researcher. It is necessary to account for how: 
 
‘The most consciously elaborated strategies can be implemented only within the limits 
and in the directions assigned to them by the structural constraints and by the practical 
or explicit knowledge-always unequally distributed-of those constraints.’ (ibid: 76) 
 
It is therefore the case that ‘the dominant is the one that occupies a position in the 
structure such that the structure acts on its behalf’ (ibid: 78; also see Swedberg 2011: 
74-5). A relational concept of economic field breaks, furthermore, with the neoclassical 
privileging of methodological individualism. This treats price as the aggregate outcome 
of individual preferences, and economic action as a response to price. In terms of an 
economic field, oligopolistic competition arises not solely from the discriminatory price-
setting practices of more established cultivators. Instead, as I flesh out in ethnographic 
detail in Chapter Six, the economic field of cannabis cultivation and exchange operates 
according to the one-sided accumulation, convertibility and utilisation of different 
species of capital by dominant cultivators, rather than according to direct intervention 
in the market. The organised crime literature, by contrast, separated out what it deemed 
were problems of inefficient competition, such as asymmetric information, from social 
mechanisms that, as I go on to argue, have emerged precisely to protect and reproduce 
production hierarchies in small-scale agriculture. Strategies involving pretension and 
bluffing were unlikely to be successful for those at a structural disadvantage, as BIG in 
Sugar Loaf discovered, because the wider structure of the field had a limiting effect, both 
objectively and subjectively, on the possibility for the success of any individually 
articulated ‘strategy’. For the dominant, however, strategies that appeared to be ‘pure 
bluff’, as I demonstrated in terms of their sleight of hand in access to land and their 
apprentices’ refrains from cheating, represented forms of deference and deterrent 
against potential challengers (ibid: 80). 
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4.8. Conclusion: From economic field to apprentice habitus 
 
In this chapter I argued that cannabis farming in Western Area was shaped by an 
institution of apprentice provisioning in the late-1700s to 1800s. This “civilising 
mission” conformed to the desire of abolitionists to transform recaptive slaves into 
industrious subjects, whose labour would undermine the slave trade through the 
legitimate commerce of small-scale agriculture. Apprenticeship was also instituted in 
the West Indies following the 1833 Abolition Act. This was based on the British master-
slave contract and more punitive forms of force and intimidation, in contrast to Sierra 
Leone’s earlier adoption of amelioration and the greater legal flexibility of indenture 
documents that put greater emphasis on mediation through inter-personal relations 
between master and apprentice. The basic institutional character of apprentice 
provisioning persisted into the 1900s, where it was closely inter-related with the 
maintenance of low-margin marketing networks during periods of economic 
depression. The traders in these markets were referred to as “higglers” in post-colonial 
Jamaica, and were consonant with the “chain work” being undertaken by cannabis 
cultivators in Sierra Leone who were responding to a period of painful economic 
structural adjustment. 
 
A tier of cannabis farmers now referred to as “shareholders” capitalised on these small-
scale agricultural production and marketing networks in the 1980s. These original 
farmers gained comparative advantages in first-rights to land ownership and exclusive 
access to high-value cross-border buyers. They also inherited a uniquely-valued seed 
variety (cannabis sativa) and cultivation techniques from newly-arrived Jamaican 
farmers that had fled the War on Drugs to settle in Hastings and Waterloo. 
Apprenticeship, I argued, was compatible with the spread of Rastafari ideas and values 
through Sierra Leone’s emerging youth culture. This was because cannabis farming 
afforded the reasonable opportunity, unlike the “slave work” of upcountry rice farming, 
to independently accumulate capital, obtain security in land access and later ownership, 
and be treated with the respect of a skilled agriculturalist.  
 
However, the basic institutional character of apprenticeship and the shareholders’ first-
mover advantages resulted in two modes of exploitation. First, the majority of 
apprentices were utilised as cheap labour, whereby apprenticeship terminated early or 
else the promised skills training did not translate into other opportunities or greater 
earnings. This was necessary because the low wages paid to apprentices would 
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otherwise have resulted in lower productivity and reduced firm-level profits. Second, 
the minority who became journeymen continued to rent small plots of land from the 
shareholders’ farms, pool resources for large orders, and were confined to the lower-
margin domestic market so as protecting shareholders from competition. I argued, 
therefore, that the shareholders authority, at first glance, resembled the conceptual 
figure of a ‘boss’. This was because shareholders could resort to various forms of 
sanction, without escalating to the use of overt coercion or violence. Apprenticeships 
were, however, also informal and so not bound by written contracts or adjudicated by 
an impartial authority. This suggested that apprenticeship, much like on the West 
Indie’s sugar plantations, was inherently unstable. It was therefore judged necessary to 
glean the motivations and commitments of the youth who participated in apprenticeship 
so as to examine why this institution continued to be reproduced. 
 
The chapter suggested that a conceptual shift to a relational sociology was necessary for 
examining the reproduction of hierarchy without the direct intervention of a higher 
authority or reduction to ostensibly “mutual” interests or “shared” moral commitments 
(see Turner 1994). To this end, I turned away from an ‘interactionist vision’ towards the 
‘structural vision’ provided by Bourdieu’s concept of ‘economic field’. This requires 
beginning with the agents participating in and reproducing institutions through their 
on-going activities, rather than with an institution’s structure or static content. The 
economic field is socially constructed and involves the accumulation, convertibility and 
use of different types of economic and non-economic capitals through on-going sets of 
practices linked to an agent’s more or less dominant position. Fields are stable when the 
objective position of an agent conforms to their subjective expectations. As I established 
in Chapter Two, habitus is not a straight-jacket, instead allowing a degree of provisional 
agency as it structures on-going action and interpretation. The field is analogous to a 
game, where the habitus is an intermediary between position and disposition.  
 
I now proceed with an ethnographic examination of apprenticeship from the point of 
view of those participating in it. This is necessary because apprenticeship enabled the 
shareholders to exploit apprentices and journeymen, without compromising its basic 
institutional structure. In what follows, I link the economic field examined in this 
chapter with an ethnographic examination of apprenticeship as a site of social learning, 
and the resulting habitus that was generative of particular actions and dispositions 
motivating participation in, commitment to, and coordination of, this field of activity in 
the everyday life of apprentices and journeymen. This requires engaging with historical 
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and subjectivist modes of analysis to establish ‘the conditions that shape the space of 
possible strategies’ (Bourdieu 2005: 83). I argue that apprentice cultivators recognised 
particular forms of acting, reasoning and valuing as necessary for being recognised, as 
the shareholders put it, of “having the mind to do it” and to not be playing a “simple 
game”. Apprenticeship represented a stable but informal institution; one in which the 
‘rules of the game’ were being reproduced in favour of the shareholders. 
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Chapter Five: The Game 
 
5.1. Introducing Apprentice Habitus: Neo-Evangelism, Rastafari and “the game” 
 
Rather than “sitting idle” in Waterloo, Musa claimed that during the late 1990s he 
migrated back to his place of birth in Kambia District and honed the skills necessary to 
cultivate cannabis: 
 
“I went to observe the movement […] I just left the house and abandoned everything 
without telling my parents; to find a way out, and live for myself as a man.”112 
 
Having acquired cannabis sativa seeds, Musa developed a small farm and after three 
years “started seeing the gain”. Musa highlighted that agricultural opportunities under 
the ruling APC party were limited and pointed to the site of a collective farm owned by 
former President Siaka Stevens as evidence for growing inequalities in access to land 
and falling real incomes. Despite his gratitude for being trained as a communications 
engineer, he lamented the limited opportunities available following an end to civil 
conflict in the early 2000s:  
 
“This is what made me go back inside the game. So I could fight to stand on my own.” 
 
By the late 2000s, these shareholders had claimed first rights to land ownership and 
hired young men frequenting panbɔdi [tin hut] youth bases in Hastings and Waterloo. 
This process was selective and Musa claimed a prospective apprentice required the 
“intention” or the “mind to do it”. 
 
This chapter takes a phenomenological approach to economic action (Guillory 1997: 
384; Martin 2011: 332-6, 344) in order to link the economic field to the apprentice 
habitus. It does so by examining the dispositions through which the shareholders sought 
to manage youths’ expectations and inculcate the sense of requiredness described by 
Musa above. If the social structure of the cannabis economy worked to reproduce 
structural advantages enjoyed by a minority of so-called shareholders, then how were 
these structures being internalised and reproduced by those apprentices who were, as 
they put it, “going inside the game”? There is, as Martin (2011: 292) claims, something 
‘vaguely repellent’ about using game metaphors to explain social action; children and 
                                                        
112 Interview with Musa Barrie, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 02/10/2013. 
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foolish adults play games, they have no ‘real’ stakes. Yet, as discussed in Chapter Four, 
apprentices were exploited through earning low or no wages, by the early termination 
of apprenticeship, inadequate skills training; and for journeymen, their exclusion in a 
low-margin domestic market and delayed rights to land ownership. In times of 
misfortune, apprentices and journeymen responded to the rhetorical phrase “Aw fɔ du?” 
[What can I do about?] with the refrain “Yu mɔs bia am” [You must bear it].113 This 
chapter argues that an apparent contradiction between the uncertainty of 
apprenticeship in its potential for exploitation and the perception that it was a means of 
“finding your own lane in life” was what the apprentice habitus worked to resolve (cf. 
Christiansen et al 2006: 13). 
 
Although youth in Sierra Leone typically treat patience as ‘an ass’ (Utas 2004), what 
apprentices referred to in agentic terms as “the game” was decidedly double-edged. I 
argue that there was a conflict between the patience and labour intensity required of 
apprentices and the expectancy of immediate gains resulting from a consumption-
mediated youth culture. It was, therefore, necessary for the polymorphous ambitions of 
youth, as one established cultivator suggested, to be “pulled down” and aligned with 
representations the shareholders had of their social world. In Pascalian Meditations, 
Bourdieu (2000: 202-5; also see 1977: 172, 176) refers to this subjective mediation of 
objectively exploitative labour relations as the ‘twofold truth of labour’. Following this, I 
argue that the game is analogous to what Bourdieu calls an illusio (Chapter Two, 2.2.8; 
also see Utas 2014). According to this concept, economic action fails to account for how 
an actor’s objective chances are rendered congruent with their subjective expectations 
in relation to a future, like that in the absence of apprentice contracting arrangements, 
which is unknown and yet-to-be realised (Bourdieu 2000: 213; see also Schackle 1990: 
5-6; Guyer 2007b). It is, therefore, left to explain why youth expended time and energy 
working for shareholders, despite their uncertain prospects and vulnerability to 
exploitation. 
 
To do this, I argue that cannabis farming was motivated by the illusio of what I term 
“righteous labour”. The chapter examines how apprentices and journeymen expressed 
deference towards their shareholders, committed to the corporeal “strain” of labour, 
and remained patient in the expectation of delayed gains. Sierra Leonean youth are, as 
Blesdoe (1990) remarks, taught from an early age that there is ‘no success without 
                                                        
113 This phrase is analogous to the English colloquialism, ‘you must deal with it’.  
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struggle’. This ethic is transposable to a range of contexts and situations, as Jackson 
(2008: 70) suggests of newly-migrated Sierra Leonean youth trying to make a living in 
Peckham, London: 
 
‘In Sierra Leone, suffering is seen as an unavoidable part of life. Though one imagines a 
better life, a fairer lot, one is taught to stoically accept the inevitability of hardship. 
What matters most is how one endures it.’ 
 
I argue that this particular ethic of economic conduct, what cultivators referred to as the 
“sabi” or “savvy” of their work, originates in a primary habitus that was maintained 
through a secondary habitus. In terms of the primary habitus, I identify ‘broad cultural 
trait[s]’ arising from a history of Protestant revivalist movments brought to Sierra Leone 
through missionary work. The core ethic of this movement continued to inform the 
contemporary beliefs and practices of my interlocutors, which I argue as being 
conducive to the institutional context of small-scale agriculture (Meagher 2009: 404).  
 
Since the late 1700s, US-based Evangelical Protestantism and English evangelical groups 
that broke away from the Anglican Church have sought to combat society’s ills through 
missionary work in sub-Saharan Africa.114 For instance, following the Abolition of 
Slavery Act, the Millerites established the American Anti-Slavery Society in 1833, which 
advocated the use of educational training, religious instruction and development of 
small-agriculture agriculture through using apprenticeship in East and West Africa 
(Höschele 2007: 58-9, 61-4, 80-2). These missionaries preached the virtues of religious 
conversion and social advancement as achievable through ‘education, skills and 
legitimate rather than illicit access to the power and resources of the state’ (Meagher 
2009: 400; Land 2015: 128-9). 
 
In the contemporary context, a US-based charismatic movement originating in the 
1960s and 1970s – often referred to as Neo-Pentecostalism – has spread to sub-Saharan 
Africa, Latin America and Asia, becoming the fastest growing denomination in Sierra 
                                                        
114 ‘Evangelist’ signals the shared history of Protestant revivalist movements in England and 
America, with respect to the slave trade and abolition, and ethics of economic conduct that now 
underpin moral communities dedicated to accumulation through a range of activities, such as 
commercial farming (see. Robbins 2004: 119; Meagher 2009: 403-4). This is necessary given the 
institutional roots of apprenticeship in England’s breakaway Anglican Evangelist movements, 
which are separate from, but also shaped by, the emergence of US-based Millerite/Adventist 
(since the mid-1800s) and Mormon/Christian Primitivist movements that spread through later 
missionary work in Sierra Leone, and were respectively formalised as the ‘Seventh Day 
Adventists’ and ‘Latter Day Saints’ movements. 
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Leone in the last four decades (Thompson 2013: 71).115 Paul Glifford (2004) argues, for 
instance, that during the post-colonial period, this movement spurred the most 
significant ideological reformation in sub-Saharan Africa. A number of churches 
affiliated with Neo-Pentecostalism have been established in Sierra Leone, including, for 
example, the Flaming Bible Church and Assemblies of God. Separately, another 
significant contemporary influence on Sierra Leonean religiosity is the Seventh Day 
Adventist denomination, which originates from the Millenialist Protestant movement. 
The Seventh-Day Adventist Church differs in form, for example, by observing Saturday 
as the Sabbath and emphasising the Second Coming of Jesus Christ. 
 
Despite these formal differences, the beliefs and practices of these two movements 
overlap in Sierra Leone because church members frequently change their religious 
identity and membership for a range of economic, moral and social reasons (Thompson 
2013). To clarify, As Thompson (2013: 165-8, also see Land 2015: 128) explains using 
life histories of church members, common to Neo-Pentecostals and Adventists is that 
they have continued to provide youth with agricultural and educational scholarships 
after the war, resulting in a ‘fluid overlapping of religious identities’ (ibid: 3) with 
members sharing similar ethics of economic and social conduct. Particularly for youth, 
this has also resulted in a relaxation of many socially conservative standards typically 
commonly associated with Seventh-Day Adventism in the United States, including in 
relation to diet, entertainment and fashion.  
 
To accommodate these overlaps while recognising their origin in nineteenth century 
Protestant revivalist movements, I use the term ‘Neo-Evangelism’ (see Woodberry and 
                                                        
115 ‘Pentecostalism’ and ‘Neo-Pentecostalism’ are arguably stretched by some authors and should 
not encompass Protestant evangelical and revivalist movements that emerged in the late 1700s 
and early 1800s (e.g. see Austin-Broos 1987). To clarify, Pentecostalism refers to the Classical 
Pentecostalism that originated during the “Great Awakening” in largely American Methodist 
churches during the early 1900s. This doctrine emphasised voluntary conversion, sanctification, 
faith healing and Millerianism. The movement formalised around Spirit baptism, which included 
speaking in tongues, and has been imported elsewhere while maintaining the Full Gospel’s ‘basic 
shape’: i) Jesus offers salvation, ii) Jesus heals, iii) Jesus baptises the Holy Spirit, iv) Jesus is born 
again (e.g. see Robbins 2004: 119-123 on the history and precision of terms). The Neo-
Pentecostal movement (also referred to as the “Charismatic movement” e.g. see Thompson 2013: 
71) subsequently emerged in the 1970s, albeit moderating strict moral asceticism, emphasising 
adherence to the Prosperity Gospel, relinquishing certain requirements such as speaking in 
tongues, and emphasising a personal rather than family commitment to Jesus – as implied by the 
term “born again”. As Shaw (2007) suggests, Neo-Pentecostalism was not indigenous to Sierra 
Leone, but was imported, the most popular being a sub-branch known as ‘spiritual warfare’, 
which arrived during the ECOMOG military intervention in the 1990s. Unlike fundamentalists 
who emphasise doctrine, Pentecostals amphasise experience (Woodbury and Smith 1998: 29). In 
Sierra Leone, this movement places emphasis on spiritual warfare and healing against a demonic 
underworld (Robbins 2004: 121). 
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Smith 1998: 26-7).116 ‘Evangelism’ points to the method of spreading Protestant gospel 
through education and preaching in a range of indigenous churches attended by my 
interlocutors since the 1980s in Sierra Leone. The prefix ‘Neo-’ highlights the everyday 
overlaps in belief and practice that now exist between contemporary Neo-
Pentecostalism and Adventism in Sierra Leone. 
 
This overlap of identity and relaxation of conservative values is important because, 
since the 1980s, Rastafari has also served, more specifically, as an ideological corrective 
for dislocated and unemployed youth seeking to make a living away from the 
paternalism of customary authorities (Savishinsky 1994). Despite usually being treated 
as unrelated phenomenon, Rastafari originated in Jamaica’s Revival Zion movement that 
had ‘grafted’ West African religiosity, such as the Mayal, onto the principles of Christian 
Evangelism that were espoused by their masters in the transition from slavery to 
freedom through, for instance, the imposition of apprenticeship on the West Indies 
plantations (Austin-Broos 1987; Johnson-Hill 1996: 12; Edmonds and Gonzalez 2010). 
This resulting folk cosmology helped ameliorate oppression on the sugar plantations 
and organise resistance against colonial authorities (Edmonds and Gonzalez 2010: 122-
126).117 I demonstrate that Rastafari also shaped youth culture in Hastings, Waterloo 
and Freetown, during the 1980s, whereby the National Provisional Ruling Council 
(NPRC), for instance, denounced the hypocrisy of the previous ruling elite through and 
called for a new more equitable society. This was because Rastafari strongly opposed 
state authorities, which they referred to as “Babylon”. 118 
 
As discussed in Chapter Four (4.2), the Rastafari working in Jamaica’s communes during 
the mid-to-late 1900s adopted small-scale provisioning and internal marketing systems 
utilised under the post-1833 imposition of apprenticeship (Mintz and Hall 1970). This 
was conducive to Rastafari principles, such as self-reliant enterprise in the pursuit of the 
                                                        
116 Use of the term ‘evangelist’ signals the shared history of Protestant revivalist movements in 
England and America, with respect to the slave trade and abolition, and ethics of economic 
conduct that now underpin moral communities dedicated to personal accumulation through a 
range of activities, such as commercial farming (see. Robbins 2004: 119; Meagher 2009: 403-4). 
This is necessary given the institutional roots of apprenticeship in England’s breakaway Anglican 
Evangelist movements, which are separate from, but also shaped by, the emergence of US-based 
Millerite/Adventist (since the mid-1800s) and Mormon/Christian Primitivist movements that 
spread through later missionary work in Sierra Leone, and were respectively formalised as the 
‘Seventh Day Adventists’ and ‘Latter Day Saints’ movements. 
117 Rastafari suggest the movement was officially formalised following the coronation of Haile 
Salassie in November 1930, and his pronouncement as the rebirth of the Holy Spirit as reflected 
in the title ‘Prince Ras Tafari’ – meaning power over the Holy Trinity. 
118 This term probably originates from the missionary Adventist’s suspicion of politics and 
organsied systems of control (Land 2015: 15). 
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ethic of “livity” [a lifestyle of living positively] (Johnson-Hill 1996: 14-17; Collins 2003: 
69, fn. 54); the personal sovereignty underscoring the redemptive ethic of “I-in-I”, and 
an emphasis on communal living implied in the value of “dread” (Johnson-Hill 1996: 12-
15; Collins 2003: 51). These ethics of economic conduct were also conducive to 
organising cannabis production through apprenticing by shareholders in Western Area. 
For instance: 
 
‘A variety of self-reliant enterprises, including agriculture, fishing, wood-working, 
knitting, painting, printing, transport services [...] the growing marketing of ganja 
provides a critical source of income for many. The range and scope of these activities 
appear to reinforce the essential independence of amorphous small group yards and 
camps.' (Johnson-Hill 1996: 16-7) 
 
Cannabis farming and consumption were, furthermore, deemed “ital” (meaning ‘vital’, 
‘natural’) as part of an integrated lifestyle in harmony with the natural environment. 
Often citing Biblical scripture, such as Psalm 104:14,119 the use of cannabis was justified 
as a basis for religious enlightenment, while farming and consumption were ritually 
practiced in an austere manner, ‘sometimes bordering on [the] asceticism’ of a 
Protestant industriousness (Land 2015: 189; Johnson-Hill 1996: 15). Therefore, these 
values organised cannabis production against a “slave mentality” that otherwise trapped 
workers in “Babylonian captivity”. 
 
Hence, I argue that Rastafari and Neo-Evangelism, while diverse in terms of their 
affiliated folk beliefs and practices, morally-accommodated cannabis farming, shaped 
youth culture, and maintained the ethics of personal accumulation, self-sufficiency and 
industriousness, in opposition to the greed, materialism and nepotism that were 
perceived to characterise “the system”. Crucially, then, apprenticeship was consonant 
with a patient and stoic sensibility that was thought necessary to claim the status of a 
“righteous somebody”. I argue that this ethic of righteousness was a leading factor in 
youth committing to apprenticeship as a legitimate means of securing masculine 
authority in a context otherwise characterised by scarcity.  
 
I conclude the chapter by arguing this ethic was also unstable. To do so, I focus on an 
emerging secondary habitus, which was marked by the social figure of the “Five Star 
General”. Referred to as a “bluff bluff”’ [deception], this was a strategy of deception that 
                                                        
119 “He causeth the grass for the cattle, and herb for the service of man”. 
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shareholders used to manage the conflicting expectations of their apprentices and 
journeymen. I demonstrate that, in spite of uncertainty and exploitation, the resulting 
secondary habitus remained congruent with an apprentice’s position by imaginatively 
accommodating the expectation of “finding their own lane” in life (Weiss 2002; Newell 
2012). 
 
The chapter now proceeds by embedding cannabis farming in the political context of the 
Rastafari movement, as it emerged in Sierra Leone during the 1980s. 
 
5.2. “Playing the game against the system”: Rastafari and the incomplete NPRC 
revolution 
 
Prospective apprentices awaited employment opportunities in one of the many panbɔdi 
[tin hut] youth bases in Hastings. Youth claimed that “Ganja HQ” comprised a group of 
houses and panbɔdis owned by a cadre of shareholders resident in an area known as 
‘Back Street’. At the centre of Back Street stood the Islex Entertainment Centre, recently 
built and funded with proceeds from cannabis cultivators that owned farms in areas 
colloquially referred to as “You Must Grumble” and “Obɔnoki”. A young man regularly 
painted murals on the walls of Islex that were commissioned by these shareholders and 
dedicated to Reggae musicians such as Bob Marley, Burning Spear and Peter Tosh. Youth 
also proposed the inclusion of newer artists, such as “LAJ” and “Kao Denero”, the 
symbolic figureheads for “kliks” [street gangs] known as the “Red Flag Movement” (or 
simply “RFM”) and “Black Leo” respectively. The juxtaposition of these figures on the 
walls of Islex demonstrated a tension that had emerged over the last decade between 
two competing expectations of what it meant to be a cannabis cultivator. The patience, 
skill and righteous labour of the shareholder stood in contrast to youth’s prospect of 
obtaining “fast money” to satisfy consumption-driven lifestyles.  
 
The Rastafari culture invested in by the shareholders finds its origins in the 1970s, when 
Freetown was already well-integrated into flows of cultural goods from Jamaica, such as 
the reggae music of Bob Marley, Bunny Wailer, Burning Spear and Peter Tosh 
(Savishinsky 1994: 22; King 1999; Stasik 2012: 50, 55-6; Nuxoll 2015: 5, 10-11). For 
instance, the Rastafari Twelve Tribes of Sierra Leone, founded by Vernon Carrington’s 
Twelve Tribes of Israel based in Kingston, Jamaica, was established in the late 1970s and 
comprised members, such as former Transport Minister Hindulo Trye. This young 
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vanguard was arguably responsible for establishing the National Provisional Ruling 
Council (NPRC) coup of 1992 (Zylbersztayn 1995).  
 
The message of the NPRC movement was rooted in Rastafari ideals and symbolised 
youths’ struggle against “the system” of the ruling APC. This struggle was expressed 
through street art and youth culture in Freetown during the early 1990s. Opala (1994: 
204-5, 209-10) argues, for instance, that Rastafari principles meaningfully shaped the 
message conveyed by proponents of the youthful NPRC revolution. Rural-to-urban 
migration also increased throughout the 1970s and 1980s, ensuring many youth were 
no longer subject to indentured forms of labour and inequalities in access to land upheld 
by the patrimonial chieftaincy in their villages of birth. The militancy of the NPRC 
student movement grew following the student revolts in 1977 that were violently 
oppressed by the APC’s Internal Security Unit. Although the organisation of the 
movement and motivations for the subsequent NPRC coup are contested, according to 
the dominant narrative, a disgruntled ‘militariat’ exploited growing youth 
unemployment, such that discussions between educated and unemployed youth who 
smoked cannabis together in Freetown’s pôtes turned from ‘muted discussions’ to ‘open 
talk about revolution’ (Rashid 1999: 48, 69-72; see Richards 1996: 9; Abdullah 2005; 
Gberie 2005: 68). Bolten (2009: 359-61) provides evidence suggesting that rather than 
being led by a disgruntled militarily-led lumpen proletariat, the NPRC ‘revolution’ was 
‘planned well in advance’ by former students who had already participated in the late 
1970s revolts. In this vein, Rastafari ideology was being actively politicised in Hastings 
and Waterloo. 
 
Following a coup d’état led by members of the opposition Sierra Leone People’s Party 
(SLPP) against incumbent President Joseph Momoh in 1992, the shareholders of 
cannabis cultivation in Hastings’ Back Street were temporarily drawn into the NPRC led 
by Captain Valentine Strasser. American, a former officer in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) 
prior to a second coup d’état led by Johnny Paul Koroma’s Armed Forces Revolutionary 
Council (AFRC) – among other military officers – supported this claim, and highlighted 
that falling wages reinforced the close relationship between the NPRC, custom officials, 
police and the nascent trade in cannabis export that had been fostered since Momoh’s 
crackdown on smuggling in 1987; and especially since a resurgence in RUF activity 
during 1994 (Keen 2005: 33, 116-7, 123-4, 129-130). As one former cultivator 
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concluded: “Much of the legacy in the game today is left by the NPRC boys [they 
represent] a lot of what is left now.”120 
 
Although the RUF in Sierra Leone’s Eastern province also articulated an anti-
government ‘ideology’, this was primarily expressed through the consumption of 
Western media, including figures such as Rambo and Tupac Shakur (Richards 1996; 
Utas and Jörgel 2008; Prestholdt 2008). The shareholders rejected this. They perceived 
the inclinations for obtaining “fast money” by deception, force and theft were a threat to 
the hard work, patience, and skill required to farm cannabis. For instance, one 
shareholder, nicknamed “BIG”, explained that his nickname represented the opposition 
between East and West Coast hip-hop, the music of Tupac being synonymous with that 
of a young pretender against the “genuine” art of Notorious BIG.121 The urban-based 
NPRC and their youthful supporters therefore espoused, at least prior to attempts to 
render military conscription more attractive (Keen 2005: 92-3), a moral rhetoric of anti-
corruption and anti-nepotism in direct opposition to the system of Momoh’s ruling APC. 
These same grievances were now being espoused against the perceived failings of 
President Ernest Bai Koroma’s government (Shepler 2010: 629; Utas 2014). 
 
For youth arriving in Waterloo and Hastings during the early 1980s, cannabis farming 
figured as a means of gaining economic autonomy and security in a context where 
structural adjustment was exacerbating inequalities in rural incomes and land 
ownership. The shareholders reasoned, for instance, that the system of apprenticing 
satiated grievances stemming from inequalities in access to land and resources that 
fuelled rebellion against customary authorities (Keen 2005: 9; Richards et al 2011; 
Peters and Richards 2011). Cannabis cultivation found an elective affinity with Rastafari 
ideology, such as the principle of “livity”, which committed youth to “live positive” and 
productively in the pursuit of self-sufficiency and equality against corruption, greed and 
materialism (Zylbersztayn 1995: 19, 29; Meeks 2002: 166). By contrast, cannabis 
cultivation associated with the RUF was considered the work of “cow boys” ungoverned 
by any productive work ethic. As one shareholder suggested: “the rebels just sat around 
and did nothing” (also see Bolten 2009: 363).122  
 
                                                        
120 Interview with Hindowa, former cannabis cultivator, Freetown, 09/12/13. 
121 Interview with B.I.G., Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 16/09/2013. 
122 Interview with Musa Barrie, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 04/05/2013. 
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A former apprentice-turned-journeyman in Hastings demonstrated the emerging moral 
accommodation of cannabis farming when retelling the story of his escaping work as a 
look-out for a cartel nicknamed “After Twelve” in 1995. The cartel, based in Freetown’s 
Lumley Street, sold “brown-brown” [the carbonised waste product of cocaine] and 
heroin: 
 
“Every day and night we were taking tablets to stay awake, because if you slept in 
Lumley Street then somebody [i.e. the police] would come and capture you. So I took 
tablets to stay awake, to look left and right, if you sleep the raiding squad will come, you 
must watch carefully.”123  
 
He concluded this work was “good for nothing” and referred to the ghettos in pejorative 
terms as having been established by “rebels”: 
 
“Lumley Street is the centre of all drugs […] during the time when the rebels came out of 
the bush, when rebels came to Freetown, they founded it. The rebels founded it […] Ex-
RUF run things here now, it was they used to smoke, to get speed, all of them go to 
Lumley Street […] but the shareholders they are not rebels, they are rich men, chairmen, 
and they are chairmen of the youth in Hastings.”124 
 
Moving from Freetown’s illicit activities to cannabis farming in the peninsula hills was 
also understood as character-defining. One cultivator explained: 
 
“When I was at school I would smoke, so raray girl [rootless; sex worker] business. So I 
moved from school to not live a bad life anymore [...] The tranga es [young sufferer] that 
I am now, well I tell God thank you. I decided to set up my own business. Although I left 
school, I had learned a trade, and having started my business I was able to forget about 
many things [i.e. worries] in life [...] so the days of scum life are no more.”125 
 
Rastafari values heeded youth’s aspirations and positioned cannabis farming as a more 
dignified and emancipatory means of making a living. A revolutionary vision to depart 
from the gerontocracy of chieftaincy and one-party statism was, therefore, not reducible 
to the terror of the RUF. Rather, anti-violent alternatives were expressed through a “One 
Love” Rastafari ideology that youth in Freetown increasingly conveyed through street 
                                                        
123 Interview with Turkish, Cannabis Cultivator, Freetown, 27/08/2013.  
124 Interview with Turkish, Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 17/09/2013.  
125 Interview with Immanuel Vincent (alias, Balani), Cannabis Cultivator and Dealer, Freetown, 
04/12/2013. 
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art, reggae music and cannabis smoking as pitching “the game” against “the system” 
(Opala 1994; Zylbersztayn 1995: 17-8; also see Johnson-Hill 1996: 18). 
 
Frustrated with the RUF’s success in capturing the strategic mining town of Koidu, a 
perceived failure to improve the conditions of frontline soldiers and manipulation of the 
military by ousted APC officials (Keen 2005: 107-8, 110), fractures began to grow within 
the NPRC. This resulted in the overthrow of Strasser by his deputy Brigadier General 
Julius Maada Bio in March 1996, and the transfer of executive power to elected 
President Tejan Kabbah and the SLPP. The invasion of Freetown by the RUF and blurred 
allegiances that characterized ex-SLA ‘sobels’ [soldiers-turned-rebels] comprising 
Johnny Paul Koroma’s Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) that precipitated a 
further coup d’état in May 1997 ensured the rapid collapse of the cannabis economy. In 
the period after a successful operation by the Nigerian-led ECOMOG forces that returned 
Kabbah to power in March 1998, Ras Oray Simeon’s Twelve Tribes of Israel stood 
accused of supporting the AFRC. Until signing of the Lomé peace agreement with 
President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah in July 1999 and disarmament of the RUF from 
December 1999 to 2001, the shareholders involvement in cannabis cultivation ceased. 
The advancing RUF and break-up of the NPRC forced the original shareholders to 
“scatter”. Instead the RUF, kamajors and ECOMOG dominated cannabis production, with 
farmers forced to work under new “Big Men” during the mid-to-late 1990s. Two 
shareholders claimed that although the trade was publicly suppressed under Kabbah's 
government in 1998, it became more clandestine with smuggling routes monopolised by 
a small elite, namely Kabbah's son, who allegedly arranged cannabis smuggling to 
neighbouring Guinea for between Le600,000 to Le700,000 per scale [kilogram]. A 
combined AFRC/RUF junta regained control again in January 1999 but were 
subsequently forced out again by ECOMOG. Instead, the ECOMOG intervention resulted 
in the splintering of the Rastafari movement, as it launched revenge evictions and looted 
cannabis crops due to the perceived association of cannabis cultivators and Rastafari 
with the failed NPRC (Fofana 1998). As a current shareholder diffidently explained; in 
the aftermath: “everything [had] turned to dust”.  
 
Wartime production networks cannot, therefore, be conflated with the norms and 
practices that organised a productive pre-war trade in cannabis through indigenous 
production and marketing networks now referred to as “chain work”. Despite its 
temporary demise, this history of Rastafari participation in cannabis farming and 
marketing provided a set of moral principles that has constituted the primary habitus of 
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the shareholders during the last decade. “The system” represented structural violence in 
exclusion from a waged, formal economy that was accessible only by ties of political 
patronage that served the interests of economic and political elites. “Playing the game”, 
by contrast, offered the self-enterprise, economic security and amicable working 
arrangements implied by the Rastafari values of “I-and-I”, “Ital” and “Livity”. The 
primary habitus of the shareholders cannot be collapsed into the category of ‘lumpen 
youth’ who are ‘prone to criminal behaviour, petty thefts, drugs, drunkenness and gross 
indiscipline' (Abdullah 2004: 45). Rather, Rastafari influences on youth culture in the 
panbɔdis of Hastings, Waterloo, and Freetown underpinned the expectation that 
cannabis farming offered a reasonable prospect of achieving economic and social 
autonomy. 
 
5.3. “Winning the race” in Back Street 
 
Like most days I am sat with a group of young men inside one of three panbɔdis in Back 
Street, Hastings. This particular panbɔdi was known as Long Bench on account of the 
patience necessary while waiting for new opportunities to sell “diamba” [cannabis herb] 
after harvest and the large number of pushers who came to buy from the area. Usually 
wearing backpacks or shoulder satchels, the young men would circulate with each other, 
before removing small black plastic bags that roughly amounted to a “quant” [quarter 
kilogram] of cannabis and offering a sample to potential buyers. In hushed voices these 
youth discussed the “grade” [quality], arranged payment – either by bulk or instalment – 
and planned onward travel to markets in Freetown or, alternatively, if their shareholder 
offered the appropriate “link”, to cross-border markets in Guinea and Liberia. After 
collecting money for “haju” [a ‘little something’ for the police] and transport from their 
respective boss, each would set off in turn on the back of okadas [motorcycle taxis] that 
pulled up periodically. One young man tries to reason with his old school friend visiting 
from Lumley, Freetown that Kao Denero, and his klik [group] of fans known as Black Leo 
are more ‘genuine’ than LAJ and his Red Flag Movement (alias, RFM). He suggests the 
RFM have only been successful because of their alleged financing by the ruling All 
People’s Congress party. Kao Denero was making “fake money” and the RFM 
represented another manifestation of the system: fast cars bought by illegitimate means 
and promiscuous sexual relationships.  
 
I took the opportunity to ask what, exactly, youth meant when they referred to “the 
game”. For some it referred literally to cannabis herb, for others to matters of risk and 
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reward when avoiding law enforcement. Typically the term was synonymous with the 
risks and gambles of work undertaken in Lumley Street’s cocaine and heroin cartels: “yu 
no go sabi wetin yu gɛt pa(n) yu an” [You never know if you will be paid]. “The game” 
was illegal and “the system” legal.  The precariousness of earning a living in the game 
reinforced the perceived financial obligations that characterised relationships with 
women: “true love takes a long time, to have security […] to not have a bad heart” 
because “women bring bitter pain”. Common, however, was articulation of “the game” in 
direct opposition to “the system”. The latter denoted members of the ruling APC, 
businessmen in air conditioned offices, and Big Men responsible for organising 
commission-based work in the informal economies of “Swazi” and “Belgium” in 
Freetown. As the Chairman of the ruling APC suggested when responding to allegations 
of corruption during a radio interview: “I am a child of God, not a beast in the bush”. In a 
different valance, the system denoted restricted social mobility. It had connotations with 
“tight” and “fixed” social practices that afforded “no movement” given the “road blocks” 
presented by bureaucracy, paper qualifications and need for influential referrals. An 
imagined geography contrasted the everyday life of Babylon “oba yanda” [over there] 
with that of Zion “na ya” [right here]. Oba yanda youth imagined they would face police 
harassment and their movement would be obstructed by “too many protocols” because 
“the system is too stiff” (also see Jackson 2008: 60). These young men claimed that 
“going inside the game” meant they were recognised and socially valued as “righteous 
sufferers”. The deception, nepotism and trickery of the system, both at home and 
abroad, represented the antithesis of this pursuit. For youth cultivating cannabis in 
Hastings and Waterloo, the strain of hard labour was a sure way to escape the social 
moratorium ensured by their elders who deemed young men, as the chief of Hastings 
put it, to be “alakie”: “those who don’t have a better future”. The labour of cannabis 
cultivation therefore offered the reasonable opportunity for these youth to “expose and 
go next level in life”.  
 
When we sat together on his porch, Harold would frequently tell Turkish that cannabis 
cultivation was for: 
 
“Righteous people [who] can stand on their own, when you are righteous you stand on 
your own […] You have two feet and two hands, so you must work for yourself, you 
cannot sit down and do nothing. [A] truthful man is a righteous man.” 
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Harold was a mentor to Turkish, having taught him how to cultivate cannabis (and avoid 
the police) since 1999. Turkish claimed that: 
 
“My boss [Harold] knew me from school; he rehabilitated me inside the work. He showed me the 
dealers, how the money is coming, how to do the expenditure; how to pull money inside the 
business […] until, finally, we know how to do the business.”126 
 
Turkish’s relationship with his father, who was a Local Unit Commander in the Sierra 
Leone Police, was increasingly fraught until his passing away. His perception of being 
disfavoured and not offered the “link” necessary to gain employment in the police force, 
unlike his two eldest brothers, motivated his increasing dependence on Harold. Having 
provided Turkish with a plot of land to use after the war, Harold suggested that he could 
now, “stand on his own”. Like most young men, Turkish shared a desire to “win the race” 
and establish a stable “reference point” by buying land, building a house, and providing 
for his wife and young child. Without the aspiration to gain a reference point, Harold 
claimed that a youth was simply a “man with no faith”. Harold first began cultivating 
cannabis the “local way” in 1978, but was subsequently taught new methods by two 
Jamaican cultivators in the mid-1980s nicknamed “Burning Spear” and “Tafaray”. The 
good fortunes brought about by this history of “suffuration”, Harold claimed, were now 
symbolised by the “vanity” of Islex, which he founded with other cultivators, including 
Ɔsilibu, American and Izato shortly after the war ended in 2001 “when this place was 
still bush”.  
 
Cultivators claimed that these “shareholders of the business” worked cooperatively to 
sponsor young men to cultivate and fulfil contracts with cross-border, and in some 
cases, international buyers. For the youth of Back Street these figures represented the 
“overseers of the business”. Indeed, their houses resided side-by-side. Having claimed 
first rights to land ownership and established a cluster of farms known as “You Must 
Grumble”, Ɔsilibu began establishing farms in Kambia, Kerry Town and Songo, while 
“Pastor” from the local Seventh-Day Adventist church sponsored a farm – that allegedly 
uses over 1,000 bags of fertiliser each year – in the village of Bat Kanu.127 The vanity of 
Islex for these senior cultivators was indicative of excess, a privilege only for those who 
have already “won the race” but denied to those who had not. For shareholders, vanity 
was tempered by the imperatives of social recognition when engaged in an activity that 
was officially illegal. The route to winning the race was extended through a particular 
                                                        
126 Interview with Turkish, Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 17/09/2013.  
127 Interview with American, Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 13/11/2013. 
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moral rhetoric; one that conferred recognition from the local community. Consequently, 
in late 2013, Ɔsilibu and American funded and oversaw the building of a market in the 
centre of Hastings, with consent from the town chief. In doing so they emphasised to 
Back Street’s youth the importance of needing to “mile”: to share what your wealth with 
those you consider your “brothers”.  
 
I first encountered the expectation of “winning the race” when Turkish took a free ride 
in his friend’s taxi. A tower of Roots Reggae and East Coast Hip-hop music CDs, stylish 
clothes and car modifications were, for him, the products of having won the race. Musa 
from Waterloo, who in his mid-30s had three children and lived with his mother, would 
in similar fashion point to Ɔsilibu’s passing Four-By-Four and highlight his penchant for 
drinking Lambrini while watching Champion’s League football as indications that he had 
already won the race. However, until one had laboured sufficiently during their 
apprenticeship it was necessary, as Turkish suggested: “to cut your coat according to 
your size, to live according to your level”. While the mixed metaphor expressing this 
stoic virtue of hard work is as diverse as the geography it travels with (Jackson 2008: 
70), most youth who perceived they were failing to win the race reasoned their 
misfortune resulted from the greed of the system in contrast to the righteousness of the 
game. For the young men of Long Bench, Harold, like the other shareholders, fell into the 
latter category, for they were respected as the leading “Akuwa” [Yoruba slang for 
cannabis shop].  
 
The panbɔdis where youth congregated, such as God Raw, Las Palmas and Pablo Base in 
addition to more established youth bases with political affiliations such as Homebase, 
Reggae Boys and Super were located throughout Hastings and Waterloo.128 They served 
as spaces of intense social activity where young men came to drink pɔyo [palm wine], 
smoke cannabis, talk about politics, relationships and sex, make arrangements to buy 
and sell cannabis or second-hand goods and most importantly, to stay close to their 
respective shareholders. The aesthetics of these bases were suggestive of an inclusive 
distancing, where youthful aspirations were spatialised according to an imagined 
geography of the Global North and a longing to be elsewhere (Ferguson 2006). Las 
Palmas, for example, was so named after the Spanish football club Las Palmas FC and 
                                                        
128 Some youth bases were established by ex-combatants from the Republic of Sierra Leone 
Armed Forces (RSLAF) and were affiliated with the ruling All People’s Congress (APC) e.g. Super 
or opposition Sierra Leone Peoples’ Party (SLPP) e.g. Homebase. Youth claimed Super was 
established by the APC to prevent Homebase mobilising youth and ex-combatants for political 
thuggery prior to the 2007 elections (see Christiansen and Utas 2008).  
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was the purported destination of former shareholders responsible for “controlling” their 
young apprentices at the base.  
 
Rather than the projection of some distant or hard-to-reach future, however, the 
panbɔdi provided youth with ‘points of orientation’ that emplaced their aspirations 
within the present. Their need to congregate resulted precisely from the lack of 
opportunities and ontological insecurity that arises within a context of scarcity (Weiss 
2002: 105-6; Hoffman 2007a). This spatialised aesthetic was closely linked with 
consumption practices that defined the means-and-ends of masculinity when 
opportunities for alternative productive activities are more-or-less foreclosed (Matlon 
2015: 152). Discussions were shot-through with a tension between the stoic sensibility 
thought necessary when labouring as a cannabis cultivator, and the more short-termist 
and self-interested pursuit of consumption by their peers that glorified masculinity in a 
context where unemployment was a threat to their status. Whereas the consumption 
aesthetic was more malleable and accommodated multiple expectations and 
possibilities, production in the cannabis economy was limited to fewer, more 
hierarchically organised opportunities. Within the space of the panbɔdi social life 
entailed ‘a process of constructing fragmented and often contradictory selves’ (Hoffman 
2007a: 405), but one that was policed by shareholders such as Harold who routinely 
challenged the attraction of consumption-driven activities and delegitimised them as 
merely the pursuit of “vanity”. Youth-turned-apprentices therefore reasoned it was the 
case that: 
 
“The more effort you put into your work, the more appreciation you get back out of 
your work. This is sufferation work. That is how we operate here [...] to 'play the game' 
is to show you have learnt your skill, to be getting experience to get your daily 
survival.”129 
 
Consequently, as another apprentice suggested: “You are no longer a youth according to 
the way you struggle”.130 
 
However, these apprentices also perceived their shareholders were “always watching 
over them”. In more private times and spaces would articulate this tension by 
comparing shareholders in terms of the material progress; measured in wages and 
                                                        
129 Interview with Abdullai, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 05/11/2013. 
130 Interview with Arthur Kemokai, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 26/09/2013.  
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access to land and new buyers. Turkish expressed to me his frustrations with working 
under Harold and his desire to join American’s “crew”. Youth, as a malleable social 
construction redefined based on the perception of an agent’s relations to others, acted 
as a refrain from directly challenging the shareholders. Indeed, as Turkish’s American 
dream seemed increasingly unlikely, he proceeded to denigrate his status, claiming 
American was “not too big” for he continued (so Turkish claimed) to live with his 
mother. To mediate the tension between stasis in the panbɔdi and rising expectations 
resulting from an imagined modernity inscribed in the art work and posters on its walls, 
the relationship between youth and their shareholders was maintained by the latter’s 
recognition and respect for the virtue of hard work, carnal “strain” and stoic sacrifice 
perceived of their shareholders, which secured an apprentice’s deference to authority.  
 
Despite their periodic consternation, apprentices dealt with their frustrations by 
sharing in the social construction of an ‘Other’. These apprentices typically drew on 
stereotypes that contrasted the righteous labour of their bosses in Hastings and 
Waterloo with that of Big Men in Freetown who, they claimed “had many fans, could buy 
what they want, and fuck who they wanted to”, but had obtained their success by illicit 
means including deception, force and theft. For others the “bigness” of these men was 
reasoned to have resulted from the deception and trickery of demonic spirits. If a 
righteous somebody faced misfortune by failing to achieve the same earnings from one 
season to the next or, for example, their crop had spoiled, then misfortune was – 
following the discourse of Neo-Pentecostal ‘spiritual warfare’ – attributed to demonic 
spirits including the devil (see Shaw 1997, 2007: 71; Utas 2003: 103-7). For instance, an 
apprentice nicknamed “Atika” who finished his first season in May 2013, claimed that 
the lower-than-promised pay he received (Le150,000 not Le200,000) was the fault of 
the “bush devil eating money”. 
 
Turkish emulated his peers and lived in a panbɔdi with his wife, whom he married in 
2012: 
 
“The shareholders inside the game didn’t have any support; they struggled, struggled, 
struggled, until they could stand [on their own]. So now I must struggle, and in the end I 
will stand [too].” 
 
Youth who had moved away from their parents, obtained ostensibly secure work, and 
held relatively well-established links with a person of perceived influence were capable 
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of obtaining the intermediary social status of “youth man”. A shareholder’s designation 
of his apprentices as youth men was a necessary compromise when young men’s 
expectations were incongruent with their economic and social chances. Youth man was 
an in-between social category. It was occupied by those who had learned skills and had 
the productive potential to contribute to their elders and wider community, but who, 
like the shareholders before them, had to continue using their labour in the service of 
others before gaining their own economic and social autonomy. 
 
5.4. Righteous labour 
 
The compound status of youth man was a compromise for apprentices who expected to 
be self-enterprising but were still awaiting the chance to be journeymen. This 
intermediary category maintained a delicate balancing act that ensured the 
shareholder’s system of apprenticing was not perceived as exploitative and akin to the 
“slave work” youth associated with upcountry farming. Apprentices regularly attended 
Neo-Pentecostal and Seventh-Day Adventist churches in Grafton, Hastings or Waterloo, 
and some were provided with educational scholarships after the war. One apprentice 
nicknamed Turkish, followed in his father’s footsteps and joined the Seventh-Day 
Adventists in the early 2000s where he received a scholarship to attend secondary 
school.131 The moral accommodation of cannabis provided by Rastafari folk religion was 
demonstrated by his satchel, which concealed wraps of compressed cannabis, yet also 
ensured he carried a copy of the Bible.  
 
When probing discussions of what it meant to be a “youth” with cultivators, an 
Evangelist symbolism ran through their explanations. 
 
So how does somebody ‘come up’ inside the business? 
“You have to convince yourself inside the business every day. We have to do work until 
God sees us as the survivor, because God will bless us. He says, ‘let me bless someone 
today!’ He says it could be you, it could be me, or it could be someone else. You know, 
when God blesses you, you continue to pursue your mission. I continue to conjugate the 
                                                        
131 Adventist missionaries arrived in Sierra Leone during the early 1900s and had established its 
headquarters in West Africa by 1914, and funded construction of Peninsula Secondary School, 
which the majority of educated cultivators in Hastings and Waterloo had attended, by the mid-
1960s. Following the mission’s departure as the RUF attacked Waterloo in December 1998, the 
Adventist church and Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) returned and built a 
new church and hospital that are still in service.  
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fire, flaming, the fire flaming up, until the effort I have pursued has allowed the business 
to grow.” 
 
What do you mean when you say ‘fire burning’? 
“It is the fire burning in your heart. You have to become clean. You have to become clean 
and work uprightly.”132 
 
Another cultivator who had farmed cannabis since 1999 and since become a 
journeyman having learned from his shareholder three years prior to the onset of war in 
the late 1980s, frequently attended the Seventh-Day Adventist church after receiving a 
scholarship for agricultural skills training in 2001.133 Given the ‘black roots’ of Neo-
Evangelist churches in efforts to transcend racial division and claim solidarity in the face 
of colonial and economic oppression (Hollenweger 2004: 127-8), one theologist has 
observed its syncretisation with Rastafari, especially during the 1970s and 1980s in 
Jamaica when branches of Christian revivalism, such as Neo-Pentecostalism, was 
practiced as the predominant category of Christian denominations (Austin-Broos 1987: 
2-4). The resulting folk religion was popular among the black, working classes of 
Jamaica, who were seeking to carve out an alternative collective consciousness during 
the 1970s against more middle class Christian revivalist movements. Having already 
spread from the United States, these branches of Neo-Evangelism were adopted 
throughout Jamaica, albeit now organised by ‘small independent groups with no 
American affiliation at all’ (ibid: 3).  
 
Neo-Evangelism and Rastafari can, therefore, prove to be complementary in providing a 
respected theology and cultural flexibility, at least as they served to challenge the earlier 
Jamaican Revivalist movement. This folk religion articulated an ideology in opposition to 
colonialism, white dominance and the middle classes: they were ‘complimentary 
opposites: complimentary but opposite ways to address some perennials of working 
class life’ (ibid). Having adopted elements of Garveyism and Rastafari, this emerging 
working class cosmology did not racially discriminate and was readily identified with 
the poor and rootless in Jamaica, which includes cultivators migrating to Sierra Leone, 
such as Carrie B and Burning Spear. Mirroring the greed and corruption symbolised by 
Babylon, Neo-Evangelists are enjoined through a ‘spirit of poverty’ doctrine that 
Marshall-Fratani (1998: 282) refers to as ‘morally-controlled materialism’. Labour was 
rendered spiritually fulfilling and meaningful.  
                                                        
132 Interview with Turkish, Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 17/09/2013.  
133 Interview with B.I.G, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 16/09/2013. 
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The folk religion that has resulted from the convergence between Neo-Evangelism and 
Rastafari in the daily lives of youth worked to ameliorate their dependency and 
paternalism, as Shilliam (2012: 341) notes:  
 
‘Many Rasta are skilled artisans and technicians, and the ethic of hard work is generally 
applauded. But not of the Protestant kind; waged work for unjust bosses, especially 
exploitative temporary contracts, is likened to slavery.’ 
 
This convergence resulted in an ethic of righteous labour. It opposed exploitative labour 
relations, such as tributary modes of production and pawning during slavery, and those 
of customary governance in rural provinces. The value of proselytization and ascetic 
moral guidance underpinning Neo-Evangelist religious practices, especially Neo-
Pentecostal forms of spiritual warfare, attracted converts from displaced and dislocated 
backgrounds. This was especially the case for those who fled the RUF to resettle in 
Hastings and Waterloo during the late 1990s that were typically young, unemployed, 
had experienced traumatic violence, and who converts suggested lacked a sense of place 
and direction in life. In a study of Zimbabwe’s Assembly of God Church, Maxwell (1998: 
351-3; also see Meagher 2009: 402) has argued, for instance, that Neo-Pentecostalism 
represented a way of dealing with ‘modernity’s dominant values and institutions’ such 
that ‘this resocialisation makes the born-again believer more industrious and socially 
mobile than many of their unsaved neighbours’. Many apprentices claimed they were 
‘rehabilitated’ through their work. As one apprentice who had migrated to Hastings 
from a rural province a year prior stated: 
 
“When I had found that boss [Ɔsilibu], he made me righteous.”134 
 
Neo-Evangelism resonated with Rastafari principles that spurred the ecstatic NPRC 
student revolutions, albeit reduced to a more modest post-war vision of ‘ecstatic escape’ 
and ethics of productive activity (Robbins 2004: 124). For those newly proselytised 
Adventist and Pentecostals in Sierra Leone, economic success resulted from ‘divine 
blessing’ whereas those of outsiders, such as Freetown’s Big Men, was attributed to 
demonic forces. Unlike the tendency in academic discourse to reduce the ethical basis of 
illegal activities to the anti-Weberian ethic of occult economies (Meagher 2009: 401), 
youth emphasised the righteousness of their work, which they recognised as illegal vis-
                                                        
134 Interview with Lamine Barrie, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 29/09/2013. 
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à-vis the state, yet socially-valuable and permissible within the wider community. This 
moral rhetoric allowed them to eschew the charge of their elders that they were 
resigned to a ‘lumpen ideology’ and lacked the ‘discipline necessary to rebuild the 
economy’ (Austin-Broos 1987: 16). Instead, apprenticeship fostered solidarity around a 
socially-valued and productive activity.  
 
A number of folk idioms provided further evidence for this. Cultivators frequently 
referred to the bush in Hastings and Waterloo as Lion Mountain, due to the apparent 
resemblance of the peninsula upon the arrival of the first Portuguese colonial settlers. 
The most established cultivator in a cluster of farms known as “Wanpala” [wide, flat 
area] who had farmed cannabis for 25 years recounted the fable of “the king of the 
forest” – often retold to those working on neighbouring farms. Derived from a 
combination of Jamaican folklore and Rastafari animism, the Tiger (or, “Brer Lion” in 
this folk version) represented the antithesis of Anansi the Spider, a common totemic 
character in West African (principally Ghanaian) folklore: 
 
‘When Tiger whispers the trees listen, when Tiger is angry and cries out the trees 
tremble. But when Anansi whispers no-one listens, when he shouts everyone laughs.’ 
(see Forsyth 1980: 67-8) 
 
Whereas Anansi schemed and hustled, the Lion was honest and strived; emblematic of a 
righteous somebody. Medal, who used to cultivate cannabis until he left his shareholder 
and “gone next level” by becoming the ”Youth Chairman” of Race Course Community in 
Freetown had a Lion tattooed on his bicep and a Lion on his belt buckle. American was 
often referred to in Hastings as “Lion’s Raw” or alternatively as the “Hungry Lion” when 
harvests disappointed.  
 
During the rule of the more conservative JLP in the 1980s the term “bobo” in Jamaica 
referred to someone who lacked mental alertness or cunning – somebody who was not 
productive (Forsyth 1980: 67). In Sierra Leone, bobo refers literally to a “small boy”, 
somebody who is an unproductive that lacks the capital, self-enterprise or, as 
shareholders suggested, the “mission” necessary to contribute to society. Those who 
were unemployed or lacked skills and education were considered to be “idle” and 
therefore capable of criminal or other destructive behaviours. It was to this transition 
from bobo to the intermediary social category of “youth man” that shareholders 
qualified their apprentices’ ethics of economic and social conduct. Whereas state 
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discrimination against the Rastafari tended to reduce participants in Jamaica’s cannabis 
economy to a lumpen sub-culture, the Neo-Evangelist work ethic utilised in Sierra Leone 
under the Parish system of apprenticing provided the opportunity to be garnered 
respect and ‘reshape[d] their aspirations no matter the predicament’ (Shaw 2007: 70). 
This ethic was  prevalent under apprenticeship in Sierra Leone during the 1970s, where 
Chuta and Liedholm (1976: 49, 51-3) in a survey of informal enterprises suggest that 
90% of masters had previously been apprenticed but 71% had received no formal 
education. For instance, apprentices greeted each other as “stɔna” [hard working 
somebody] and bumped their fist into an upturned palm – a haptic clue of the social 
value that was qualified by apprenticeship in the absence of formal qualifications or 
significant economic capital. 
  
In the absence of this productive ethic, apprentices reasoned they would be subject to a 
more degenerate social status:  
 
“The sufferation. There is sufferation presently because there is no finance, no money, 
and no school. Our families and ourselves have no money, so we [i.e. the youth] go in 
search of the money, to try and make our survival. So that is the problem. Money was 
not there for over nine years [during the civil war], there was no common food, no good 
clothes; there was no way of living. That is why we prefer to grow [cannabis], inside the 
business. We look at it as […] if we don’t grow inside the business our families shall 
suffer […] a lot of youth are idle, there is a lot of struggle. There are many problems, so 
many problems. So [by cultivating cannabis] they have to heal. Those nails that are 
there, we have to heal them. When you grow inside the business, you have become 
clean.”135 
 
The emphasis placed here on the healing provided by apprenticeship stemmed from the 
Neo-Pentecostal spiritual warfare practice of ‘forgetting’ violence during the civil war.  
In the contemporary context, however, it mapped onto a folk cosmology that marked the 
potential of transitioning from a hopeless present to a productive future (Maxwell 1998; 
Robbins 2004: 126; Shaw 2007). As one journeyman similarly invoked in his need to 
become “clean”: 
 
                                                        
135 Interview with Turkish, Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 17/09/2013.  
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“Some people always want to keep you behind. They’ll say: ‘Eh, where is Yusif? Ah, he 
isn’t working, he isn’t doing this, he isn’t doing that. He is not clean; he always stays in 
the ghetto. Those are the people who don’t want to let you grow.”136 
 
Rastafari principles were compatible with this transition from idleness to social value in 
productivity. For instance, although Zion represented the land of redeemed souls in 
contrast to the exploitation of labour bondage in Babylon, Rastafari emphasised the 
principle of ‘livity’ [living positively]. According to the providence of H.I.M. as the 
personification of God, livity afforded ‘profane endeavours’ in Babylon towards ‘sublime 
ends’ in Zion (Shilliam 2012: 340). In doing so, Rastafari proffered a sense of agency that 
transcended the individual ego – of ‘I-and-I’ – and thereby ‘incorporate[d] a collective 
personhood cultivated through the lived experience of suffering and a deepening 
relationship with the sublime’. This Rastafari exception meant for shareholders that 
some exploitation in apprenticing – the profane means – was justified, because this 
secured their apprentices better life chances and prevented them being subject to 
customary authorities; thereby allowing for sublime ends. Such pursuits had historically 
been articulated in opposition to the Colonial church under West Indies plantation 
slavery. External authorities, such as the colonial administration, could not grant these 
sublime ends, rather, they were to be realised through self-enterprise and toil. Hence, 
there is an affinity between “exposing” [i.e. expecting] oneself to a Western modernity 
yet-to-come and these Rasta principles. The ends, what shareholders conveyed as 
“vanity”, were compatible with the profane means of apprenticeship, because their 
apprentices reached them by undertaking righteous labour. Hence, it was necessary to 
“livicate” [dedicate] oneself in achieving the task at hand (Edmonds and Gonzalez 2010: 
188). As Harold made clear to his apprentices, the trappings of vanity had to be earned, 
only after securing the stable “reference points” of a family, land and a house. These 
goals represented the durable “roots” of their righteous labour. Apprentices therefore 
perceived that by virtue of their righteous labour, it was permissible to reach Babylon. 
Babylon spatialised the expectations of an imagined life inside Western Europe or North 
America, quite literally in the posters, photographs and murals of the panbɔdi.  
 
Turkish recounted his life history while sat inside Pablo Base as the August rains fell. 
Taking his time to smoke one sling and beginning to “meditate”, he claimed that in the 
late 1990s he was able to “expose” by gaining a job as a warehouse worker for the 
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone. Having obtained a “link” with “one Indian man”, 
                                                        
136 Interview with Yusif Bangura, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 17/10/2013.  
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Turkish worked at a Lumley Street cartel during the night but relieved the “pressure” – 
that “load in my head” – by providing cocaine and cannabis to the “white men”. 
According to Rastafari the ‘ritual ingestion of cannabis assists in the journey to discover 
the true self or I-n-I consciousness’, providing an imaginative space in which to 
challenge hardship and oppression (Edmonds and Gonzalez 2010: 188). Although it was 
not possible to corroborate the exact details, Turkish’s retelling suggested fantasy 
professed a degree of realism that guided social practice in the here-and-now (Weiss 
2002: 94-100), indicative of how youth deferred their pursuit of masculine authority 
while undertaking apprenticeship. 
 
The relationship between these folk beliefs and the social status of youth is also 
apparent when interpreted according to a Neo-Evangelical aesthetic. In this view, loyalty 
to a “shareholder” is counter-balanced by the ‘psychological payoff of promised benefits’ 
to gain access to education, a legitimate job, and respect in the local community 
(McCauley 2013: 15). Given the uncertainties of contracting and potential for 
exploitation during apprenticeship, however, the credibility of these payoffs was 
delicate. For instance, during disagreements over payment, apprentices argued that 
their conditions were akin to “slave work”. To take one example, when Musa supplied 
David with Medo to work as a “caretaker”, Medo complained that David acted too much 
like a “Big Man” by allowing others to give him orders on his behalf: “it is slave work”. 
 
The apprentice habitus, being based on a folk cosmology of Rastafari and Neo-Evangelist 
ethics was not entirely stable. It was argued in Chapter Four that the conceptual figure 
of “boss” is useful here, given it accommodates recourse to various forms of sanction. 
However, this does not explain why youth invested in and committed to apprenticeship. 
Given that the lack of enforceable contracting arrangement rendered apprenticeship an 
uncertain endeavour, it remains to be addressed how apprentices’ expectation of 
achieving the “vanity” of a consumption-oriented lifestyle were made congruent with 
their position in hierarchical labour relations that their shareholders permitted as 
necessarily ‘profane’ (Shilliam 2012: 336, 341-2). Moving forward, I begin to reconcile 
the primary habitus with a secondary habitus that emerged, not from a shared history of 
economic, political and religious experience, but rather, in the immediate relations 
between shareholders and their apprentices and journeymen. In the absence of 
enforceable contracting arrangements clarifying life chances, how did youth’s 
expectation of self-enterprise and economic security square with the uncertainty of 
deferred gains and vulnerability to exploitation? 
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To answer this, I follow Weiss (2002: 98) who suggests in his study of young men and 
barbershops in Arusha, Tanzania that ‘habitus requires imaginative activity if it is to be 
more than mindless repetition’. This was especially the case because youth hoped for a 
wide range of possible lives related to the globalisation of business, fashion, music, sport 
and so forth that were unlikely to be immediately reachable. In what follows, fantasy is 
treated as ‘essential to the very definition of reality as it is perceived and encountered 
by youth’ (Weiss 2002: 97). The chapter now turns to consider the ways in which the 
shareholders readjusted their young cultivators’ expectations with reference to the 
social figure of the “Five Star General”.  
 
5.5. The Five Star General’s “bluff bluff” 
 
Having worked as an apprentice for three years and journeyman for two years in You 
Must Grumble, Mohammed – nicknamed “Moshie” – was now in his late twenties and 
responsible for several ‘bobo dɛn’ [small boys] under his “control”: “it’s like a youth 
employment scheme”, he suggested. Moshie emphasised when we first met that, 
because he was a Five Star General for youth in Waterloo, he had “left the game now”. 
“Five Star Gen!” or “Five-O Gen!” was typical of how Moshie was greeted. He was 
respected as a “strong man” that “stood on his own”. Moshie was also the recipient of an 
educational scholarship and agricultural skills training from the local Seventh-Day 
Adventist Church in Waterloo after the war in 2001. His investment of proceeds from 
cultivating cannabis into a kiosk selling electronics imported from Guinea; including 
smart phones, DVD players, and tablet PCs, meant that “they recognise you live for 
yourself now”. Moshie’s life was appealing to youth who respected his ability to move 
around, bind with others and make money. Sitting down with several other young men, 
Moshie resumed his favourite film, Third World Cop, and provided me with his usual 
running commentary: 
 
Moshie leads me away from his electronics stall to a concealed space at the back of 
Malogie’s second-hand clothes stall. ‘This is the formula we use to conceal this thing’, he 
tells me. Smoking one sling of diamba, he hits play on his portable DVD player and resumes 
‘Third World Cop’. The DVD case is emblazoned with the strapline: ‘We Run Tings, Tings 
Nuh We Run’, a slogan taken from Red Dragon’s record of the same name during the 
heyday of live DJ’ing in dancehalls throughout Kingston in the 1980s. Set in Kingston, the 
film follows the lives of a police officer (Capone) returning to undercover duty, and his 
brother (nicknamed Ratty) who Moshie describes as a ‘criminal, thief and bad man’ that 
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has been the member of a criminal gang run by Oney; a man dressed in a red suit and hat 
who Moshie refers to as a ‘big man’. Malogie, a younger cultivator, interrupts and jokingly 
shouts, ‘You’re under arrest!’ before greeting Moshie as ‘Five-O Gen’ and joining us. 
Moshie says the ‘thieves’ are concealing drugs in local churches in preparation for a major 
drug deal. He points to Oley smoking a cigar and suggests, ‘he is a Big Man, he can eat, he 
can fuck, he can wear fine clothes’; but warns me that if you have these characteristics 
you are a, ‘thief man’ and a ‘raray boy’137 […] it is street life; smoke, move around, steal’. 
As Capone confronts Oney at Kingston Harbour, Malogie suggests that Freetown’s Water 
Quay is much the same and that, like Kingston, life is similar here: ‘Na fiba’ [It is 
familiar/similar]. Oney allays Capone’s concerns and in the next scene orders a group of 
young men to transport the drugs to a waiting truck. Malogie nods as Moshie comments, 
‘You always know who your boss is’. The scene ends as Oney and his associates meet in a 
darkened room. He tears a page from the bible and uses it to wrap a joint of cannabis. 
Mohammed says he has torn the page of Psalm 23, and that he will, ‘have no fear now’.138 
 
Moshie’s commentary presented a contradictory moral rhetoric. While the young men 
who worked for him regularly perceived the police were Babylonians, Capone, the 
undercover detective, was revered for his fight against corruption and theft attributed 
to “Big Men” such as Oley who displayed their vanity: cigar smoking, sexual promiscuity 
and a “light finger” with money. And although youth their need to stoically commit to 
apprenticeship, they clung to the expectation that a life like Capone’s was in reach. 
Indeed, many wanted to join the police. When questioning Moshie how the youth under 
his control “saw him”, he suggested that: 
 
“Five Star is my cover near all the men in the streets. I take them as youth men and can 
sit down and talk to them. All of them, they understand it is not about anything bad, 
because they also don’t wish to lead a bad life [so] they take me as the big one for them. 
I am able [to] control them. It makes them call me ‘Five Star!”139 
 
Moshie’s emphasis on “cover”, meaning to conceal or disguise, served two purposes. 
First, it was demonstrative of his need to deal with a tension between the vice of 
conspicuous consumption that attracted disdain from his peers and the police, and the 
expectations of his followers who wanted to be like him. The shareholders recognised 
the threat posed by these shorter-term, consumption-oriented expectations and 
                                                        
137 Raray boy denotes a youth who is rootless or dislocated, be it from family and/or 
employment. It is generally used to disparage, albeit used more pejoratively than the term bobo, 
and from my observations a raray was a bobo that did not have an aim to strive for in life. 
138 Field notes, with Mohammed (alias, “Moshie”) in Waterloo, 24/09/2013.  
139 Interview with Mohammed (alias, Moshie), Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 24/09/2013.  
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instructed their apprentices not be “boastful” or “advertise themselves” as this would 
attract undue attention and trouble. And yet when travelling with Musa, a shareholder 
in Loko Fakay, to meet his pusher at Race Course Community in Freetown, he would 
frequently change into a Nike branded red sweater, blue jeans and chromatic silver 
trainers in order to interact with high-value dealers.  
 
Five Star Generals performed the expectation youth had to “expose and go next level” in 
different ways. Medal, who used to cultivate cannabis under a shareholder in Four Mile, 
but had since emerged as the Youth Coordinator for Race Course’s self-proclaimed 
youth development project, arranged for me to meet other “high level” pushers in the 
area following Musa’s visit. “I cover all the youth men here”, he suggested. In discussions 
with youth, Medal employed what I termed “NGO Speak”: “transparency”, 
“empowerment”, “equality”, and “human rights”. These rhetorical flourishes were used 
in his efforts to “sensitise” youth about the value of working together on one of his many 
alternative livelihood or community policing projects that were facilitated through his 
relationships with local government officials and NGO personnel (cf. Bolten 2012). 
Frequently the first thing youth would ask was the purpose of my “project” and proceed 
to request help in writing a project proposal or establishing contacts with expatriates 
better positioned to help. Ishmail (alias, “Issue”), a Five-Star General of Las Palmas youth 
base in Fulah Town, transformed his youth base into “Las Palmas Youth Organisation”. 
He emphasised that the organisation was registered with the government (despite no 
supporting documentation) and was providing youth employment opportunities.  
 
Given youth were subject to a delegitimising discourse that characterised them as 
lumpen and unproductive idlers, the Five Star General’s modus operandi appeared to be 
a bluffing strategy that, in a context of material scarcity, enabled youth to ‘draw back a 
little of the chance to exert collective representation and identity’ (Jones 2011: 700). 
Despite flushing, Issue also regularly told stories of his attempts to secure a passport 
and visa with which to reach his extended family in the U.S. (and sometimes Western 
Europe) by claiming he could “bluff bluff” [to pass off, imitate] a living abroad. While 
Moshie and Medal’s admission that they “covered” their apprentices served realism to 
the fantasy that they could “run things” too, the bluff bluff recognised the limits of these 
fantasies. This was because the Five Star Generals usually journeyman who continued to 
depend on the shareholders for land access and remained trapped in a low-margin 
domestic market in lieu of being introduced to cross-border buyers. Yet, they realised 
that to succeed by controlling new apprentices of their own, it was necessary to 
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maintain the façade of material progress through self-enterprise. To bluff, as Newell 
(2012: 38, emphasis added) explains ‘require[s] a symbolic mastery of culture from 
which [youth are] excluded’ and that presents youth with ‘a proof of potential 
membership’. As Moshie’s opportunity for introspection during interview revealed, the 
bluff bluff was, quite literally, a double bluff. This was because journeyman recognised 
the deceit of their self-representation as Five Star Generals; especially given that 
repetition in Krio is to place emphasise on, to exaggerate a claim. Although he initially 
claimed to have left the game, Moshie later confided that:  
 
“I am thirty years old now. I don’t have anything. I don’t have [a] house, I rent. I don’t 
have a fixed site [i.e. permanent place to stay]. I am still in the suffering mode. [But] I 
still tell god thank you, because I decide that I have found myself, so there is no other 
thing to do next.”140 
 
The bluff operated according to a ‘process of subjectification through which [] young 
men deploy[ed] their own subjugation […] as a means of overcoming marginalization’ 
(Weiss 2002: 105). Yet, when doubled, the bluff bluff denoted a, ‘labour of social 
mourning, that does not say its name’ (Wacqaunt 1999: 156). The symbolic mastery of 
the Five Star General lay in his ability to ‘manipulate others, to inveigle and deceive 
them’, in order to qualify of the apprentices they required in their own pursuit of 
economic and social autonomy (ibid: 142-3). The ambition to become a Five Star 
General proved attractive to young men migrating to Freetown and its environs from 
the “boredom” of the provinces who imagined they might be able to progress, in 
materialistic terms, under the guidance of skilled master. Journeymen comprised a 
growing cadre of these social figures. This betrayed being stuck in a liminal position. 
Journeymen were not yet capable of becoming shareholders, but they required 
apprentices of their own in order to reduce labour costs and garner respect. Therefore, 
Moshie asserted he needed: 
 
“To pull them down and sensitise them […] the faith, be patient. With that patience you 
survive. You are able to bear and maintain, and in the long run you will be a better 
somebody.”141 
 
These efforts to accommodate the impatience of apprentices responded to a tension 
between the ethics and guidance of shareholders based on a Rastafari-Evangelical folk 
                                                        
140 Interview with Mohammed (alias, Moshie), Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 06/11/2013.  
141 Interview with Mohammed (alias, Moshie), Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 06/11/2013. 
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cosmology, against an urban youth culture premised on multivalent expectations and 
material gains.  
 
The stakes of the economic field therefore needed to be reshaped by aspiring 
journeymen in the image of contemporary youth culture, if they were to succeed. This 
tacit complicity, as Bourdieu suggests, is necessary, because the desires of youth 
outstripped the available means to achieve them. Such aspirations represented a threat 
to their collective sense of belonging inside the game, as a singular organised striving for 
(see Martin 2011: 248-254). Youths’ aspirations needed to be “sensitised” to those 
congruent with apprenticeship.  
 
One apprentice’s earlier invocation of the system to contrast the illegitimate success of 
the RFM with the genuine success of Black Leo provides further evidence of how these 
desires were being moderated. The “contradiction here” as one former journeyman 
suggested:  
 
“Is that they will tell you that they are Rastafarians, [that] they believe in equal rights, 
justice for all, that’s what they’re preaching that the government shouldn’t steal money. 
They will listen to those Jamaican lyrics. That’s what they preach; they go by the 
Jamaican’s. Those are the kinds of messages they’ll say. But their life does not actually 
depict the message they talk.”142 
 
Youth is a socially constructed generational category, but one open to being reshaped by 
those trying to forge a better life and ‘escape’ conditions of hardship and inequality 
(Christiansen et al 2006). Yet this category was also used as a political tool for those in 
more dominant positions to control certain expectations and social distinctions, and 
thereby ensure those beneath them acquiesced to their interests. The “fearness” of the 
Five Star General striving against the system reduced the social distance despite 
apprentices being exploited and not being granted certainty in future gains. Moshie’s 
lesson to his “youth men” was found in its suffix “man”. To play the game required 
validation by those already committed to righteous labour, and who therefore had the 
authority to assume the paradoxical status of youth-yet-man, rather than a mere bobo. 
By being apprenticed, then, youth could evade the charge of being an unproductive idler 
and the dependency, emasculation and paternalism they claimed to experience under 
alternative labour arrangements.  
                                                        
142 Interview with Hindowa, former Cannabis Cultivator, Freetown, 09/12/2013. 
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5.6. Conclusion: The illusio of righteous labour 
 
During a visit to an established cultivator’s farm in Loko Fakay, one of his bobos 
nicknamed “Ayo Pack”, after Tu Pac Skakur, had a habit of telling me how he would get 
into fights at school. Ayo Pack took pride in the “tɛn” [a street colloquialism for “chuk”, 
meaning stab wound or cut] that was beginning to heal on his bicep: “it makes people 
think that you are a gangster”. His shareholder would, however, interject, claiming that 
his were not real scars; at least not like those he and his peers bore. Ayo Pack had the 
scars of a “raray boy” [rootless, displaced], of somebody who lacked a commitment to 
hard work and who did not possess the mind or the intention to contribute to the wealth 
of his brothers. While youth imagined they had the reasonable opportunity to run things 
here as the narrative of Capone and Oloney in the movie Third World Cop suggested, a 
secondary habitus adjudicated their opportunities for accessing economic and social 
capital. These readjusted dispositions ensured the more polymorphous, consumption-
oriented expectations of youth were “pulled down” and rendered congruent with the 
objective chances they had of progressing within hierarchically-organised labour 
relations. The symbolism of cannabis wrapped in Psalm 23 was indicative of the 
aesthetic appeal that the chance to be recognised as a youth man offered, for:  
 
“The Lord is my shepherd; I shall not want […] He restoreth my soul: he leadeth me in 
the paths of righteousness for his name’s sake.” 
 
The compound status of “youth man” suggests that habitus does not entail mindless 
repetition, as Bourdieu (2000: 161) also argues. Instead, this intermediary socio-
generational category accommodates individual idiosyncrasies and the manifold 
expectations that young men undertaking cannabis farming sought to achieve. This was 
illustrated by apprentice’s and journeymen’s desire to “expose” [to reach for, claim] 
themselves to a modernity-in-waiting, a fantasy of what was yet-to-come. And yet Ayo 
Pack’s attempts to assert his masculine authority through the youth culture of a younger 
generation were routinely denied. This mechanism of control through accommodation 
was analogous to the social figure of the Five Star General, who worked to discourage 
the broader horizons of those who had not sufficiently undertaken their apprenticeship 
and could therefore not yet be recognised as being “inside the game”. The well-timed 
trivialisations and dismissive remarks of the shareholders therefore functioned as ‘calls 
to order’ that were directed at their new apprentices and ensured the ‘social 
manipulation of [their] aspirations’ (Bourdieu 2000: 217-8). Shareholders turned the 
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tables on what it took to reach adulthood by introducing the status of youth man, a 
paradoxical compound whose suffix qualified the means necessary – apprenticeship – to 
command masculine authority. These young men inhabited a:  
 
‘Signposted universe, full of injunctions, and prohibitions, signs of appropriation and 
exclusion, obligatory routes or impassable barriers, and, in a word, profoundly 
differentiated, especially according to which [the field] offers stable chances, capable of 
fulfilling and sustaining stable expectations.’ (ibid: 225) 
 
Rarely do we observe fields of activity in which subjective expectations indicating where 
an agent would like to be are congruent with their objective chances of fulfilling that 
expectation in the here-and-now (Shackle 1990: 48-9). Incongruences between 
expectations and chances result in what Bourdieu refers to as hysteresis (Chapter Two, 
2.7.3). As the transitory status of youth man suggests, hysteresis represents a time lag in 
which positions and dispositions are not yet congruent, but rather, indicative of a field 
yet-to-come. When dispositions were at odds with the more circumscribed positons of 
the economic field, apprenticeship stepped in as a ‘collective control’ and reaffirmed the 
link between habitus and field (Bourdieu 2005: 87). For instance, journeymen seeking 
to become shareholders were shown to moderate the expectations of their prospective 
apprentices by inventing new social figures that were congruent with their youth 
culture. This was necessary to begin “sensitising” youth to a more ascetic moral code 
forged in the confluence of Neo-Evangelism and Rastafari that valued the productivity 
and righteousness of their “strain”. 
 
The term righteous proceeds from an Old English etymology, ‘right wise’ (way & 
manner) and is synonymous, as D’Angelo (2015a: 10) argues in relation to the ethics of 
Sierra Leone’s alluvial miners, with ‘rectitude’: the state or quality of having a constant 
direction. To have direction meant to have faith (and faith implies patience), to invest in 
a particular kind of practical activity. For one self-proclaimed Five Star General, to be 
righteous meant to partake in “civilised business […] but you must have the mind to do 
it”. Shareholders reasoned that the problem with young men was their lack of 
commitment and preference to pursue more polymorphous and unrealistic ambitions:  
 
“All men have a different mind. All men are of a different mind. That is the problem.”143 
 
                                                        
143 Interview with Yusif Bangura, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 16/10/2013. 
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Apprentices reasoned it was therefore necessary to: 
 
“Come up by working hard, by having a good plan. You have to collect all the ideas [and] 
focus on what you want to do […] The more effort you put into your work the more 
appreciation you get back.”144 
 
Righteousness implied judgement. It was the sense of requiredness and validation 
experienced by apprentice cultivators that impelled investments of ‘time, money and 
work in a given field, it is what [made] agents get together, compete and struggle with 
each other’ (Bourdieu 1990: 88). The apprentice habitus was well-suited to 
dissimulating what would otherwise be more readily recognisable as the “slave work” of 
blunt, economic self-interest (see Guillory 1997: 384; Bourdieu 2005: 86-7). As 
Bourdieu (2005: 80) argues, while the ‘strategies’ of dominant players ‘may be pure 
bluff’ it is the case that ‘their symbolic capital renders [them] credible and hence 
effective’.  
 
By following the concept of illusio I argued that there was an extra-economic profit to be 
gained (the social worth of being recognised as a youth man) and the avoidance of some 
threat to social being (emasculation as a mere bobo) that:  
 
‘Binds them to [labour] through the freedoms […] that are left to them, and under the 
effect born of the competition of differences […] that are constitutive of the occupational 
space functioning as a field […] Thus, what is apparently most ‘subjective’ and ‘personal’ 
is an integral part of the reality that analysis has to account for in each case.’ (Bourdieu 
2000: 203-4) 
 
A stoic commitment to work hard under the guidance of shareholders was, therefore, 
necessary to avoid the “shit” that resulted from their inability to demonstrate the 
productivity of their labour in providing for the community and their elders. Yet the 
double truth, or the bluff bluff, was that while apprenticeship provided social worth, 
respect and the avoidance of stigma, those in dominant positions recognised that the 
expectations youth men had to claim social adulthood by securing land ownership and 
financial self-sufficiency needed to be deferred, if not achieved at all. It was precisely the 
misrecognition of this uncertain forthcoming which secured a ‘subjective experience 
                                                        
144 Interview with Abdullai, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 05/11/2013.  
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that induce[d] the hard work that was the foundation of their labour’ (Burwaoy 2012: 
188).  
 
Unlike the concept of interest in more formalist economic theory that confines 
subjectivity to the immediacy of a ‘field of expectation’ (Schackle 1990), the illusio of 
righteous labour was a captivating forth-coming. It marked out the reasonable prospect 
of owning land, building a house, and providing for children and elders; an essential 
characteristic in the process of becoming adult. These expectations, if not explicitly 
articulated and clung to, were nevertheless ‘already present in the immediate present 
and not constituted as future’, for it is the work of habitus that it ‘combines in a single 
aim’ – finding your own lane – ‘a past and a forth-coming, neither of which is posited as 
such’ (Bourdieu 2000: 210). Despite the absence of contracting arrangements and 
potential for exploitation suggesting a more unpredictable future, the apprentice 
habitus ensured a degree of congruence between subjective expectations and objective 
chances. Apprenticeship “opened a lane” to self-sufficiency in the mind of the 
apprentice, but this was indicative of a habitus that had emerged precisely to reduce the 
uncertainty of deferred gains, possible termination, and potential exploitation in 
receiving low or wages, or remaining subject to the low margins of the domestic 
exchange market. In short, apprenticeship ensured youth men were able to ‘work for the 
uncertain’ (ibid: 216).  
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Chapter Six: Apprenticeship 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter argued that apprenticeships were undertaken in the expectation 
of being respected as a “youth man”. Since being utilised by the Evangelical Parish 
System in the late 1700s, the basic institutional structure of apprenticeship remained 
intact and organised labour relations in cannabis farming. These apprenticeships 
provided young men with social worth as skilled agriculturalists and presented the 
reasonable opportunity for self-enterprise necessary to reach social adulthood.  
 
This chapter now turns to examine how apprenticeship facilitated collective learning by 
doing. This resulted in apprentices acquiring and reproducing practices that guided 
their adjudication of “links” with exchange partners, of how to value cannabis, and the 
forms of interaction that were permissible while working under their shareholders. 
Cannabis farmers reasoned that apprenticeship endowed them with ‘knowledge, skills 
[and] competence’, and a practical sense of how others operated and how they too 
should operate (Guillory 1997: 381-2; see also Bourdieu 1998a: 25; Wacquant 2014a, 
2014b: 126). By undertaking apprenticeships it was possible to acquire “skills” and 
“ideas” that qualified their status as youth men, rather than underproductive idlers (cf. 
Wacquant 2004: 60; Bourdieu 2006: 176-7). Apprenticeship marked inclusion within a 
socially respected and valued group. By consequence, apprentice cultivators 
emphasised that they needed to learn cultivation in order to acquire the skills necessary 
to succeed when “going inside the game”.  
 
The chapter examines how farmers and dealers enacted and interpreted two specific 
emic practices – “sababu” and “grade” – that were perceived as being required and were 
validated by others. The chapter argues that sababu represented an imperative in a 
context of scarcity for establishing relationships with a person in a position of influence 
who provided access to opportunities otherwise foreclosed. Journeymen, for instance, 
reasoned that these relationships were compulsory for gaining access to economic 
capital. I argue, however, that this practice also minimised a sense of dependency – and 
even betrayal – by offering them the reasonable expectation of reciprocation and 
progress, even if this was unlikely to be borne out in practice. 
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Furthermore, I argue that when negotiating the grade [quality] of cannabis, apprentices 
and journeymen conformed with rigid categories of valuation closely related to their 
disadvantaged positions. This is contrary to price responsiveness that treats exchange 
as equal and resting on the negotiation of a ‘fair’ price. By drawing on the economic 
anthropology literature (Graeber 2001; Guyer 2004, 2012; Berry 2007), I treat value as 
a social construction and as a process of valuation adjudicated from unequal positions. 
This approach compliments Bourdieu’s concepts of objectified and embodied cultural 
capital in terms of how objects (cannabis herb) and relationships (with exchange 
partners) are perceived and valued in an economic field. Dominant players adjudicated 
sababu; it was not as opportunistic or spontaneous as they claimed. It therefore 
represented a useful moral rhetoric that had functional importance in terms of 
regulating access to high-value buyers and land. The chapter concludes that, by virtue of 
securing youths’ misrecognition, these practices governed their ability to accumulate 
economic capital and prevented journeymen gaining a competitive advantage over 
shareholders. 
 
6.2. Learning the game 
 
I walked with Musa along the winding copper-orange tracks to his cannabis farm in 
Loko Fakay, an area of bush he cleared and named after an old Krio village. We passed a 
checkpoint manned by three RSLAF soldiers protecting land owned by the military 
training school from being encroached by rapid urbanisation. “They are here to stop 
trouble and confusion […] they are inside the game, don’t worry about that”, he claimed. 
Musa tells me he controls two young men nicknamed Ayo Pack and Lamine (alias, 
Lamtɛk) who are apprenticed in order to “sabi the game”. “Be honest to yourself” was 
carved into a rock marking the boundary with another farming plot. The work is 
physical. Musa helps the young men lift large yellow jerry cans of water from a nearby 
river and dispenses them daily across 200 dug out holes. He itemises the cultivation 
process in meticulous detail, from the timing between planting “nɔsri” [nursery garden]; 
to the quantities of fertiliser, chicken dung, and fish kanda [peel/skin] required for 
cultivating a “fayn” [high quality] crop; to the planning of seasonal crop rotations. Ayo 
Pack and Lamtɛk remained on the farm for at least six months until the December 
harvest, during which they slept in small, make-shift wooden huts to keep watch over 
the farm at night. When Musa pointed to his eye and asked if I could “see the work now”, 
he was referring both to his perceived unique skills, while also searching for an 
indication that I appreciated the strain and patience his labour required. Their labouring 
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practices were indicative of an ascetic commitment; one resulting in the acquisition of 
superior skills that qualified their status as youth men.  
 
Ayo Pack and Lamtɛk claimed they were fortunate to have been “drawn” into cannabis 
cultivation. The opportunity to be apprenticed marked inclusion in a social group that 
valued each other’s expertise and was set apart from unproductive and lazy youth 
synonymous with the common idiom that “an idle mind is the devil’s workshop”. For 
those who congregated inside the panbɔdis of Hastings and Waterloo, the process of 
being apprenticed was selective. Shareholders claimed they would sit with youth at 
bases such as Las Palmas and God Raw to talk with them and see if, as one cultivator 
suggested, they had the “sense” or “the mind to do it”. One journeyman qualified what it 
meant to be a youth man by asserting that “we only share our work with those who sabi 
it”.145 The Krio term “sabi” shares a linguistic affinity with the English term ‘savvy’ 
denoting the shrewdness and practical knowledge of domesticated slaves turned 
graduated apprentices during the early 1800s. The term was likely transferred by 
Portugese traders, likely originating from the Portugese word ‘saber’ meaning ‘to know’. 
It also shares the same Latin root, “sapere”, meaning to be wise or knowing (Ndemanu 
2015: 25). In Krio street vernacular, this referenced noun and verb interchangeably, as 
something to be learned and as a knowledge that was possessed (i.e. being recognised as 
savvy). It therefore pointed to a concept, fact or value; the content of which had already 
been agreed upon and that agriculturalists felt obligated to pass on. Youth also 
commented, for instance, that you must “Gɛt di idea” [Have the idea] otherwise you 
experience “idea loss”. A former apprentice-turned-journeyman explained that: 
 
“When you labour for them [i.e. your shareholder] you get a small change in your head 
[…] when he teaches you, you are happy, so you won’t go and make a palava [a public 
disagreement], you avoid it.”146 
 
One shareholder who was granted land by a former boss in an area colloquially referred 
to as You Must Grumble, explained that he now apprenticed three young men: 
 
“I am the leader. I am the force for work. When I work they see the example, and I say 
that by seeing this example now it is your turn to take the work. So when they go and 
work I am watching them. Any one mistake, I will correct it and tell them it is not the 
                                                        
145 Interview with B.I.G., Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 16/09/2013. 
146 Interview with Yusif Bangura, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 17/10/2013. 
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way to work – I direct it. It is to let them understand […] Of the workmen I had before 
[last season] they all understand the game now.”147 
 
Apprenticeship was not limited to acquiring technical skills: how to groom, when to 
water, what inputs to use and how to assess the quality of the diamba [cannabis herb]. 
Life histories demonstrated that by gaining an “idea” or “mission” to earn an income it 
was possible to reclaim masculine authority in a pre- and post-war context of chronic 
unemployment and limited opportunities for production.  
 
As argued, the ethics of cannabis cultivation are rooted in the confluence of Neo-
Evangelism and Rastafari since the 1980s. When I questioned a shareholder about this 
period he claimed that “the skill over that was passed down to us from those Jamaican 
guys, in a book”. As new clusters of production, such as Sugar Loaf, Wanpala and Loko 
Fakay began to emerge in Hastings and Waterloo, unemployed youth were drawn into 
apprenticeships and the “skills training” thought necessary to ensure a degree of 
stability following the upheaval of civil conflict. Having been an IDP and acquired first-
rights to land-ownership in 2001, shareholder claimed that since 2000 he had worked 
for three years under his “bra” known as “Sorie Root”:  
 
“I have been inside this thing for over ten years now, since 2000, just after the war. I 
was working for my bra [boss]. I was working for somebody. Through that way I 
trained, that bra there he taught me.” 
 
So he taught you how to grow it? 
“Yes, he gave me the book. Those Jamaicans, they wrote the book in Jamaica and 
brought it here. You know the sɛnsi [i.e. sensimilla] book that told us how to plant. It is 
that book we were reading, it told us how to do the work, how to do the practical. When 
our bra came they gave us the book, and taught us how to do the practical, because at 
that time we were not fortunate enough to go to school. So I read it to understand […] If 
they come back they can do more teachings, make us understand better.” 
 
[…] And how did you know Carrie B? 
“Carrie B came to the country as a musician; they came and played a lot of sets. Our 
elder brothers [Ohsilibu and American] understood and were used to them, so they 
wanted to use him as a friend. So it was with him that they linked. Then Carrie B 
married that man’s sister. So that’s what gave them the idea to grow this thing […] Then 
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Carrie B taught ‘Sorie Root’ [nickname for a Rasta in Waterloo] and so he taught me 
back how to grow it […] It was my bra who taught me because he had the book. So the 
Jamaican’s came with the book and we read it. You see all the specimens and techniques 
in the book. So you understand we had to go and do it according to the practical.” 
 
What do you mean by ‘practical’? 
“When you go and do something following an example. They gave us the book and 
showed us from that how to plant the shoots [nɔs am], how to water. It shows you what 
to do when you reach one week, two weeks, what to feed it. It shows you everything. So 
I went and learned from my bra [for three years] and then made for myself my own 
garden.”148 
 
Following the war it was also not possible to re-enter formal education since:  
 
“They [the RUF] burned everything, even my O Level paper [certificate] they blaze[d] 
everything […] So it was through that rehabilitation that made the country redevelop 
back […] After the war we have got the idea inside our brain now.”149 
 
For these nascent cultivators, the value they attributed to their skills while engaging in 
an activity recognised by the community as productive following two decades of 
economic crisis, depressed rural incomes, and growing inequalities in access to land, 
represented an important means of reclaiming masculine authority in a context of 
scarcity. A folk cosmology of the righteous poor underpinning cannabis farming 
(Chapter Five) emphasised the need for providing a lasting contribution to the 
community. This is what shareholders referred to as a “fixed reference point”, such as a 
house, fertile land or church donation, and informed a moral economy that stood in 
contrast to the “vanity” of youth. 
 
For instance, the messages presented in both Seventh-Day Adventist and Neo-
Pentecostal church services suggested salvation through hard work and personal 
accumulation independent from communal and kin obligations. These virtues were 
based on a morally-mediated materialism that scorned vanity and treated debt, violence, 
tobacco and alcohol as akin to bodily sin (Maxwell 1998: 253-4). However, this was a 
folk belief that, given the Rastafari values of older farmers, accommodated the 
production and consumption of cannabis. Church services encompassed notions of 
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“keeping the eye on the prize” and “finishing the race strong”, which had affinities with 
desires to “win the race”. Failings of the past, symbolised in devastating form by Sierra 
Leone civil war, needed to be rectified through their righteous toil. Apprenticeship 
represented a process of re-socialisation that emphasised ‘literacy, moral probity and 
industriousness, [which] reintegrat[ed] the volatile category of urban youth into 
productive forms of social engagement’ (Meagher 2009c: 402). As Comaroff (2012: 47) 
agrees, participation in activities recognised as social productive is indicative of a 
‘widespread quest for ontological security’. This folk cosmology meant that, far from an 
illegal activity reducible to private self-interest, cannabis farming conformed to a 
productive and redistributive work ethic. Cannabis cultivation therefore carved a place 
within a licit category that cultivators referred to as “our illegal sweat”. This distinction 
underscored the attractiveness of apprenticeships that confirmed farmers’ status as 
youth men: 
 
So what does it mean to be a youth man? 
“When you have begun to live for yourself, when you have begun to stand as a man for 
yourself. When you are a strong man for yourself. When you are able to fight for 
yourself and get your own. Then you are independent, you are an independent man 
now. If you don’t then you are a youth.” 
 
And how do you see yourself? 
“Well now, I am a youth man, because I have small people with me. I am able to control 
three men now, yes. You see? So that makes me a youth man now.” 
 
To be a youth man was to possess a respected and valued skill. It obligated that these 
skills be passed on to other unemployed youth. As another shareholder claimed: 
 
“I tell them that we have suffered, we have toted, but now we have a skill.”150 
 
Apprenticeship was therefore synonymous with social worth and utility at a time when 
the distinctions between productive and unproductive work, as a principle discourse 
moderating what counted as licit and illicit work, came under increasing scrutiny from 
both the local community and agents of the state. Youth were required to learn 
agricultural skills in order that their status as youth men was validated by others, but 
this imperative also mediated the relationship between shareholders and their 
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respective apprentices for, as Bourdieu (2000: 172) notes, ‘acts of submission, [and 
therefore] of obedience’ are also ‘acts of knowledge and recognition’. 
 
After Lamtɛk finished his first season, Musa discussed with neighbouring cultivator 
Sorie whether he had the understanding necessary to sell a scale of diamba on their 
behalf. Citing his attention to “grooming” [removing seeds], lack of “grumbling” 
[complaining], obedience, and above all, patience, Musa asserted “that bobo [small, 
dependent boy] is maturing now, he talks mature, I think he gets the game”. 
 
6.3. Finding your own lane? 
 
It was common for apprentices and journeymen to reason that they were trying to “find 
their own lane in life”. A lane or sometimes simply “a road to pass” denoted potential 
access to higher value exchange partners but also signified an imagined path of action 
that was relatively congruent with expectations for gaining economic autonomy.151 One 
journeyman spread his arms and explained how finding your own lane was analogous to 
“opening the game”.152 Another journeyman explained how he had spent one season 
learning how to cultivate under a boss nicknamed “Mr Mɛd” before he decided to find 
his own lane: 
 
“Why did I leave him? I have understood for myself now. So now I can utilise the idea. 
Up until now I am utilising it […] The first farm he was sponsoring us on was a big farm, 
nearly more than one thousand holes. I didn’t work for myself, there were plenty of 
others. We were working with them small boys. Plenty of them were working. After a 
season has finished you make a lot of money […] We see it. We say: ‘Eh bobo this is from 
diamba. We have the idea now.’ So from there now we decided to avoid him [our 
shareholder]. Yes. We all went to find our own lane. We are trying for ourselves now.”153 
 
What does it mean to find a new lane? 
“To find your own passion. To go and start a new life on your own. When you go and 
start a new life on your own. Without nobody again. I am not under Mr Y, I am not under 
Mr B. Yes. I am doing it on my own now. On my own, single. Everything on my own.” 
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However, those apprenticed by more dominant shareholders such as Ɔsilibu and 
American complained that despite the expectation of economic and social autonomy, 
they had been held back. As a former apprentice turned journeyman who had stopped 
working under Ɔsilibu claimed: 
 
“[Through] all that time, all the bobo there didn’t understand the game […] we didn’t 
understand the game, where to buy and sell it. So we made losses.”154 
 
The dismayed cultivator, nicknamed Musa, bemoaned how “we saw ourselves as 
brothers”. After a year working for Ɔsilibu, Musa was promoted to what he described as 
“head bobo” and was given responsibility to manage five apprentices: deciding when to 
transfer new shoots and when to water and rotate crop cycles. It was his duty to 
monitor them and make sure they did not steal. Musa claimed, however, that his 
shareholder “began to treat me in a way that wouldn’t let me succeed; [he] wouldn’t let 
me work for myself”.  
 
Although the acquisition of technical skills indicated new cultivators were, objectively-
speaking, competent enough to cultivate on their own after one or two seasons, whether 
they really understood how to play the game was not for them to judge. Instead, what 
was validated as being competent corresponded to a form of classification within a 
hierarchy. Whether an apprentice cultivator could become a journeyman; by being 
granted a small plot to rent, or an offering in-kind of fertiliser or a meeting with a higher 
value exchange partner, depended on how the shareholders manipulated the rules in 
their own favour. For instance, the dominant shareholders were shown to terminate 
apprenticeships early in order to extract cheap labour. Journeymen were granted 
autonomy in deciding how to grow and sell their cannabis, but continued to rent land on 
their shareholder’s farm and remained confined to a low-margin domestic market in lieu 
of promised contacts with cross-border buyers. 
 
Musa was an exception because he recognised this exploitation but also that the 
shareholders presided over a one-sided adjudication of his labouring practices. He 
therefore reasoned that being apprenticed foreclosed his pursuit of self-enterprise. 
Running the risk of cultivating a small plot for himself away from the prying eyes of 
Ɔsilibu and his associates, Musa began to accumulate the economic capital necessary to 
lease land from other elders and purchase the necessary inputs. He came to reason that 
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the authority exercised by the shareholders was in part economic, but was also based on 
a sleight of hand that he too could practice. This was indicated by his cynicism when 
helping me to find another “chairman” to interview:  
 
“Chairman? Which one? There are so many chairmen these days! [Laughs]” 
 
Musa produced some of the largest yields and obtained one of the highest average 
returns per kilogram, despite being one of the youngest cultivators to own their own 
farm. Musa claimed he was now his own youth man, free from the dependencies of his 
shareholder, and would continue to cultivate cannabis “until God makes me succeed and 
[I] go next level”.  
 
Musa reasoned that by “standing on his own”: 
 
“I am a youth man […] according to this project I am doing. I am a popular man, I know 
how to talk to people […] So if I do that raray [rootless] boy way there, no! You won’t 
solve any problems. I have to put my heart down, I find money […] I am getting what 
God has marked for me […] they say you have matured, [that] you have begun to take on 
responsibility.”155 
 
Yet the social category of youth man also accommodated those who remained 
dependent on their shareholders and had not accumulated the expected economic 
capital through their perceived self-enterprise as journeymen. Despite another 
journeyman still renting land from and providing cannabis for his shareholder to sell, he 
claimed that: 
 
“The community all so admire us. Yes, because they know we understand how to make 
money inside the business. They say we are able; we are so able. God has given us the 
strength.”156 
 
The desire to continue working for the shareholders was motivated for good 
psychological reasons (cf. Burawoy 2012: 192-3). Apprentices and journeyman alike 
reasoned that working for them garnered respect and social value from the wider 
community, congruent with the folk cosmology underpinning cannabis farming. Yet, 
unlike Musa they simultaneously misrecognised that the worth and value attributed to 
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this system of apprenticing meant their chances to succeed, economically-speaking, 
were foreclosed. The elective affinity found between Rastafari and Neo-Evangelism in 
the folk beliefs of cannabis farmers acted as a ‘kind of white heat that reset time and re-
establishe[d] truth’ (Comaroff 2012: 57). 
 
For those who remained under shareholders, the aspiration to find their own lane in life 
was congruent with how they perceived their respective shareholders, as those who – 
like them – had stoically struggled too. The relations between shareholders and their 
dependents was therefore a symbolic struggle over what character, comportment, 
struggle and toil were legitimate. The misrecognition of those at the bottom of the 
hierarchy resulted from their reasoning that success required emulation, which could be 
achieved by conforming to the dictates of their shareholders. In doing so, youth clung to 
a stoic virtue of demonstrating their commitment to working hard and expending time 
and energy in the here-and-now, albeit in the reasonable expectation that they would 
(eventually) succeed over a longer time horizon and fulfil their aspirations to own land, 
build a house, and be respected as a productive and righteous somebody that could 
“stand on their own”. One cultivator explained this complex process of acculturation 
through a mixture of Krio colloquialisms and Evangelist and old English metaphors:  
 
What do you mean when you say you ‘must grow like the tree’? 
“This is how we should do things. When you want to, erm, do a mission, you should 
always accomplish it. They say that when the tree grows, nobody can cut it off. So if you 
don’t accomplish the mission, then the tree has been cut down, and nobody can rescue 
you. This is the problem. So whenever you are on a mission, you should try to 
accomplish it. If you accomplish that mission then, finally, you are a winner […] If you 
don’t accomplish the mission you are a loser, you feel it deep down in your heart.” 
 
So who cuts the tree? 
“Balogun, it is just a proverb. Just a story. You have seen? The Book of Proverbs.” 
 
So what does this proverb mean? 
“It means you should stand tall, not stay short […] That is, you should cut your coat 
according to your size. You should live according to your level.”157 
 
This present toil confirmed their being youth men. It was signposted by their patrons 
who respected the “strain” of their physical labour and, as suggested by the tree in 
                                                        
157 Interview with Turkish, Cannabis Cutlivator, Hastings, 17/09/2013. 
 
 
198 
 
Turkish’s metaphorical interpretation, the use of their able-bodies as contributing to the 
community. Yet, youth man was also an accommodation, for it suspended a process of 
becoming adult, which was tied to those economic and social resources the shareholders 
needed to protect. This positioning within broader socio-generational categories played 
out in accordance with a folk cosmology that dictated the success of the righteous poor 
needed to be earned. Given judgement on their status was ultimately served by the 
shareholder, apprentices and journeyman were subject to an ‘experience of time’ that 
had ‘engendered in the relationship between habitus and [the] social world’ the 
‘practical expectations which [were] constitutive of an illusio as investment in a social 
game [… and] the probabilities of fulfilment that they offer to these expectations’ 
(Bourdieu 2000: 208). 
 
Bourdieu was aware of the role imagination played in restructuring the temporalities 
experienced by young, unemployed Algerians during the 1960s and youth passing time 
on French housing estates during the 1990s. Those youth found themselves trapped in a 
choice ‘between flight into the imaginary and fatalistic surrender’ (ibid: 221-3). The 
remedy for an uncertain future, Bourdieu claims, is found precisely in a higher authority 
that realigns expectations, such that: 
 
‘The whole set of goals posited in advance, independently of any conscious project, in 
the forms of demand and commitments […] and the whole forth-coming already given 
in the immediate present [means] this objective universe of incitements and indications 
[…] orientate[s] and stimulate[s] action.’ (ibid: 222) 
 
Cannabis farmers conformed to their intermediate social status because it offered refuge 
from the ontological insecurity of otherwise being ‘excluded from the game, 
dispossessed of the vital illusion [illusio] of having a function or a mission’ (ibid). By 
committing to a folk cosmology of righteous labour forged in response to economic 
deprivation and civil war, these youth from the objective position of the researcher-as-
observer were somewhat: 
 
‘Detached from reality and sometimes a little crazy, as if, when nothing was possible, 
everything became possible, as if all discourses about the future – prophecies, 
divinations, millenarian announcements – had no other purpose than to fill what is no 
doubt one of the most painful wants: the lack of a future.’ (ibid: 226) 
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The ability of habitus to motivate and coordinate social practice cannot be reduced to 
mindless repetition. Whereas activities geared towards consumption, such as those 
bemoaned of Freetown’s Big Men, appeared to extend the time horizon of aspirants, 
productive activity in the cannabis economy restructured temporalities and tied them to 
an ascetic commitment in the present. Youths’ commitment to apprenticeship was 
therefore rooted in common understandings of what it meant to be a youth man. 
Apprenticeship was motivated by wanting to attain a particular quality of self, but one 
that did not undermine the structural advantages of more dominant agents. As Jeffrey 
(2012: 250) remarks in a review of youths’ agency in recent anthropological studies, 
youth can appear resourceful while at the same time reproducing structures of 
domination. This is not to say that youth are ‘brainwashed’ or blind conformists to a 
‘disciplinary regime’ that dictates what they should do, but rather, domination is 
embedded in ‘local notions of shrewdness and enterprise’.  
 
These local notions suggested that if “you don’t have any job where you are learning 
something then you will turn into a criminal”.158 To not be recognised as a youth man, in 
turn, was to risk being dismissed by peers as an unproductive idler. Youth were 
therefore subject to the social pressures of what two new apprentices in Loko Fakay 
referred to as “linger loss”. The longer you sat down in the panbɔdi the less chance you 
had of acquiring the skills necessary to “go in search of the paper [money]”.  
 
The misrecognition motivating on-going practices can be explained as: 
 
‘The capacity to impose and inculcate means of understanding and structuring the 
world, or symbolic systems, that contribute to the reproduction of the social order by 
representing social and political power in disguised forms that endow them with 
legitimacy and/or taken-for-grantedness – the best warrant for social longevity any 
social order might hope for’. (Wacquant 1987: 66) 
 
The guidance of their shareholders was rendered legitimate, for youth and their peers 
treated cannabis cultivation as a captivating, legitimate and organised ‘striving for’ 
(Martin 2011: 248-54). And yet by virtue of this misrecognition, apprenticeship 
reproduced the structural advantages that shareholders had first acquired when 
cultivating in the mid-1980s and late-1990s.  
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The concept of structural advantage therefore has two inter-related dimensions. First, 
apprenticeship enabled dominant players to maintain exclusive access to land and 
extract cheap labour. Second, structural advantage was inter-subjective, for youth 
adhered to particular practices and social categories that resulted in deference to 
authority and reshaped conventions of time relative to expected material gains in favour 
of the shareholders. Hence, structural advantages were secured by more covert power 
relations that were not solely reducible to organised violence or social sanction. I 
therefore follow Bourdieu (2000: 184) and claim that youth men were subject to a 
degree of ‘learned ignorance’ in their commitment to on-going practices that qualified 
their social status in hard work, honesty and sacrifice. 
 
The chapter now turns to examine journeymen in the domestic exchange market and 
considers how structural advantages were secured through the unequal accumulation of 
social and cultural capital. I suggest that the ability to accumulate economic and social 
depended on a ‘conversion rate’ that was not entirely explicit to youth, but was tied to 
the unequal positions they assumed within the economic field (Bourdieu 1984). 
 
6.4. Sababu: cooperation in the exchange market 
 
Early into field work a taxi driver pointed to a newly constructed three-story building 
off from Siaka Stevens street and declared “I gɛt sababu” [He had sababu]. Sababu was 
the imperative in a context of scarcity for establishing relationships, from the fleeting to 
the more durable, with a stranger in a position of influence who claimed to be capable of 
providing the recipient with obligation-free opportunities, be it for credit, exchange, 
access to land, wage labour or NGO funding: “sababu is a high up person who will talk 
for you in a higher place”.159 For unemployed youth, these influential persons were 
typically found unexpectedly; usually from God, and were to be grasped at any 
opportunity. 
 
Enria (2015: 643-4) argues, for instance, that the emphasis youth placed on needing to 
obtain sababu results from their desire to be included in redistributive relations. 
However, I argue here that these relationships were neither strictly reciprocal nor 
synonymous with the inclusion of youth within a moral economy comprising ‘shared’ 
norms and ‘mutual’ interests. Instead, the emic concept indicated dissimulated 
economic dependency based on the veneer of a moral rhetoric that claimed sababu was 
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necessary to “play the game against the system” of nepotism in formal waged labour and 
politics. Moreover, these relations had to be earned and used or else it diminished. It 
depended on “the way you hold it, if you hold it fine you won’t lose it”.160 Those in 
dominant positions adjudicated prospective relations according to character and 
reputation. One shareholder who had owned a cannabis farm for more than a decade 
explained that: 
 
“With sababu you can get up and stand strong [otherwise] you will face a lot of 
harassment [...] Sababu shows you a road to pass, without sababu nobody is looking at 
you clearly [i.e. they are judging you].”161 
 
An apprentice also reasoned that sababu was related to character and reputation: 
 
“A good attitude can help you get sababu [...] If you can get a good friend then they can 
help you at any moment, but you need a good attitude, because you know that you are 
not stealing, and that you are working hard to find your survival [...] So you know that 
you are someone who will mile [share with everyone from the same pot], you don't 
steal, you are working hard to have your own.”162 
 
Following Bourdieu’s (1986) concept of social capital, to earn sababu required an 
intense degree of sociability until youth possessed a ‘more or less durable network of 
more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition’. 
New social relations were obtained “through [recognition of] your own character, 
through the way you are”.163 This reasoning began from a position of equality, which 
suggested that “we are all mortal men here”. The mortal man represented commonality 
and was stripped of any marks of differentiation. The mortal man stood as a social figure 
for co-presence, familiarity and the expectation of reciprocity during unfamiliar social 
encounters that would otherwise have faced the problem of ‘strangeness’ (Torche and 
Valenzuela 2011). 
 
It was indicative of a shared morality by virtue of which youth perceived they were not 
judged or discriminated against. This was despite decisions to afford new relationships 
being couched in stereotypical personal judgments that regulated access to high-value 
buyers. Despite this, youth reasoned that successful networking was based on the 
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recognition that: “We have the common understanding; it is someone you can trust”.164 
The operation of sababu was, therefore, precisely to minimise youths’ potential feelings 
of betrayal and sense of dependency by offering them a hopeful future, even if this was 
unlikely to be achieved. The equality of the game suggested by the trustworthiness of 
those who appealed to being mortal men was merely a façade. Dominant players 
dictated the terms of sababu; it was not as opportunistic or spontaneous as claimed. 
 
This arrangement had functional significance in terms of regulating recurrent exchange 
in favour of shareholders, whereas their journeymen were confined to the low-margin 
“open shop” of Freetown’s ghettos. By contrast, the shareholders in You Must Grumble 
had established relationships with cross-border buyers in Guinea. For those outside of 
these networks who sold primarily to the domestic market, some price variation 
resulted from whether transactions were facilitated through a pre-established 
relationship or sold on the open market. These dynamics can be accounted for by 
comparing transaction prices at point of sale with the advertised price cultivators 
provided when they circulated a “sample” of their most recent harvest in the panbɔdis of 
Hastings, Waterloo and Freetown. The advertised price was generally immutable – 
except for sellers from You Must Grumble – when journeymen searched for buyers in 
the open market. Mean prices were structured according to an ordinal scale based on 
fixed weights of cannabis herb. During the dry season, the mean value of a scale (roughly 
1 kg) was Le150,000 and Le30,000 for one quant (roughly ¼ kg), unlike the more 
common relationship of decreasing price with increasing volume. While prices 
seasonally fluctuated about this mid-point, more established sellers maintained these 
categories more rigidly. Newer sellers, by contrast, resorted to the more flexible sales 
strategy of “auctioning” cannabis herb for a lower price.  
 
Consequently, there existed a lower average for and greater variation between 
transaction prices among journeymen, even if the advertised price was more ambitious. 
Their ability to establish recurrent exchange relationships depended on character and 
social standing. Exchange decisions were not reducible to self-interest encapsulated in 
shared social norms because personal judgments to trust were not couched in the same 
risk and payoff structures. Instead they were generative of the shareholders’ historic 
accumulation of symbolic capital and varied according to the one-sided dispositions and 
ways of accumulating, converting and valuing social capital that journeymen acquired 
through their apprenticeship and brought into social encounters. The choice of sales 
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practice depended on a journeyman’s position and how, as a potential buyer’s sababu, 
they were perceived and valued. It was, for example, common that youth would over-
trust and attempt to sell by installments, only for their exchange partner to abandon the 
deal having stolen the payments. It is therefore necessary to examine the function of 
social capital among strangers in terms of their subjective experience. In this case, 
youths’ dispositions to trust made sense in the relational context of an economic field, 
whereby sababu indexed more to less dominant positions based on ‘the learned capacity 
that develops through life experiences’ (Torche and Valenzuela 2011: 191-2). 
 
The shareholders were explicit in their refutation of sababu as non-reciprocal, self-
interested and tactical: for them relationships were a means to an end. Journeymen, 
however, reasoned according to a moral rhetoric that suggested the right comportment 
and commitment to hard work were necessary for it to be earned, regardless of 
economic positon. Access to new buyers was, therefore, unequal such that the implied 
reciprocity was articulated more as a subjective expectation than it was borne out in 
practice. Sababu was envisioned as an avenue of opportunity in a context of scarcity. 
Claims to it were experienced as an act of generosity on the part of those more 
dominant. For shareholders, however, this represented a moral discourse that was 
useful to secure the compliance of youth and their expectation that good things would 
result if they worked in the right way.  
 
Youth men reasoned that economic capital flowed from social capital in a one-way 
relationship. Judgements regarding whether their sababu was “genuine” or “fake” were 
crucial when journeymen sought to rent a plot of land through extant shareholders 
(primary rights users) and, to a lesser extent, through other original land owners:  
 
“Anybody who wants to work on this ground has to meet the shareholder of that 
particular place. If you do not then you should not work there […] then he will authorise 
you and give you the permit to do the work. To work there quietly […] If you do not, he 
will not agree with you, because it is a law, in the ground of Hastings. That is the law, so 
everybody obeys it and abides by that law. If not then everybody will blame you, they 
will say you should abide by the law […] You should give him a little money, it is not too 
much [and] he will give you the line, [show you] how you should work […] So they [the 
shareholders] will never obstruct you, because you have shown the effort.”165 
 
                                                        
165 Interview with Turkish, Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 17/09/2013.  
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The convertibility of social capital into economic capital depended on how they were 
perceived and valued, which was generative of an underlying distribution of symbolic 
capital. Trust was based on a potential exchange partner’s character. Such judgements 
were the purview of shareholders that acted as gatekeepers. Having obtained funding 
from remittances, a journeyman nicknamed “Adebayor” had not undergone 
apprenticeship. Despite observing his behaviour to the contrary and having maintained 
a high degree of co-presence by farming cannabis close to cultivators in Loko Fakay, he 
was, however, dismissed as an alcoholic and criminal that “moved” with a klik [gang] in 
Waterloo known as the “Reggae Boys”. Adebayor tried to rationalise this stigma by 
explaining that sababu had to be earned: 
 
“Through my own preference […] through the way I live my life. That is how you get 
sababu. If you live your life good and not bad, if you don’t do [anything] bad to other 
people, otherwise you don’t feel free.”166 
 
Youth were therefore wary, as one journeyman put it, of avoiding the “blaze” of rumour 
that would ensue if they did not have the trust and reputability of a shareholder backing 
them. While negotiating whether to sell to a new dealer who had arrived in Waterloo 
from the provinces, a cultivator from Loko Fakay reasoned that “pushing back” by 
paying the dealer installments, it was possible to “let the game open” and observe 
whether they would be “stubborn” and not adhere to timely repayments. Another 
cultivator cautioned, however, that for him the game was closed and he would have to 
“study” and “clear” the dealer first: “She doesn’t understand that the Freetown game is 
very fast, it is not like that upcountry game”. While credit-based deals are an important 
adjudicator when gauging the trust of those who are unfamiliar (von Lampe and 
Johansen 2004), both cultivators eventually abandoned this strategy given the dealer’s 
uncertain character and lack of a credible sababu: “I don’t like using credit; you 
shouldn’t trust somebody with that. Debt, it is trouble, there is no trust”. If the dealer 
“grumbled too much” about this arrangement, both cultivators agreed that “all lanes will 
blaze, your sababu will spoil”. As Berry (2007: 61) similarly argues, transactional 
histories in West Africa have a ‘significant bearing on the terms of exchange [...] would-
be transactors may spend substantial effort and resources in trying to obtain or conceal 
information about them’.  
 
                                                        
166 Interview with Bayo Manseray (alias, Adebayor), Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 19/11/2013.  
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Decisions to trust were therefore not reducible to ‘encapsulated self-interest’ (Hardin 
2001), because personal judgments were not couched in the same risk and pay off 
structures for all agents, but instead corresponded with unequal social positions. These 
positions were often signaled by the nicknames of pushers that, in turn, depended on 
their respect and social standing. One of the most well-connected dealers in Hastings 
was referred to as “High Network” and another as “Busy Signal”. Both examples are 
indicative of how ex ante signaling facilitated the expansion of exchange in a context 
where inter-personal trust through weak ties was more difficult. As one of Loko Fakay’s 
journeymen explained:  
 
“If you don’t have sababu you won’t sell. You will sell it cheap-cheap [very cheaply]. You 
won’t get fine money. But if you have sababu you are able to get fine [a lot of] money […] 
If you have sababu then when you talk to someone you will have no fearness.”167 
 
By claiming to have no “fearness” youth reinterpreted the hierarchical organisation of 
the cannabis economy as a level playing field on the basis of misrecognising that their 
righteous labour would garner them greater influence. When faced with a future that 
was otherwise more uncertain, youths’ heightened social reflexivity ensured they 
reflected on the toughness of their lives such that sababu offered some sense that they 
could regain balance and control over their destiny (Jackson 1996: 19; Vigh 2008: 18-
20). Journeyman’s attempts to forge these more durable relationships did, however, 
depend on the more-or-less exclusive and private judgment of shareholders and their 
middlemen. Although they claimed sababu was obtained “through your own character”, 
their reputation as converged with their unequal positions under apprenticeship that, in 
turn, limited the possibilities that “sababu” would “give you the lane and [that] money 
will come from that lane”.168 For journeymen it was enough to cling to the expectation of 
reciprocity by conforming to the moral rhetoric of righteous labour. This expectation, in 
turn, rendered the more cynical and self-interested views privately held by shareholders 
less explicit. With shareholders the gatekeepers for access to economic and social 
capital, sababu acted as a principle of convertibility that secured their structural 
advantages.  
 
 
 
                                                        
167 Interview with Samuel Joseph, Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 26/09/13. 
168 Interview with Mɔnga, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 24/10/13. 
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6.5. Navigating social distance 
 
The degree to which sababu marked out social distance can be demonstrated by 
contrasting how a shareholder (Musa) and journeyman (Turkish) navigated Eastern 
Freetown’s ghettos to “link” with prospective buyers. Musa regularly met his dealer, 
Dawda, in Eastern Freetown’s Race Course Community and could vouch for me when 
meeting these “high level” dealers. Upon arrival at Race Course, Medal, the elected youth 
representative, explained the various links that connected these senior dealers with 
cultivators in Hastings and Waterloo. Musa remarked that this “was the work of sababu”. 
Dawda also gave a common explanation: “a contact, someone with influence who [can] 
call you to meet others […] somebody who can help you”.169 Yet his was qualified with 
the insistence that this status was reserved for those who were already well known or, 
in my case, those that had been given “the signal” by a middleman. 
 
Contrary to this more judicious negotiation of new exchange relationships, Turkish 
moved around frequently, from Race Course to Firestone, to Lumley Street, following a 
trail of nicknames gleaned second-hand on the off-chance one might grant him higher-
value opportunities to sell. In many accounts of street culture, movement is synonymous 
with the ability to bridge social distance and difference, indicative of a practical mastery 
(Wacquant 1999; Bourgois 2003: 3; Simone 2005: 517; Sandberg 2008; Venkatesh 
2009; Langevang and Gough 2009). Such movement was, however, frequently ridiculed 
by youth in Eastern Freetown who insisted Turkish needed to stay and “bind” [hang out, 
talk] with them. Youth at Race Course claimed Turkish “didn’t know the ground here” 
and his inquiries were consequently ignored or greeted with the disrespect of a middle 
finger. In street vernacular movement was denoted by the greeting “aw di tɔnin?” [how 
is it turning?] when rotating between various informal and illicit work opportunities.170 
Guided by the haptic clue of turning fingers, youth explained this greeting referred, quite 
literally, to their perceived ability to turn into different roles, be it a mechanic, taxi 
driver or street vendor, as well as indicative of a means by which they could “turn” over 
a profit. Journeymen perceived movement was necessary to avoid being left with 
“stagnant” customers unlikely to buy in bulk. As one journeyman explained:  
 
                                                        
169 Interview with Dawda, Cannabis Dealer, Eastern Freetown, 04/12/2013. 
170 For older cultivators, the term “drɛg”, which Hoffman (2007a) defines as ‘hustle’, also denoted 
movement, albeit confined to those engaged in productive activity, such as agricultural labour. 
During British colonial rule Krio fishermen in the protectorate used the term drɛg to describe the 
action of casting out a large fishing net into the sea, which may or may not have returned a 
successful catch. 
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“The price falls if a lane [new exchange partner] is not there, by which I mean a stagnant 
person. If you find a person with a lane you can sell to others for three coin 
[Le300,000].”171 
 
It was necessary to reside within the same ghetto and cultivate the necessary sababu in 
order to be granted the signal to sell larger quantities. As Back Street’s youth claimed 
“Wi de na di grawnd” [We are in the ground]. Turkish provided a similar explanation 
regarding his attempts to negotiate new exchange relationships in Eastern Freetown: 
 
“The way I am finding buyers is through my kɔmpin [non-biological ‘brothers’]. The 
message comes through my kɔmpin. Turkish makes a give-and-take motion with his 
hands moving backwards and forwards. They will say: ‘Eh, that shareholder who comes 
and buys 150 kilo, who is that?’ I will try to know that line and link with that man. So 
from that man, he will channel me in the business. Then finally I will have made money 
for myself.” 
 
The nuanced social practices involved in dealing cannabis; the unravelling of a black 
bandana, bodily routines for how to bind one another and the street vernaculars 
required for various greetings with local kliks, indicated journeymen possessed a 
practical mastery of how to play the game. Turkish had, however, incurred debts, a 
situation referred to as “mismanagement inside the game”. Having exhausted his own 
funds, Turkish relied heavily on credit from his two most durable sababu: his 
shareholder Harold and Harold’s middleman nicknamed “King David”. To obtain credit, 
Turkish was obliged to sell pɛkus [quarter of a kilogram] of cannabis on their behalf by 
commission. Given Harold and King David could afford to save cannabis to sell during 
periods of greater demand in the rainy season, they would provide three or four pɛku, 
which Turkish promised to sell for Le50,000 in Freetown, gaining a commission of 
Le20,000 upon return to Hastings. Sitting on the porch of King David’s auto repair kiosk 
awaiting customers during the evening, Turkish was left to exploit what economic 
sociologists refer to as information asymmetries.  
 
Turkish was aware of the risks posed when relying on “auctioning”. This sales practice 
was associated with those who did not understand how to play the game:  
 
“If I say that I am only selling it by pɛku-pɛku [just under ¼ kilogram], just half-half, then 
man will only destroy.” 
                                                        
171 Interview with Sallieu Conteh, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 26/09/2013. 
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This strategy had failed demonstrably and Turkish frequently returned to Hastings 
seeking finance from Harold to resolve debts he had incurred to King David. “Mojo”, a 
former lookout who used to work with Turkish in Lumley Street’s cartels before 
cultivating cannabis in Hastings, was a crucial link in this chain of credit. Having failed to 
sell three pɛku for Le50,000, Mojo suggested “I dɔn pwɛl di sababu” [He has spoiled the 
sababu]. Turkish was no longer considered “righteous inside the business”.172 Their 
relationship deteriorated into occasional violent threats and withholding of personal 
property, until Harold provided more credit to pay off Mojo’s advances. The episode 
tarnished Turkish’s reputation. His ability to secure sababu depended on the repayment 
of debts that, while left unpaid, cascaded his financial obligations back to the lender of 
origin: his shareholder. The restricted economic mobility denoted by the apparent 
paradox of increasing geographic movement signalled to others that he did not 
understand how to play the game, and was therefore unlikely, as Dawda put it, to be 
given the signal for access to higher value exchange partners.  
 
Musa also reasoned that he relied on the “bluff bluff” of his street smarts and would 
change into a Nike-branded red sweater, blue jeans and chromatic orange and silver 
trainers when visiting Eastern Freetown. This bluff was, however, supported by his 
ability to demonstrate reciprocity with Dawda given his more secure financial position 
allowed for bulk sales. As discussed in Chapter Five, the bluff was unlikely to be 
successful for those who more limited economic capital. When asking Turkish about the 
differences between how he played the game in Hastings as opposed to Eastern 
Freetown, he compared himself to “Kɛkunda”, an alleged drug trafficker during the NPRC 
government: 
 
“He was a bluff man. He knew the formula and he would come with the game [i.e. with 
the cannabis]. He didn’t get any problems with it.” 
 
Turkish, like other disadvantaged journeymen, reasoned their failings resulted from a 
lack of social skill having not learned how to play the game correctly. More successful 
dealers had better street smarts and were skilled at innovating the “formula” [method of 
concealment] required to enhance their “movement”. Since the death of his father who 
was a former Local Unit Commander in the police force, Turkish had, however, also lost 
a vital partner to help him change the formula: 
                                                        
172 Interview with Turkish, Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 17/09/2013.  
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“Sababu is like when [I] had my father, who is a proud man inside the police. For 
example, I want to have a job inside the police, but I can’t, then my father has a debt. 
Then I will work through my father’s relationship [...] I meet them and explain things, 
they will understand.”173 
 
By imagining himself “turning into” this new role, Turkish expected this “new lane” 
would help resolve his financial worries. His need for a middleman was crucial for 
navigating the shifting social environment of Eastern Freetown, as one cultivator-cum-
dealer whose shareholder had recently passed away noted: 
 
“Sababu is a thing that will defend you in the long run. It's where they defend you. If I 
have sababu now in this place, in Waterloo, they would know that my papa [father] is 
my eldest, and so people that know me they fear me. But now, if I don't have any sababu, 
I will go to jail. But when I have that sababu they are able to say: ‘Eh bra, I am begging 
for this man, make them understand’ [...] As I said, sababu defends people to let you go 
and make a living.”174 
 
Despite Turkish’s perceived knowledge of the street he could not – unlike Musa –
reciprocate or successfully bluff bluff a relationship with more prominent buyers. As the 
movement of his hands suggested, he could only take from, but could not give back to 
his kɔmpin. Without a middleman to defend him; to give him the “fearness” required to 
reduce the social distance perceived between him and others in the economic field, his 
reputation was open to challenge and ridicule. Be it from a middle finger, or Harold’s 
sarcastic laughs or a prospective buyer retorting “Turkish, I swear to God”.  
 
Sababu was perceived to be linked with street smarts in terms of their ability to bluff by 
continually innovating the formula. However, this association acted as a mechanism 
informally regulating journeymen’s ability to accumulate economic capital. What 
mattered was the degree to which the bluff was recognised by others in the field as 
legitimate, which in turn rested on the symbolic capital the bluffer had already 
accumulated. The acquisition of sababu cannot be explained solely by appealing to the 
social skills of how life on the street was experienced and mastered (i.e. in terms of 
cultural capital). Hustlers, as Wacquant (1999) claims, lead ‘double-edged’ lives. The 
symbolic power of social capital operated precisely to engender youths’ movement on 
                                                        
173 Interview with Turkish, Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 17/09/2013.  
174 Interview with Mohammed (alias, Moshie), Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 04/11/13. 
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the street and its logic of social practice as somewhat matter-of-fact, unquestionable and 
even banal. Given the one-sided interpretation of what was necessary to negotiate with 
middlemen, journeyman found that the most untenable lines of questioning were those 
that challenged the one-way relationship from sababu to economic capital. They had 
invested in the reasoning that social capital was necessary to make money and access 
land; rarely was this calculation the other way around. 
 
The expectation of being able to “grow the right way inside the business” converged 
with a particular set of dispositions and practices recognised by others as competent 
(for their labour was valued as righteous) and that in doing so reproduced structural 
advantages. Sababu as economic exchange dissimulated through symbolic exchange 
resulted in a reasonably well structured economic field that underpinned what appears 
in more ideographic readings of youths’ experience as more dynamic, fluid and 
uncertain (see Wacquant 2004: 391-2; Newell 2006: 182-3). Despite their subjective 
expectations to the contrary, the objective chances youth had to obtain durable and 
reciprocal social relationships with a person of influence, were limited and 
circumscribed by their disadvantage positions relative to shareholders. Sababu was not, 
therefore, synonymous with the weak ties of expanding social capital (Granovetter 
1985), nor with treating ‘people as infrastructure’ prone to forging ever-increasing 
social circles across difference (Simone 2004). Rather, it worked to foreground youths’ 
expectations during their social encounters with those in unequal positions. It indexed a 
particular view from a particular position within an unequal economic field that secured 
the oligopolistic hold of dominant players. 
 
6.6. “Na di grade”: economic valuation as social process 
 
During daily taxi rides across Freetown, the price for a fare was rarely up for 
negotiation. Fees were determined according to an interval level, such as the number of 
“ways” that could be travelled during a taxi journey. This represented a shared scheme 
of valuation. Although the precise destinations and distances that comprised a “one 
way”, “two way” or even “three way” journey were open to subtle reinterpretation 
based on the play of social positions between drivers and their back seat passengers, 
and inflation linked to fuel prices, the starting point for any potential negotiation of 
price remained fixed to interval-level categories. For instance, while travelling from St 
John Street to the commotion of Sani Abacha’s street vendors, a driver 
uncharacteristically suggested to me that “the game is open to you now”. According to 
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him, in a “locked game” the price was fixed such that one way equated to Le1,000. When 
the game was open, however, a passenger was free to negotiate the price of a single way 
or add more ways to the price of one. Trying my luck to negotiate with the driver, he 
responded “Eh Sam, you don’t understand the game”. “Sam”, meaning a novice, implied 
that whether the game was open or locked depended on social position. For foreign 
expatriates associated with the system, the game was open only to a better price for the 
driver, in order to demonstrate the greater earning power attributed to this advantaged 
social position. 
 
The social processes involved in economic valuation had important implications for 
price formation. One ‘puzzle’, to use Guyer’s (2004) term, that illustrated the role sababu 
played as a principle of differentiation during economic valuation was how a “lagati” 
[bundle] of newly-harvested cannabis herb came to obtain a transaction price at 
market.175 Once groomed, compressed down and transferred to LeoCem cement bags, a 
lagati was converted into a unit referred to as a “scale” that cultivators claimed was 
roughly equivalent to a metric unit of one kilogram. Once converted, the advertised and 
expected prices for a scale remained relatively fixed. During the dry season, the mean 
value of a scale was Le150,000 and Le30,000 for one quant [¼ kg], unlike the more 
common relationship of decreasing price with increasing volume. While prices 
seasonally fluctuated about this mid-point, more established sellers maintained these 
categories more rigidly. Newer sellers, by contrast, resorted to the more flexible sales 
strategy of auctioning for a lower price.  
 
Consequently, there was a lower average for and greater variation between transaction 
prices among journeymen, even if the advertised price was more ambitious. The 
preference to adopt weight as the initial criterion for valuation, as opposed to volume or 
amount, was also common in comparisons of currency. The Pound sterling was “ɛvi ɛvi” 
[very heavy, of high value], whereas the Leone was “light”. During more frequent visits 
to farms, cultivators rarely weighed what they claimed to be a scale, despite 
considerable variation in plant sizes and the resulting volume of cannabis herb that was 
                                                        
175 This puzzle resembles Jane Guyer’s (2004: 57, 2013: 299-300) analysis of the South 
Cameroonian ntet. The ntet refers to a piece of basketwork comprising a bundle of iron axe 
heads. Ntet was later formalised as the Beti number for 100, although the number of arrowheads 
within a bundle varied widely. Ntet referred to the bundle before it referred to the number, ‘a 
bundle simply happened to contain about a hundred in the currency system of the region when 
missionaries first defined the meaning of Beti words in translation’ (Guyer 2004: 57). From a 
longer historical point of view, Ntet was indicative of a transactional repertoire being drawn on 
to deal with volatile inflation (cf. Chinese late-Qing Dynasty ‘string coins’).  
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packed and selotaped into a paper LeoCem bag. Some farmers also mixed different 
varieties of cannabis (sativa, indica, sensimilla) without any differentiation in quality 
discerned by the buyer and no resulting variation in price. When cultivators did weigh a 
scale, as demonstrated when visiting a farm known as Wanpala [open, flat area], it did 
not strictly correspond to a metric scale. Rather, cultivators referred to an ordinal scale 
corresponding to load markings scratched on to the pivot of a metal rod about a make-
shift balance metre. Each marking represented one scale. “It is a reference point”, one 
cultivator claimed as he explained how one scale was translated into the ratio scale of 
cash money: “One skel is Le150,000, the price is fixed”.  
 
Scales of equivalence have been ‘haphazardly’ institutionalised to regulate monetary 
transactions in West Africa, such that there exists a wide-ranging repertoire of possible 
measurement scales that are drawn into ‘performances’ indicative of more determinate, 
‘underlying’ power relations (Guyer 2004: 49). The implementation of weights and 
measures controls by authorities during the colonial period; Momoh’s campaign against 
smuggling in the 1990s and more recent government regulations, are indicative of state 
officials’ continued despair with the unruliness of price.176 Western Area’s bush, markets 
and wharves have featured as sites for contesting state-mandated ‘economic discourse 
[and therefore] had implications not only for political power but also had deep social 
and cultural meanings, even when focused on the most mundane places’ (Howard 2003: 
263). By returning to the ‘wild’ space of the bush, cultivators have long been argued to 
successfully evade attempts by the colonial and post-colonial state to enforce fiscal and 
legal regulations upon the conduct of economic activity (Jackson 1989; Roitman 2005; 
Hoffman 2007b: 106-8).  
 
Despite this apparent triumph of fiscal disobedience, transactional repertoires utilised 
by cultivators shifted when observing the valuation of cannabis undertaken by 
shareholders, such as Ɔsilibu and American. Scales and pɛkus were bypassed in favour of 
a stricter, monetary base scale. A “tɛnt” [tent] equated to Le1 million and a “kɔyn” [coin] 
to Le100,000.177 When buying from Ɔsilibu, dealers claimed that one scale was always 
worth three kɔyn [Le300,000] – double that of the median price (Le150,000). When 
questioning another cultivator as to why the use of these monetary scales appeared to 
be deployed only during encounters with shareholders, he explained: 
                                                        
176 The Weights and Measures Act 2010 attempted to enforce the use of a metric scale, as 
opposed the use of ‘bags’ and ‘cups’ as interval-level units in the market place.    
177 This monetary scale likely originates from Yoruba concepts of ‘bags’ and ‘pounds’, especially 
given influence Yoruba has had on the development of Krio vernaculars along the peninsula.  
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“It [the price] changes by category, yes, by step, by level, according to how you work to 
sell the business.” 
 
What do you mean by a ‘category’? 
“Well, like, how you are here now, it is just a difference.” 
 
I’m not sure I follow… 
“Well it is according to [laughs] it is according to the way you come and meet me.” 
 
If, as market theory suggests, prices are determined through the process of exchange 
rather than the instantaneous outcome of a calibration between supply and demand, 
then in these social encounters value was somewhat more ambiguous. As the cultivator 
claimed, prices were the outcome of a social process – “the way you come and meet me” 
– rather than the more mechanical outcome of price responsiveness indicative of 
reliable seasonal fluctuations in supply and demand, ‘other things being equal’ (Berry 
2007: 61-7). Journeymen, by contrast, were unable to sell all of their cannabis to pre-
established buyers. This resulted in advertising their product by circulating a “sample”. 
In the panbɔdis of Hastings, Waterloo and Eastern Freetown, buyers would meticulously 
judge the quality of these samples. When dealers explained to me how the price changed 
during these encounters, they referred first to seasonal fluctuations in supply and then 
claimed, in a matter-of-fact and somewhat exasperated tone: “Na di gred!” [It is the 
quality].  
 
Appraisals were meticulous. A black plastic bag would be opened, the cannabis rubbed 
between the fingers to inspect condition of the Trichomes before being smelt between 
the palms. While this careful adjudication suggested quality was, objectively-speaking, a 
major determinant of price, by following cannabis that left the same farms but with 
journeymen associated with shareholders in structurally different positions, as was the 
case when comparing the experience of Musa and Turkish earlier (section 6.4); the 
monetary valuation of their respective samples was markedly different. While dealers 
reasoned that the failure to secure a buyer resulted from poor quality, my observations 
indicated that it was the sababu of seller and buyer, as an index of social position and 
repository of credit history, which acted as the means for more dominant and 
established players to adjudicate who could access higher-value buyers (cf. Berry 2007: 
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61). As the owner of Macdonald’s largest farm claimed: “sababu is a person who can 
show you the road to pass”.178 
 
The most established shareholder in Waterloo who had grown cannabis for at least 25 
years explained that the sale of cannabis worked according to how you “frem” [frame] 
somebody: “It is a frem business […] it is when you know you can use someday – [it is] 
usage”. To frame a social encounter was to organise the positions between partners to 
an exchange, in terms of who was more or less dominant, as an initial move to decide 
whether, and under what tacitly accepted terms, a transaction should proceed. As my 
experience hailing taxis suggested, how the transaction was framed depended on 
whether somebody was in a position of equivalence and could be granted an open game 
or whether they were resigned to a locked game. This was despite journeymen claiming 
that “when you have fayn [high quality] tay [cannabis] then you can get fayn customers – 
that is the game”.179  
 
The reproduction of structural advantages can therefore also be explained in terms of 
how value was objectified in the exchange process. Value shifted according to the 
performance of different scales, and following Bourdieu’s concept of objectified cultural 
capital, how cannabis was subjectively appreciated in terms of what I termed social 
aesthetics. Valuation of the “sense” and “taste” of cannabis was tied to qualitative 
experience from unequal positions. In turn, the onus placed on skills and street smarts 
acquired through apprenticeship, and resulting need to appreciate the product of their 
labour as akin to a craft that validated their undertaking, worked to suppress economic 
interest. This dissimulated how prices were being determined according to the unequal 
positons that were occupied. As Bourdieu (2005) has argued, it is not prices that 
determine everything but everything that determines prices.  
 
A phenomenological analysis of exchange relationships has therefore suggested it is the 
expectation of quality, tied to unequal social positions, which is instrumental in 
determining the variation of price at the macro level of the economic field. The social 
processes involved in determining the quality of cannabis were, quite literally, about 
“grading”: of assigning a level of proficiency and of classifying the skill of their exchange 
partner according to their ties with shareholders and corresponding ability to know 
how to “play the game”. 
                                                        
178 Interview with Mr Shɛkah, Cannabis Cultivator, Macdonald, 19/11/2013.  
179 Interview with Abdullai, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 05/11/2013. 
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6.7. Conclusion: apprenticeship as the site for misrecognition 
 
The emphasis apprentice cultivators placed on their need to learn cannabis farming and 
dealing was, conceptually-speaking, indicative of an unequal accumulation of symbolic 
capital. This impressed a particular vision of what was required to be a successful 
cultivator and concealed the interest of their respective shareholders in “pulling down” 
challengers (Bourdieu 1977: 180). Journeymen perceived that the practices they 
learned during apprenticeship were less a matter of technical proficiency – innovations 
that would have otherwise destabilised structural advantages (Bourdieu 2005: 75-6) – 
and instead akin to the ritualistic practice of a craft. Their craft involved the adjudication 
of ‘countless minor tasks’ including the correct schedules for mixing in fertiliser and 
chicken dung, in addition to particular ways of “grooming”, “chopping” and compressing 
cannabis. I have argued that these mundane tasks were indicative of a pedagogy shared 
by apprentice cultivators that re-presented competence and success as resulting from a 
practical understanding of what was necessary to move beyond their playing merely a 
“simple game” (Bourdieu 2006: 176-180). 
 
This chapter argued that the urgency of youth to commit to apprenticeship was 
analogous with what Bourdieu refers to as the accumulation of cultural capital; of social 
action being funnelled through durable dispositions that corresponded with a mastery 
of how to act and interact with others recognised as socially competent and valuable. 
The cultural capital that had been acquired by journeymen through their 
apprenticeships was, however, differentially valued by middlemen. The degree to which 
shareholder’s protégés were perceived to understand how to play the game acted as a 
principle of differentiation. It motivated their position-takings within the economic field, 
and regulated the conversion of cultural capital – their practical knowledge – into other 
forms, namely: economic capital in access to land and labour; social capital in 
negotiations with new buyers; and, finally, objectified cultural capital in terms of the 
expectations they held when negotiating the monetary value of their cannabis with 
prospective dealers. Two emic practices, sababu and grade, acted as principles of 
convertibility that regulated the ability of journeymen to accumulate economic capital 
and gain autonomy from their shareholders in decision-making through marketing 
networks and in land ownership. 
 
Sababu was closely related to the grade of cannabis such that the valuation of quality 
depended on the recognition of who was valuing, their respective position in the 
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economic field relative to others, and the expectation that those in particular positions 
would judge quality and assign price accordingly. Economic valuation during a variety of 
social encounters was – objectively-speaking – ambiguous and open to interpretation in 
spite of reliable seasonal fluctuations in supply. This was because exchange partners 
reasoned that they possessed different levels of knowledge that foreshadowed their 
expectations of resulting prices in any given transaction. To know the quality of 
cannabis meant to rank the persons engaging in a transaction, which were 
commensurate with the transactional repertoires of scales and kwants or tents and 
pounds (Guyer 2004: 68-9). As Sarah Berry (2007: 61) has argued:  
 
‘The questions and expectations that people bring to a potential exchange, and the 
performative strategies they employ as the transaction unfolds, arise out of their own 
past experiences and in the course of their encounters with one another and/or the 
things being exchanged.’ 
 
The emic practices of sababu and grade worked to maintain a high degree of social 
distance between journeymen and their shareholders, thereby acting as an uncertainty-
reducing mechanism that secured the structural advantages necessary for oligopolistic 
competition to thrive. Mainstream economic theory suggests that information 
asymmetries represent market inefficiencies. To the contrary, this chapter 
demonstrated that asymmetries were rooted in the degree of convertibility between 
different kinds of capital that worked precisely as a principle of regulation. This enabled 
the coordination of market exchange through valuation, rather than primarily through 
an interactionist vision of organised violence or inter-personal trust. 
 
Sababu as akin to social capital, grade as a social process of valuation, and sabi as the 
validation and recognition of one-sided competencies, formed a tripartite of emic 
practices that reproduced structural advantage. These emic practices worked as 
regulatory principles that organised the cannabis economy in which participants were 
committed to on-going practices as if these were rational; what Bourdieu refers to as the 
tacit collusion of competition and struggle in the economic field (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992). Following Burawoy’s (2012: 196) claim that ‘the power of 
misrecognition is linked to the level of skill’, it has been necessary to move towards a 
social aesthetics. Aesthetics here minimally refers to ongoing qualitative experience 
from a particular point of view within a field of organised activity. This stands in 
contrast to aesthetics as the interpretation of, say, an artwork or lagati [bundle] of 
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cannabis, by which the creativity or skill of the producer is assessed according to the 
product produced. 
 
Instead, the cultivator of cannabis – in terms of how their skill was judged by others – 
and the appreciation of the product of the cultivator’s labour were not qualitatively 
separate. It would, for example, have been difficult for a buyer to appreciate the quality 
of cannabis produced if they did not already value the skill of the seller’s respective 
shareholders who had taught them how to cultivate during their apprenticeship. 
Otherwise, buyers would not have come to know any meaningful distinctions in 
expertise or skills. There is, therefore, no automatic correspondence between the 
imperative to acquire knowledge through apprenticeship, and the expectation that this 
knowledge improved a journeyman’s “feel for the game”. Instead, their practices 
corresponded with orientational qualitative experience, for agents assessed and 
appreciated their social environment in different ways depending on the pedagogy of 
their apprenticeship.  
 
The methodological approach of social aesthetics enhances Bourdieu’s concept of 
symbolic capital. The chapter argued that the one-sided accumulation and utilisation of 
cultural and social capital resulted from acquired dispositions that constituted the 
habitus of apprentices. This habitus coordinated socially recognised and competent 
practices that conformed strictly to neither a grid-of-perception nor a wholly passive 
phenomenology. Rather, the analysis demonstrated that practices always have an 
audience. As Martin (2011: 203) similarly argues, every social encounter involves a ‘we’ 
as much as it does an ‘it’. When youth ‘get it’ then they: 
 
‘‘Get’ the ‘we’ as well, in the sense of establishing an assumption of like-mindedness 
with those of similar taste [i.e. there is inter-subjective agreement…] Aesthetic 
experience is inseparable from perceived entry into some group.’ 
 
Qualities are, as Martin (2011: 204) perceptively remarks ‘cultivated’. Journeymen that 
had acquired particular dispositions under the pedagogic authority of their bosses held 
particular expectations of quality and what constituted a good buyer. While an outsider 
may comprehend these one-sided practices as a failure of rationality (Guillory 1997: 
384-5); the social aesthetic from the point of view of my interlocutors in structurally 
disadvantaged positions could ‘only have a meaning in reference to divisions between 
persons’ (Martin 2011: 204). Hence, the we-ness implied by a social aesthetics, as 
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experienced from a particular position taking in the economic field (i.e. a claim to being 
inside the game), worked as a principle of social construction that ensured inter-
subjective validity (i.e. this is what we mean by the grade). Albeit, this was based on a 
tacit complicity that, when more dominant “meets” less dominant, the former is judged 
the better grade or the more trustworthy sababu. Quality did not, therefore, fully explain 
variation in price across farms, all other things being equal, but was instead explained 
by position within the economic field and the structural advantage that more dominant 
position was rooted in. How the quality of cannabis was valued corresponded to the 
history of social relationships indexed by the actions and perceptions of their respective 
shareholders that, in turn, regulated conversion back into economic capital in terms of 
access to credit, land and cash-money. Apprenticeship afforded the acquisition of one-
sided practices that regulated opportunities to accumulate economic capital, albeit in 
such a way that was compatible with their re-adjusted expectations. In doing so, 
however, apprenticeship ensured relations between apprentices, journeymen, and 
shareholders were not reduced to naked self-interest (Bourdieu 2006: 196). 
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Chapter Seven: Raiding 
 
7.1. Introduction: you must “dɔkiamp” 
 
Turkish walked through the back streets of Eastern Freetown stopping in a courtyard 
known as Peace Market. Cannabis had been dealt here since a coup d’état led by Johnny 
Paul Koroma’s AFRC in May 1997. Turkish pulled a black bandana from his bag, a 
symbol of membership to the recently allied Black Leo and Cens Coast Hood; youth 
“kliks” [gangs] dominant in the area. Cannabis was still sold in Peace Market and 
concealed inside the car doors and engine parts of used motor vehicles for onward 
travel to Guinea and Liberia. As I sat with Turkish, he scanned the surroundings and 
claimed that the uncertainties presented by law-enforcement could be dealt with by 
gaining access to a precious commodity:  
 
“We pass information. We get information from the police and then pass it all back, 
inside the cartel.” 
 
The extra-legal networks through which journeymen, shareholders and their 
middlemen passed information concerning impending raids had come under increasing 
pressure since the United Nations led Transnational Organised Crime Unit (TOCU) was 
established in 2010. UNODC officials and civil society representatives claimed that the 
seizure of a Cessna aircraft transporting cocaine to Lungi International Airport was a 
“wake-up call” for the government of the threat to national security posed by organised 
criminal groups, especially those using West Africa as a transit point into Europe from 
Latin America.180 TOCU had been mandated to gather intelligence and tackle organised 
crime and drug trafficking. However, this agency lacked the expertise and resources to 
target higher-value illicit drug trafficking networks that it claimed were operating 
through more clandestine Ghanaian and Nigerian subsidiaries with European 
contacts.181 A change in strategy suited an emerging rhetoric that purported cannabis 
cultivation and ‘trafficking’ represented a threat to national security in West Africa 
(Csete and Sanchez 2013; WACD 2014). The re-articulation of cannabis-as-threat, in 
turn, legitimised the government’s access to funding and training offered by the United 
Nations, European Commission and a host of national law enforcement agencies 
(UNODC 2009; Klein 2014). With cultivation, sale and possession subject to the same 
                                                        
180 Interview with UNODC officials, Freetown, 06/12/2013. 
181 Interview with TOCU personnel, Freetown, 06/12/2013. 
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punitive enforcement measures as other illicit drugs under the National Drugs Control 
Act 2008, the ability to read and anticipate the changing dynamics of law enforcement, 
centered in Freetown, was being rendered somewhat more ambiguous and uncertain.  
 
Three pɛku were concealed inside Turkish’s bag. Having paid a small fee of Le10,000 to 
King David, we relocated to a nearby mechanics shop. Turkish claimed his fee ensured 
King David was his sababu and would protect him from the Sierra Leone Police (SLP). 
Turkish was approached by two undercover, plain clothes police officers. Although the 
officers were “known” to him in Hastings, his room for maneuver was, however, 
somewhat more limited. It was not until Turkish was sitting inside a local police station 
that he pointed to the fading white lines of chalk marking the times and dates of various 
law enforcement operations against so-called “grey zones”. Peace Market had been 
targeted by TOCU during what cultivators and dealers began referring to as “raiding”. 
While Turkish had incurred debts and King David was unwilling to reciprocate the 
higher price required for securing police inaction, TOCU’s presence began to harden the 
boundaries between law-enforcers and law-breakers and challenged local social 
categories that previously motivated SLP officers to treat cannabis dealing as a licit and 
permissible activity in their everyday encounters. 
 
When I told the story of Turkish’s arrest to a shareholder, he recited a common idiom 
concerning the need to “dɔkiamp”182 that emerged following a significant increase in the 
frequency of TOCU’s operations since 2012183:  
 
“Men conceal secrets in their throat; you cannot allow the secret to come out of your 
mouth.”184 
 
                                                        
182 The term “dɔkiamp” is used phonetically in Krio. My interlocutors suggest it probably 
originates from an indigenous Temne name for the capital Freetown, referring to the mouth of 
the Rokel River estuary. The centrality of the men’s Poro secret society in Temne culture 
indicates mouth refers literally to concealing secrets (i.e. not speaking with your mouth) when 
dealing cannabis in Freetown. 
183 According to TOCU’s data, operations in 2010 coincided with a significant increase in the 
mean price of cannabis by Le125,000 from 2009 to 2010.  While seizures appear low in 2010, the 
majority of TOCU’s crop eradication operations occurred during the peak of the cultivation 
season at the end of December, such that seizures were typically recorded in the following year. 
TOCU claimed to have arrested 15 people on drug offences and seized 1920kg of cannabis herb 
with a purported market value of US$76,781. Since 2010 a total of 15.2 grams of heroin and 
cocaine were seized. 
184 Field notes, with Musa Barrie in Waterloo, 04/05/13. 
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To dɔkiamp was an instruction: to keep your mouth shut and keep a secret. Journeymen 
could obtain information allowing them to anticipate and evade law-enforcement 
operations. This information was usually made available when they or, more commonly, 
their shareholders provided law-enforcers with “haju”. Haju meant to “give something, 
for something in return”. It ranged from ephemeral one-off payments by journeymen in 
the domestic exchange market to more durable and formalised arrangements secured 
by shareholders protecting production. The threat posed by TOCU increased the 
demand for more formalised bribery arrangements and the necessity for youth to seek 
protection in extra-legal networks established by shareholders that were more capable 
of adapting to these changing law enforcement dynamics.  
 
In this chapter I examine how cultivators learned and practiced what it meant to 
dokiamp and how by conforming to apprenticeships and attempting to obtain the 
sababu of shareholders, they could gain access to information that protected their farms 
and deals from raiding. By considering different social positions within extra-legal 
networks, the chapter introduces an objectivist vantage from which to assess the access 
to and efficacy of this information during everyday encounters. Rather than reducing 
encounters between law-enforcers and law-breakers to the ‘blurring’ of distinctions 
between state and society (Galemba 2012), as is common in the anthropological 
literature, I argue instead that the ability to secure protection from the police depended 
on their position within what Bourdieu (1987) refers to as the juridical field. The 
concept of juridical field aids an analysis of the extent to which journeymen and 
shareholders could negotiate protection from the police.  
 
I argue that, although the emic practice of haju was an illicit act in exchange for police 
inaction, the resulting efficacy of this act – in terms of securing police inaction – 
depended on being recognised as in receipt of the right kind of sababu. This, in turn, 
depended on a cultivator or dealer’s position within the economic field in terms of the 
status of their associated shareholders and middlemen. Rather than treating haju as 
purely an ‘extra-legal’ relation of collusion that corresponds to intimacy or privacy 
within a closed group of co-conspirators, I examine encounters between law-enforcers 
and breakers through the lens of public secrecy: that which is generally known, but 
cannot be articulated (Bellman 1981; Taussig 1993). Given the locations of cannabis 
farms, and the identities of complicit cultivators and corrupt police officers were widely 
known, public secrecy worked through a variety of semantic and social ambiguities that 
rendered information obtained through bribery as scarce and consequently as valuable.  
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In other words, monetary bribes alone were not enough to secure police inaction. 
Rather, the inaction of police depended on social position in terms of respect for and 
status of different cultivators.  
 
To this end, the chapter examines unequal rights to and the efficacy of information 
about impending police raids. I suggest the prevalence of public secrecy meant that 
attempts to negotiate police protection through bribery varied in efficacy. Instead, 
public secrecy, in terms of knowing what not to say relative to social position, worked as 
a further covert principle of convertibility between sababu and haju that reproduced the 
structural advantages. Although the Sierra Leonean state was bureaucratically weak and 
allowed for corruption contrary to the public interest, the presence of TOCU meant that 
law enforcers could now only unofficially suspend the law only for some, but not others. 
 
7.2. Conceptual starting points: juridical field and public secrecy 
 
The efficacy of bribe payments depended on an ability to accumulate what Bourdieu 
(1987: 838) refers to as juridical capital. The field of juridical capital is endowed with 
symbolic relations of power specific to the dynamics of pre-existing fields of organised 
activity ‘which give it its structure and which order the competitive struggles’ between 
those participating in it. The juridical field is closely tied to the economic field given its 
proximity to the authority and resources of the state make it an important site of 
struggle for those, such as the original shareholders of the 1980s and 1990s, who were 
seeking to retain the structural advantages they enjoyed over competitors (Bourdieu 
2005). The law is enforced according to a performative logic that impresses a particular 
vision of order and that finds its efficacy in the impersonality and neutrality of the law: 
its ‘deceptive appearance of autonomy’ (Bourdieu 1987: 808, 838). This performativity 
allowed law-enforcers to serve criminal and public interests simultaneously. Law-
enforcers were able to step back from inter-personal relations and assume the more 
abstract authority of the state (as an agent of the state) in some cases, while in others 
they unofficially suspended the authority of the state by releasing suspects or otherwise 
turning a blind eye. Consequently, the juridical field is careful not to conflate the actions 
of agents of the state with the state itself (Anders 2008: 152), since both law-enforcers 
were guided by their own private as well as public interests.  
 
I follow Bellman (1981) to argue that public secrecy; knowing a secret but not being 
able to articulate the facts as such, enabled only journeymen and middlemen with the 
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right connections to shareholders to be considered by law-enforcers as being “inside the 
game”. Public secrecy is a more common social phenomenon than that attributable to 
youth transitions through secret societies: it is the ‘lifeblood of social structure’ (Taussig 
1993: 69). It served to dissimulate the perception of social distance between those in 
more and less dominant positions, even while the content of the secret – names, farm 
locations and corrupt officers – was widely known. A conceptual bias is therefore often 
introduced into the study of illicit economies. Extra-legality is relegated to the roles of 
facilitating corruption and organising violence against challengers. In contexts where 
law-enforcers act in both criminal and public interests for reasons of poor wages and 
the interests of their personal networks, public secrecy accounts for social encounters 
between the police, cultivators and wider community whereby ‘those in power and their 
agents [the police], [must establish they are] acting purportedly in the public interest’ 
(Bellman 1981: 7). It is precisely because of the heavy involvement of the police in 
cannabis production in the context of increasing pressure TOCU placed on upholding a 
distinction between criminal and public interest, which required the more malleable 
targeting of cannabis farmers and dealers who could no longer be protected solely by 
monetary bribes. This was because the more limited blurring between what was licit 
and illicit during encounters between law-enforcers and breakers following the 
inception of TOCU outside of the game, was giving force to the government’s attempts to 
delegitimise cannabis cultivation, sale and consumption, and was undermining the 
ability of the police to act purportedly in the local community’s interest.  
 
As distinctions between law enforcers and breakers hardened, especially in Freetown, 
cultivators under the guidance of their shareholders were taught to dɔkiamp [to not tell 
secrets]. Yet, paradoxically, shareholders were complicitous with the police by engaging 
in what they described as “leaking” information regarding those journeymen, especially 
those trying to farm and deal on their own, who were now deemed to be criminals. This 
presented a paradox according to which ‘to tell a secret is to do secrecy’ (Bellman’s 
1981: 8). Given that criminal activity was widely known, public secrecy rendered this 
not-so-secret information into a scarce commodity exchanged between shareholders 
and police who were under pressure to conform to TOCU’s new policy mandate. This 
new character of bribery cannot be explained fully in terms of the passive transmission 
of information between nodes in a network. Rather, secrets were known, but cultivators 
told, interpreted and acted upon these secrets in ways that corresponded with the 
asymmetric exchange of this not-so-secret information between dominant players. The 
economic and juridical fields therefore overlapped and served to regulate each other.  
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More important than the act of concealing information, then, public secrecy 
foreshadowed encounters between law-breakers and enforcers, and thereby mediated 
the competing pressures on police to act in both self- and state-interest. From the 
perspective of those dependent on the shareholders, public secrecy delimited claims to 
and recognition regarding who could leak secrets and who could not. While TOCU’s 
inception and the shareholders’ claim to their respective apprentices that they needed 
to keep secrets implied a degree of conceptual duplicity with previous studies of illegal 
economy, to dɔkiamp entailed a more paradoxical social practice in which secrets were 
known at the same time as it was reasoned that they were not to be shared openly. 
 
The concepts of juridical field and public secrecy are used to analyse how structural 
advantages were reproduced during everyday encounters in the open exchange market 
and the networks through which the shareholders tried to protect their farms from 
being raided. Bourdieu’s concept of juridical field is useful for examining the selective 
criminalisation of certain cultivators and dealers, which was now being justified on the 
basis of a distinction between productive (and licit) and unproductive (and illicit) 
journeymen. Law-enforcers were able to arrest and harass those more peripheral to the 
extra-legal networks established by shareholders because they lacked the requisite 
sababu. This targeting was legitimised by virtue of an emerging public discourse that 
challenged the self-enterprise of journeymen, claiming instead that they were idle, lazy, 
unproductive and criminal. This enabled the police to continue benefitting from 
cannabis production while placating the demands of TOCU, because the shareholders 
had spent the haju and maintained the extra-legal relations necessary to both secure 
police inaction and leak information that implicated more autonomous journeymen. 
 
7.3. Distinguishing the Il/licit in grey zones 
 
In response to TOCU, the SLP began to designate areas frequented by those who they 
deemed were “criminals”, “idlers” and “thieves” as grey zones. These were the same 
areas typically used by self-enterprising journeymen aiming to sell cannabis through 
their own autonomous marketing networks. The common distinction between 
productive youth man and unproductive bobo [small boy] justified the targeting of 
panbɔdi [tin hut] youth bases in Hastings, Waterloo and Freetown who police officers 
claimed were already “known” to them for engaging in other kinds of criminal activity. 
Police action was often justified, for instance, by the purported membership of these 
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youth to kliks [gangs] such as Black Leo, the Red Flag Movement and the Cens Coast 
Hood. Alternatively, they claimed to target these youth because they allegedly consumed 
prescription drugs that made them “irrational” and “dirty”. Hence, the police claimed 
they represented a danger to the public because they were liable not to “keep the 
peace”. One shareholder confirmed by suggesting that the SLP only targeted those who 
were “krez” [crazy] and that would “stare into the abyss and collect spit at the sides of 
their mouths”.185 The tautological reasoning that drug addicts were “crazy” because they 
took drugs was rooted in the moral accommodation of cannabis farming and 
consumption, outlined in Chapter Five, that youth, the police and local residents within 
Hastings and Waterloo had long drawn between illegal-yet-licit drugs such as cannabis, 
and illegal-yet-illicit drugs such as cocaine and heroin. These distinctions were often 
emotively reinforced with reference to the use of illicit drugs by the RUF during the civil 
war. Since the late 2000s, however, government and media began to advance a rhetoric 
that treated cannabis as a threat to national security synonymous with cocaine and 
heroin trafficking. Meanwhile, public health officials drew crude parallels between very 
different kinds of narcotics, with one prominent psychiatrist claiming the effects of 
cannabis, cocaine, and heroin were “all the same”.186 Meanwhile, TOCU was increasing 
its operational tempo and its newly legislated mandate intensified cooperation with 
surveillance officers from the Criminal Investigations Division and Central Intelligence 
and Security Unit. Shareholders reasoned they were now more “exposed”. 
 
Journeymen that dealt cannabis in these newly designated grey zones were considered 
by shareholders as now only playing a “simple game”. They suggested these former 
apprentices had failed to dokiamp. Those caught in grey zones lacked the “formula”, a 
method of concealment that required continual innovation. One dealer in Eastern 
Freetown referred to the story of a “powerful” dealer nicknamed “VTEC” to explain the 
importance of having a formula: 
 
“Like, erm, one cartel owner I know in Goderich Street, VTEC, he has a spare parts shop 
out front. Out back they sell this substance [cannabis] there and they use the code ‘Five-
Five-Five’. When you call Five-Five-Five they will give you the drug. You give the money 
first and then they will give you the drug […] It is the formula, the code.”187 
 
                                                        
185 Interview with Musa Barrie, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 04/05/2013.  
186 Interview with Dr Nahim, Clinical Psychiatrist, Freetown, 04/12/2013.  
187 Interview with Fanan Turay, Cannabis Dealer, Eastern Freetown, 09/12/2013. 
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A shareholder also emphasised the need to adopt a “disguise” in order to evade 
attention from the police: 
 
“Some police officers will know you but they can pretend like they don't understand 
what you are talking about, but we can disguise still. I can disguise, I can divert to 
another branch.”188 
 
During conversations with cultivators and dealers in Freetown, Hastings and Waterloo, 
my attempts to ascertain specific information regarding farm locations, relationships 
between apprentices and shareholders, and those with the police, were responded to in 
hushed voices and answers framed in indirect and ambiguous terms. References to 
idioms and parables ran through explanations of their production hierarchies and extra-
legal relations. Shareholders were addressed with reference to vague social figures such 
as “chairman”, “head” and “shareholder”, in addition to multiple and changing 
nicknames. These ‘semantic ambiguities’ (Penglase 2009: 57-8) were indicative of the 
importance they assigned to innovation of the formula. 
 
These ambiguous forms of concealment were necessary because, as one dealer based in 
Grafton claimed: “All they [the police] want to do is change you and change your load”. 
“Load” carried two valences. Literally speaking, a load is carried. Yet figuratively, a 
young man’s load symbolised the burdens of trying to claim masculine authority. It was 
a “bundle inside your head”: the obligation to find employment and be respected as a 
productive member of the community. The greater the load, the more tenuous was 
recognition by others as a righteous somebody. The perception that the police wanted to 
change the load a youth carried was indicative of pressure the government and TOCU 
placed on what social categories counted as criminal and which did not in their 
everyday social encounters.  
 
During raids on youth bases in Hastings and Waterloo, the police frequently drew on 
moral distinctions between productive and unproductive youth in order to assign 
culpability for the crime of “frequency”: “those criminals known to the police that return 
to certain areas regularly”.189  Given journeymen and less influential middlemen 
frequently sold cannabis at youth bases, frequency provided a suitably ambiguous 
charge with which to selectively criminalise those lacking the requisite sababu of a 
                                                        
188 Interview with Mr Shɛkah, Cannabis Cultivator, Macdonald, 19/11/2013.  
189 Interview with Malogie, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 16/10/2013. 
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shareholder who was trying to placate the growing pressure on the police to tackle the 
cannabis trade. Youth’s ability to deflect culpability depended on their appeals to 
influential witnesses who mediated recognition of their sababu. Although the payment 
of haju afforded more successful appeals, whether the police attributed culpability 
depended on whether youth were working under a shareholder and were accordingly 
recognised as a righteous somebody. Such recognition created a demand to engage in 
apprenticeships under bosses who, in turn, could vouch as their sababu during raiding. 
 
Those unable to secure protection were resigned to “flushing”: concealing something 
illegitimate inside something considered by those outside the game as legitimate. This 
counter-strategy was prevalent at a youth base in Eastern Freetown known as Race 
Course Community that hosted several “high level” cannabis dealers was indicative of 
this strategy. Having been designated a grey zone on several occasions since 2009, Race 
Course established itself as a proto-NGO by establishing “links” with a local APC 
politician, a community policing initiative and several Non-Government Organisations 
engaged in employment generating waste disposal projects. Medal, the elected youth 
representative, explained that Race Course arranged for unemployed youth to 
undertake apprenticeships with cannabis cultivators just outside the small town of Four 
Mile. Medal’s deputy, nicknamed “Balani”, claimed he had dealt cannabis in Race Course 
since 2005 and had since been elected as the “organising secretary”. He explained that 
flushing was a response to the increasing criminalisation of youth by local politicians 
and the police. They had in his words, been “stained” by “the system” and needed to 
“organise things better”: 
 
“We are fighting to make development in this area, because as you see yourself in this 
country we have got a system, we have made [these] long benches […] we have painted 
[murals and] we have put up the rules. According to the culture today men can curse, 
they fight in this place. We see all of that, and they [the police and politicians] have 
stained us, the people, that are doing business in this place. So now we tell God thank 
you, we have stopped it now. We have made our own rules and now nobody can curse, 
nobody will stand-up and fight. So, like how I am living now, I feel I am free today […] so 
we have put everything under control.”190 
 
To reinforce their claims to the public interest, Race Course members worked together 
with the Local Policing Partnership Board (LPPB) to conduct neighbourhood-watch 
                                                        
190 Interview with Balani, Cannabis Dealer, Eastern Freetown, 04/12/2013. 
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along boundaries between rival youth bases (e.g. see Baker 2008, 2011; Albrecht 2010: 
57, 2015). Like other youth bases, Race Course publicly displayed and enforced rules to 
penalise unruly and obscene conduct such as fighting, swearing and spitting. Klik [gang] 
membership was actively discouraged. Medal claimed theft was a problem only for a 
neighbouring youth base pejoratively nicknamed “Bɔme” [rubbish tip]. Flushing 
therefore represented the response of youth to the threat posed by the criminalisation 
of grey zones. As Christiansen et al (2006: 15) note, youth culture in marginalised 
contexts begets the question: ‘to what degree can youth construct meaningful worlds of 
their own and pursue their own interests?’ Having been more peripheral to extra-legal 
networks established since the late-1980s and 1990s, the emerging cultural practice of 
flushing represented a counter-strategy employed by self-enterprising illicit agents to 
negotiate a way out of the culpability of being deemed a criminal, idler or thief. 
 
7.4. Commoditising police inaction 
 
Musa, a shareholder in Loko Fakay, regularly frequented Waterloo’s Las Palmas youth 
base in search of what he described as “links” with new buyers and police officers who 
passed through to drink pɔyo [palm wine], smoke cannabis and socialise when off shift. 
When greeting police officers, Musa bumped his index fingers side-by-side and claimed 
“Wi de tugɛda” [We are together]. This haptic clue suggested that relations with police 
officers were no longer as durable as the tightly bound fingers that had organised their 
chain work. I sat with Musa in a panbɔdi while he negotiated arrangements with a new 
sponsor, Sergeant Conteh, to whom he would provide a journeyman (Mɛdo) as the 
caretaker for his farm plot. Conteh repeatedly showed Musa the wear and tear of his 
upturned palms and vowed his commitment to “suffer for the business”. During these 
proceedings, three undercover police officers on okadas [motorcycles] pulled up outside 
a neighbouring panbɔdi frequented by a number of small-time dealers who regularly 
frequented Las Palmas.  
 
The undercover officers announced Las Palmas was a grey area and detained two young 
men nicknames “LG” [Lucky Guy] and “Mr Gadget” on charges of frequency. Alongside 
the young men, Musa and Sgt. Conteh surrounded the officers. National Identity cards 
were displayed and the names of various sababu exchanged, including a number of 
bluffs by younger dealers claiming to know distant relatives in the police force. During 
this play of social networks and positionings none of the dealers’ claims held weight. 
Conteh responded by pulling the officers back inside the panbɔdi and displayed his 
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Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) identity card. With a payment of 
Le100,000 passed to the officers, LG and Mr Gadget were released from their handcuffs. 
Musa claimed that the youth in Las Palmas were targeted because they:  
 
“Are thieves in the night, they are soft touch guys [i.e. prone to theft]. They are known to 
the police. Look at his t-shirt: ‘The Rules Are There Are No Rules’. The idle mind is the 
devil’s workshop”.  
 
LG suggested by contrast that “this is laughing time now” and inverted the SLP’s motto: 
“They are a force for bad, a force that spoils”. Another dealer nicknamed “Fresh Up” 
claimed that “they didn’t get the right people; they are only trying to fake poor people”. 
Both conceded, however, that Conteh and Musa had provided the phone number of a 
local police officer who could “balance them” [negotiate with them] in case further raids 
targeted this newly designated grey area. Unlike these youth, Musa claimed that: 
 
“The police won’t touch me because I am an ex-service man [Musa shows me an out-of-
date military identification card] If you want to move around come with me. I know the 
LUC [Local Unit Commander] […] She knows me, I will have no problem […] They know 
you very well, no problem with that.” 
 
Since the departure of “Issue”, the former chairman of Las Palmas who claimed he had 
“left the game” to raise his recently born son, these dealers bemoaned that they were 
increasingly “exposed”. It was therefore necessary to make payments of haju 
(Le100,000 per month) to the local officers introduced to them by Musa and Conteh in 
order to prevent further harassment. These bribes afforded police inaction because, as 
one cultivator explained: 
 
“If you are not opening this door, financially, you will not grow because they [the police] 
will come and block you […] A mortal man, when he has haju, it is a person which is 
good. It is a person that, like me, you know individually as a human being […] Haju 
means in Krio: ‘to open up’. Haju, is a good relation […] It is a pledge […] You don’t get 
any wahalla [trouble] because you haju […] That’s haju. They can love you; they can tell 
you this secret. They can pull you for a mission. They will never lock this game. 
Whenever the police officer, the intelligence [undercover police] comes to you, they will 
come and tell you the information, the right source […but only] if you have made money 
inside the business, one hundred and fifty thousand Leones, today, inside the business. 
You can go and pledge your policemen, fifty thousand. They see you as a friend, that you 
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are my friend. You say I have come to find money […] They will tell you: ‘thank you’. 
They will turn into a good friend. Tomorrow if you have a problem they will not agree 
[with those arresting you] […] They will leave you and give all of the property back, all 
of the money, because the police are there to watch. They are there to watch, they have 
to know the criminal who is trying to sabotage the business.” 
 
So what makes a criminal want to sabotage the business? 
“The criminal who wants to sabotage the business is the one who doesn’t have any 
finance. They don’t understand the business [...] The police that are there; they 
understand the business. They know they have the key to the business.”191  
 
This explanation was congruent with observations of raids against other youth bases in 
Hastings and Waterloo that had also been designated grey zones. While sitting at God 
Raw with a shareholder who had owned a farm in Sugar Loaf for eight years, six 
Operational Support Division (OSD) officers brandishing tear gas launchers suddenly 
entered the panbɔdi and arrested several loudly protesting young men. Seemingly 
relaxed, he claimed: 
 
“It is raiding. They are raiding. This is the way they work; they need money when job 
facility is not there. If you have haju you will never fall, they will never catch me.” 
 
The cultivator then introduced me to a senior OSD officer wearing a red beret: 
 
“This is my guy, he is a friend, do not worry. Corruption, intelligence and information, 
this is how it works.”192 
 
The logic of haju was not reducible to law enforcement turning a blind eye. Rather, the 
law was strategically suspended upon regular receipt of haju, thereby protecting self-
interests in the cannabis trade while also conforming to the public interest in their daily 
encounters by TOCU. Raids against youth bases designated grey zones created a demand 
for police inaction, which was formalised through the regular payment of haju by 
shareholders that now began to “control” each youth base and the targeting of certain 
dealers that frequented them over those that were under their tutelage.  
 
                                                        
191 Interview with Turkish, Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 17/09/2013.  
192 Interview with Mɔnga, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 24/10/2013.  
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Formalised extra-legal networks first emerged following an influx of young migrants 
into Waterloo, Hastings and Freetown who were escaping renewed offensives by the 
RUF in the late 1990s. Unmet demand for cannabis in Freetown expanded the consumer 
market for entrants who could exploit its then greater contestability and gain access to 
those with the contacts and resources to reach inter-regional markets. Although many 
now current shareholders and journeymen described this period in terms of the 
growing suspicions and uncertainties following infiltration of the RUF into Waterloo and 
fragile political allegiances within the NPRC during the late 1990s, domestic exchange 
continued to be well-coordinated. This was because, until the fall of the NPRC, cannabis 
dealers were subject to the social regulation of urban secret societies.  
 
Experienced cultivators and dealers noted that the odelay societies193 of Firestone and 
Paddle, originally of Yoruba origin, in addition to the more recent Civili Rule and 
Rainbow urban-based societies, were important sources of belonging and sodality, and 
acted as gatekeepers in access to scarce resources, especially during the 1980s and 
1990s (Nunley 1987: 61-102; Albrecht and King 2015). Although urban secret societies 
have typically been discussed in terms of the then-ruling All Peoples’ Congress party’s 
mobilisation of political thuggery (Rosen 2005: 78), odelays are noted to have provided 
Freetown’s influx of unemployed youth with work in the informal and illicit economies 
(Abdullah 1998: 208). While tracing Turkish’s movements through Eastern Freetown, 
he claimed the Firestone Community in Foulah Town – an area historically dominated 
by Protestant Krios – had been resident to many of the “highest level” cannabis dealers 
who were adept at navigating the dense and blurred allegiances of Eastern Freetown’s 
manifold social networks. Firestone was officially founded in 1967 by upcoming 
members, known as the ‘Young Bloods’ who, unlike their older counterparts, were less 
reticent in their consumption and procurement of cannabis and ‘quickly took to its use’ 
having already been closely engaged with Rastafari culture (Nunley 1987: 77-9). Having 
established exchange relationships with cultivators in Hastings during the late 1980s to 
1990s, new members of Firestone were provided with opportunities to cultivate 
cannabis along the peninsula, and in return, these societies facilitated cultivators’ access 
to growing consumer markets in Freetown. 
 
                                                        
193 The ‘odelay’ is a youth-oriented and urban-based troupe established in the 1970s that draw 
on the iconography of colonial-era hunting societies and involve annual public masquerades (see 
Nunley 1987). 
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Odelays were central to the extra-legal networks that regulated Eastern Freetown’s 
exchange market for cannabis. A local civil society representative claimed that the 
influence of odelays extended to the organisation of cocaine and heroin “katɛls” [cartels] 
such as “After Eight” and “Bangkok” based in Lumley Street.194 The youth of Race Course 
claimed that the Firestone had cooperated closely with local divisions of the SLP since 
LPPBs were established following the civil war in the early 2000s (also see Albrecht and 
King 2015: 187-9). Turkish likewise explained how his late father, a Local Unit 
Commander (LUC) in charge of law enforcement operations in Hastings and Grafton, 
was a participant on one such LPPB and worked closely to share information concerning 
criminal activity. These intermediaries were important for protecting shareholders from 
being targeted by the police, but these arrangements were now coming under strain 
from TOCU. Therefore, as one cultivator suggested, the ability of shareholders to 
influence the LPPB’s was important because they represented the:  
 
“Intelligence […] they will come and tell you the information, the right source. They will 
not let you fall in the business.”195 
 
With shareholders already benefiting from the incorporation of pre-existing social 
institutions that they had participated in since the 1980s, under the pressure of TOCU 
they became patrons given their access to and ability to influence what criminals and 
criminal activity should be targeted and what should not. 
 
7.5. Secrecy and the politics of raiding 
 
The shareholders utilised established and more predictable extra-legal networks to 
protect their interests. By contrast, small-time dealers without the support of these 
shareholders utilised counter-strategies of the formula and flushing to evade the police 
in Eastern Freetown’s exchange market. For them, criminal selection and targeting was 
more ambiguous due to the overt presence of the police in the cannabis trade. For 
instance, police officers openly mixed with dealers in youth bases and a number of 
shareholders claimed they either owned or sponsored farms to increase their income. 
Despite police awareness of high-level farmers and dealers being an open secret, the 
shareholders were still not targeted. For instance, during one visit to American and 
                                                        
194 Interview with Hindowa, former cultivator and civil society representative, Freetown, 
09/12/2013.  
195 Interview with Turkish, Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 17/09/2013. 
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Ɔsilibu’s compounds, a large truck containing at least 1,000 bags of fertiliser had parked 
outside. Twenty young men took turns to eat and carry the bags into the bush (see 
Appendix Eight). While waiting for American and Ɔsilibu to return from their 
discussions with other shareholders concerning this “arrangement”, I asked one 
journeyman whether I could enquire as to why they openly conducted such activity:  
 
“You must speak to someone first and they will give you the green light […Especially] 
those high up in the game. We are the small ones; we do not know how to talk to them 
[…] You need to flip things upside down.”196 
 
Our proximity 500 meters from the National Police Training Centre confirmed that, if 
secrecy was primarily a method of concealment, then it was not one required by the 
shareholders. My focus shifted to the journeyman’s admission that not all those aware of 
the duplicitous role played by the police had the right to interact with them by breaking 
an otherwise open secret. Instead, they were resigned to unequal power relations 
because the shareholders in complicity with local law-enforcement adjudicated what 
was criminal and what was not. Adherence to the implicit rule of knowing what not to 
say worked to sustain a network of extra-legal relations according to how youth handled 
and presented certain information deemed by their peers to be “secret”. This, in turn, 
foreshadowed their encounters with law enforcers during which they perceived it was 
necessary to acquire or retain the support of shareholders to evade criminal charges. As 
one cultivator perceptively claimed: 
 
“Risk is when you are doing something with fearness; tricks are when you are doing 
something with style.”197 
 
His reference to “tricks”, synonymous with having a formula, suggested that the “style” 
according to which illegal activities are concealed is what mattered. To have “fearness”, 
however, was to be protected by a sababu who could minimise the real “risk” of being 
harassed by the police. “Fearness” denoted the duplicitous closure of social distance 
between the police and shareholders, whereas “style” was a counter-strategy of 
concealing illicit activities in the absence of a protector. His compound statement 
suggested that while most independent dealers perceived that an ability to evade the 
police was universally defined by the innovation of different kinds of concealment 
                                                        
196 Field notes, with Turkish in Hastings, 13/11/2013.  
197 Interview with Alpha Fofana, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 31/10/13. 
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(style), the heavy involvement of the police meant it was actually those that secretly co-
operated with them (that “fearness”) that really mattered. And yet, it was precisely this 
logic that the more experienced journeymen who had completed his apprenticeship felt 
unable to divulge. This duplicity was necessary to maintain the coherence of a moral 
rhetoric that purported the shareholders worked against “the system” despite 
precluding their apprentices’ life chances.In doing so, they remained “fearful” sources of 
public authority to their dependents. As one shareholder suggested: “we are all 
brothers, we know our secret, we know ourselves”.198 Bellman (1981: 1) notes that ‘the 
practice [of public secrecy] is so pervasive that it is relevant to any type of social 
situation’. The shareholders therefore duplicitously suggested that the changing politics 
of drug control were a threat to their shared survival, which meant it was now 
necessary for their apprentices to dɔkiamp. 
 
The need for shareholders to modify their extra-legal relations stemmed from reforms 
to the security and intelligence services amid post-conflict reconstruction efforts since 
2001, which resulted in many senior law enforcers being sidelined from drug control 
agencies in Sierra Leone.199 Despite claiming to possess a parliamentary mandate to 
gather intelligence on and coordinate law enforcement operations against illicit drug 
production and trafficking, the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) was 
reduced to what one NGO representative described as a “white elephant”. Former head 
of the now defunct Military Intelligence Bureau and the current director of the NDLEA 
bemoaned his perceived usurpation by TOCU, which reduced the agency to four 
administrative staff (see Appendices Nine & Ten). Civil society representatives and law 
enforcement officials routinely criticised the lack of cooperation between the NDLEA 
and TOCU, with the implicit message that although the NDLEA “knew” more about the 
illicit drug economy than other agencies who staffed younger recruits from the diaspora 
deemed more reliable and impartial, for political reasons the ruling APC would not allow 
the NDLEA to regain an operational role, because: 
 
“He [the NDLEA director] is a dangerous guy [but] he has a lot of information […] 
sensitive information, be careful what you say to him […] he continues to have a lot of 
people working for him [to gather intelligence] presently.”200 
 
                                                        
198 Interview with Abdullai, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 05/11/2013. 
199 For a comprehensive overview of security sector reforms during the post-war period see: 
Jackson and Albrecht (2009); Albrecht (2010) and Krogstad (2012). 
200 Interview with Civil Society Representative, Freetown, 06/12/13. 
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Aptly nicknamed “Awoko” [a Yoruba term for a singing bird i.e. a gossiper] this 
interlocutor in the intelligence services suggested it was important “to be careful what 
you say [during your interviews], a lot of them are spying for the government”. Despite 
the implementation of technocratic reforms, old elites continued to defend the networks 
of haju that were established by the original shareholders during the 1980s and 1990s.  
 
Haju was a precious commodity. Cultivators claimed that although it was possible for 
anyone to secure haju, there was always the threat of “leakage”. Leakage, in its literal 
sense, referred to the revealing of information to the police concerning farm locations, 
rainy season stores of diamba and plans to transport cannabis to Guinea. Given this 
information was presented as secret at the same time as being widely known, whether a 
leaked secret was acted upon depended, first, on whether the subject of the leak had the 
requisite sababu allied to these changing elite-level extra-legal networks and, second, on 
whether they could meet their sababu’s increasing demands for haju. The paradox of 
secrecy this entailed was aptly explained by a shareholder who had farmed in Loko 
Fakay since the late 1990s: 
 
So what do you mean by ‘leakage’? 
“When you go and report somebody about the things you don’t know about. Do you 
understand?”201  
 
By developing his studies of West African secret societies in relation to secrecy in more 
mundane social encounters, Bellman (1981: 8, emphasis added) has noted that ‘when a 
secret is revealed it automatically restructures interpretation. To tell a secret is to do 
secrecy’. Shareholders were more prone to “tell” secrets than were their journeyman 
counterparts. The efficacy of telling a secret hinged on whether the receiver recognised 
the authority of the teller to reveal said information. As such the leaking of secrets was 
as much a normative question regarding who ought to do the telling, as it was a positive 
one regarding the content of the secret. Although anxieties about telling secrets were a 
feature of everyday discussions, the practice of leaking secrets was well-organised 
through competing extra-legal networks established through LPPBs during the NPRC of 
the 1990s, and those that emerged under TOCU during post-conflict reconstruction 
programmes following the late 2000s. With reference to his father who was formerly a 
Local Unit Commander in neighbouring Grafton, a cultivator in Hastings provided a 
detailed explanation of what it meant to leak a secret:  
                                                        
201 Interview with Alpha Fofana, Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 31/20/13.  
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“If they [the shareholders] find out you have the business [but you are not one of their 
apprentices], then they will leak it. If you don’t have the money but you have the sababu 
then you will never make money, trust me. If you have sababu, then that sababu will 
pursue you out [i.e. back you up]. And then if you have money, then your money will 
come close, you will know how to make them [the police] come closer, to sensitise you, 
because they come here to give you that sense. If they want to raid you, to come and 
capture you, then they must give you that sense. They [the shareholders] have 
authority, because of money. You will go and meet them and say: ‘Hey pape, look at this 
one million Leones’. And he says: ‘Leave five hundred thousand’ […] ‘There now, look at 
this one million Leones – hold it’. You have closed them. Then finally they will give you a 
receipt for the business. They will say that anybody who holds you [i.e. tries to arrest 
you] should come and meet us, so call this number. Turkish bangs his index finger on the 
bench. They will never hold you; they will never come and obstruct the business. That is 
why money [is important]. Even for Ɔsilibu when they went and captured him, during 
the time of NPRC [National Provisional Ruling Council], before the coup, they said they 
would come and overthrow him […] But because he was a strongman inside the ganjin 
[cannabis economy], they released him.” 
 
[…] 
 
So you keep some secrets and leak others out? 
“No we don’t let the ghetto man’s [i.e. our network’s] secret leak out. But if they [the 
police] want to come and raid in the ghetto then we would tell the men in the ghetto 
that they are coming to raid. We would hide everything and make a disguise. Then if the 
policemen want to get hold of the criminals, then we help them, because we are the 
intelligence. We let them apprehend criminals.” 
 
So the information comes from your father’s friends? 
“That makes the police know where they move. All the movement they are doing at all 
of the corners. They are trying to gain information. We are trying to gain information. 
[But] we are not working to disturb the peace. The police are working to gain 
information, to know about you. If you are a criminal, if you are a minister, or a teacher, 
that is what they want to know. […] This is the work of the police: to try and save life 
and property.”202 
 
The efficacy of leaked secrets depended on whether the social network through which 
the secret had been communicated was recognised by law enforcement as legitimate. 
                                                        
202 Interview with Turkish, Cannabis Cultivator, 17/09/2013, Hastings.  
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Secrecy took the form of a message interpreted from different points of view within 
hierarchical networks resulting in a 'restriction of information about information' 
(Bellman 1981: 8). From the perspective of secrecy as a communicative act, the 
analytical focus is less on what was leaked (i.e. the content of the secret) for the police 
could already obtain the information through pre-existing networks of surveillance. A 
common theme across interviews with senior law enforcement and security officials 
was their tacit acknowledgement that my research should not be empirically 
challenging, for information regarding the specifics of the cannabis economy; including 
names of cultivators and dealers, locations of farms and ghettos, the organisational 
hierarchies, and so forth, were already well known to them. It was rather my failure to 
contact them and their particular network in the first instance; to acquire their sababu 
and be granted their “permission”, that was perceived as incompetent. As a civil society 
representative who previously worked as a dealer in one of Eastern Freetown’s ghettos 
claimed, many of the largest farms and ghettos were owned by members of the SLP:  
 
“I will tell you for free, the police know every ghetto in this country. They know the men 
who are doing all the stuff, but it is only that they are not proactive, because they have 
gains that can be made from the sale. So if you want to stop it then [he pauses suddenly 
and changes tack] well in most cases, actually, they won’t go there, they will just tell the 
boys, because, in fact, this isn’t an allegation, it’s the truth.”203 
 
More emphatically, the Director of the NDLEA claimed that:  
 
“The police are hopeless, useless, they don’t want the drug trade to end […] I could 
name them all. I could bring a tsunami to Salone [Sierra Leone] Everyone knows 
everyone. If you want to know all of them go to CID, one thousand dollars should get 
you what you need.”204  
 
Such claims indicated that various activities and players were widely known but not 
acted on by law enforcement. This was because the targeting of one dominant player 
could precipitate the targeting of others in different networks. The act of leaking secrets 
can therefore be reinterpreted as a 'number of implicit instructions that accompany [the 
telling of a secret] and constitute its [communicative] key' (Bellman 1981: 9). Common 
during discussions with law enforcers was the absence of specific details regarding 
                                                        
203 Interview with Hindowa, Civil Society Representative, Freetown, 09/12/13. 
204 Interview with Sim Turey, Director of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA, 
Freetown, 13/12/13. 
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information that led to an arrest, eradication of a farm or seizure of cannabis from a 
vehicle travelling to Guinea. It was the act of leaking itself that appeared to be at stake, 
rather than the content. This was because those who were told secrets needed to 
disregard the telling as an exposing (because the information could already be obtained 
by other means) and in doing so the police assumed membership “inside the game” with 
cultivators and pushers who shared dominant positions within their respective extra-
legal networks. Consequently, disputes at the elite-level of drug enforcement were 
indicative of a struggle over access to the authority and resources of the state and its 
“official” rules. A selective deceit ensued whereby police recognised that secrets 
originating only from certain high-level cultivators were secret in the stricter sense of 
the term. Separately, apprentices and journeymen occupying structurally 
disadvantageous positions were not party to this tacit collusion. Instead they perceived 
the leaking of secrets to law enforcement as a threat to all, which in turn necessitated 
their closer cooperation with shareholders who could afford them a degree of 
protection.  
 
When I asked Turkish why we could observe the illegal activities of the shareholders, 
but were unable to interview them on specifics, he claimed that: “We are the smaller 
ones; we do not know how to talk to them”. The emphasis placed on “how” is crucial, for 
it suggested that only those who occupied structurally advantageous positons possessed 
the interpretive keys necessary – of putting two-and-two together – to leak a secret with 
efficacy. Such one-sided communicative acts imply a double truth, for the semantic 
ambiguities youth engaged in were motivated by the perceived threat law-enforcement 
posed should their secret leak out. This was despite such secrets only having efficacy – 
in terms of arrests, eradications and seizures – if the teller of the secret and the receiver 
(the police) occupied the 'same structural position vis-a-vis all others who would make 
different use of the concealed information' (Bellman 1981: 19).  
 
Therefore, in most cases, the subject of a leaked secret was only targeted if they 
occupied a structurally disadvantageous position to the teller. This was because the 
leaking of secrets had been communicated from a position of authority. Otherwise 
secrecy amount to merely gossip and rumour that, in turn, provided youth with an 
incentive to pursue the protection of a shareholder in a social landscape they perceived 
as being inherently uncertain and unpredictable. As the owner of a farm in Macdonald 
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who was more peripheral to these extra-legal networks claimed: “if raiding comes, it is 
in God’s hands”.205  
 
Those that had not undertaken apprenticeships were resigned to treat raids organised 
by TOCU as inevitable and matter-of-fact. The practice of leaking secrets marked out 
membership categories corresponding to the clustering of cultivators around 
shareholders that could access extra-legal networks, and which in turn, were structured 
and restructured according to their changing positions within the economic field. Access 
to information regarding impending raids against cannabis farms, and the ability to 
secure haju in the face of police harassment in the exchange market, depended on the 
positon of cultivators within geographically clustered hub-and-spoke networks. As a 
journeyman who rented a plot from a shareholder in Loko Fakay claimed: 
 
“Yeah, a secret Balogun [the researcher]. I can get information some days when they 
[the shareholders] say: ‘Hey! Raiding is coming! So-so-so time. They call and give me a 
hint. Then I know and can be ready. Well then I know that today they are doing it.”206 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
205 Interview with Mr Shɛka, Cannabis Cultivator, Macdonald, 19/11/2013.  
206 Interview with Bayo Manseray (alias, ‘Adebayor’), Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 
19/11/2013.  
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Based on data regarding ties observed and reported between cultivators and law 
enforcers, the network diagram in Figure Five depicts directed and undirected channels 
of communication between law-enforcers, shareholders, journeymen and apprentices. 
Journeymen and apprentices relied on their shareholders to pass on information. This 
network focuses on extra-legal relations in production and therefore does not account 
for the role played by middlemen in the exchange market. However, other groups in the 
open market, as suggested in the case of youth bases in Freetown, Hastings, and 
Waterloo, were marginal to the extra-legal networks inhabited by shareholder farmers. 
Each node is sized according to its respective betweenness centrality (see Appendix 
Five). This is a useful metric for understanding how the more localised extra-legal 
networks organised through LPPBs since the early 2000s, were being challenged by 
TOCU at the elite-level of drug enforcement. Betweenness centrality measures the 
degree to which a cultivator lies on the shortest path between two other cultivators and 
Figure Three: Extra-Legal relations in cannabis production between cultivators and law-
enforcement. Source: Fieldwork data (Appendix Four). 
Shareholders 
Journeymen 
Apprentices 
Law enforcement 
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law enforcers across the entire extra-legal network, including those shareholders 
detached from any extra-legal relation.207 In the context of these changing extra-legal 
networks, betweenness helps to identify those that ‘are able to funnel the flow [of 
information] in networks’ and who in doing so, ‘can assert control over the flow’ (Opashl 
et al 2010: 3-4). Each node is sized according to the degree of betweenness centrality, 
such that larger nodes represent cultivators with greater access to sources of 
information regarding impending raids against farms by TOCU. Ɔsilibu obtained the 
highest betweenness (0.35). Mr Shɛkah, the landowner of Macdonald farm, obtained the 
lowest (0.0), given he was detached from the newly emerging network presided over by 
TOCU. These betweenness statistics closely approximated each cultivator’s experience 
of raiding, with, for example, Macdonald farm having been targeted by TOCU in 
December 2012 and 2013, given this cluster of production lacked the sababu necessary 
to control the flow of information percolating from TOCU down the SLP hierarchy.208  
 
With these extra-legal arrangements incorporated into the extant production 
hierarchies examined in Chapter Four, the resulting social structure is a larger hub-and-
spoke network, which is suited to the maintenance of hierarchy and the efficient 
communication of information.209 Those shareholders with a greater betweenness 
statistic, such as those clustered in Hastings, are thereby interpreted to have assumed a 
more dominant position and as such are better protected. Yet, as discussed in relation to 
public secrecy, not all information has the same efficacy for individuals within each 
production hierarchy of shareholders, journeymen and apprentices. This was because 
only information presented as secret was accepted as genuine and valuable, as opposed 
to gossip and rumour. As discussed in Chapter Three, it was necessary to link the 
subjectivist analysis of public secrecy with an objectivist analysis that was more 
detached and situated the flow of information in the hierarchically unequal positions 
assumed by cultivators. Hence, only shareholders were able to establish the extra-legal 
relations necessary for bribe payments to be acted on their law-enforcing counterparts. 
For example, a former apprentice cultivator that had quickly obtained land ownership 
and greater net profit on average corresponded to a high value of 0.22. This was 
                                                        
207 The betweenness centrality of a node (v) is calculated according to g(v) = ∑
𝑛 ₐₑ(𝑣)
𝑛 ₐₑ𝑠 ≠𝑣 ≠𝑡 
 where 
nₐₑ is the total number of shortest paths from node a to node e and nₐₑ (v) is the number of those 
paths that pass through v. 
208 According to the land owner, TOCU’s “Operation Green Hay” in 2012 and “Operation Green 
Hay 2” in 2013 eradicated 5km/sq of Macdonald farm. 
209 The spread of rumour, for example, is not the result of passive information “diffusion”, but 
rather, motivated by deliberate demand and notification in relation to those who are proximate 
in social as well as geographic space (Martin 2009: 164). 
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indicative of the relations he strategically maintained with his former shareholder, 
Ɔsilibu, which allowed his payments of haju to have greater efficacy and served as prior 
warning for raids against cultivators. Having completed an apprenticeship, Ɔsilibu 
represented this cultivator’s sababu [influential person] whom he could signal to for 
protection when dealing and for receiving credible information of impending raids. 
Consequently, the convertibility of social capital in relations between cultivators and 
juridical capital in terms of payments of haju was regulated by an underlying 
distribution of symbolic capital that was generative of who had the right to credibly leak 
secrets and who did not. Repeated interactions across hubs, while limited to only certain 
shareholders, resulted in the formation of these hub-and-spoke networks. Those that 
had established extra-legal relationships with law-enforcement acted as the mediators 
of information for the ‘spokes’ – the apprentices and journeymen – attached to them. 
Timely receipt of information regarding future raiding – when understood as credible 
and signalled by a cultivator’s sababu – also acted as a withholding sanction against 
failure to pay land rent or in the event of theft. 
 
Since the inception of TOCU, cultivators formed increasingly close-knit networks 
represented by the colloquial names given to neighbouring plots, such as Loko Fakay 
and You Must Grumble. Hub-and-spoke networks conformed to the imperative of 
shareholders that youth were to dɔkiamp and that, far from duplicity, they were all 
equally subject to the same uncertainties. The resulting structure was ‘ideal to handle 
issues of dissemination of information when the source and recipient of that 
information are not easily specified in advance’ (Martin 2009: 167). Consequently, the 
shareholders gained a structural advantage in the juridical field given they were 
provided by elites within law enforcement circles of impending raids. These elites had a 
vested interest to “leak” such secrets as it helped them undermine each other’s 
effectiveness and stood to make light of their corrupt practices. When cultivators and 
pushers ventured away from a shareholder, haju lost its efficacy. Youth that moved 
around most frequently were treated with disdain. Law enforcement could therefore 
continue benefiting from bribes, without undermining the position of the established 
shareholders whom they sought to protect. This created an incentive for youth to 
undertake apprenticeships that, in doing so, contributed to the reproduction of 
structural advantages. As one former dealer noted: “The police, you know, they are like 
players in this ring”. 
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7.6. Conclusion: misrecognition in the juridical field 
 
Rather than extra-legality being indicative of a dereliction of duty to the “public”, 
corruption was strategic and served localised political ends. The interests of local law-
enforcers in the cannabis economy meant it was treated as an illegal-yet-licit activity, as 
demonstrated by acts of suspending the law during everyday social encounters. 
However, these episodes of police inaction were not solely reducible to the gains that 
stood to be made from self-interested bribery against all law-breakers. Rather, they 
favoured those in positions of authority who inhabited extra-legal networks in which 
shareholders and law-enforcers were co-present since at least the 1980s. The inception 
of TOCU did, however, begin to sharpen distinctions between law-enforcers and law-
breakers, for cannabis production was increasingly conveyed as a threat to national 
security. This placed pressure on localised extra-legal networks comprising 
shareholders and LPPBs since the early 2000s. Notions of cannabis as illegal-yet-licit 
were being undermined by government discourse and centrally co-ordinated law 
enforcement, challenging the ability of shareholders to protect clients. This was 
demonstrated by Turkish’s difficulty negotiating with two undercover police officers 
whom he already “knew” while residing in Hastings.  
 
Competition between local networks of protection and the more independent TOCU at 
the level of everyday social encounters was explained according to the concept of 
juridical field. Here, different players vied to legitimise and delegitimise (i.e. criminalise) 
localised social categories regarding what counted as licit and illicit, permissible and 
impermissible. Police inaction in this regard was justified on the basis of common 
criminal categories. Small-time dealers in youth bases with no shareholder affiliation 
were subject to the charge of frequency and treated as idle delinquents engaged in the 
use of prescription drugs and theft. Apprentices and journeymen perceived that all were 
equally subject to the law. This notion extended from a moral rhetoric advanced by the 
shareholders that positioned their righteous work in opposition to “the system” that 
sought to foreclose their life chances. Those in disadvantaged positions did not, 
therefore, engage in purposive ‘boundary work’ by negotiating the roles of law-breaker 
and law-enforcer in line with their interests (Beek 2012). Rather, the efficacy of bribery 
on the part of journeymen and middlemen navigating the exchange market depended on 
social rather than economic capital. This was demonstrated by their signalling affiliation 
to shareholders during encounters with different local police forces in order to secure 
inaction. When qualified by sababu, the payment of haju was credible.  
 
 
244 
 
 
Extra-legality is often treated as synonymous with small, closed and collusive groups 
that provide a context in which corruption subverts the public interest. In this 
conceptual framework, primacy is given to the need for secrecy as a form of 
concealment; such that corruption must be kept private if co-conspirators are to avoid 
detection (Baker and Faulkner 1993). This chapter demonstrated that secrecy can be 
defined as qualitative experience tied to particular positions within a field of activity 
that cuts across a clear demarcation between ‘state’ and ‘society’. For instance, 
shareholders taught their apprentices the importance of needing to dɔkiamp; to not tell 
the police their secret. As such, journeymen and independent dealers began to develop 
counter-strategies, such as the forms of concealment denoted by flushing and the 
formula. Given the presence of TOCU rendered shareholders’ ability to protect their 
clients increasingly uncertain, youth reasoned that detection by law-enforcement 
stemmed from a failure to innovate new methods of concealment and a lack of discipline 
in keeping their secret in everyday social encounters. This was demonstrated by the 
increasing prevalence of semantic ambiguities and hushed voices, compounded by 
gossip and rumour. 
 
Secrecy usually bares an analogical relation to intimacy and privacy. Typically secrecy 
matters in terms of who is privy to a secret and who is not. Privacy and secrecy do, 
however, represent different ways of treating knowledge during social encounters. 
While all manner of information can be concealed, such as gossip and rumour; only 
secrecy ‘restructures interpretations of social reality’ (Bellman 1981: 2-8; Piot 1993). 
This restructuring of reality occurred on the part of those apprentices and journeymen 
that learned to dɔkiamp, which ensured the coherence of a moral rhetoric that their 
shareholders were not complicit with agents of the state. 
 
Wacquant (1998: 4) notes, for instance, that the hustling involved in criminal activity is 
defined by an ‘ability to manipulate others, to inveigle and deceive them’. While 
shareholders deceived current and former apprentices by stressing the need to keep 
secrets, the reality of their hustle was somewhat more difficult to ‘pin down in reality 
itself’ (ibid: 5). Public secrecy, the shared norm of knowing what not to say, worked to 
dissimulate the complicity between protagonists that youth clung to as occupying the 
separate moral universes encompassed by “the game” and “the system”. This duplicity 
stemmed from shareholders and law-enforcers needing to protect their mutual interests 
from the increasing encroachment of TOCU. The absence of their dependent’s 
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misrecognition would have otherwise undermined their investment (illusio) in 
apprenticeship. As Wacquant concludes on the social figure of the hustler, the 
‘awareness’ of duplicity results in ‘a pained lucidity that makes [them] realize that to 
pity oneself would be in vain’ (ibid: 5).  
 
Following his father’s death, Turkish remained a journeyman but had lost a vital 
guarantor to protect him from the police. With the inception of TOCU and the changing 
dynamics of law enforcement beginning to turn against him, Turkish reasoned he must 
continue to pursue his work in order to not become “bɔmboshɔro”. To be bɔmboshɔro, as 
Turkish explained in the introductory vignette (Chapter One), was emasculating and 
indicative of the “shit” youth experienced when unable to assume the more 
accommodating identity status of youth man. The shareholders did, however, offer new 
forms of protection, thereby accommodating their continued status as youth men while 
paradoxically increasing their dependency and foreclosing opportunities for self-
enterprise. It is for this reason that illicit work was experienced by youth as decidedly 
double-edged. 
 
Despite their misrecognition to the contrary, the objective convertibility between 
sababu and the haju of police inaction, as understood by an observer, reproduced the 
structural advantages of dominant cultivators and dealers through youths’ everyday 
encounters in the economic field of cannabis cultivation and exchange. The negotiation 
and adjudication of sababu placed limits around their opportunities to convert social 
into economic capital. Haju responded to a demand for police inaction. Together these 
imperatives emphasised to youth that apprenticeship was the means by which they 
could ensure a degree of stability in their lives. Apprenticeship allowed young men to 
avoid the pitfalls and uncertainties of playing the game, and in turn worked to inculcate 
and reproduce emic practices as compatible with what it meant be a youth man. Hence, 
sabi, sababu and haju formed a tripartite of emic practices that ensured the on-going 
cultivation of hierarchy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
246 
 
Chapter Eight: Conclusion: Reproducing Structural Advantage 
 
8.1. Research question and avenues 
 
During the introductory vignette I traced Turkish’s life history from the late 1990s as he 
went “inside the game” of cannabis cultivation in Hastings, having dropped out of school 
and found himself socially marginalised undertaking the work of illicit drug running for 
a Lumley Street cartel. On the precipice of his life turning bɔmboshɔro [break, rupture, 
synonymous with the Krio colloquialism of a “frakas”], Turkish sought existential refuge 
in an apprenticeship with his shareholder Harold. First introduced by Jamaican 
cultivators displaced amid the Jamaican Labour Party’s War on Drugs in the mid-1980s, 
I examined in Chapter Four how these shareholders benefited from new cultivation 
techniques and seed varieties that increased yields and provided them with a 
competitive advantage for the next three decades. Furthermore, these nascent 
cultivators – such as Ɔsilibu and American – established extra-legal relations that 
allowed them to access information regarding impending raids on farms by law 
enforcement.  
 
I argued that illicit drug economies are typically conceptualised through what I termed 
an objectivist-structuralist approach. By reading non-state organisation through the 
assumptions of embeddedness and interactionism, organised and credible threats of 
inter-personal violence were privileged as the mechanisms through which small, closed 
and collusive groups mitigated challenges by newcomers and evaded detection and 
disruption by law enforcement. Given the uncertainties of product illegality, 
interference by law-enforcement, and resulting need for intra-group discipline and 
monitoring, violence was treated as the preferred organisational strategy for small and 
closed groups. Consequently, it was argued that the analysis of illicit drug economies in 
sub-Saharan Africa fell back on epistemic and conceptual assumptions relating to the 
objectivist-structuralist and subjectivist-constructivist approaches, with the empirical 
focus having been almost exclusively on cases of illicit drug economies found in North 
America, Europe and Latin America. Rather than careful analysis of the institutional 
histories, norms and actors involved in the production and exchange of illicit drugs, a 
paucity of empirical data has resulted in various kinds of essentialism that have 
emphasised the criminalisation of the state, war economies and Mafia-type organisation. 
In effect, the transit economy for cocaine and heroin operated by Eastern Freetown’s 
handful of cartels that Turkish was escaping from, has been conflated with the longer 
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and more productive history of the cannabis economy in Hastings and Waterloo, such 
that it was increasingly being treated by government, law enforcement and 
international donors as a threat to national security.  
 
When cultivators in Hastings and Waterloo locked their index fingers together, the 
explanation and practice of what they referred to as chain work was at odds with this 
representation of Sierra Leone’s cannabis economy. Examining this production and 
marketing networks in Chapter Four was apparent that dominant players benefitted 
from structural advantages in access to land, labour and higher value exchange partners. 
A survey of seasonal returns concluded the presence of oligopolistic price competition. 
Yet, neither the presence of organised violence nor a unitary and corrupt police force 
secured these advantages. This seeming contradiction in the objectivist-structuralist 
approach motivated the underlying research question of this thesis: 
 
How are structural advantages secured in cannabis production and marketing 
networks, without dominant players limiting contestability by resorting to 
organised violence? 
 
During an initial phase of field research (Dec 2013 to May 2014) I identified boss-
apprentice relations (i.e. apprenticeship) as the site at which structural advantages were 
being reproduced. A short period of desk research (June 2014) allowed me to develop 
the conceptual tools necessary to examine the reproduction of structural advantages in 
both the economic field of cultivation and exchange and the juridical field of law 
enforcement. This task required bridging an impasse between objectivist-structuralist 
and subjectivist-constructivist approaches that had resulted from disciplinary silos. To 
this end, Chapter Two discussed Bourdieu’s relational sociology and outlined his key 
open concepts of field, capital, habitus, practices, illusio, misrecognition and symbolic 
violence. These concepts were considered in theoretical relation to each other, as a 
‘toolbox’, rather than taking a more partial reading that selected certain concepts that 
have been deployed primarily to understand particular empirical contexts (e.g. of highly 
striated class society). The chapter further developed the concepts of misrecognition 
and symbolic violence that emerged from Bourdieu’s study of non-state ‘modes of 
domination’ and concluded they required better empirical specification. Rather than 
reverting to an interactionist vision that privileged inter-personal relations, relations 
were argued to lie between position-takings occupied by agents within an organised 
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field of activity, such that on-going practices – acting, reasoning and valuing – were 
motivated and shaped by the dispositions (habitus) tied to that particular position.  
 
8.2. Examining structural advantage 
 
Structural advantages were ‘structural’ in two senses. First, according to the objectively 
unequal distribution of economic (land, labour and cash-money); cultural (who was 
recognised to be competent and knowledgeable), and social capital (in relationships 
with exchange partners). Second, structure took on an inter-subjective form, 
representing a symbolic system according to which cultivators classified, utilised and 
valued objects and relations in particular ways in their on-going activity. Structure was 
objective and subjective and related to the concepts of field and habitus respectively. 
Practices represented particular ‘forms’ of acting, reasoning and valuing that when 
reiterated produced the regularities observed at the level of the economic field and gave 
it a degree of stability. This allowed the field to be examined by using objectivist tools of 
analysis such as regression analysis and network mapping. By contrast, a probability 
function broke down at the level of the individual and their particular idiosyncrasies, 
lending to the impression in subjectivist-constructivist accounts that life is more 
uncertain and volatile (see Lainé 2014). By moving iteratively between theory and 
evidence it was possible to examine how apprentice cultivators misrecognised the 
subjective nature of social life as an ‘objective’ reality that motivated and gave meaning 
to their on-going practices. The result was identification of more covert forms of 
symbolic violence, rather than inter-personal violence or structural violence. I argued 
that structural advantages could be examined by coordinating the qualitative experience 
of more and less dominant participants that assumed particular positions within the 
economic and juridical fields. This alternative approach to the study of illicit economies 
was referred to as social aesthetics.  
 
The methodological avenue necessary to flesh out a social aesthetics entailed the linking 
of objectivist and subjectivist modes of analysis. I followed Bourdieu and adopted the 
methodological approach of participant-objectivation. Rather than assuming that 
greater immersion as a participant-observer would result in greater objectivity, Chapter 
Three argued for a degree of detachment during field work and analysis in order to 
situate the experience of interlocutors according to the position they occupied within 
the field. This was also necessary because covert power operated extra-discursively and 
was more challenging to elicit through techniques such as interviewing that are 
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primarily inter-subjective. Consequently, I used objectivist and subjectivist techniques 
of data collection and analysis and examined the degree to which subjective 
expectations diverged from objective chances. This window onto social distance was 
clearest in terms of what Chapter Three referred to as public secrecy. By initially 
focusing attention on subjects who assumed more and less dominant positions, it was 
possible to examine who had the right to reveal secrets to law enforcement and who did 
not, thereby coordinating points of view from advantaged and disadvantaged positions 
within the juridical field.  
 
8.3. Cultivating hierarchy: main arguments 
 
Several empirical contributions were provided in Chapter Four: Chain Work towards a 
better understanding of drug production in sub-Saharan Africa and to the economic 
analysis of cannabis cultivation and exchange more broadly. A fine-grained institutional 
analysis demonstrated that a system of apprentice provisioning utilised by Christian 
Evangelists in the late 1700s spurred a legacy of institutional adaptation in small-scale 
agriculture whereby apprenticeship was inter-related with a low-margin, domestic 
marketing system. The introduction of cannabis sativa in the mid-1980s and new 
cultivation techniques also significantly improved crop yields and reduced harvesting 
time. In response to increasing intra-regional demand, prices rose during Sierra Leone’s 
post-war recovery. Cannabis provided greater returns than licit agricultural goods and 
cultivators were able to strategise based on reliable seasonal fluctuations in supply. 
Returns were skewed in favour of so-called shareholders who had obtained first rights 
to land ownership and established clusters of cannabis production in the mid-1980s (in 
You Must Grumble). Rather than explaining these observations as a market inefficiency 
resulting from the opacity of price signals (i.e. incomplete information) or unequal 
access to information regarding quality and high value exchange partners, I argued that 
asymmetric and incomplete information were indicative of principles through which the 
shareholders secured their dominant positions.  
 
This operated in two ways. First, quality and price were not closely associated such that 
the expectation of price was more significant than any ‘objective’ valuation when 
cultivators and dealers shared samples of their product. Second, more competitive 
cultivators had a longer history of providing apprenticeships to newer entrants and had 
historically acted as gatekeepers in access to economic capital (credit, labour and land). 
The chapter concluded that price formation in the cannabis economy could not be fully 
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explained when limited to an interactionist vision. Turning to the concept of economic 
field afforded a structural vision of illicit economies whereby particular dispositions tied 
to unequal positions within a field were structured through access to, and ownership of, 
land and labour. The economic field was socially constructed and I argued that what 
apprentices considered rational strategy was likely shaped by particular dispositions 
and expectations that informed how they negotiated exchange relationships. Rather 
than a market inefficiency, oligopolistic competition indicated schemes of action, 
reasoning and valuation (i.e. practices) that were oriented to the possibilities and 
constraints of particular positions as youth men and shareholders.  
 
This system of apprenticing was demonstrated to be uncertain owing to a lack of 
enforceable contracting arrangements or independent referees, and the threat of 
interference by law-enforcement. Despite shareholders exploiting the cheap labour of 
apprentices and journeymen remaining confined to a low-margin domestic market, 
apprenticeship was rendered durable and reproduced according to an elective affinity 
between Rastafari and Neo-Evangelism. This folk cosmology invoked a sense of 
requiredness and validation by others sharing the same field of activity that motivated 
and co-ordinated action in cannabis farming and marketing networks. The ensuing 
practices were qualified by notions of hard work and the “strain” of physical labour that 
conformed to broader socio-generational categories of what it meant to be a respected 
and worthy young person. This process represented what I referred in Chapter One as 
‘alignment’, which was necessary to align expectations with chances, or in other words, 
of subjective dispositions with objective positions. As demonstrated in Chapter Five: 
The Game, what I described as the primary habitus of shareholders came into 
confrontation with the expectations of youth that were guided by the telos of a stylised 
Western modernity. To attune the expectations of their prospective apprentices to the 
objective chances they had of succeeding in the economic field of cannabis cultivation, 
they needed to be “sensitised” and “pulled down” to more reasonable goals. The Five 
Star General’s “bluff bluff” was indicative of the double-edged nature of this habitus, on 
the one hand offering hope and on the other concealing that expectations were unlikely 
to be fulfilled.  
 
The legacy of these early shareholders was the clustering of cannabis cultivation in the 
peninsula bush around Hastings and Waterloo into several distinct sites, referred to 
colloquially as Loko Fakay, Obɔnoki, Sugar Loaf, Wanpala and You Must Grumble. Each 
site was shown to be hierarchically organised, with what I referred to as ‘bosses’ 
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claiming ownership to ancestral and state-owned land by assuming the status of a 
stranger. This land was then informally rented to secondary land users who farmed on 
plots under the guidance of their respective shareholder who taught them how to grow, 
how to gain the sababu [influential people] of higher value exchange partners, and how 
to monetarily value the quality [grade] of cannabis when distributing a sample of their 
product to dealers in the panbɔdi [tin hut]. While apprentices and journeymen assumed 
the intermediary category of “youth man”, this institutional accommodation ensured 
their investments of energy, hard work and time while apprenticed reproduced a 
hierarchical social structure and enabled the shareholders to extract cheap labour. 
Shareholders also regulated access to economic capital in land, higher value exchange 
partners, and as such were able to “control” the labour of their apprentices. I concluded 
that habitus was not synonymous with mindless repetition but was instead to be 
grasped phenomenologically in particular sites (i.e. apprenticeship) at which field and 
habitus were being linked. This was necessary to explain how the subjective 
expectations were aligned with objective chances, and thereby reproduced the 
institution of apprenticeship and its associated marketing networks under conditions of 
uncertainty.  
 
It was through apprenticeship that habitus and field were linked to reproduce structural 
advantages. In Chapter Six: Apprenticeship I examined how apprenticeship, as a 
collective form of “learning by doing”, provided the possibility of acquiring a valuable 
skill and claiming the status of a productive and righteous somebody within a context of 
scarcity. Youth engaged in two inter-linked emic practices – sababu and grade – that 
acted as covert principles regulating access to higher value exchange partners, greater 
returns for the product of their labour, and to police inaction amid raiding of cannabis 
farms and deals. When apprentice cultivators came to understand the game, they 
recognised what was permissible and impermissible; what kinds of acting, reasoning 
and valuing were perceived necessary so as not be playing a “simple game”. I argued 
that, conceptually-speaking, the imperative of being viewed as savvy [sabi in phonetic 
Krio vernacular] was synonymous with the accumulation of cultural capital, and 
produced symbolic relations of power that shaped how these specific species of capital 
were accumulated, utilised and valued.  Apprentice cultivators’ claim to be ”finding their 
own lane in life” was a subjective manoeuvre that provided them a degree of uncertainty 
in spite of the risk of being exploited by not receiving wages, land ownership, higher 
value exchange partners, or the their skills otherwise not being recognised by other 
shareholders as valuable . The recognition – worth and value – resulting from 
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participation in apprenticeship entailed misrecognition of the objective structures that 
kept them hemmed in. To be considered a righteous and productive somebody, as 
argued in relation to the illusio of righteous labour, had psychological payoffs motivating 
participation, which supported the economic incentives examined in Chapter Four. In 
effect, apprenticeship operated as what Wacquant (1995) terms a ‘collusio’, by securing 
the reproduction of structural advantages through one-sided practices.  
 
The juridical field of law enforcement overlapped with the economic field of cannabis 
production and exchange. In Chapter Seven: Raiding I argued the juridical field allowed 
agents of the state, namely the police, to assume the abstract and impersonal authority 
of the state and target those cultivators and dealers who assumed disadvantaged 
positions. When peripheral to extra-legal networks that had been organised by the 
shareholders since the mid-1980s, youth could not access information regarding 
impending raids against cannabis farms and were treated as unproductive idlers by the 
police when attempting to sell their product in Hastings, Waterloo and Freetown. With 
the inception of TOCU in 2009, I argued that these extra-legal networks were being 
placed under increasing strain. Consequently, the shareholders and more established 
cultivators began to emphasise the importance of needing to dɔkiamp: to keep your 
mouth shut and not leak a secret. Information regarding locations of farms, residence of 
cultivators and complicity of police officers was, however, widely known. By examining 
everyday social encounters between law breakers and enforcers the chapter focused on 
the role played by public secrecy: knowing something but not being able to articulate 
the facts as such. Rather than secrecy being analogous to privacy and social closure, it 
mattered more in terms of how certain information “inside the game” was presented as 
secret, and that in doing so foreshadowed encounters in terms of who had the right to 
“leak” secrets and who did not. Rather than securing protection through a corrupt and 
unitary police force, public secrecy created scarcity in terms of the efficacy of 
information and commoditised police inaction through the trade of haju: giving a little 
something for something in return. Haju represented a covert principle, in tandem with 
sababu and grade, which limited challenges by new comers and created an increasing 
demand for apprenticeship in order to access information regarding impending raids 
against farms. 
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8.4. Theoretical implications: dealing with uncertainty? 
 
This thesis suggests that Bourdieu’s concepts of illusio, misrecognition and symbolic 
violence represent important tools for examining the organisation of and youths’ 
participation in the illicit economies of the Global South. Furthermore, a relational 
sociology was shown to compliment an institutional approach, by demonstrating how 
regularities in social behaviour could be reproduced in the absence of self-enforced 
contracting arrangements and independent referees in a context of illegality. This was 
particularly important given apprenticeship has demonstrated a degree of permanence 
and popularity in West Africa, despite the majority of such arrangements not being 
formalised or predictable for apprentices (Meagher 2011: 65-6). As Martin (2003: 26) 
has argued in his development of field theory as an alternative approach to sociological 
explanation: ‘it may be that his [Bourdieu’s] approach is completed not contravened by 
a restriction of field to interinstitutional relations’. By linking habitus and field, it was 
possible to examine the reproduction of one informal institution, apprenticeship, in a 
context that, as highlighted in the introductory vignette, has been characterised as 
somewhat more uncertain and volatile. Uncertainty was shown as typically being dealt 
with by privileging dense, closed and small organisations in which violence was a 
regulatory compliment to internal discipline, monitoring and outwards protection in 
exchange relations. However, at the individual level, uncertainty has also been dealt 
with by maximising the agency of youth to observe, plot and navigate economic, political 
and social change. Following Vigh’s (2006, 2008, 2009) widely utilised concept of ‘social 
navigation’, youth adjust and respond to change in the immediate environment of the 
here-and-now in interaction with ‘goals and prospective positions’ of an imagined 
horizon that ‘they perceive as being better than their current location and the 
possibilities within them’ (Vigh 2009: 432). Social navigation is therefore ‘to plot, to 
actualize plotted trajectories and to relate one’s plots and actions to the constant 
possibility of change’ (ibid: 426). Youths’ social practice is argued to entail flexible action 
oriented towards provisional goals that ‘derive maximal outcomes from a minimal set of 
elements’ (Simone 2004: 411). Uncertainty equates to an unknowable future, and in 
response the uncertain has typically been treated as a ‘permanent place of provisionality 
where interactions occur […] through loosely knit and constantly changing networks’ 
(Nielson 2014: 216). It is argued that in contexts of uncertainty youth exercise a high 
degree of ‘provisional agency’: 
 
 
 
254 
 
‘A transformative mode of ‘can do’ sociality, a means of opening up possibilities through 
improvisation and creation of something new and effective, which may allow for 
thriving as well as surviving.’ (Jauregui 2014: 76) 
 
Following this line of argument, it is common for economically and socially marginalised 
agents to assume a ‘posture of openness to possibility’ (Johnson-Hanks 2005: 367) and 
to be endowed with a ‘willingness’ to interact with one another across social difference 
and distance to harness the opportunities of ever-increasing social circles (Simone 
2004: 408).  
 
While some admit that uncertainty is experienced unequally (Vigh 2009: 431-2) and 
that the capacity to deal with uncertainty depends on the historically unequal positions 
of agents (Zeiderman et al 2015: 285, 298), the conceptual thrust guiding the literature 
is that, when faced with uncertainty, youth have an ability to exploit new social relations 
and opportunities while adhering to goals that are only ever provisional and subject to 
changing circumstances. How certain courses of action are invested in and come to be 
meaningful, as I have argued in this thesis with reference to the concept of illusio, 
represents a line of enquiry not fully explored. Yet this avenue for research is important 
in light of current developments in field theory that, having paid close attention to the 
legacy of existential phenomenology and Bourdieu’s sociology, examine how agents are 
motivated to seek ‘existential refuge in the collective’ (Fligstein and McAdam 2012). As 
Bourdieu (1990: 48 emphasis added, also see 1998: 78) argues explicitly: 
 
‘[The] precondition for entry to the field is recognition of the values at stake and 
therefore recognition of the limits not to be exceeded on pain of being excluded from the 
game.’ 
 
Following his arrest, Turkish explained the apprenticeship he undertook with his 
shareholder through the commonly used metaphor of the cotton tree: 
 
“When they cut the tree you will see shit. They [the shareholders] say that when you are 
under the tree you know that you are being covered. But when a time comes that they 
cut the tree, you know that the tree is valuable. So you should work like the tree and 
grow like the tree – this is the way we should grow.”210 
 
                                                        
210 Interview with Turkish, Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 17/09/2013. 
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The pain of exclusion corresponded precisely to the “shit” youth experienced on leaving 
their apprenticeships (Chapter Four) and, lacking access to more reliable sources of 
economic capital, were subject to a pernicious discourse that relegated them to the 
“bobo” [small boy] of an unproductive idler. In other words, dealing with uncertainty by 
recourse to flexible and provisional action requires a degree of cognitive dissonance on 
the part of agents who otherwise seek meaningful lives that provide a sense of worth 
and value. Cultivators like Turkish participated in a hierarchically organised institution 
in the expectation (illusio) that it would allow membership to a group that would be 
garnered social respect and value as a knowledgeable and righteous somebody.  
 
Those arguing from the position of the productive capacity of uncertainty rely on a 
partial reading of Bourdieu’s sociology that short-circuits the concepts of illusio, 
misrecognition and symbolic violence in favour of conceptualising fields as highly 
structured and habitus as somewhat mechanistic and conformist (e.g. see Vigh 2009: 
426-7, 2010: 156-7; also see Guyer 2004: 68-70). Bourdieu is typically treated as a 
‘reproduction’ theorist who reduces youth to cultural dopes despite being at pains in his 
work to emphasise that outside of particular empirical contexts ‘fields do not have 
invariant properties’ (Bourdieu 1990: 111).211 As Crossley (2003) highlights, the 
reproduction line of critique results when conflating the theoretical sensitivity of 
Bourdieu’s open concepts with specific empirical contexts, namely that of French class 
society discussed in Distinction (1984). In doing so this reduces Bourdieu’s relational 
sociology to the mechanistic formula: ‘[(habitus) + (capital)] + field = practice’ (ibid: 
101; also see Calhoun 2006: 1403). The result is a partial reading of Bourdieu that 
privileges ‘an underlying idea of relatively stable class-structured states’ (Vigh 2009: 
427). Further confusion arises when Bourdieu’s economic concepts – ‘interest’ and 
‘capital’ – are treated as ‘explicitly formalist’ (Graeber 2001: 27), despite these concepts 
remaining ‘open’ and articulated in somewhat more metaphorical terms as part of a 
                                                        
211 Absent from Bourdieu’s sociology, however, is the role of production. His conceptualisation of 
the economic field begins with an underlying, pre-existing distribution of capital, but does not 
directly address how an unequal accumulation of capital results from the extraction of surplus 
value. Bourdieu’s formulation is bracketed to, ‘capital is accumulated labour […] which, when 
appropriated on a private, i.e. exclusive basis’, rather than ‘that is’ (also see Gulliory 1997: 382). 
It is not clear how labour value, in terms of youth’s time and effort spent toiling in 
apprenticeships for 3.2 years on average, is secured, and by consequence, how surplus value is 
appropriated by their respective bosses. Curious in Bourdieu’s (2000: 202-5) later work, as 
Burawoy (2012) has similarly noted, is a short passage sub-titled, ‘The Two Fold Truth of 
Labour’. Only under particular historical circumstances do agents invest solely in the objective 
truth of labour, ‘an intrinsic profit in labour, irreducible to simple monetary income’ a situation 
that is otherwise ‘profoundly abnormal’. 
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more complex, subjectivist mode of analysis, indicative of Bourdieu’s semantic 
sensibilities while he engaged in a project to articulate an economic anthropology that 
took the symbolic basis for experiences of economic ‘reality’ seriously. Lebaron (2004: 
263) argues this mode of analysis and writing represented ‘one of Bourdieu’s most 
personal trade secrets’. As discussed in Chapter Two, such critique is at odds with 
Bourdieu’s earlier studies of the Algerian Kabyle, masculinity in Béarn or the political 
and social turmoil experienced in France in 1968, where field and habitus were 
increasingly incongruent. These field studies and historical events prompted the 
conceptual elaboration of hysteresis (Chapter Two, 2.7.3). 212  The privileging of 
Distinction over Bourdieu’s other texts has resulted in a reading of his sociology that is 
confined to ‘more compact and abstract statements’ (Wacquant 2014b: 128). Rather 
than mindless repetition, the examination of habitus in this thesis required paying 
attention to imagination and highly complex subjectivities. The development of field 
theory as a more robust approach to sociological explanation indicates that: 
 
‘You have to face the fact that the faculty of imagination is a crucial intermediary between 
ourselves and the world, between the senses and the intellect. We also have judgement, a 
second and countervailing intermediary, one able to correct the flaws of the productive 
imagination […] I do not think that we have yet really grappled with what this means.’ 
(Martin 2014: 111-2) 
 
By utilising a subjectivist mode of analysis (to explicate habitus) in dialogue with an 
objectivist analysis (to explicate field) I argued it was possible to grasp how subjective 
expectations were brought into alignment with the objective structures of 
apprenticeship through a range of complex emic practices, namely sababu, grade and 
haju, which were taken as legitimate competence.  
 
‘Crisis’ occurs when illusio, the belief of investing in the game as worthwhile, is no longer 
aesthetically captivating (Crossley 2003: 46). During times of crisis the habitus readjusts 
to bring objective chances and subjective expectations back into congruence (Bourdieu 
2000: 211-6). Chapter Five argued that precisely this dissonance was emerging as field 
and habitus diverged, such that the shareholders responded with a “bluff bluff” that 
compressed youths’ temporality into a future present attuned to more reasonable goals. 
Bourdieu was very much interested in the relationship between impatience and 
hysteresis, and called for a serious phenomenological approach to flesh out the illusio of 
                                                        
212 Also see Bourdieu (2000: 159) on ‘Mismatches, Discordance and, Misfiring’. 
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specific fields of organised activity, as experienced by agents, that guides and secures 
participation (Bourdieu 2000: 208-34). As Burawoy and von Holdt (2012: 3) have 
argued when applying Bourdieu’s concepts in the context of Johannesburg, South Africa: 
 
‘Bourdieu’s thinking about domination and order may alert us to the processes of 
ordering beneath a surface that appears unruly and fragmented.’213 
 
Rather than automatically assuming the circular logic of field and habitus, the analytical 
task is to grasp how a degree of fit is secured between them. It is to recognise that there 
is a degree of positioning within positions of marginality that allows fields such as the 
cannabis economy to be productive in the first place.  
 
Problematic in Bourdieu’s conception of domination is that it operates extra-
discursively as well as inter-subjectively. Drawing on snapshot interviews, Finn and 
Oldfield (2015) claim that the ‘strain’ experienced by Freetown’s street vendors and 
sand miners was indicative of a high degree of provisional agency. But surely to strain 
implies limits? While the righteousness gained when participating in the cannabis 
economy was recognised (and discursive) apprenticeships were based on the sleight of 
hand of their respective shareholders that was otherwise misrecognised as the 
appropriate or correct way to succeed when going inside the game. This subjective 
manoeuvre pointed to extra-discursive processes that have otherwise been less well-
specified in Bourdieu’s sociology. As I argued in Chapter Three, to more convincingly 
grasp the double-edged expectations and hopes articulated by youth it was 
methodologically prudent to exercise a degree of detachment and reflect on the 
objective structure of a field of activity and examine how aspirations were incongruent 
with chances of succeeding, even if these were more congruent in youths’ 
representation of their social reality. In other words, ethnographic studies must strike a 
dialogue with objectivist tools, such as network and statistical techniques, if we are to 
avoid the trap of idiographic and subjective closure that I critiqued in Chapter Two (2.1). 
Otherwise, there is always the risk of romanticising agency (Thieme 2013: 391) and, 
more importantly, of down-playing the political consequences of social suffering in our 
representations of youth in illicit drug economies (see Bourdieu 1998b).  
 
                                                        
213 A similar conclusion is drawn by a small number of economic sociologists that have utilised 
Bourdieu’s concepts to examine how, ‘even in a period of strong economic changes, cultural and 
symbolic factors limit drastically the “fluidity” or “flexibility” of society’ (Lebaron 2003: 56).  
 
 
258 
 
Although Bourdieu’s theory of practices – and practice theory more broadly – has often 
failed to specify empirically verifiable mechanisms for the transmission and sameness of 
social action across agents, the learning trajectories of each apprentice cultivator 
examined in this thesis were not as idiosyncratic or individualised as critics suggest (e.g. 
see Turner 2001; Turner 2007: 356). Instead, apprentices were embedded in an 
organised field of activity – their respective production hierarchies – such that the 
acquisition of practical knowledge was reasonably well ordered and subject to explicit 
instruction based on a directed and consciously articulated pedagogy.214 This argument 
is also apparent in Wacquant’s (2004: 70-1, 99-127) formulation of the pugilistic 
habitus, which emphasises the explicit instruction of a trainer in the gym and tacit 
processes of acquirement by the trainee with other apprentice boxers in the ring. 
Practices are social, in the plural sense that action is directed towards and adjudicated 
by an audience that confers recognition and the validation of that action as competent 
(Chapter Two, 2.6.1). Apprenticeships operated as a pedagogic authority, through which 
young men established particular expectations concerning what kinds of practice were 
recognised as competent and valuable, and that resulted in the acceptance of 
apprenticeship as the legitimate means by which to “sabi the game”  (Bourdieu and 
Passerson 1990; Wacquant 2011: 86).  
 
The theoretical scaffolding here is consummate with recent work seeking to bridge the 
disciplinary silos of social anthropology and cognitive neuropsychology. These 
disciplines have argued that apprenticeship represents a plausible ethnographic site for 
studying knowledge acquisition that is organised, explicitly instructed, incremental and 
– crucially – time consuming for those implicated in them (Sterelny 2012: 32-43).215 
This conclusion is synonymous with earlier studies in a range of contexts that conclude 
apprenticeship works to shape social action and interaction beyond its particular 
master-apprentice relation: 
 
                                                        
214 This critique of practices is usually arrived at by reducing mechanisms for transmission and 
sameness to the implicit/unconscious and therefore to the cognitive. Such critique is usually 
framed in terms of the cognitively implausible notion of ‘downloading’ practices from some 
shared social object that exists outside the mind (Turner 2007: 355-6). Debate has revolved 
around the ‘discovery’ of cognitive mechanisms that enable social learning from others without 
conscious reflection, including mirror neurons (Lizardo 2007, 2009) and connectionism (Bloch 
2012: 195-200). Despite Lizardo’s more explicit argument that mirror neurons represent the 
missing cognitive link in fleshing out Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, it would be unwise, as Martin 
(2011: 290, fn. 32) cautions, to ‘bet the house’ at this early stage. 
215 Although Kim Sterelny’s (2012) theoretical examination of human cognition and social life 
does not reference Pierre Bourdieu explicitly, his conceptual use of ‘Cognitive Capital’ is perhaps 
indicative of the theorist’s influence. 
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‘Training is never without [the] structure of specific instruction […] relevant learning 
occurs not solely in the context of apprenticeship, but life-long through play, 
observation outside of apprenticeship, and general social constraint.’ (Coy 1989: 1)  
 
Rather than assuming the theoretical circularity between field and habitus that has 
opened Bourdieu’s sociology to the critique of treating youth as cultural dopes, the 
analysis of this thesis adds validity to Wacquant’s methodological proposal to begin first 
with the objective moment (the field) before embarking on an ethnographic analysis (of 
habitus and practices). The economic field examined in Chapter Four acted as the 
analytical starting point from which the subsequent qualitative chapters argued that 
apprenticeship regulated youths’ access to economic capital in land, labour and credit 
through culturally and historically specific emic practices. Meanwhile, apprentices 
more-or-less conformed to the secondary habitus examined in Chapter Five. This was 
responsible for realigning their subjective expectations to the more limited objective 
chances offered after apprenticeship as journeymen. Even if individual learning 
trajectories were more idiosyncratic, youths’ on-going practices were still tied to their 
specific positon within the field, indicative of what I referred to as social aesthetics: 
qualitative experience tied to unequal positions within a field of organised activity 
(Martin 2011: 314-5; 2014).  
 
By utilising a long-term qualitative methodology grounded in a historical political 
economy and objectivist analysis of the economic and juridical fields, it was possible to 
examine how the institution of apprenticeship reproduced social order in a context 
elsewhere treated as more uncertain and volatile. The reproduction of structural 
advantage hinged on how the subjective aspirations of youth were made congruent with 
the objective structures of the production hierarchies they participated in. Youth 
misrecognised that the competence and worth recognised by others in their on-going 
practices worked to produce the structural advantages enjoyed by more dominant 
cultivators and dealers. Rather than cultural dopes, the primary habitus of their bosses 
that had been shaped by Neo-Evangelist and Rastafari values and virtues, and the more 
immanent promise of being recognised as a righteous and productive somebody in a 
context of scarcity, formed the basis for a captivating illusio that offered the chance for 
un- and under-employed young men to reclaim masculine authority. The result was 
symbolic violence in “the game” motivated by a moral rhetoric that sought refuge from 
the structural violence of “the system”. Structural violence was field forming and 
symbolic violence was field reproducing. When recognised as competent practices, 
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sababu, grade and haju operated as covert principles in subjective experience that 
regulated access to economic capital in land, higher value exchange partners, greater 
returns on the product of their labour and in securing police inaction. It was therefore 
possible to conclude that Sierra Leone’s cannabis economy was not regulated through 
the organised violence of closed social groups, but instead operated as a durable, high 
value activity in contrast to more destructive activities such as theft and cocaine 
trafficking, with important political implications. By taking the experience of youth in 
illicit economies seriously, and grounding that experience in an empirical analysis of the 
economic conditions and social structures that have come to shape their circumstances, 
it is possible to eschew geopolitical misrepresentation in favour of analytical precision. 
Or at least this would represent one small step towards understanding why youth: “bind 
around this, but not around that”. 
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Appendix 1: Tabulated Data from Surveys with 58 Cannabis Cultivators in Hastings and 
Waterloo during 2013. 
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Appendix 2a: Tabulated data for nodes within network diagram of production 
hierarchies.216 
 
 
 
                                                        
216 ‘0’ values are null values corresponding to cultivators for which one-on-one survey data was 
not collected. Instead position and relations were cross-checked by observations recorded in 
field notes and in discussions with other cultivators.  
Node-ID Name Duration of 
apprenticeship
Position in 
production 
hierarchy
Output 
(annual)
Price 
(dry 
season)
Price 
(rainy 
season)
Price * Output 
(dry season)
Price * Output 
(rainy season)
Price * 
Output 
(annual)
Output 
(dry 
season)
Output 
(rainy 
season)
Location 
of farm
81 David Kamanda (49) 0 3 12 50000 150000 500000 300000 800000 10 2 Wanpala
83 Gibo (63) -6 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Wanpala
84 Wilfred Kamanda (62) 0 2 22 150000 250000 1800000 5000000 6800000 12 20 Wanpala
85 Mustafa Kamara (41) -5.5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Wanpala
89 Augustine Kamanda (61) -2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Wanpala
95 Manso (64) -1.5 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Wanpala
98 Mr Shekah (57) 0 3 17 100000 150000 1100000 900000 2000000 11 6 Wanpala
99 Mako (65) -1.5 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Wanpala
104 Alieu (52) -2 2 25 120000 170000 2400000 850000 3250000 20 5 Wanpala
105 Lahay Corrie (53) -1 2 5 50000 0 250000 0 250000 5 0 Wanpala
106 Abu Bakar (66) 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Wanpala
107 Arthur Kemokai (29) -2 2 50 150000 240000 7500000 0 7750000 50 0 Wanpala
108 Immanuel Lamey (12) -2 2 36 170000 0 6120000 0 6120000 36 0 Wanpala
112 George I Will (13) -1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Wanpala
113 Lamine K (14) -6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Wanpala
114 Phillip K (25) -10 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Wanpala
115 Ibrahim Bangura (54) -1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Wanpala
116 Sara (51) -7 2 24 50000 150000 1100000 300000 1400000 22 2 Wanpala
117 Musa Barrie (1) 0 3 28 130000 190000 2340000 1900000 4240000 18 10 Loko Fakay
118 Bishi (35) -2 1 14 150000 0 2100000 0 2100000 14 0 Loko Fakay
119 Mohammed (67) -2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Loko Fakay
120 Unknown 1 (68) -2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Loko Fakay
121 Sorie (3) -5 2 17 120000 150000 1200000 1050000 2250000 10 7 Loko Fakay
122 Gbrilla M (36) -1 2 15 170000 0 2550000 0 2550000 15 0 Loko Fakay
123 Ayo Pack (70) -2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Loko Fakay
125 Lamine (69) -2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Loko Fakay
126 Mehdo (31) -10 2 20 110000 0 2200000 0 2200000 20 0 Loko Fakay
127 Pa Mohammed (6) 0 3 8 30000 30000 240000 0 240000 8 0 Loko Fakay
128 Joaquie Ibrahim (9) -1 2 14 140000 230000 1400000 920000 2320000 10 4 Loko Fakay
129 Mohammed M (5) -4 2 22 100000 150000 1800000 6000000 2400000 18 4 Loko Fakay
130 Musa Limba (71) -4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Loko Fakay
131 Jonny B (40) -1 2 14 70000 100000 980000 0 980000 14 0 Loko Fakay
132 Immanuel T (56) -1 2 10 150000 0 1500000 0 1500000 10 0 Loko Fakay
133 Musa Sesay (46) -6 2 12 180000 0 2160000 0 2160000 12 0 Loko Fakay
134 Abdul Rahman-Sesay (28) -2 2 26 120000 170000 2400000 1020000 3420000 20 6 Loko Fakay
135 Bayo Manseray (55) -5 2 25 150000 250000 2250000 2500000 4750000 15 10 Loko Fakay
136 Ibrahim T (37) -2 2 23 120000 0 2760000 0 2760000 23 0 Loko Fakay
137 Moses (38) -4 2 13 60000 60000 600000 180000 780000 10 3 Loko Fakay
138 Izu (72) -2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Loko Fakay
139 Unknown 2 (73) -1.5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Loko Fakay
140 Sam Bayo (74) -1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Loko Fakay
141 Ali Manseray (75) 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Loko Fakay
142 Tamba Bangura (10) -1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Loko Fakay
143 Musa Duya (76) -3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Loko Fakay
144 Sara Conteh (2) -4 2 8 150000 200000 1000000 0 1000000 8 0 Loko Fakay
145 Maxwell K (39) -8 2 5 150000 180000 750000 0 750000 5 0 Loko Fakay
146 Samuel A Cole (4) 0 3 50 80000 150000 3360000 640000 4000000 42 8 Sugar Loaf
147 Kohnehl (77) 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Sugar Loaf
150 BIG (17) 0 3 65 150000 200000 6000000 5000000 1.10E+07 40 25 Sugar Loaf
151 Usman Sesey (43) -2 2 27 100000 190000 2500000 1140000 3640000 25 6 Sugar Loaf
152 Sorie Conteh (78) 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Sugar Loaf
153 Mohammed Kargbo (45) -4 2 14 70000 90000 980000 0 980000 14 0 Sugar Loaf
154 Abdullai (44) -3 2 14 80000 100000 960000 200000 1160000 12 2 Sugar Loaf
157 Mohnga (60) -7 2 50 130000 200000 5200000 2000000 7200000 40 10 Sugar Loaf
158 Unknown 3 (79) -3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Sugar Loaf
159 Unknown 4 (80) -2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Sugar Loaf
162 Gibril Sesay (81) -1.5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Sugar Loaf
163 Abu K (82) -2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Sugar Loaf
164 Alusine (83) -2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Sugar Loaf
167 Sila Tourey (84) -1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Sugar Loaf
168 Silasey (85) -1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Sugar Loaf
169 Unknown 5 (86) -1.5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Sugar Loaf
170 Unknown 6 (87) -1.5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Sugar Loaf
171 PM (88) 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Sugar Loaf
172 Myers Bangura (50) -1 2 10 50000 0 500000 0 500000 10 0 Sugar Loaf
173 Maze (89) 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Sugar Loaf
174 Henry (90) 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Sugar Loaf
175 Morlie Kamara (91) 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Sugar Loaf
177 Unknown 7 (93) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Sugar Loaf
178 Unknown 8 (94) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Sugar Loaf
179 Ohsilibu (95) 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
180 Lamine Barrie (27) -2 2 30 150000 200000 3000000 2000000 5000000 20 10 YMG
181 Alpha Fofana (42) -10 2 28 170000 220000 3400000 1760000 4160000 20 8 YMG
182 Unknown 9 (99) -2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
183 Musa Bangura (8) -2 2 16 80000 100000 800000 600000 1400000 10 6 YMG
184 Musa Koroma (58) 0 3 80 200000 400000 1.10E+07 1.00E+07 2.10E+07 55 25 YMG
185 Unknown 12 (102) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
186 Unknown 11 (101) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
187 Unknown 10 (100) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
188 Salman (112) 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
189 Salieu Conteh (32) -4 2 34 100000 180000 2700000 1260000 3960000 27 7 YMG
190 Unknown 14 (104) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
191 Unknown 13 (103) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
192 Mohammed Moshie (47) -2 2 95 200000 230000 1.30E+07 6900000 1.99E+07 65 30 YMG
193 Unknown 15 (105) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
194 Unknown 16 (106) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
195 Unknown 17 (107) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
196 Unknown 18 (108) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
197 Unknown 19 (109) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
198 Unknown 20 (110) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
199 Michael Dawo (113) 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
200 Unknown 21 (111) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
201 Unknown 22 (112) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
202 Unknown 23 (113) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
203 Unknown 25 (117) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
204 Unknown 26 (118) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
205 Unknown 27 (119) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
206 Unknown 28 (120) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
207 Unknown 29 (121) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
208 Unknown 30 (122) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
209 Unknown 31 (123) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
210 Unknown 32 (124) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
211 Unknown 24 (116) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
212 Unknown 33 (125) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
213 Amerikan (98) 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Obohnoki
214 Unknown 39 (131) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Obohnoki
215 Unknown 38 (130) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Obohnoki
216 Unknown 37 (129) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Obohnoki
217 Unknown 36 (128) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Obohnoki
218 Unknown 35 (127) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Obohnoki
219 Aroul (132) 0 3 25 150000 200000 2250000 4250000 6500000 15 10 Obohnoki
220 Ibrahim Torunka aka. Turkish (18) -1 2 25 120000 140000 2400000 700000 3100000 20 5 Obohnoki
221 Atika (19) -3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Obohnoki
222 Thimu (19) -1 2 0 50000 200000 1000000 2000000 3000000 20 10 Obohnoki
223 Michael (134) -1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Obohnoki
224 Abdullai (133) 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Obohnoki
225 Santi Bangura (26) -1 2 20 100000 200000 2000000 0 2000000 20 0 Obohnoki
226 Mohammed Bangura (?) 2 Obohnoki
227 Idrissa (22) -7 2 20 60000 250000 960000 1000000 1960000 16 4 Obohnoki
228 Alie Bangura (21) -12 2 23 70000 200000 1260000 1000000 2260000 18 5 Obohnoki
229 Unknown 41 (136) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Obohnoki
230 Unknown 42 (137) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Obohnoki
231 Unknown 40 (135) -1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Obohnoki
232 Unknown 41 (136) -1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Obohnoki
233 Hasan Jalloh (25) 0 3 12 50000 100000 500000 200000 700000 10 2 Obohnoki
234 Tapeia Sesay (24) 0 3 19 80000 200000 1120000 1000000 2120000 14 5 Obohnoki
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Appendix 2a (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
181 Alpha Fofana (42) -10 2 28 170000 220000 3400000 1760000 4160000 20 8 YMG
182 Unknown 9 (99) -2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
183 Musa Bangura (8) -2 2 16 80000 100000 800000 600000 1400000 10 6 YMG
184 Musa Koroma (58) 0 3 80 200000 400000 1.10E+07 1.00E+07 2.10E+07 55 25 YMG
185 Unknown 12 (102) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
186 Unknown 11 (101) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
187 Unknown 10 (100) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
188 Salman (112) 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
189 Salieu Conteh (32) -4 2 34 100000 180000 2700000 1260000 3960000 27 7 YMG
190 Unknown 14 (104) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
191 Unknown 13 (103) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
192 Mohammed Moshie (47) -2 2 95 200000 230000 1.30E+07 6900000 1.99E+07 65 30 YMG
193 Unknown 15 (105) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
194 Unknown 16 (106) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
195 Unknown 17 (107) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
196 Unknown 18 (108) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
197 Unknown 19 (109) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
198 Unknown 20 (110) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
199 Michael Dawo (113) 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
200 Unknown 21 (111) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
201 Unknown 22 (112) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
202 Unknown 23 (113) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
203 Unknown 25 (117) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
204 Unknown 26 (118) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
205 Unknown 27 (119) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
206 Unknown 28 (120) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
207 Unknown 29 (121) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
208 Unknown 30 (122) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
209 Unknown 31 (123) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
210 Unknown 32 (124) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
211 Unknown 24 (116) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
212 Unknown 33 (125) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 YMG
213 Amerikan (98) 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Obohnoki
214 Unknown 39 (131) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Obohnoki
215 Unknown 38 (130) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Obohnoki
216 Unknown 37 (129) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Obohnoki
217 Unknown 36 (128) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Obohnoki
218 Unknown 35 (127) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Obohnoki
219 Aroul (132) 0 3 25 150000 200000 2250000 4250000 6500000 15 10 Obohnoki
220 Ibrahim Torunka aka. Turkish (18) -1 2 25 120000 140000 2400000 700000 3100000 20 5 Obohnoki
221 Atika (19) -3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Obohnoki
222 Thimu (19) -1 2 0 50000 200000 1000000 2000000 3000000 20 10 Obohnoki
223 Michael (134) -1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Obohnoki
224 Abdullai (133) 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Obohnoki
225 Santi Bangura (26) -1 2 20 100000 200000 2000000 0 2000000 20 0 Obohnoki
226 Mohammed Bangura (?) 2 Obohnoki
227 Idrissa (22) -7 2 20 60000 250000 960000 1000000 1960000 16 4 Obohnoki
228 Alie Bangura (21) -12 2 23 70000 200000 1260000 1000000 2260000 18 5 Obohnoki
229 Unknown 41 (136) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Obohnoki
230 Unknown 42 (137) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Obohnoki
231 Unknown 40 (135) -1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Obohnoki
232 Unknown 41 (136) -1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Obohnoki
233 Hasan Jalloh (25) 0 3 12 50000 100000 500000 200000 700000 10 2 Obohnoki
234 Tapeia Sesay (24) 0 3 19 80000 200000 1120000 1000000 2120000 14 5 Obohnoki
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151 167 Directed 169
151 168 Directed 170
154 169 Directed 171
154 170 Directed 172
157 158 Directed 162
157 159 Directed 163
171 172 Undirected 173
171 173 Undirected 174
171 174 Undirected 175
171 175 Undirected 176
172 178 Directed 178
174 177 Directed 179
179 180 Undirected 180
179 181 Undirected 181
179 183 Undirected 183
179 189 Undirected 188
179 192 Undirected 191
179 199 Undirected 198
179 203 Directed 203
179 204 Directed 204
179 205 Directed 205
179 206 Directed 206
179 207 Directed 207
179 208 Directed 208
179 209 Directed 209
179 210 Directed 210
179 211 Directed 202
179 212 Directed 211
181 182 Directed 182
184 185 Directed 186
184 186 Directed 185
184 187 Directed 184
184 188 Undirected 187
189 190 Directed 189
189 191 Directed 190
192 193 Directed 197
192 194 Directed 196
192 195 Directed 195
192 196 Directed 194
192 197 Directed 193
192 198 Directed 192
199 200 Directed 199
199 201 Directed 200
199 202 Directed 201
213 214 Directed 216
213 215 Directed 215
213 216 Directed 214
213 217 Directed 213
213 218 Directed 212
219 220 Undirected 217
219 221 Undirected 218
219 222 Undirected 219
219 223 Undirected 220
224 225 Undirected 221
224 226 Undirected 222
224 227 Undirected 223
224 228 Undirected 224
224 231 Directed 227
224 232 Directed 228
228 229 Directed 225
228 230 Directed 226
Source Target Type Tie-ID
81 83 Undirected 98
81 84 Undirected 99
81 85 Undirected 100
84 89 Directed 95
84 113 Directed 122
84 114 Directed 123
98 95 Undirected 108
98 99 Undirected 110
98 108 Undirected 118
98 109 Directed 119
98 115 Directed 124
98 116 Undirected 125
98 157 Undirected 161
106 104 Undirected 115
106 105 Undirected 116
106 107 Undirected 117
106 112 Directed 121
117 118 Directed 129
117 119 Directed 130
117 120 Directed 131
117 121 Undirected 133
117 122 Undirected 132
117 126 Undirected 134
121 123 Directed 128
121 125 Directed 127
127 128 Undirected 135
127 129 Undirected 136
127 130 Undirected 137
127 131 Undirected 138
127 132 Directed 139
127 133 Directed 140
127 134 Directed 141
129 138 Directed 145
130 136 Undirected 143
130 137 Undirected 144
131 140 Directed 147
132 139 Directed 146
134 135 Undirected 142
141 142 Directed 149
141 143 Undirected 150
141 144 Directed 151
141 145 Undirected 152
147 152 Undirected 156
147 153 Undirected 157
150 151 Undirected 155
150 154 Undirected 158
150 162 Directed 164
150 163 Directed 165
150 164 Directed 166
Appendix 2b: Tabulated data for ties within network digram of production 
hierarchies.217 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
217 Target and source numbers correspond to the Node-ID in appendix 2a. 
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ID Source ID Target Duration of 
apprenticeship 
(years)
Type ID Source ID Target
Duration 
of 
apprentic
eship 
(years)
Type
1 110 2 Directed 57 111 3 Directed
2 111 14 Directed 58 1 2 Directed
3 1 4 Directed 59 124 3 Directed
4 1 2 Directed 60 124 2 Directed
5 1 0.25 Directed 53 1 2 Directed
6 70 1 Directed 54 1 2 Directed
7 112 1 Directed 55 5 2 Directed
8 111 1 Directed 56 33 1 Directed
9 46 7 Directed 61 14 1.5 Directed
10 113 4 Directed 62 14 2 Directed
11 114 1 Directed 63 14 2 Directed
12 115 6 Directed 64 125 1 Directed
13 115 10 Directed 65 125 1 Directed
14 116 3 Directed 66 36 1.5 Directed
15 106 4 Directed 67 36 1.5 Directed
16 106 2 Directed 68 14 2 Directed
17 106 2 Directed 69 14 2 Directed
18 106 5 Directed 70 116 0 Directed
19 73 2 Directed 71 70 2 Directed
20 73 2 Directed 72 116 0 Directed
21 73 5 Directed 73 70 0 Directed
22 120 1 Directed 74 35 2 Directed
23 106 4 Directed 75 47 1 Directed
24 70 4 Directed 76 47 1 Directed
25 70 4 Directed 77 47 1 Directed
26 117 2 Directed 78 27 1 Directed
27 73 4 Directed 79 27 1 Directed
28 14 2 Directed 80 38 3 Directed
29 25 3 Directed 81 38 2 Directed
30 4 1 Directed 82 38 1 Directed
31 118 1 Directed 83 38 1 Directed
32 119 6 Directed 84 38 1 Directed
33 70 5 Directed 85 38 1 Directed
34 115 1.5 Directed 86 87 1 Directed
35 70 5 Directed 87 70 0 Directed
36 126 8 Directed 88 87 1 Directed
37 127 1 Directed 89 87 1 Directed
38 70 3 Directed 90 70 1 Directed
39 112 4 Directed 91 70 1 Directed
40 70 3 Directed 92 70 1 Directed
40 121 5 Directed 93 70 1 Directed
41 1 2 Directed 94 70 1 Directed
42 1 1 Directed 95 70 1 Directed
43 71 3 Directed 96 70 1 Directed
44 122 1 Directed 97 70 1 Directed
45 70 3 Directed 98 70 1 Directed
46 116 1 Directed 99 70 1 Directed
47 123 2 Directed 100 70 1 Directed
48 115 3 Directed 101 73 1 Directed
48 124 2 Directed 102 73 1 Directed
49 115 6 Directed 103 73 1 Directed
50 46 1.5 Directed 104 73 1 Directed
50 124 2 Directed 105 73 1 Directed
51 46 1.5 Directed 106 70 2 Directed
51 70 2 Directed 107 106 1 Directed
52 125 1.5 Directed 108 106 1 Directed
109 106 1 Directed
Appendix 3: Tabulated Data for Network Diagram of Boss-Apprentice Relations.218 
                                                        
218 Directed ties are pointed from source (boss) to target (apprentice) and weighted 
according to the duration of apprenticeship. Each tie represents one instance of 
apprenticeship.  
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Appendix 4: Betweenness Statistics for Extra-legal Relations between Cultivators and 
Law-enforcement.219  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
219 36 out of 132 cultivators and law enforcers returned a betweenness statistic > 0.  
Name  Betweenness statistic
Local Police Chief) (Waterloo) 0.470082504
Ohsilibu 0.353284756
Local Police Chief 0.35160768
Musa Koroma 0.223918575
Local Unit Commander (Western Area) 0.187601203
Pa Mohammed 0.172102706
Forest Guard 0.155042794
BIG 0.145385149
Musa Barrie 0.108373814
Abdullai 0.108373814
PM 0.096615005
Mohammed Moshie 0.082234559
Amerikan 0.070437196
TOCU 0.056789267
Abu Bakar 0.055285681
Ali Manseray 0.055285681
Aroul 0.055285681
Kohnehl 0.042485928
Wilfred Kamanda 0.041637752
Michael Dawo 0.041637752
David Kamanda 0.029030766
Sorie 0.027874161
Musa Limba 0.027874161
Usman Sesey 0.027874161
Abdullai 0.027874161
Salieu Conteh 0.027874161
Alie Bangura 0.027874161
Mohammed M 0.013994911
Jonny B 0.013994911
Immanuel T 0.013994911
Abdul Rahman-Sesay 0.013994911
Myers Bangura 0.013994911
Henry 0.013994911
Alpha Fofana 0.013994911
Town Head (Hastings) 0.010062457
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Appendix 5: Initial Interview Guide for Cannabis Cultivator Respondents (Krio). 
Background (1) 
 Wetin na yu nem? 
 Usay yu bɔn? 
 Wetin mek yu ka(m) ya? 
 Yu (bin) go skul? 
 Ustɛm yu tap pan buk lanin? 
 Wetin mek yu lɛf? 
 Wetin mek una yut? Aw sɔmbɔdi fɔ bi yut? 
Employment & work (2) 
 Uskayn wok yu bin de du na ya? 
 Yu bin de du ɛni ɔda kayn wok? 
 Ustɛm yu bigin fɔ gro am? Aw lɔng yu de insay di biznɛs/gem/diamba wok? 
 Aw yu bin ebul fɛn wok na ya? 
 Wetin mek yu (begin fɔ) gro diamba/ganja/am? 
 Yu kin mek mɔni pas ɔda kayn wok? 
Cannabis cultivation (3) 
 Aw mɛni ol de de? 
 Wetin una kal di grawnd na ya? 
 Uskayn arenjmɛnt una gɛt fɔ gro am na ya? 
 Yu de ɔnda bɔs? [If interviewee is a land owner or rights user]: 
o Yu gɛt wok man dɛn? / Aw mɛni wok man dɛn de na ya? 
o Aw una de sheb di wok (una de du)? 
o Yu de pe am/dɛn? 
o Wetin yu de du we dɛn mek wahalla/yala yala? 
 Yu de rɛnt yu in land? 
o Aw mɔs? 
 Aw yu/una de gro di diamba/ganja? 
o Ustɛm yu bigin fɔ gro am? Aw lɔng? 
o Insay aw mɛni sizɛn? 
o Wɛtin ɛn wɛtin yu de yus pa di diamba/ganja? 
 Aw yu dɔn insay wan sizɛn? 
 Aw m mɛni sizɛn yu dɔn gro am? 
 Aw yu de sɛl am? Yu gɛt link? 
o Na opɛn ɔ sikrit? 
 Una de/kin trɔst? 
 Am mɔs yu de sɛl na di: dray sizɛn, reni sizɛn? 
 Di prays kin chenj? Wetin mek am chenj? 
 Wetin yu fil se mɔ impɔtant: sababu or mɔni? 
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Legitimacy & law enforcement (4) 
 Una tink se diamba/ganja na rayt ɔ rɔng? 
o Ba nɔto ligal? 
 Aw dɛn de si am? 
 Aw gɔvmɛnt si am? 
 Aw di ɛdman si am? 
 Pipul kin tif am? 
 Wetin go apin if dɛn tif am? 
 Aw una balans ofisadɛn? Dɛn bin red yu? 
 
The future (5) 
 Yu wan fɛn ɔda kayn wok? 
 Wetin yu tink se mek yu go lɛf am/di gem? 
 Lɛ wi se gɔvmɛnt dɛn red bɔku-bɔku ɛn dɛn stɔp di gem tide-tide – wetin yu go du? 
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Appendix 6: Initial Interview Guide for Cannabis Cultivator Respondents (English). 
Background (1) 
 What is your name? 
 Where were you raised? 
 What made you come to Hastings/Waterloo? 
 Did you undertake formal education? 
 Why did you leave education? 
 What makes somebody a ‘youth’? 
 
Employment & work (2) 
 What kind of work have you been doing in Hastings/Waterloo? 
 Have you undertaken any other kinds of work? 
 When did you begin to grow cannabis?  
 How long have you grown cannabis? 
 How did you find work as a cannabis cultivator? 
 Why did you begin to grow cannabis? 
 Can you make more money growing cannabis than other kinds of work? 
 
Cannabis cultivation (3) 
 How many ‘holes’ are in your farm?  
 What do you call this place? 
 Do you have an arrangement according to which you grow cannabis? 
 Do you have a boss? How do you know him? [If interviewee is a land owner or rights 
user]: 
o How many workers do you have? 
o How do you share the work? 
o Do you pay them? How much? 
o What do you do if there is a dispute? 
 Do you rent the land/plot you are using? 
o How much must you pay to rent the land/plot? 
 How do you grow your cannabis? 
o When do you begin to grow? How long is it until harvest? 
o For how many seasons do you grow cannabis each year? 
o What do you use to grow the cannabis?  
o How much do you put in the hole/what is the price (Leones)? 
 Fertiliser (bags) 
 Chicken dung (bags) 
 Fish skin (bags) 
 Anything else? 
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o How much do you typically cultivate in one season (in kilograms)? 
 How do you sell your cannabis? Do you have a ‘link’? 
o Do you sell it openly or is it a secret? 
 How can you trust them? 
 For how much can you sell 1 kilogram? 
o In the dry season 
o In the rainy season 
 Can the price change? What makes the price change? 
 What is more important for cannabis cultivators: money or sababu [person of influence]? 
Legitimacy & law enforcement (4) 
 How do you see the way you make money? Is it right or wrong? 
o …But it is illegal? 
 What do other people think about cannabis cultivators? 
 What is the town chief’s opinion of cannabis cultivation? 
 What is the government’s opinion of cannabis cultivation? 
 Do other people try to steal your cannabis? 
 What happens if you catch a thief? 
 How do you deal with the police? Have they ever ‘raided’ you? 
The future (5) 
 Would you consider finding other kinds of work? 
 What would make you leave cannabis cultivation? 
 So let’s say the government raid a lot, and they stop this business right now, what will 
you do? 
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Appendix 7: Plates of Interview Transcripts (English) with Analytic Notes. 
 
Plate 1: Interview transcript, Cannabis Cultivator, 
‘Bayo Manseray’, Waterloo, 19-11-2013. 
Plate 2: Interview Transcipt, ‘Musa Koroma’, 
Cannabis Cultivator, Waterloo, 20-11-2013. 
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Plate 3: Interview Transcipt, ‘Turkish’, 
Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 17-09-2013. 
Plate 4: Interview Transcipt, ‘Turkish’, 
Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 17-09-2013. 
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Plate 5: Interview Transcipt, ‘Turkish’, 
Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 17-09-2013. 
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Appendix 8: Plates of Field Diary Entries with Analytic Notes. 
 
 
 
 
 
Plate 1: Fieldnotes with ‘American’, Cannabis 
Cultivator, Hastings, 13-11-2013. 
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Plate 2: Fieldnotes (pg. 1) with ‘Turkish’, 
Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 29-10-2013. 
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Plate 3: Fieldnotes (pg. 2) with ‘Turkish’, 
Cannabis Cultivator, Hastings, 29-10-2013. 
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Appendix 9: National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) Circular, 26th June 2013. 
 
This document has been redacted due to 
third party copyright restrictions 
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Appendix 10: ‘Strategic Plan for 2014’, National Drug Law Enforcement Agency 
(NDLEA). 
